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Abstract
The system of international investment arbitration is established by hundreds o f 
investment treaties that have the following key features:
1. States authorize foreign investors (read multinational enterprises) to make and 
enforce international claims for damages against states in disputes arising from 
the state’s exercise of public authority, without those claims being filtered by 
the investor’s home state or by an international organization;
2. States are subjected to broadly-worded international standards that apply to a 
wide range of governmental activity, affording arbitration tribunals broad 
discretion to award damages to investors and thus make decisions about the 
cost o f  government, with limited supervision by domestic courts; and
3. Disputes are resolved using a private model of adjudication based on rules of 
private arbitration and incorporating the enforcement structure o f 
international commercial arbitration.
The argument of this thesis is that investment arbitration, although commonly 
approached as a reciprocally consensual method o f adjudication, should instead be 
viewed as a unique form of governing arrangement. Investment arbitration is a 
governing arrangement because it is established by a sovereign act of the state and 
because it is used to resolve regulatory disputes arising from the exercise of pubic 
authority. This distinguishes investment arbitration from conventional international 
adjudication (between states) or international commercial arbitration (between private 
parties). Further, investment arbitration is unique and open to criticism because it 
combines the prospective and far-reaching, yet selective, individualization of 
international claims with the use of a private model o f arbitration. This distinguishes 
investment arbitration from other forms of international adjudication which allow 
individual claims. Overall, characterizing investment arbitration as a unique form of 
governing arrangement reveals the importance o f the system as a means to control the 
exercise of public authority in the regulatory sphere.
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In Match, 2003, an international tribunal in Sweden, established under a bilateral 
investment treaty, ordered the Czech Republic to pay U.S.$>353 million to an investor 
that owned a Czech television broadcasting business.1 The investor was a Dutch 
company, CME C^ech Republic, owned by cosmetics billionaire Ralph Lauder, an 
American citizen.2 The tribunal ordered the damages award after deciding that the 
Czech government had violated a 1991 investment treaty between the Czech Republic 
and the Netherlands.3 After unsuccessfully trying to have the award set aside in the 
Swedish courts, the Czech government committed to pay the award in full lest it 
suffer more harm to its reputation among international investors.4
Even in the fast-changing environment o f international investment 
arbitration,5 the CME award stood out for two reasons. First was its size: the CME 
award was the largest yet under a flood of investment treaties signed in the last 20
1 CME Republic B. V. v. C e^ch Republic (Merits) (13 September 2001), 14(3) World Trade and 
Arb. Mat. 109; CME Republic B. V. v. C%ech Republic (Damages) (14 March 2003), 15(4) World 
Trade and Arb. Mat. 83 and 245 (hereinafter CME\.
2 B. Von Hase, “Do the Right Thing” The [London] Times Magazine (13 September 2003) 50.
3 Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the C e^ch and Slovak Federal Republic, 29 April 1991, online: UNCTAD 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/czech netherlands.pdf. The treaty 
violation arose from the Czech government’s regulatory treatment of a Czech television 
network that was owned by CME. According to the arbitration tribunal, the government in 
effect destroyed the investment by forcing CME to give up its ownership share.
4 CME Republic B. V. v. C%ech Republic (SVEA Judgment) (15 May 2003) (C.A. Sweden), 15(5) 
World Trade and Arb. Mat. 171. The Czech Republic applied to set aside the award before 
the Swedish court of appeal, rather than the Czech courts, because Sweden had been chosen 
by the arbitration tribunal as the legal “seat” of the arbitration (the actual hearings were held 
in Diisseldorf, Germany). L.E. Peterson, “Swedish court affirms award against Czech 
Republic; damages could be taxable” Investment Law and Policy Weekly News Bulletin (16 May 
2003).
5 The term “investment arbitration” (or “investor-state arbitration”) refers to compulsory 
arbitration, pursuant to an investment treaty, between a state and an investor at the instance 
of the latter. The term “international” investment arbitration is used to distinguish treaty- 
based investment arbitration from legislation-based and contract-based investment 
arbitration. In this thesis, references to “investment arbitration” refer to treaty-based (i.e. 
international) investment arbitration.
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years. The award was roughly equal to the Czech annual health care budget.6 Adjusted 
for population size and gross national income, it was equivalent to an award of $19 
billion against the United Kingdom, $26 billion against Germany, or $131 billion 
against the United States.7 Second, just ten days before the CME award was made, a 
parallel claim for damages by Ralph Lauder himself, based on essentially the same 
case against the Czech Republic but this time under a Czech-U.S. investment treaty, 
was dismissed by a separate tribunal.8 Thus, two conflicting decisions emerged from 
the same dispute, adjudicated under two similarly-worded investment treaties.9 Mr. 
Lauder, the American investor, lost his personal claim on the basis that the breach of 
the treaty was “too remote to qualify as a relevant cause for the harm”.10 Nevertheless, 
Mr. Lauder, the Dutch investor, collected damages through a holding company 
established in the Netherlands.11
A. The emerging system of international investment arbitration
The CME award is an outcome o f an emerging system of international arbitration 
based on more than two thousand investment treaties, most o f which were concluded 
since the early 1990s.12 As part o f this system, investment treaties have three key 
features:
6 T. Kellner, “The Informer: Call It the Ronald Lauder Tax”, 171(9) Forbes Magazine (28 April 
2003).
7 CME (Merits), supra note 1, para. 80 (separate opinion).
8 Ronald S. Lauder v. C e^ch Republic (Final Award) (3 September 2001), (2002) 4 World Trade 
and Arb. Materials 35 [hereinafter Lauder].
9 C.N. Brower, C.H. Brower II, and J.K. Sharpe, “The Coming Crisis in the Global 
Adjudicative System” (2003) 19 Arb. Int’l 415,424-8.
10 Lauder, supra note 8, para. 235.
11 The Czech Republic’s application to set aside the award on this point was rejected by the 
Swedish court of appeal on the basis that Ralph Lauder and CME — the Dutch company 
controlled Mr. Lauder — were different parties and that their claims could therefore proceed 
concurrently, even though the substance of the claims was the same (CME (Merits), supra 
note 1, para. 426-33). The Swedish court of appeal was also influenced by the fact that the 
Czech Republic had refused, at an early stage, the investor’s offer to consolidate the two 
claims: CME (SVEA Judgment), supra note 4,210 and 242.
12 UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties — 1959-1999 (New York: United Nations, 2000), 1 
(the number of bilateral investment treaties rose from 385 in 1989 to 1,857 by 1999); 
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004 (New York: United Nations, 2004), 221 (2,265 
bilateral investment treaties were concluded by the end of 2003, involving 175 countries).
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1. States authorize foreign investors (read multinational enterprises13) to make 
and enforce international claims for damages14 against states in disputes arising 
from the state’s exercise of public authority, without those claims being filtered 
by the investor’s home state or by an international organization;
2. States are subjected to broadly-worded international standards that apply to a 
wide range o f governmental activity, affording arbitration tribunals broad 
discretion to award damages to investors and thus make decisions about the 
cost o f government, with limited supervision by domestic courts; and
3. Disputes are resolved using a private model of adjudication based on rules of 
private arbitration and incorporating the enforcement structure of 
international commercial arbitration.
Taken together, these features define investment treaties as something more than a 
mere collection of disparate treaties with distinct dispute settlement procedures. 
Indeed, they unify them as a generalized adjudicative system, one designed to control 
and discipline states in the regulatory sphere. This system is complex, fragmented, and 
at times incoherent because o f variations among different treaties and, although it has 
wide geographic coverage, the system falls short of a global system in the absence o f a
13 As defined by the OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Revision 2000 
(Paris: OECD, 2000), 17-18, “multinational enterprises”:
usually comprise companies or other entities established in more than one country 
and so linked that they may co-ordinate their operations in various ways. While one 
or more of these entities may be able to exercise a significant influence over the 
activities of others, their degree of autonomy within the enterprise may vary widely 
from one multinational enterprise to another. Ownership may be private, state or 
mixed.
See also S. Timberg, “International Combines and National Sovereigns” (1947) 95 U. Penn. 
L.R. 575, 577-8; A.A. Fatouros, “On Domesticating Giants: Further Reflections on the Legal 
Approach to Transnational Enterprise” (1976) 15 U. Western Ontario L. Rev. 151,152-4; M. 
Wilkins, “Defining a Firm: History and Theory” in P. Hertner and G. Jones, eds., 
Multinationals: Theoiy and History (Aldershot: Gower, 1986), 80-1.
14 The term “damages” is used instead of “compensation” to highlight that the money 
remedy follows from a finding of unlawful conduct: D.W. Bowett, “Claims Between States 
and Private Entities: The Twilight Zone of International Law” (1986) 35 Cath. U. L. Rev. 
929, 937-8.
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multilateral investment code or bilateral investment treaties (BITs) between capital- 
exporting states. Even so, contemporary investment treaties should be approached as 
part o f  a system because of what they have in common: the authorization of 
individual claims for damages using broad jurisdictional concepts and liberal standards 
o f investor protection, based on a private model o f adjudication.
The system of investment arbitration has emerged recently through the 
proliferation o f investment treaties in the 1990s, along with growing awareness of 
investment arbitration among investors.15 Since the mid-1990s, in particular, investors 
have used investment arbitration more frequently and in increasingly sophisticated 
ways. For example, following the CME award, other investors threatened claims 
against the Czech Republic in cases ranging from the collapse o f a Czech bank to an 
unsuccessful bid for a mobile phone network to the seizure of a jet by customs 
authorities in lieu of back taxes owed by the owner.16 Under the investment 
provisions o f the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), claims have been 
launched against each NAFTA state in disputes arising from various governmental 
activities, including a ban on the export o f hazardous wastes by the Canadian 
Parliament, the creation of an ecological park by a Mexican state government, and the 
conduct of a jury trial by a U.S. court.17 Under bilateral investment treaties, through 
the use of holding companies, foreign investors have been able to bring multiple 
claims in relation to the same underlying dispute and domestic investors have 
successfully brought an international claim against their own state.18 Perhaps most
15 For a description of the process of investment arbitration, see G.N. Horlick and A.L. Marti, 
“NAFTA Chapter 11B: A Private Right of Action to Enforce Market Access through 
Investments” (1997) 14J. Int’l Arb. 43; UNCTAD, Dispute Settlement: Investor-State, UNCTAD 
Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements (New York: United Nations, 2003), 
40-64.
16 L.E. Peterson, “Investors emboldened by arbitral verdict against Czech Republic”
Investment Law and Policy Weekly News bulletin (11 April 2003); Z. Kawaciukova, “State ordered 
to pay 10 billion Kc” The Prague Post (19 March 2003); R. Anderson, “Tribunal to rule on 
Czech bank failure” Financial Times (8 April 2005) 27.
17 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada (Merits) (12 November 2000), 40 I.L.M. 1408,15(1) 
World Trade and Arb. Mat. 184; Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States (Merits) (30 
August 2000), 40 I.L.M. 36,13(1) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 45; The Loewen Group, Inc. and 
Raymond L. Eoernn v. United States of America (Merits) (26 June 2003), 42 I.L.M. 811,15(5) 
World Trade and Arb. Mat. 97.
18 E.g. CME (Merits) and Lauder; supra note 1 and 8, respectively; Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine 
(Jurisdiction) (29 April 2004), 16(4) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 75 [hereinafter Tokios], para. 
21 and 38.
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dramatically, investors have made roughly 37 claims against Argentina and are seeking 
tens o f billions of dollars in damages arising from the government’s response to the 
country’s financial crisis in 1998.19
B. The character of investment arbitration
International investment arbitration is commonly approached as a reciprocally 
consensual method of adjudication between an investor and the state. The argument 
of this thesis is that investment arbitration should instead be characterized as a unique 
form o f governing arrangement. Investment arbitration — based on investment 
treaties — is a governing arrangement because it is established by a sovereign act o f the 
state and because it is used to resolve disputes arising from the exercise o f public 
authority; i.e. disputes within the public sphere. As such, the subject matter o f  
investment arbitration is a regulatory dispute arising between the state (acting in a 
public capacity) and an individual who is subject to the exercise o f public authority by 
the state. This distinguishes investment arbitration from reciprocally consensual 
adjudication as conventionally used to resolve international disputes (between states) 
or commercial disputes (between private parties). Investment arbitration engages the 
regulatory relationship between the state and an individual, rather than a reciprocal 
relationship between juridical equals.
As a governing arrangement, investment arbitration is unique and open to 
criticism because it provides for the prospective and far-reaching, yet selective, 
individualization o f international claims based on a private model o f adjudication. 
Investment arbitration entails far-reaching individualization of international claims 
because states authorize investors direcdy to bring and enforce international damages 
claims, often without imposing a duty to exhaust local remedies. This 
individualization is selective because it applies only to investors. Moreover, 
investment arbitration is based on a private model of adjudication in that investment 
treaties adopt rules of arbitration that originate in commercial arbitration and they
19 M. Kantor, “The New Draft Model U.S. BIT: Noteworthy Developments” (2004) 21J.
Int’l Arb. 383, 393; O.C. Pell, News Release via PR Newswire, “Recent Argentine Legislation 
and Bondholder Remedies — Memorandum to the Global Committee of Argentina 
Bondholders” (16 February 2005).
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incorporate the enforcement structure of international commercial arbitration. These 
aspects o f investment arbitration distinguish it from other forms o f international 
adjudication that allow individual claims, and they are open to criticism as discussed 
below.
Distinguishing investment arbitration from both conventional international 
adjudication and international commercial arbitration highlights the significance of 
investment arbitration as a governing arrangement. In the first place, investment 
arbitration can be distinguished from conventional international adjudication between 
states because it is based on the authorization o f individuals to directly bring 
international claims. The individualization o f international adjudication makes it more 
likely that international claims will be instituted against states and damages awarded to 
foreign investors.20 Moreover, individualization under investment treaties is more far- 
reaching than under other international arrangements which authorize individual 
claims, such as human rights treaties, because investment treaties typically limit the 
investor’s duty to exhaust local remedies, adopt damages against the state as the 
remedy, and authorize the direct enforcement o f awards by domestic courts in a large 
number o f countries. Also, investment treaties are distinct from historical claims 
commissions involving international claims on behalf of individuals because they 
contain a prospective -  or general -  consent by the state to the compulsory arbitration 
of any future dispute between the state and foreign investors. The broad scope and 
substance of the general consent arguably subjects the regulatory relationship with 
foreign investors to binding and enforceable standards to a greater degree than any 
form of international adjudication since the colonial era.
Investment arbitration should also be distinguished from international 
commercial arbitration even though investment treaties rely on a private law model of 
adjudication. In commercial arbitration, when a state consents by contract to the 
arbitration of a commercial dispute with a private party, the state acts in a private
20 In CME, the U.S. Embassy to the Czech Republic reportedly declined to bring a claim of 
diplomatic protection on behalf of the investor: B. Kenety, “Nova TV: New Democracy or 
Old-Fashioned Greed?” The Prague Post (12-18 February 1997), citing a U.S. Embassy press 
release (“The US Embassy wishes to correct the misperception that it may be contemplating 
a diplomatic intervention, or other ‘expression of views’ on behalf of TV Nova [CME]. The 
Embassy does not believe there are grounds for such action. It is our view that the climate 
for foreign investors in the Czech Republic is generally favorable.”).
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capacity. In such cases, the arbitration arises not from a regulatory dispute but from a 
dispute between juridical equals; i.e. between two private parties (one o f which 
happens to be the state) equally capable o f possessing legal rights and obligations. In 
contrast, when a state consents generally by treaty to the compulsory arbitration of 
investment disputes, the state acts in a sovereign capacity. Only a state can exercise 
the public authority required to make a general consent. Also, where an investor 
subsequendy consents to investment arbitration by acting on the opportunity 
provided by the state’s general consent, the investor invokes a governing arrangement 
established by states. Finally, disputes that are resolved through investment arbitration 
arise from the exercise o f public authority by the state, whereas disputes that are 
resolved through commercial arbitration arise from the state’s participation in a 
commercial relationship with another private party.
The significance o f the emerging system o f investment arbitration is 
sometimes underestimated. Characterizing investment arbitration as a unique form of 
governing arrangement reveals the importance o f the system as a means to control the 
exercise o f public authority in the regulatory sphere. Simply put, no other adjudicative 
system combines all of the elements of international investment arbitration. 
Recognizing this enables a more informed and precise assessment o f the emerging 
system in the context o f contemporary globalization. The argument that investment 
arbitration is a unique form of governing arrangement is elaborated below.
1. The use o f adjudication as governing arrangement
The system o f investment arbitration is a governing arrangement which uses 
compulsory21 adjudication as a means to determine the legality and appropriateness of 
the exercise of public authority.22 A governing arrangement is an instrument or 
mechanism adopted by the state to manage the relationship between public entities
21 M.O. Hudson, International Tribunals (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace and the Brookings Institution, 1944), 75 (“compulsory jurisdiction... may be said to 
exist only where a particular tribunal, either preexisting or susceptible of being brought into 
existence without the concurrence of the parties to the dispute, is endowed with power to 
decide a dispute upon the application of a single party”).
22 M. Damaska, “Activism in Perspective” (1983) 92 Yale L.J. 1189,1191-2; M. Loughlin, The 
Idea of Public Taw (Oxford: OUP, 2003), 5 and 12.
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and individuals who are subject to the exercise o f public authority. As a governing 
arrangement, investment arbitration forms part o f the collection o f institutions and 
processes that apply to the relationship between those who govern and those who are 
governed; between public officials and bodies, on the one hand, and private parties 
who are subject to the state’s authority, on the other.23 In many states, adjudication 
plays an important and expanding role in regulating relations between individuals and 
state.24 One o f the purposes of public law is to constrain the exercise o f public 
authority by executive government and, under domestic constitutions, by the 
legislature.25 When a judge invokes his or her public law jurisdiction to resolve a 
dispute between the state and a person or organization that is subject to the exercise 
o f public authority, he or she determines matters such as the legality o f governmental 
activity, the degree to which individuals should be protected from regulation, and the 
appropriate role o f the state.26 Adjudication is thus part o f the governing apparatus.27
Because investment treaties are broad in scope and apply liberal standards o f 
investor protection, they impose extensive constraints on government. Indeed, in 
strict legal terms, investment arbitration tribunals have more authority to award 
damages against the state than any other court or tribunal, whether domestic or 
international. As a result, tribunals decide policy matters o f broad public concern. By 
interpreting a treaty and deciding whether to award damages, arbitrators determine 
the cost and, as such, the viability o f government. They rule on the legality o f state 
conduct, evaluate the fairness of governmental decision-making, determine the 
appropriate scope and content of property rights, and allocate risks and costs between 
business and society.28 As a governing arrangement, investment arbitration involves 
the resolution o f conflicts between investors and other individuals and groups,
23 An adjudicator’s authority to resolve a dispute, like the authority of other individuals who 
exercise public authority, is a part of the apparatus for governing within a state. Damaska, 
ibid., 1191-2; Loughlin, ibid., 5 and 88.
24 M. Shapiro, “The Globalization of Law” (1993) 1 Ind. J. Global Legal Studies 37, 47-50; 
J.H.H. Weiler, “Epilogue: Towards a Common Law of International Trade” inJ.H.H. Weiler, 
ed., The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA  (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 201-2.
25 Loughlin, supra note 22, 30 and 85.
26 J.H.H. Weiler, supra note 24, 202; M. Koskenniemi, “What Is International Law For?” in 
M.D. Evans, ed., International Eaw (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 99-100.
27 Loughlin, supra note 22, 5 and 88.
28 F.I. Michelman, “Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 
‘Just Compensation’ Law” (1967) 80 Harv. L.R. 1165,1168-9; C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, 
Taw and Administration (London: Butterworths, 1997), 605-6.
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conflicts that would otherwise be resolved by other means, including adjudication 
based on domestic public law. For these reasons, investment arbitration has important 
implications not only for states and investors but for anyone who is legally 
represented by the state and affected by state regulation o f international business.
The characterization of investment arbitration as a governing arrangement 
draws on assumptions about sovereignty. In the juridical sense, sovereignty is a 
conceptual framework for understanding the representative relationship between the 
state and the people in its territory and, as such, for organizing the public sphere.29 
Sovereignty means that the state is treated as the entity that represents a group of 
people in relation to the members o f the group and to other states.30 Sovereignty is a 
matter of authority not control; it is a concept not an attribute.31 In ideal terms, 
sovereignty implies external autonomy and internal control on the part of the state 
but neither fully exists in reality.32 Rather, sovereignty is a tool for thinking about how 
people are organized as political entities. As such, it is a foundational concept of 
public international law and domestic public law.33 As a sovereign in the international 
sphere, a state is the representative o f a population and territory; in the domestic 
sphere, the state is the repository of the collective authority to make governmental 
decisions.
The establishment of investment arbitration as a governing arrangement 
originates in the exercise of public authority by the state, acting as the juridical 
sovereign. By consenting generally to the international arbitration o f regulatory 
disputes that could arise in its territory, a state exercises public authority that no
29 F.W. Maitland, “The Crown as Corporation” (1901) 17 L.Q. Rev. 131,131-3 and 138; Q. 
Skinner, “Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State” (1999) 7 J. Pol. Phil. 1,1-3; I. 
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2003), 119 and 289.
30 R. Jackson, “Sovereignty in World Politics: a Glance at the Conceptual and Historical 
Landscape” (1999) 47 Pol. Studies 431, 453; Brownlie, ibid., 58 and 497.
31 A.V. Dicey, A n Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution [1885] (London:
Macmillan, 8th ed. 1915), 27-34; Jackson, ibid., 432-3; A. Sweet Stone, “Islands of 
Transnational Governance” in M. Shapiro and A. Sweet Stone, eds., Law, Politics, and 
Judiciali^ ation (Oxford: OUP, 2002), 323.
32 S. de Smith and R. Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 8th ed. (London: Penguin, 
1998), 97-100; Loughlin, supra note 22, 76 and 84.
33 C. Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law (New York: NYU Press, 1928), 4, 
28 and 35-6; A. James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1986), 267-9; Loughlin, supra note 22, 58-60 and 83; C. Warbnck, “States and 
Recognition in International Law” in M.D. Evans, ed., International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 
211 - 12 .
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private party can possess.34 In other words, states act in a sovereign capacity when 
they consent by treaty to compulsory investment arbitration. Only the state can 
delegate adjudicative authority over a regulatory dispute in its territory to an 
international tribunal: this authority is an inherently public authority that flows from 
the representative nature of the state.35 Likewise, only the state can authorize the 
enforcement o f a foreign arbitration award by its domestic courts. Thus, the system of 
investment arbitration depends on the legal authority (as well as coercive power) of 
the state in order to protect investors and constrain government. For the same reason, 
the system remains subject to modification by states.36 This is because states alone 
have the authority to conclude, abrogate, or amend an investment treaty, even though 
the exercise o f that authority -  like all public authority — takes place in a social and 
political context in which private actors influence and participate in public decision­
making.
2. The adjudication o f regulatory disputes
The system of investment arbitration uses international adjudication as a governing 
arrangement for the resolution of regulatory disputes. A regulatory dispute is a dispute 
between the state and a private individual who is subject to the exercise o f public 
authority by the state. Regulatory disputes can be distinguished from other public 
disputes (between states or state entities) as well as private disputes (between private 
parties). This characterization is based on the distinction between the public and the 
private sphere, a distinction that has its complications.37 For instance, not all legal
34 W.I. Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (London: University of London Press, 1959), 
312; W. Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society (London: Stevens & Sons, 1959), 351; E.M. 
Borchard, “Governmental Responsibility in Tort: VII” (1928) 28 Colum. L. Rev. 577, 610 
and 614-15; D. Cohen and J.C. Smith, “Entidement and the Body Politic: Rethinking 
Negligence in Public Law” (1986) 64 Can. Bar. Rev. 1, 5-6; Harlow and Rawlings, supra note 
28, 5 and 41-5.
35 Dicey, supra note 31, 4,18-19, 68-72, and 103.
36 D. Schneiderman, “Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism” (2000) 25 Law & 
Social Inq. 757, 761-2.
37 More precisely, it is acknowledged that non-state entities can, of course, exercise public 
authority (as delegated by the state) and wield power over large numbers of people in 
important ways. Rather, the categories of public and private are based on a formal distinction 
between public and private authority as opposed to actual power. See A. Claire Cuder,
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disputes are exclusively public or private in nature.38 On the other hand, most 
disputes that are subject to investment arbitration do fall squarely within the public 
sphere and, more precisely, within the regulatory sphere. This is not because the 
outcome o f the dispute is significant to the public at large (although this is often the 
case) but because the dispute arises from the exercise o f public authority.
Overlooking this “public” aspect of investment arbitration leads to confusion about 
the nature of the emerging system.39 For this reason, abstractions like “governing 
arrangement” and “regulatory dispute” are important in the characterization of 
investment arbitration.40
To elaborate, a public dispute is a dispute that arises from the exercise of 
public authority. A public dispute can be international or domestic in nature. 
International disputes (in the public sphere) include disputes between states and 
disputes between a state and an international organization (such as the United 
Nations). Domestic public disputes traditionally include disputes between entities of 
the state (such as a national ministry or local government) and disputes between the 
state and a person or organization that is subject to the exercise o f public authority by 
the state. Only this last form o f public dispute directly involves a private party as a 
disputing party alongside the state. Put differendy, only this last form of public 
dispute is “individualized” by the inclusion of an individual as a party to the dispute. 
For the purposes o f this thesis, this form of public dispute is referred to as a 
regulatory dispute.
A regulatory dispute is a dispute that arises from the relationship between the 
state and a party who is subject to regulation by the state.41 A regulatory dispute is a 
form of public dispute because the dispute arises from the exercise of public authority. 
In contrast, a private dispute is a dispute between individuals, each acting in a private 
capacity, even if the relationship between those individuals is itself subject to state
“Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International Law and 
Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy” (2001) 27 Rev. of Intil Studies 133,138; D. Mullan and 
A. Ceddia, “The Impact on Public Law of Privatization, Deregulation, Outsourcing, and 
Downsizing: A Canadian Perspective” (2003) 10 Ind. J. Global Legal Studies 199, 245.
38 M.M. Carrow, The Background of Administrative Taw (Newark: Associated Lawyers, 1948), 14.
39 E.g. Brower et al., supra note 9, 415 (characterizing all investment disputes as commercial 
disputes).
40 W. Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory (London: Butterworths, 2000), 11.
41 Damaska, supra note 22,1191-2.
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regulation.42 In commercial arbitration, a party’s consent to arbitration is a consent 
within the private sphere, not because the consent is irrelevant to the wider 
community, but because the disputing parties -  acting in a private capacity — have 
agreed to use a particular method of adjudication to resolve their dispute.43 In other 
words, they have agreed to remove the adjudication o f the dispute from the courts 
and subject the dispute to private arbitration.
In a regulatory dispute, as in any public dispute, it is impossible for the 
disputing parties — acting in a private capacity -  to consent to an alternative form of 
adjudication because a public dispute by definition involves the exercise of public 
authority by the state. Further, and as a result, when the state authorizes the 
adjudication of a public dispute, the state acts in a sovereign capacity.44 In authorizing 
the adjudication, the state makes a policy decision to incorporate that method of 
adjudication into the state’s governing apparatus. Thus, the use o f adjudication as a 
governing arrangement can be distinguished from consensual adjudication in the 
private sphere because the state acts in a sovereign capacity when it consents to the 
adjudication and because the relevant disputes arise from the exercise o f public 
authority.
By concluding a treaty that provides for compulsory investment arbitration, a 
state delegates45 adjudicative authority over disputes arising from the exercise of 
public authority in the state’s territory to international tribunals. Further, the state 
delegates the judicial authority to supervise those international tribunals to the courts 
o f a large number o f countries.46 This transfer o f authority integrates decision-making 
by international tribunals and foreign courts into the governing apparatus of the state. 
The use o f investment arbitration as a governing arrangement does not remove
42 A. Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation” (1976) 89 Harv. L.R. 1281, 
1282-4.
43 A.S. Rau, “Integrity in Private Judging” (1997) 38 South Texas L.R. 455, 486-7; A. Redfem 
and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1999), 135.
44 V. Lowe, “Jurisdiction” in M.D. Evans, ed., International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 351-2.
45 The state “delegates” adjudicative authority in the same manner that it delegates any public 
authority that resides in the state as a representative entity. Dicey, supra note 31, 4,18-19, 68- 
72, and 103.
46 See chapter six of this thesis, page 209-11.
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governmental decision-making from the regulatory relationship between investors and 
the state; it changes how and by whom governmental decisions are made.47
The adjudication o f a regulatory dispute by a domestic court involves the use 
o f adjudication, not as a consensual method o f adjudication between private parties, 
but as a governing arrangement.48 Based on a conventional characterization of inter­
state relations, regulatory disputes were traditionally adjudicated by domestic courts 
acting on the basis o f domestic public law. Domestic public law conventionally dealt 
with the internal authority of the state: how public authority was constituted, 
delegated, and exercised within the state’s territory.49 On the other hand, public 
international law conventionally dealt with the external authority o f the state: how 
relations and disputes among states were governed and resolved.50 It is true that, in 
public international law, adjudication was occasionally used to resolve disputes arising 
from one state’s treatment of a national of another state and, in such cases, 
international adjudication appeared to directly engage the regulatory relationship 
between a state and foreign nationals who were subject to the exercise o f public 
authority by the state. However, the degree to which this was so was limited by 
doctrines o f sovereign consent and immunity and by the duty to exhaust local 
remedies. Regulatory disputes in a state’s territory were presumed to fall within the 
exclusive domain o f the state’s legal system subject to minimum standards of 
international law,51 and disputes could not be adjudicated at the international level 
without the host state’s consent.52 Further, an international claim on behalf of a 
foreign national had to be brought by the home state and was treated, in principle, as 
the home state’s claim.53 These rules flowed from assumptions about the exclusive
47 A.T. Mason, “Judicial Activism: Old and New” (1969) 55 Va. L.R. 385, 385-6; Chayes, 
supra note 42,1304; Harlow and Rawlings, supra note 28, 78-8.
48 L.L. Fuller, “Consideration and Form” (1941) 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799, 806-8; Chayes, supra 
note 42,1294-5.
49 de Smith and Brazier, supra note 32, 6-7 and 503; Loughlin, supra note 22, 84.
50 T.J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Taw (London: Macmillan and Co., 1923), 2-3; 
M.N. Shaw, International Taw, 5th ed. (Cambridge: CUP, 2003), 121.
51 Brownlie, supra note 29, 291.
52 Hudson, supra note 21, 69; D .J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Taw, 5th ed. 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998), 985.
53 Mavrommattis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Great Britain) (1924), P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 2 
[hereinafter Mavrommattis], 12; Administrative Decision No. V  (1924), 7 R.I.A.A. 119,19 AJIL 
612, 626-7 (U.S.-Germany Mixed Claims Commission); Nottebohm (Tiechtenstein v. Guatemala),
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nature o f the state’s authority in its territory and they circumscribed international 
adjudication as a means to resolve regulatory disputes.
Thus, in customary international law, where the regulatory relationship was 
subject to international adjudication, a dispute was conceptually converted from a 
regulatory dispute between the host state and an individual into a dispute between 
juridical equals (i.e. states). The regulatory relationship became a reciprocal 
relationship. However, with the individualization of international claims, regulatory 
disputes are carried into the realm o f international adjudication, and the state and the 
aggrieved individual directly face each other as disputing parties. The regulatory 
relationship becomes subject to an individualized form o f international adjudication. 
Yet, the selectivity o f individualization has an important implication: the fact that only 
investors are able to make international claims disadvantages other individuals who 
remain dependent on the state to represent their rights and interests in relation to 
investment disputes that are resolved through international arbitration.
C. The uniqueness of investment arbitration
There is nothing remarkable about the fact that some legal disputes have an 
international character in that they engage the interests o f different states or the 
interests of nationals of different states, or both. The mere existence o f states makes 
international disputes inevitable. International investment disputes have existed for as 
long as people and organizations in one country have acquired business interests 
abroad. Economic and social developments in the 19th and 20th Centuries -  European 
industrialization and expansion, the spread o f international business and international 
credit, socialist revolution and Third World decolonization, the creation of new states, 
the rise and fall o f the Soviet bloc — all created conditions in which investment 
disputes proliferated.54 To what degree could a state favour domestic industry over 
foreign competitors? To what minimum standard of treatment were foreign investors 
entitled under international law? In what circumstances could a government regulate
[1955] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 24; Barcelona Traction, Ught and Power Co. {Belgium v. Spain), [1970] I.C.J. 
Rep. 3, 9 I.L.M. 227 [hereinafter Barcelona Traction], para. 78-9.
54 A.A. Fatouros, “International Law and the Third World” (1964) 50 Va. L.R. 783, 783-94; 
P.T. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 10-11.
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(or expropriate) the property and business of a multinational enterprise? These 
questions have driven the international law o f diplomatic protection for well over a 
century,55 culminating in the recent explosion o f investment arbitration.56
In international law, the adjudication of regulatory disputes that raised issues 
within the international sphere was conventionally dealt with through dispute 
resolution between states.57 Disputes involving the treatment o f a foreign national 
could be the basis for a claim of diplomatic protection by the home state of the 
foreign national against the host state whose conduct was in question.58 However, 
claims of diplomatic protection were usually resolved through negotiation and, rarely, 
by adjudication between states.59 Even if the individual was dissatisfied with the result, 
he or she had no further remedy under international law.60 Individuals could not act 
independently o f their own state by bringing a claim before an international tribunal.61 
Individuals lacked legal standing to make such claims and international tribunals 
lacked general jurisdiction to hear them.62 As such, individuals relied on their home
55 C.D. Gray, Judicial Remedies in International Imw (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), 11; D. Bodansky 
and J.R. Crook, “Symposium: The ILC’s State Responsibility Articles — Introduction and 
Overview” (2002) 96 AJIL 773, 776.
56 From 1996 to June 2005,149 investor-state claims were registered at the International 
Centre for the Setdement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in Washington, D.C., compared 
to 35 claims in the previous three decades. So recent is the explosion of investment 
arbitration that UNCTAD (Trends in International Investment Agreements: A n Overview, UNCTAD 
Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements (New York: United Nations, 1999), 
47) could not long ago report:
There is very litde known on the use that countries and investors have made of 
[bilateral investment treaties]: they have been invoked in a few international 
arbitrations, and presumably in diplomatic correspondence and investor demands. 
Their most significant function appears to be that of providing signals of an attitude 
favouring FDI.
57 Hudson, supra note 21, 67-9; J.G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, 3rd ed (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1998), 114-15; J. Collier and V. Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in International Imw 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1999), 6-7.
58 Mavrommattis, supra note 53,12. E.M. Borchard, “Basic Elements of Diplomatic Protection 
of Citizens Abroad” (1913) 7 AJIL 497, 576; Fatouros, supra note 54, 800-4.
59 Harris, supra note 52, 985; J. Merrills, “The Means of Dispute Settlement” in M.D. Evans, 
ed., International Imw (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 541.
60 Barcelona Traction, supra note 53, 78-9. G.A. Christenson, “The United States-Rumanian 
Claims Setdement Agreement of March 30,1960” (1961) 55 AJIL 617, 618-20; Muchlinski, 
supra note 54, 534-6.
61 Hudson, supra note 21, 67-9 and 198; R. McCorquodale, “The Individual and the 
International Legal System” in M.D. Evans, ed., International Imw  (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 308.
62 Mavrommattis, supra note 53,12. Hudson, supra note 21, 67-9 and 198; E.F. Mooney, Foreign 
Seizures — Sabbatino and the Act of State Doctrine (University of Kentucky Press, 1967), 130.
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state for representation and, as victims of “the arbitrary whim or caprice o f state 
officials” or “the most flagrant spoliations o f private property”, they sometimes 
suffered for this dependence.63
However unfair this might appear — from the perspective o f protecting 
individuals from state abuse — it flowed from a central assumption o f the international 
system. As a matter of principle, states are the representatives of their population and 
territory on the international plane.64 As state-based representation changes and 
individuals are allowed to make international claims on their own behalf, important 
questions arise. For what reasons and in what circumstances should individuals be 
allowed to make international claims? Should foreign workers be able to claim 
damages from states that deny them access to all of the rights and privileges of 
domestic workers? Should refugees be able to make claims against states that refuse 
them asylum and deport them to torture? Should indigenous peoples have the right 
make claims against states that expropriated their land?
Though arguably fair and commendable, these potential changes to state-based 
representation -  based on the elevation o f the status o f individuals to allow them to 
better defend their rights and interests — are not seriously on the international 
agenda.65 With the notable exception of the European Union, states have long 
resisted allowing individuals to make international claims and, because only states 
have the authority to change customary rules o f international law, such reform has 
not taken place.66 This is why international claims by investors in cases like CME are 
groundbreaking. They stand out, not because they reflect a general movement to 
elevate the individual in the international sphere based on open and independent
63 Quoting, respectively, M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and L. Chen, “Nationality and 
Human Rights: The Protection of the Individual in External Arenas” (1973) 83 Yale L.J. 900, 
906; W.L. Penfield, “Address: Is the Forcible Collection of Contract Debts in the Interest of 
International Justice and Peace?” (1907) 1 Am. Soc’ty Int’l L. Proc. 129,131.
64 W.W. Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law (New York: Macmillan, 1924),
307.
65 Important reforms have taken place to elevate the international status of individuals, 
especially in human rights law, but they differ in their scope and effectiveness from 
contemporary investment arbitration: D. Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law 
(Oxford: OUP, 1999), 137-8; E.B. Weiss, “Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-first 
Century” (2002) 96 AJIL 798, 809-11 and 815; R. Bachand and S. Rousseau, “International 
Investment and Human Rights: Political and Legal Issues” (Background paper for Rights & 
Democracy, 11 June 2003), 14.
66 Hudson, supra note 21, 200-2.
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judicial decision-making,67 but for the opposite reason. Investment arbitration is a 
highly exceptional -  yet ambitious and powerful -  arrangement to protect some 
individuals by constraining government, to the disadvantage o f those who might 
otherwise benefit from governmental activity.68
Normally, regulatory disputes are resolved by executive and legislative 
decision-making, including diplomatic relations between states.69 Removing such 
disputes from these forums and subjecting them to investment arbitration allows an 
adjudicator to determine the legality and appropriateness o f governmental activity.70 
In itself, this is nothing new: states often impose legal controls on government that 
are implemented in rules-based form through adjudication.71 What is remarkable 
about the system o f investment arbitration is that it combines the prospective and far- 
reaching individualization of international claims with a private model of international 
adjudication in order to resolve regulatory disputes.
67 R. Higgins, “Conceptual Thinking about the Individual in International Law” (1978) 4 Brit. 
J. Int’l Studies 1, 5-7; Shapiro, supra note 24, 47-50.
68 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1996 (Geneva: United Nations, 1997), 161-73; 
Schneiderman, supra note 36, 762-4; UNCTAD (2004), supra note 12, 221.
69 Eagleton, supra note 33, 23; Hudson, supra note 21,191-4.
70 Chayes, supra note 42,1294-5.
71 E.M. Borchard, “Government Responsibility in Tort, VI” (1927) 36 Yale L.J. 757, 765; M. 
Loughlin, Sword and Scales (Oxford: Hart, 2000), 9-10; M. Shapiro, “Administrative Law 
Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance” (2001) 8 Ind. J. Global Leg. 
Studies 369, 375-6.
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1. The individualization of international claims
Investment arbitration elevates the status o f the individual in international 
adjudication. Individual investors are authorized to bring claims under investment 
treaties, resulting in the individualisation o f international claims. Moreover, investment 
arbitration allows investors to obtain damages against the state. By allowing investors 
to make and enforce damages claims, investment treaties regulate states more 
intensively than other international regimes that protect individuals by constraining 
government. Other treaties that protect individuals very rarely allow individual 
damages claims to remedy a breach o f the treaty and those few that do allow damages 
claims limit them in ways that investment treaties do not. Moreover, in domestic law 
the scope o f state liability (in the regulatory sphere) is typically limited for reasons of 
legislative autonomy, judicial finality, and administrative discretion.72 In contrast, 
investment treaties do not contain broad and express exceptions on these grounds, 
leaving the matter to the discretion o f arbitrators. Thus, investors have more 
protection, understood in terms of the availability o f damages as a public law remedy, 
under investment treaties than under domestic law. On the whole, investment 
arbitration involves prospective and far-reaching individualization that provides 
exceptionally powerful legal protection for investors, but not other individuals.
The individualization of claims depends on the state’s consent to the 
compulsory arbitration of investor claims. Under investment treaties, states consent 
generally to the arbitration o f future investment disputes based on broad jurisdictional 
concepts and liberal standards o f investor protection.73 The state’s consent is not 
limited to a specific dispute, investor, or investment project. Rather, compulsory 
arbitration can be initiated by any member o f an unknown class o f potential claimants 
in relation to a virtually unlimited range o f disputes. Thus, a wide range of regulatory 
disputes between investors and the state can be subjected to international arbitration 
at the instance o f investors. Further, investment treaties define the scope of the state’s 
consent and the jurisdiction o f international tribunals in broad terms.74 They apply to
72 Borchard, supra note 34, 589 and 593; de Smith and Brazier, supra note 32, 601-6.
73 J. Paulsson, “Arbitration without Privity” (1995) 10 ICSID Rev. 232, 232-3.
74 T.W. Walde, “Investment Arbitration Under the Energy Charter Treaty — From Dispute 
Settlement to Treaty Implementation” (1996) 12 Arb. Int’l 429, 434-6; A.E.L. Tucker, “The
23
virtually any sovereign act and they define “investment” to include a very wide range 
o f assets. Also, investment treaties frequently define “investor” to include holding 
companies thus allowing forum-shopping by investors. Finally, investment treaties 
adopt liberal standards o f investor protection in order to regulate the exercise of 
public authority in relation to investors. This setdes — in favour of investor protection 
-  historical controversies about whether and how international law protects foreign 
business from discriminatory treatment, denials o f justice, expropriation, and other 
forms o f interference or regulation by the state.75
As a result, investment arbitration engages the regulatory sphere to a greater 
degree than other forms o f international adjudication. This is in part because investors 
are able directly to threaten and initiate claims, appoint arbitrators, develop legal 
arguments, negotiate terms o f setdement, and receive and enforce awards. Granting 
this status to investors makes it more likely that international claims will be initiated 
and ambitiously pursued. Moreover, investment treaties remove customary limits on 
international adjudication. First, many treaties allow claims by corporations without 
imposing shareholder nationality restrictions or minimum thresholds o f foreign 
ownership and control.76 Second, most treaties limit or remove the duty to exhaust 
local remedies, allowing investors to bring an international claim before domestic 
courts have resolved the relevant dispute.77 Taken together, these aspects of 
investment arbitration intensify the application o f international disciplines in the 
regulatory sphere while making the framework o f domestic public law more relevant 
to international adjudication.
Energy Charter Treaty and ‘Compulsory* International State/ Investor Arbitration” (1998) 11 
Leiden J. Int’l L. 513, 523-4; P.T. Muchlinski, “The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment: Where Now?” (2000) 34 Int’l Law. 1033,1045-6.
75 J.F. Williams, “International Law and the Property of Aliens” (1928) 9 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 1, 
28; A.P. Fachiri, “International Law and the Property of Aliens” (1929) 10 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 
32, 33-4 and 49-51; B.A. Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 
1959), 119-26; Muchlinski, supra note 54,173 and 501-14.
76 E.g. Waste Management Inc. v. United Mexican States (Merits) (30 April 2004), 43 I.L.M. 967, 
16(4) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 3, para. 80; Tokios, supra note 18, para. 36; CMS Gas 
Transmission Company v. The Pdpublic of Argentina (Jurisdiction) (17 July 2003), 42 I.L.M. 788, 
para. 47.
77 E.g. CME (Merits), supra note 1, para. 410; CME (Damages), supra note 1, para. 398 and 
412-13. UNCTAD, supra note 15, 31-7; V.L. Been andJ.C. Beauvais, “The Global Fifth 
Amendment: NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an 
International ‘Regulatory Takings’ Doctrine” (2003) 78 N.Y.U. L.R. 30, 83-6.
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Given the expansion of international adjudication into the regulatory sphere, 
investment arbitration is analogous -  not to conventional international adjudication or 
international commercial arbitration — but to domestic adjudication under 
constitutional or administrative law. This means that investment arbitration should be 
analyzed and conducted with reference to a public law framework — based on 
principles such as openness and independence in adjudicative decision-making -  that 
are often discarded or subordinated in inter-state adjudication and commercial 
arbitration. Similarly, the discretionary choices of arbitrators can be evaluated against 
the backdrop of different styles of public law adjudication, such as liberal 
normativism and pragmatic functionalism.78 A public law framework is relevant to 
investment arbitration because investment arbitration is a governing arrangement 
rather than a form of reciprocally consensual adjudication between juridical equals.
The individualization of international claims is open to criticism for its 
selectivity. Access to investment arbitration is restricted to individuals who own 
sufficient foreign assets to make an investor claim and in most cases those investors 
are multinational enterprises. Investors who are exclusively domestic, and foreign 
nationals who do not own foreign assets, obtain no legal protection. A foreign-owned 
business whose profitability is reduced by state regulation can make a claim under an 
investment treaty, but a natural person -  with foreign nationality — who was 
imprisoned without trial and tortured cannot. Where wealth constitutes a legal as well 
as practical condition of access, one is led to ask why the rights and interests of 
investors should be formally prioritized over other individuals in the governing 
apparatus.
2. The adoption of a private model o f adjudication
The individualization of international adjudication takes a unique form in the case o f 
investment arbitration because investment treaties adopt a private model of 
adjudication. Claims by investors are resolved by privately-appointed arbitrators based
78 M. Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 59-61.
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on rules and procedures that originate in commercial arbitration.79 Also, to enforce 
investment arbitration awards, investment treaties incorporate the enforcement 
system of international commercial arbitration. This reliance on a private model o f 
adjudication has prompted some commentators and adjudicators to approach 
investment arbitration as a form of international commercial arbitration. However, 
investment arbitration is a governing arrangement, not a reciprocally consensual 
method o f adjudication between private parties.
Some commentators argue that globalization requires one to look beyond the 
state and the positive laws of states in order to recognize the emergence of 
autonomous and transnational legal orders in which non-state actors exercise law­
making authority.80 This view is often advanced in relation to the expansion of 
international commercial arbitration and lex mercatoria.81 In this context, it is said, 
states have conceded law-making authority to a global regime in which private 
arbitrators and business organizations regulate conduct and resolve disputes without 
authorization by the state.82 Also, it is said, arbitrators are empowered to apply 
substantive standards that reflect practices of the international business community 
rather than the domestic law of any state.83 This transnational legal order is rooted not 
in a particular territory but in orders and systems operating beyond the control o f 
states.84 The transnational law thesis is open to criticism on various grounds,85
79 Walde, supra note 74, 448; J.A. Soloway, “Environmental Regulation as Expropriation: The 
Case of NAFTA’s Chapter 11” (2000) 33 Can. Bus. L.J. 92,108.
80 F. Snyder, “Governing Economic Globalisation: Global Legal Pluralism and European 
Law” (1999) 5 Eur. L.J. 334, 336 and 340-2; I. Seidl-Hohenveldem, International'Economic Law, 
3rd ed. (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 1-3; Cutler, supra note 37,133 and 143- 
7; Muchlinski, supra note 54, 229-37.
81 P.C. Jessup, Transnational Law (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1956), 3-5; W. Mattli, 
“Private Justice in a Global Economy: From Litigation to Arbitration” (2001) 55 Int’l Org. 
919, 923-6 and 944-5; I. Davies, “The New Lex Mercatoria: International Interests in Mobile 
Equipment” (2003) 52 I.C.L.Q. 151,154-7. See also M. Somarajah, “The UNCITRAL Model 
Law: A Third World Viewpoint” (1989) 6 J. Int’l Arb. 7, 16-17; M.J. Mustill, “Arbitration: 
History and Background” (1989) 6 J. Int’l Arb. 43, 50-1; Y. Dezaley and B. Garth, Dealing in 
Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 3-4 and 120-3.
82 Shapiro, supra note 24, 37-8; G. Teubner, “‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the 
World Society” in G. Teubner, ed., Global Law Without a State (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997), 
10- 11.
83 J. Paulsson, “Arbitration Unbound: An Award Detached from the Law of its Country of 
Origin” (1981) 30 I.C.L.Q. 358, 362.
84 Teubner, supra note 82,14-15 and 20-1.
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although, given the emergence of the system of investment arbitration, one issue 
stands o u t In particular, the transnational law thesis would be more compelling if  
states’ concession o f adjudicative authority to international arbitrators and institutions 
extended beyond the realm of commerce to that of government. This also suggests 
that the conclusion o f over 2,000 investment treaties in which states consent to 
compulsory private arbitration of regulatory disputes supports the transnational law 
thesis more clearly than the expansion o f commercial arbitration.
The most remarkable and suspect feature of investment arbitration is that, in 
contrast to adjudication before domestic or international courts, investment 
arbitration uses a private method o f adjudication to resolve disputes in the regulatory 
sphere. One o f the most fundamental aspects o f sovereign authority — understood in 
terms o f sovereignty as a juridical concept -  is the authority to resolve disputes 
regarding the legality o f the exercise of public authority. The fact that this authority 
has been delegated from domestic courts to arbitration tribunals rather than an 
international judicial body means that panels of privately-contracted adjudicators may 
resolve disputes that fall squarely within the regulatory sphere. Put differently, 
investment treaties transfer adjudicative authority not simply from domestic to 
international institutions but also from public to private institutions. This raises 
concerns about the independence and accountability of the system of investment 
arbitration, arising from the apprehension that arbitrators tend to favour adjudicative 
outcomes that are consistent with their commercial interest and professional mandate 
to promote investment arbitration. Few would argue that globalization calls for the 
transfer o f legislative authority to international committees o f skilled and reputable 
legal drafters, jointly appointed by investors and states. It is also questionable whether 
private arbitrators should have the authority to resolve regulatory disputes.
This is not a thesis about international adjudication per se. It concerns the use o f 
international adjudication in a novel way. Its object is to explain how investment 
arbitration may best be understood as a governing arrangement. The thesis does not
85 M. Koskenniemi, “The Future of Statehood” (1991) 32 Harv. Int’l L.J. 397, 406; Shapiro, 
supra note 24, 37-8; Snyder, supra note 80, 341-2; Muchlinski, supra note 54, 233-6 and 238-9.
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explicitly question the underlying rationale for a state to conclude an investment treaty; 
rather, the aim is to identify and define the system o f investment arbitration, 
illuminate its character, and highlight some of its implications, thus drawing attention 
to an important development in contemporary globalization.
In sum: investment arbitration is a unique form o f governing arrangement 
because it uses adjudication to resolve disputes arising from the exercise o f public 
authority in the regulatory sphere. Investment arbitration involves the transfer o f 
adjudicative authority both from domestic to international institutions and from 
public to private methods of adjudication. In transferring adjudicative authority from 
domestic to international institutions, investment treaties selectively elevate the 
individual in international law by allowing investors to make international claims. This 
makes investment arbitration unique as a form o f international adjudication in the 
degree to which it engages the regulatory sphere. In transferring authority from public 
courts to private arbitrators, investment treaties transplant rules and structures from 
the realm o f commerce to that of government. The convergence of these movements 
— based on the combination o f prospective and far-reaching individualization with a 
private model of adjudication — captures the significance o f investment arbitration as 
a governing arrangement.
The use o f investment arbitration as a governing arrangement means that 
important governmental decisions will be made through international adjudication. 
Indeed, investment arbitration arguably engages the regulatory sphere more than any 
form o f international adjudication outside of the European Union. By itself, this 
might be a welcome development but the selectivity of investment arbitration and its 
reliance on a private model o f adjudication is problematic. To an unprecedented 
extent, states have established an international regime that singles out wealth for legal 
protection while subjecting regulatory disputes about the legality and appropriateness 
o f governmental activity to the discretion of private contractors instead of tenured 
judges. For these reasons, the emerging system of investment arbitration should be 




The purpose of this chapter is to examine the origins o f the emerging system of 
investment arbitration in order to inform later analysis o f the character o f that system. 
In particular, the examination focuses on the evolution o f the legal framework of the 
system, and especially key treaties, so as to highlight the importance o f states’ 
consents to the use o f international arbitration as a governing arrangement. In 
adopting this orientation, this chapter diverges from other chapters o f the thesis 
which focus on specific elements of investment arbitration itself.
A. Historical background
In the twentieth century, major capital-exporting states advanced several proposals for 
a multilateral1 treaty that would codify liberal standards o f investor protection2 under 
international law. Some o f these proposals would have given investors the ability to 
make international claims for damages against states. All were ultimately rejected, 
however, in the face o f opposition by capital-importing states.
One example was the proposed International Convention for the Mutual 
Protection of Private Property Rights in Foreign Countries, aired in 1957 at an 
economic conference in San Francisco.3 The proposed code was described by one 
delegate, Miguel A. Cuaderno (then the Governor of the Central Bank of the 
Philippines) as allowing private investors to dominate the economic, if not political,
1 In this thesis, the term “multilateral” is reserved for investment treaties that are open to or 
intended for signature by any state. Investment treaties concluded between two states are 
referred to as “bilateral” investment treaties (BITs) and those between more than two states 
(whether or not as part of a broader trade agreement) as “regional” investment treaties.
2 Substantive provisions in investment treaties are sometimes divided into standards of 
“protection” and “liberalization”: e.g. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1996 (Geneva: 
United Nations, 1997), 189-94. In this thesis, for simplicity, all such provisions are referred 
to as standards of investor protection.
3 A.S. Miller, “Protection of Private Foreign Investment by Multilateral Convention” (1959) 
53 AJIL 371.
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affairs o f underdeveloped nations.4 Guillermo Belt, representing Cuba, rejected the 
proposal as “a return to the Gay Nineties”.5 He was referring to the period of 
international business security and freedom that characterized imperialism and 
globalization in the late nineteenth century. But he might have been presaging the 
future, for the 1990s witnessed the emergence o f an international regime that has 
greater scope and potency for protecting investors by controlling governments than 
any comparable regime since colonial arrangements were dismantled. Investment 
arbitration lies at the heart o f this regime.
The failure o f proposed multilateral investment codes in the twentieth century 
prompted major capital-exporting countries (i.e. the former European colonial 
powers, the United States, and Japan) and private investor organizations to advance 
an alternative investor protection regime based on a complex network o f treaties and 
domestic implementing legislation. In particular, two key arbitration treaties — the New 
York Convention o f 1958 and the ICSID Convention o f 1965 — provide for domestic 
recognition and enforcement6 o f arbitration awards as well as a forum and procedural 
framework for investment arbitration. Also, over 2,000 investment treaties — both 
bilateral and regional — establish the consents o f states to compulsory investment 
arbitration. Viewed as a whole, these treaties constitute the emerging system of 
investment arbitration.
1. The context o f post-colonial conflict
International investment law originates in the late nineteenth century, during which 
most o f the world was organized into European empires and large amounts o f 
Western capital flowed abroad.7 In this period, the legal framework for the resolution 
of investment disputes was very different from today’s. In many cases, regulatory
4 Miller, ibid., 375, citing The New York Times (16 October 1957).
5 Miller, ibid., citing Time Magazine (28 October 1957).
6 “Recognition” of an arbitration award by a court serves to bar fresh proceedings by the 
other disputing party; “enforcement” refers to the court’s application of legal sanctions, 
including seizure of property and other assets, forfeit of bank accounts, or imprisonment: A. 
Redfem and M. Hunter, Taw and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (London: Sweet
6  Maxwell, 1999), 449.
7 E. Hobsbawm, Industiy and Empire (London: Penguin, 1968), 129-31; I. Brownlie, Principles of 
Public International Taw, 6th ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2003), 500.
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authority emanated from an imperial capital.8 Disputes between investors and local 
authorities in colonized territories were resolved within the imperial legal system and, 
when subject to adjudication, they fell within the jurisdiction of imperial courts or 
administrators.9 Imperial law regulated the conduct of business across the empire and 
the law ensured a high level of freedom and protection for investors in order to 
facilitate the exploitation o f colonized areas.10 Where indigenous organizations or 
groups interfered with the activities o f international business, they faced the authority 
and power o f the empire.
N ot all non-European territories were formally colonized in the nineteenth 
century. Even so, in the context o f rapid industrialization and economic growth, 
European and American business “globalized” by acquiring extensive interests in 
these territories, and this inevitably led to disputes with local authorities.11 In some 
cases, relying on their military superiority, Western powers imposed capitulation 
treaties on other states, including China, Persia, Egypt, and the Ottoman Empire, in 
order to open their economies to foreign commerce and industry.12 Thus, the Anglo- 
Turkish Convention of 1838 gave European investors the right to establish themselves in
8 A.V. Dicey, A n Introduction to the Study of the Caw of the Constitution [1885] (London: Macmillan, 
8th ed. 1915), 51-61; R. Jackson, “Sovereignty in World Politics: a Glance at the Conceptual 
and Historical Landscape” (1999) 47 Pol. Studies 431, 441-4.
9 S.M. Hill, (1900) “Growth of International Law in Africa” 16 L.Q.Rev. 249, 256-9; Dicey, 
ibid., 47 and 55-8.
10 S.K.B. Asante, Transnational Investment Law and National Development (Lagos: University of 
Lagos, 1981), 24; Y. Ghai, R. Luckham, and F. Snyder, “Introduction” in Y. Ghai, R. 
Luckham, and F. Snyder, eds., The Political Economy of Law (Oxford: OUP, 1987), 8; P.T. 
Muchlinski, “The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Where Now?”
(2000) 34 Int’l Law. 1033,1034-5. Governing powers were in many cases granted direcdy to 
a chartered colonial company: Hill, ibid., 258-9 and 264; J.H. Latane, “Address” (1907) Am. 
Soc’ty Int’l L. Proc. 100,136.
11 G.S. Jones, “The History of U.S. Imperialism” in R. Blackburn, ed., Ideology in Social Science 
(Glasgow: Fontana/ Collins, 1972), 228-30; Muchlinski, ibid., 1034-5.
12 W.E. Grigsby, “The Mixed Court of Egypt” (1896) 12 L.Q. Rev. 252; A.M. Latter, “The 
Government of Foreigners in China” (1903) 19 L.Q.Rev. 316; J.K. Fairbank, The United States 
and China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), 120-3; W.R. Johnston, 
Sovereignty and Protection: A  Study of British Jurisdictional Imperialism in the Late Nineteenth Centuy 
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1973), 29; C. Lipson, Standing Guard—Protecting 
Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1985), 13-14; J.A.G. Roberts, A  History of China (London: Macmillan, 1999), 162-8; A. Anghie, 
“Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International 
Law” (1999) 40 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1, 41.
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the Ottoman Empire, lowered tariffs, and removed internal barriers to trade.13 In 
response, Ottoman control of foreign investors “simply disintegrated” and by the 
mid-nineteenth century European business had penetrated Ottoman territory and 
secured extensive concessions in mining, railroad and port construction, coastal 
navigation, banking, and public utilities.14 Where a dispute involved a foreign investor, 
Ottoman court proceedings were supervised by foreign consular officials who had 
direct judicial authority or veto power over the local judge.15 Foreign investors 
maintained the nationality of their home country and their property was protected by 
its laws.16 Thus, outside of formally colonized areas, investor protection was ensured 
by the extraterritorial application o f European or American law.17
Even in the nineteenth century, some countries managed to escape both 
formal colonization and extraterritorial law, primarily in Latin America and later 
Japan.18 In such circumstances, where the law was not directly imposed by an imperial 
or foreign power, investment disputes became inter-state disputes.19 Thus, most of 
the mixed claims commissions of the time — the ancestors o f contemporary 
investment arbitration — were established to resolve disputes between Western 
investors and Latin American states.20 Similarly, as colonial and extraterritorial 
arrangements were replaced in the twentieth century by less one-sided arrangements, 
investment disputes increasingly became international disputes.21
13 C. Issawi, The Economic History of Turkey 1800-1914 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1980), 5; Lipson, ibid., 13.
14 Quoting Lipson, ibid., 14.
15 Alternatively, disputes involving foreigners were subject to the jurisdiction of a mixed 
court on which foreign judges sat in the majority: Grigsby, supra note 12, 253-4. See M.O. 
Hudson, “The Rendition of the International Mixed Court at Shanghai” (1927) 21 AJIL 451, 
454-5.
16 Johnston, supra note 12, 29; Issawi, supra note 13, 5; Lipson, supra note 12, 13-14.
17 Muchlinski, supra note 10,1034-5; A.A. Fatouros, “On Domesticating Giants: Further 
Reflections on the Legal Approach to Transnational Enterprise” (1976) 15 U. Western 
Ontario L. Rev. 151,166.
18 M.J. Farrelly, “Recent Questions of International Law: Japan and European Consular 
Jurisdiction” (1894) 10 L.Q.R. 254, 266-7; A. Alvarez, “Latin America and International 
Law” (1909) 3 AJIL 269.
19 Muchlinksi, supra note 10,1034-5.
20 Brownlie, supra note 7, 500.
21 W. Peter, Arbitration and Renegotiation of International Investment Agreements (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1995), 6-7. The new arrangements were based on the European 
model of bilateral commercial treaties, dating from at least the eighteenth century, which 
were founded on commitments to mutual recognition of non-discrimination in trade in
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After World War Two, in particular, newly independent states sought greater 
domestic control over their economy and resources, including by requiring the 
resolution o f investment disputes in domestic courts based on domestic law.22 In the 
1960s and 1970s, developing countries asserted the principle of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources and proposed a New International Economic 
Order, both o f which were opposed by international business and major capital- 
exporting states.23 This demand for sovereign autonomy over economic activity can 
itself be traced to the Latin American Calvo doctrine24 and the Drago doctrine25 of 
the late nineteenth century, which foreshadowed more recent conflicts between 
capital-exporting and capital-importing states.26 As such, although the modern 
context for investment arbitration differs from the colonial period, the international 
character o f investment disputes is rooted in post-colonial conflicts about foreign
goods and to the unhindered carrying on of business in each state’s territory: R.R. Wilson, 
“Post-War Commercial Treaties of the United States” (1949) 43 AJIL 262, 263 and 277; H. 
Walker, “Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present 
United States Practice” (1956) 5 Am. J. Comp. L. 229, 230-1; R. Dolzer and M. Stevens, 
bilateral Investment Treaties (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1995), 10-11.
22 International Law Commission, Summary Records of the 9th Session, 1957, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/106, [1957] 1 Y.B. Int’l Law Comm. 155, para. 45-51 (comment by P. Nervo); W. 
Friedmann, Taw in a Changing Society (London: Stevens & Sons, 1959), 454-5; A.A. Fatouros, 
“International Law and the Third World” (1964) 50 Va. L.R. 783, 802-4; A.F. Abbott, “Latin 
America and International Arbitration Conventions: The Quandary of Non-Ratification” 
(1976) 17 Harv. Int’l L.J. 131,136-7.
23 Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources^  United Nations G.A. Res. 1803 
(XVII), UN GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, UN Doc. A/5217 (1962) 15, 57 AJIL 710; 
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order; UN GA Res. 3201 (S-VI), 
UN GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, UN Doc. A/9559 (1974) 3,13 I.L.M. 715; Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States, UN GA Res. 3281 (XXIX), UN GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. 
No. 31, UN Doc. A/9631 (1974) 50,14 I.L.M. 251. J. Castaneda, “The Underdeveloped 
Nations and the Development of International Law” (1961) 15 Int’l Org. 38, 39; K. Hossain, 
“Introduction” in K. Hossain and S.R. Chowdhury, eds., Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources in International Taw (London: Pinter, 1984), ix-xix.
24 Asserting that the use of force to protect foreign investors was prohibited and that, upon 
entering a state’s territory, foreign investors had to respect local laws and subject themselves 
to domestic courts. The only protection to which investors were entitled under international 
law was the same treatment as that enjoyed by nationals. C. Calvo, Te Droit International’ 5th ed. 
(Paris: A. Rousseau, 1896), 118-64; A.S. Hershey, “The Calvo and Drago Doctrines” (1907) 1 
AJIL 26; D.R. Shea, The Calvo Clause (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955), 9- 
21 .
25 L. Drago, “State Loans in Their Relations to International Policy” (1907) 1 AJIL 692; 
Hershey, ibid.
26 Muchlinski, supra note 10,1035.
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ownership and control of local assets.27 Then, as now, most international capital flows 
emanated from Europe and the U.S., and foreign-owned assets were predominantly 
owned by European and American business.28
Pressure to establish an international regime for investor protection is thus a 
integral aspect o f the post-colonial era. For much o f the twentieth century, 
international investors could not directly rely on imperial or extraterritorial law for 
protection, and they had no right to make international claims against the states in 
whose territory their assets were located.29 An investment dispute was treated as an 
inter-state dispute and was settled through diplomacy or, exceptionally, by 
adjudication between states.30 Only the home state of an investor could initiate an 
international claim against a host state and the investor had to accept the outcome 
agreed to by its state.31 Thus, investors were at the mercy o f their government; their 
interests were subsumed within the state’s consideration of its interest. In some cases, 
states agreed to use international adjudication to resolve disputes with foreign 
nationals, but the jurisdiction of international tribunals was usually limited to a 
specific dispute or historical event. Naturally, this state o f affairs was less desirable for 
international business and for major capital-exporting states. But efforts to enforce 
international standards o f investor protection were viewed by capital-importing states 
as discriminatory toward domestic investors and as an unacceptable challenge to their 
autonomy.32
27 Fatouros, supra note 22, 783-94.
28 The significant historical exception is Japan: P.T. Muchlinski, Multinational 'Enterprises and the 
Taw (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 28-9. See D.R. Young, “Governmental Regulation of Foreign 
Investment” (1969) 47 Texas L.R. 421, 425-6; UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004 
(Geneva: United Nations, 2004), xviii (developed countries continue to account for over 
90% of total outward FDI) and annex table A.I.3, A.III.5, A.III.12, B.2, and B.4.
29 Fatouros, supra note 22, 795-6.
30 Brownlie, supra note 7, 500; J. Merrills, “The Means of Dispute Settlement” in M.D. Evans, 
ed., InternationalTaw (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 541.
31 M.O. Hudson, International Tribunals (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace and the Brookings Institution, 1944), 67-9 and 198; UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment 
Treaties in the Mid-1990s (Geneva: United Nations, 1998), 89-90; Muchlinski, supra note 28, 
534-6; M.N. Shaw, International Law, 5th ed. (Cambridge: CUP, 2003), 722-3; R. 
McCorquodale, “The Individual and the International Legal System” in M.D. Evans, ed., 
International Taw (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 308.
32 Castaneda, supra note 23, 39-41; Abbott, supra note 22,137; S.K.B. Asante, “International 
Law and Foreign Investment: A Reappraisal” (1988) 37 I.C.L.Q. 588, 591-5; S.K.B. Asante, 
“International Law and Investments” in M. Bedjaouni, ed., International Taw: Achievements and 
Prospects (Paris and Dordrecht: UNESCO and Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), 669-73. Similar
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In this context, various proposals have been advanced since the 1920s for a 
multilateral investment treaty that would enshrine liberal standards o f investor 
protection and thus protect international business from regulation by host states.33 
These included: the 1929 Draft Convention on the Treatment o f Foreigners;34 the 
1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad;35 a Uruguay Round 
proposal for a multilateral investment treaty as part o f the World Trade 
Organization;36 and the 1998 draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) 
prepared by the Organization for Economic Cooperation (OECD).37 All of these 
proposals were rejected by developing countries and in some cases by constituencies 
within developed states themselves.38 On the other hand, alternative proposals that 
enshrined the discretion o f host states to regulate investors — especially the proposed
arguments have been made in the case of developed capital-importing countries: e.g. V.L. 
Been and J.C. Beauvais, “The Global Fifth Amendment: NAFTA’s Investment Protections 
and the Misguided Quest for an International ‘Regulatory Takings’ Doctrine” (2003) 78 
N.Y.U. L.R. 30,128-39.
33 M. Hart, “A Multilateral Agreement on Foreign Direct Investment — Why Now?” (1996) in 
P. Sauve and D. Schwanen, eds., Investment Rules for the Global Economy (Toronto: C.D. Howe 
Institute, 1996), 50-6; Muchlinski, supra note 28, 573-4; Muchlinski, supra note 10,1035-7.
34 Responsibility of Statesfor Damage Caused in Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, 
League of Nations Conference for the Codification of International Law, Bases of 
Discussion, vol. 3, LN Doc. C.75.M.69.1929.V (1929). E.M. Borchard, “‘Responsibility of 
States,* At the Hague Codification Conference” (1930) 24 AJIL 517, 530; A.K. Kuhn, “The 
International Conference on the Treatment of Foreigners” (1930) 24 AJIL 570.
35 H. Abs and H. Shawcross, “The Proposed Convention to Protect Private Foreign 
Investment” (1960) 9 J. Public L. 115; G. Schwarzenberger, “The Abs-Shawcross Draft 
Convention on Investments Abroad: A Critical Commentary” (1960) 9 J. Public L. 147; A. 
Fatouros, “An International Code to Protect Private Investment — Proposals and 
Perspectives” (1961) 14 U.T.L.J. 77, 89-90; Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 21, 2.
36 P. Civello, “The TRIMS Agreement: A Failed Attempt at Investment Liberalization”
(1999) 8 Minn. J. Global Trade 97; S. Dillon, International Trade and Economic Taw in the 
European Union (Oxford: Hart, 2002), 100; Muchlinski, supra note 10,1039.
37 The M AI Negotiating Text, OECD, Paris (1998) [hereinafter MAI\. E. Smythe, “Domestic 
and International Sources of Regime Change: Canada and the Negotiation of the OECD 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment” (Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the 
Canadian Political Science Association, St. John’s, Nfld, 8 June 1997), 9-10; P. Juillard, “MAI: 
A European View” (1998) 31 Cornell Int’l L.J. 477,477.
38 C. Lalumiere and J.-P. Landau, “Report on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI)” (Interim report to the Government of France, September 1998); S. Picciotto, “A 
Critical Assessment of the MAI” in S. Picciotto and R. Mayne, eds., Regulating International 
Business (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1999), 99-100; Muchlinski, supra note 10,1035-9; A. Walter, 
“NGOs, Business, and International Investment: The Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 
Seatde, and Beyond” (2001) 7 Glob. Governance 51, 58-60.
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Havana Charter o f 194839 — were a non-starter for major capital-exporting states and 
organizations o f private investors.40
The failure to conclude a multilateral investment agreement reflects the 
enduring intensity of the conflict pitting capital-exporting countries and international 
business against capital-importing states (led in recent years by Brazil, Egypt, India, 
Malaysia, and Uganda).41 Even so, it is remarkable that capital-importing states have 
been willing, especially since the 1990s, to agree to an intrusive regime o f investor 
protection based on compulsory investment arbitration. Indeed, despite the failure to 
conclude a multilateral code, capital-exporting states have successfully established 
networks o f investment treaties that guarantee a high level o f protection for 
international business.42 The evolution o f this treaty-based regime and the emergence 
of the system of investment arbitration is discussed later in this chapter, following a 
review o f some explanations for why developing countries have lately consented to so 
many investment treaties.
39 Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment: Havana Charter for an 
International Trade Organisation, UN Conference on Trade and Employment, UN Doc. 1948
II.D.4.1 (1948), art. 12, online: WTL http: /  /www.worldtradelaw.net/misc 7havana.pdf. C. 
Wilcox, A  Charter for World Trade (New York: Macmillan, 1949).
40 L.H. Woolsey, “The Problem of Foreign Investment” (1948) 42 AJIL 121,126-8; W. 
Diebold, “The End of the ITO” in Essays in International Finance, no. 16 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1952), 18-19; Fatouros, supra note 35, 80 and 101; Hart, supra note 33, 54. 
The leading organization of private investors is the International Chamber of Commerce, 
supported by national organizations such as the U.S. Council on International Business, the 
National Association of Manufacturers, and the National Foreign Trade Council: e.g. ICC, 
“Fair Treatment for Foreign Investments: International Code” (ICC Brochure no.129,1949); 
National Association of Manufacturers, “The Havana Charter for an International Trade 
Organization” (1949); National Foreign Trade Council, “Position of the NTC with Respect 
to the Havana Charter for an ITO” (1950); ICC, “Multilateral rules for investment” (Doc. 
No. 103/179, Rev., 30 April 1996); ICC, “ICC’s expectation regarding a WTO investment 
agreement” (Policy statement of the ICC Commission on Trade and Investment Policy, 7 
March 2003); D.M. Price, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House 
Committee on Ways and Means, Hearing on the Summit of the Americas and Prospects for 
Free Trade in the Hemisphere (Statement on behalf of the U.S. Council for International 
Business, 8 May 2001).
41 B.A. Wortley, Expropriation in Public InternationalEaw (Cambridge: CUP, 1959), 119-26; 
Peter, supra note 21, 329-31; Muchlinski, supra note 28,173, 501-14, and 573-4; Shaw, supra 
note 31, 733-7; Muchlinski, supra note 10,1039; J. Hillary, “Divide and Rule: The EU and US 
Response to Developing Country Alliances at the WTO” (Report for Action Aid 
International, 2004), 7.
42 UNCTAD, supra note 28, 221.
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2. Explanations for the emergence of investment arbitration
The emergence of international investment arbitration converges with trends 
commonly associated with globalization.43 These include: the internationalization o f 
economic activity, the development of new communications and transportation 
technology, the withdrawal of the state from various social and economic activities, 
the rise o f non-state actors, and the transfer of public authority to private 
organizations.44 In the case of investment arbitration, probably the two most 
important trends are the rise of multinational enterprises45 and the liberalization of 
international financial markets.46
First, in the post-war era, multinational enterprises have assumed an 
increasingly central role in planning and financing economic activity, extracting 
natural resources, producing goods, delivering services, employing labour, developing 
technologies, and marketing products.47 Today, multinational enterprises organize 
most cross-border private capital flows — i.e. international investment — often within 
their own corporate structure.48 In addition, organized business has exercised 
significant influence over governmental decision-making in many areas, including the
43 D. Held and A. McGrew, “Globalization” (1999) 5 Glob. Governance 483, 490-4; P.T. 
Muchlinski, “Globalisation and Legal Research” (2003) 37 Int’l Lawyer 221, 221-5.
44 E.g. A.A. Fatouros, “Transnational Enterprise in the Law of State Responsibility” in R.B. 
Lillich, ed., International haw of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens (Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 1983), 361-3; S. Picciotto, “Introduction: What Rules for the World 
Economy?” in S. Picciotto and R. Mayne, eds., Regulating International Business (Houndmills: 
Macmillan, 1999), 9-10; Muchlinski, supra note 28, 35-8; A.C. Aman, “The Limits of 
Globalization and the Future of Administrative Law: From Government to Governance”
(2001) 8 Ind. J. Global Legal Studies 379, 379-84; S. Sassen, “Globalization or 
Denationalization?” (2003) 10 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 1, 5-6.
45 N.S. Rodley, “Corporate Nationality and the Diplomatic Protection of Multinational 
Enterprises: The Barcelona Traction Case” (1971) 47 Indiana L.J. 70, 71-2 and 84-5; Fatouros, 
supra note 17,154-6; M. Somarajah, The International haw on Foreign Investment (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1994), 51; Hart, supra note 33, 39-44; Muchlinski, supra note 28,25-33.
46 R. Kozul-Wright and R. Rowthom, “Spoilt for Choice? Multinational Corporations and the 
Geography of International Production” (1998) 14 Ox. Rev. Econ. Policy 74, 84-5; C. 
Deblock and D. Brunelle, “Globalization and New Normative Frameworks — The 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment”, Cahier de recherche 98-2 (Groupe de recherche sur 
l’integration continentale, Universite de Quebec a Montreal, 1998), 5-8; J. Kelsey, “The 
Denationalization of Money: Embedded Neoliberalism and the Risks of Implosion” (2003)
12 Social & Leg. Studies 155,158.
47 J. Dunning, International Production and the Multinational Enterprise (London: Allen and Unwin,
1981); UNCTAD, supra note 28, xvii.
48 R.J. Mataloni, Jr., “A Guide to BEA Statistics on U.S. Multinational Companies” (March 
1995) Survey Current Bus. 38, 48; Picciotto, supra note 44, 6-7.
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deregulation o f capital flows.49 As the dominant investors in the international 
economy, multinational enterprises are the most important actors — other than states 
— in investment arbitration.
Second, investment treaties are an outcome o f the removal o f domestic 
controls on private capital flows and the growth of an international market for 
investment.50 Absent the massive expansion of cross-border private capital flows in 
recent decades, there would be much less pressure for capital-exporting states to 
secure legal protection for assets owned by their nationals abroad.51 Similarly, without 
an international market for private investment, there would be no reason for capital- 
importing states to seek to attract foreign investors by concluding investment treaties. 
Finally, most deregulated capital flows are controlled by multinational enterprises, 
including global financial firms.52 Thus, the removal o f domestic capital controls, 
linked to the expansion of international business, is a major factor in the growth of 
investment arbitration.
Against this backdrop, the negotiation of investment treaties clearly involves 
more than that implied by a simple division of interests between capital-exporting and 
capital-importing states. In multilateral negotiations, it is sometimes possible to 
identify negotiating blocs based on this dichotomy, but the position o f many capital- 
importing countries has shifted in favour of opening their economy to foreign 
investment, in order to carry out what their governments no doubt consider to be a 
more appropriate development strategy based on integration into the international 
economy.53 One should not overlook the role and potential benefits o f foreign
49 J. Braithwaite and P. Drahos, Global business Regulation (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), 488-91; 
Walter, supra note 38, 52-3; A. Prakash, “Beyond Seattle: Globalization, the Nonmarket 
Environment and Corporate Strategy” (2002) 9 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 513, 520-1.
50 Picciotto, supra note 44, 7-9; World Bank, World Development Report 1999/2000 (Oxford: 
OUP, 2000), 71-2; A. Baines, “Capital Mobility and European Financial and Monetary 
Integration: A Structural Analysis” (2002) 28 Rev. Int’l Studies 337, 347.
51 B. Eichengreen et al., “liberalizing Capital Movements: Some Analytical Issues”,
Economic Issues No.17 (IMF, 1999).
52 Peter, supra note 21, 381-2 and 388; J. Bhagwati, “The Capital Myth: the Difference 
between Trade in Widgets and Dollars” (1998) 77(3) For. Affairs 7,11-12.
53 Peter, supra note 21, 13-14; A.M. Rugman and M. Gestrin, “A Conceptual Framework for a 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Learning from the NAFTA” in P. Sauve and D. 
Schwanen, eds., Investment Rules for the Global Economy (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1996), 
159-62; UNCTAD, World Investment Rjport 2003 (Geneva: United Nations, 2003), 87 and 106.
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investment in domestic development and national competitiveness.54 Moreover, 
besides well-known investment platforms and tax havens such as Singapore or 
Bermuda, many Asian and oil rich states are themselves important sources of capital 
for the West, whereas other former colonies have developed their own centres o f 
capital and multinational enterprises, and they play an important investment role in 
the regional setting if not the world.55 Reflecting these conditions, many investment 
treaties in the 1990s were concluded between conventionally capital-importing 
countries.
In turn, many capital-exporting states are important destinations o f foreign 
investment. The United States, in particular, has been a major capital-importer as well 
as exporter.56 Further, the deregulation o f capital flows has facilitated forum-shopping 
by investors, capital flight, and “round trip” investment, thus exposing all states to a 
wider range o f claims by foreign investors and, as such, to new liabilities.57 Developed 
states have been the targets o f numerous claims under investment treaties, especially 
under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), where a raft o f claims against 
the U.S. by Canadian investors prompted a debate in the U.S. Congress and 
Administration about the American investment treaty program.58 To a lesser degree,
54 M.E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 548-9, 
670-1 and 678-80; UNCTAD, ibid., 139, note 138; M.P. Todaro and S.C. Smith, Economic 
Development, 8th ed. (Harlow: Pearson, 2003), 638-44.
55 UNCTAD, supra note 28, xviii (reporting that TNCs from developing countries’ share of 
global FDI flows rose from less than 6% in the mid-1980s to 11% in the late 1990s, before 
falling to 7% during 2001-03. Some developing countries invest more abroad than some 
developed ones: Singapore (36% of gross fixed capital formations during 2001-03), Chile 
(7%), and Malaysia (5%), compared to the U.S. (7%), Germany (4%), and Japan (3%)).
56 Muchlinski, supra note 28, 30; UNCTAD, supra note 28, xix (reporting that the U.S. was the 
world’s largest FDI recipient until 2003, when it was surpassed by China).
57 UNCTAD, supra note 28,238, note 15; G. Xiao, “People’s Republic of China’s Round- 
Tripping FDI: Scale, Causes and Implications”, Asian Development Bank Institute 
Discussion Paper No. 6 (ADB, 2004), 6.
58 This led to the modification of the U.S. Administration’s trade negotiating authority under 
the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of2002, Div. B, Title XXI, Trade Act of2002, Pub. 
L. No. 107-210,116 U.S.C. 933, s. 2102(3) (2002), and to some limitations on the scope and 
substance of investor protection in the Singapore-United States Free Trade Agreement, 6 May 2003 
(2003), online: USTR
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade Agreements /Bilateral/Singapore FTA/Final Texts/Section I 
ndex.html: the Chile-United States Free Trade Agreement, 6 June 2003 (2003), online: USTR 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade Agreements/Bilateral/Chile FTA/Final Texts/Section Index, 
html: and the Central American Free Trade Agreement, 20 December 1993 (not in force), 32 
I.L.M. 605. L. Sek, “Fast-Track Authority for Trade Agreements (Trade Promotion 
Authority): Background and Developments in the 107th Congress” (CRS Report to U.S.
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there are pressures within major capital-exporting states to moderate investor 
protection in order to preserve space for domestic policy-making in labour regulation 
and environmental protection. This follows the belated realization in many countries 
that the implications o f investment treaties based on compulsory investment 
arbitration are more extensive and perhaps less one-sided than once thought.59 In 
these circumstances, the distinction between capital-exporting and capital-importing 
states has been undermined.
Even so, the homogenizing trend can be understated. Is it so surprising that a 
major industrialized country can be the subject of investor claims in a world o f large 
and diversified multinational enterprises and deregulated capital flows? The broad 
scope and jurisdictional flexibility o f investment treaties facilitates this outcome. Most 
importantly, the international negotiating agenda for investment treaties is still largely 
directed by major capital-exporting states.60 As such, one should not downplay the 
distinct positions that different states occupy within the system o f investment 
arbitration as well as the dynamic o f inter-state competition in a global economy.61 
The most common scenario remains that o f the developing country which concludes 
an investment treaty with a capital-exporting state, for which the developing country 
is not itself a significant source o f investment.62 In this scenario, the developing 
country assumes significant liabilities and constraints, backed by the threat o f a 
potentially crippling damages award, without receiving direct legal advantages for its 
own nationals. Many governments conclude that the benefits o f encouraging 
investment outweigh the liabilities that flow from investment arbitration, but this does
Congress, 17 January 2002), 1-2; R. Singh, “The Impact of the Central American Free Trade 
Agreement on Investment Treaty Arbitrations: A Mouse that Roars?” (2004) 21 J. Int’l Arb. 
329, 329-34.
59 D. Brown, “Commentary” in L.R. Dawson, ed., Whose Rights? The N AFTA Chapter 11 
Debate (Ottawa: Centre for Trade Law and Policy, 2002), 40-1.
60 Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 21,12; Muchlinski, supra note 10,1049.
61 Y. Dezaley and B. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the 
Construction of a Transnational Legal Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 7; P.G. 
Cemy, “Paradox of the Competition State: the Dynamics of Political Globalization” (1997) 
32 Gov’t and Opposition 251, 259-67; Smythe, supra note 37, 3-4; Kozul-Wright and 
Rowthom, supra note 46; Deblock and Brunelle, supra note 46, 9-10 and 21-4.
62 Kozul-Wright and Rowthom, supra note 46, 88; J.A. Soloway, “Environmental Regulation 
as Expropriation: The Case of NAFTA’s Chapter 11” (2000) 33 Can. Bus. L.J. 92, 99; 
UNCTAD, supra note 53,95.
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not alter the fact that, in legal terms, the bargain is one-sided.63 Extended to over 
2,000 investment treaties, the present system rigorously regulates capital-importing 
states without imposing obligations on capital-exporting states in relation to outward 
investment, or on investors themselves. Moreover, if the purpose is to attract new 
investment, why do investment treaties apply to existing investments?64 Why would 
host state wish to assume extensive new liabilities in relation to investments already 
secured?
So, why did developing countries sign so many investment treaties in the last 
two decades? Put differently, why did states exercise their sovereign authority by 
consenting to investment arbitration and by reducing their ability to regulate 
multinational enterprises? First, the question o f the role o f multinational enterprises in 
the domestic economy has evolved from a somewhat speculative and jingoistic debate 
in the 1960s and 1970s to a more informed discussion o f the costs and benefits o f 
foreign investment.65 Further, the 1990s witnessed a stronger commitment to 
economic integration and liberalization in many countries,66 and in international 
financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.67 This 
created political conditions favouring the conclusion o f investment treaties while 
prompting other reforms that enable or encourage foreign investment, including the 
removal o f capital controls and widespread privatization o f state-owned assets.68 In 
many countries, large numbers of BITs were concluded in a short period after 
governments adopted a liberal economic policy, based on the promotion of foreign 
investment and a commitment to a high level of investor protection.69 There is no
63 Wilson, supra note 21, 286; Walker, supra note 21, 243-4; UNCTAD, supra note 31,144.
64 Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 21, 46.
65 T.J. Farer, “Economic Development Agreements: A Functional Analysis” (1971) 10 Colum. 
J. Transn’l L. 200, 200; Hart, supra note 33, 78-84; UNCTAD, supra note 2,131-2; Muchlinski, 
supra note 28,11; A. Mody and A.P. Murshid, “Growing Up with Capital Flows” (IMF 
Working Paper, Doc. No. WP/02/75, 2002), 3-5.
66 Muchlinski, supra note 28,10-11 and 93; Kelsey, supra note 46,158.
67 UNCTAD, supra note 2,131-2; D. Kalderimis, “IMF Conditionality as Investment 
Regulation: A Theoretical Analysis” (2004) 13 Social & Leg. Studies 103,107.
68 K. Williams, “British Re-Nationalization and Regulation: The Government’s liability to 
Shareholders” (1993) 14 U. Penn. J. Int’l Bus. L. 243, 243-4; Muchlinski, supra note 28, 10-11 
and 203-4.
69 E.g. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina (Jurisdiction) (17 July 2003), 
42 I.L.M. 788 [hereinafter CMS], para. 60 (noting that, in the early 1990s, invitations from 
Argentina to foreign investors to purchase state assets expressly mentioned the protection
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hard evidence to show that the conclusion of BITs actually brings in new foreign 
investment70 but, even if there was, it is still remarkable that international business has 
heralded the advantages o f investor protection since the 1920s and yet only in the 
1980s and 1990s did its lobbying efforts bear real fruit
This indicates that structural factors coalesced in the 1980s and 1990s to 
intensify the pressure on developing countries to attract foreign private capital.71 The 
most important factors are the legacy o f capital flight, tight international credit and 
Third World debt crisis, the loss of bargaining options after the fall o f the Soviet bloc, 
and reductions in Western official aid.72 In this context, the increasing mobility of 
capital put international capital in a stronger position to demand legal concessions 
from host states. Added to this was pressure from financial institutions, both public 
and private, and from capital-exporting states.73 For example, the World Bank and 
IMF generally link their evaluation of a country’s creditworthiness and policy 
compliance to its level o f openness to foreign investment.74 Also, capital-exporting 
states have tied the availability o f national insurance for foreign investment to the
available to foreign investors under BITs). Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 21,12; World 
Bank, World Development Report 2005 (Washington, D.C.: IBRD, 2004), 176-8.
70 M. Hallward-Driemeier, “Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct 
Investment? Only a Bit... and They Could Bite”, World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 3121 (Washington: World Bank, June 2003), 4-5 and 22-3; J. Hewko, “Foreign 
Direct Investment — Does the Rule of Law Matter?” (Report to the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, Rules of Law Series, Report No. 26, April 2002), 6-9; Been and 
Beauvais, supra note 32,122-4.
71 Smythe, supra note 37, 5-8; K.J. Vandevelde, “Sustainable Liberalism and the International 
Investment Regime” (1998) 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 373, 386-90; A. Walter, “Globalisation and 
Policy Convergence: the Case of Direct Investment Rules” in R.A. Higgott et al., eds., Non- 
State victors and Authority in the Global System (London: Roudedge, 2000).
72 Fatouros, supra note 22, 795; Hart, supra note 33, 79; UNCTAD, Trends in International 
Investment Agreements: A n Overview, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements (New York: United Nations, 1999), 29-30; S. Haggard, Developing Nations and the 
Politics of Global Integration (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995), 6-7; C. Thomas, 
“Balance-of-Payments Crises in the Developing World: Balanced Trade, Finance and 
Development in the New Economic Order” (2000) 15 Am. U. Int’l L.R. 1249,1263; M. 
Somarajah, The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes (Boston: Kluwer, 2001), 12.
73 Peter, supra note 21, 388; Bhagwati, supra note 52,11-12.
74 L.C. Situmbeko and J. Jones Zulu, “Zambia: Condemned to debt” (Report by the World 
Development Movement, April 2004), 52 (reporting that Zambia’s Investment Act of 1993, 
which increased legal protection for foreign investors, was introduced as a condition of a 
World Bank privatization and structural reform credit that year).
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existence o f an investment treaty with the recipient state.75 Overall, these conditions 
expanded the clout and prestige o f private investors in a world o f many states, most 
o f whom compete eagerly (or desperately) to attract investment and promote “their 
own” multinational enterprises.76
A particularly compelling explanation for the expansion o f investment 
arbitration lies in the dynamic of inter-state competition.77 States conclude investment 
treaties to attract investment, but the degree to which any one treaty makes a state 
more attractive to investors depends on the degree to which the treaty offers more 
favourable treatment than that provided by competing investment destinations. States 
with less to offer in terms of their domestic market, resources, or workforce must 
compensate by conceding more in terms of legal protection in order to attract 
investment.78 The trade off is that these states are then left with a narrower range of 
policy options to support domestic development or respond to wider competitive 
pressures in relation to levels o f taxation, subsidization, and regulation o f capital 
generally.79 Cumulatively, the proliferation of investment treaties intensifies the 
pressures on states to attract capital by liberalizing investment standards. Likewise, the 
conclusion of a series of “high standard” investment treaties by capital-exporting 
states in one region pressures other capital-exporting states to obtain comparable 
protections for their own international firms. As more states accept investor-friendly
751. Delupis, Finance and Protection of Investments in Developing Countries (Epping: Gower Press,
1973), 37 and 136-50; Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 21, 12 and 156-7; C.K. Dalrymple, 
“Politics and Foreign Direct Investment: The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and 
the Calvo Clause” (1996) 29 Cornell Int’l L.J. 161,186; Muchlinski, supra note 28, 514-19.
76 K.J. Vandevelde, “The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty” (1998) 92 AJIL 
621, 633-5; O. Morrissey, “Investment and Competition Policy in the WTO: Issues for 
Developing Countries” (2001) 20 Development Policy Rev. 63, 64-5.
77 W.W. Bratton et al., “Introduction: Regulatory Competition and Institutional Evolution” in 
W.W. Bratton et al., eds., International Psgulatory Competition and Coordination (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1996), 4,13-14, 49 and 54-5; Y. Dezaley, “Between the State, Law, and the 
Market: The Social and Professional Stakes in the Construction and Definition of a 
Regulatory Arena” in W.W. Bratton et al., eds., International Regulatoiy Competition and 
Coordination (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 61-2; S. Picciotto, supra note 38, 92-3.
78 Walter, supra note 71; Been and Beauvais, supra note 32,121.
79 Kozul-Wright and Rowthom, supra note 46, 86-7; S. Sassen, “Losing Control? The State 
and the New Geography of Power?” (1999) 1 Global Dialogue 78, 83-7; Muchlinski, supra 
note 28, 222-3; R.S. Avi-Yonah, “Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of 
the Welfare State” (2000) 113 Harv. L.R. 1573, 1575-9; Prakash, supra note 49, 514-15.
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rules, the bar rises as to what qualifies as a hospitable climate for investment.80 The 
result is a bidding up o f state concessions to international capital.81
No doubt, each individual country will have specific reasons for concluding an 
investment treaty. Conclusive findings about negotiating trends in the 1990s would 
require more detailed comparative study of specific countries and treaties, which is 
beyond the scope o f this thesis. The factors identified here are not intended to explain 
outright the recent wave of investment treaties although they do provide context for 
the emergence o f investment arbitration. The discussion now turns to the evolution 
o f the relevant treaty framework.
B. The evolution of the treaty framework
The emerging system o f investment arbitration is based on bilateral and regional 
investment treaties in which states consent to compulsory investment arbitration. 
However, these investment treaties also incorporate existing arbitration treaties (most 
importantly, the New York Convention o f 1958 and the ICSID Convention o f 1965) in 
order to provide an institutional forum and procedural framework for investment 
arbitration, and to authorize domestic recognition and enforcement82 o f arbitration 
awards. Such arbitration treaties pre-date contemporary investment treaties because, 
conventionally, the use of international adjudication to resolve disputes involving 
private individuals was generally restricted to commercial disputes. For this reason, in 
this section, the examination of the evolution o f the system of investment arbitration 
begins with a review o f the treaty framework for international commercial arbitration. 
The examination then reviews how the structure o f international commercial 
arbitration was transplanted to the arbitration o f investment disputes in the public sphere, 
marking the emergence of investment arbitration as a governing arrangement.
80 Been and Beauvais, supra note 32,124. A dynamic of inter-state competition is written into 
investment treaties themselves through the most-favoured-nation treatment standard, which 
requires states to make commitments under one investment treaty available under others.
This establishes a systemic assumption in favour of expanding protection to investors as a 
wider group.
81 A.T. Guzman, “Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties” (1998) 38 Va. J. Int’l L. 639, 671-2.
82 Supra note 6.
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1. The establishment of international commercial arbitration
During the twentieth century, states progressively recognized arbitration as an 
institution for the resolution of commercial disputes. In doing so, their main purpose 
was not to regulate the exercise of public authority but to facilitate international 
commerce. In the beginning, 17 states — mosdy in Europe — signed the Geneva Protocol 
of 192383 which was drawn up at the League of Nations in response to an initiative by 
the International Chamber of Commerce.84 In this treaty, states parties agreed to 
recognize agreements by private parties based in different jurisdictions to submit 
future disputes between them to binding arbitration.85 At the same time, states 
qualified this arrangement by agreeing to enforce an award only if the award was 
made within their own territory and by limiting the treaty to commercial disputes.86 
This preserved domestic judicial control over the scope o f international commercial 
arbitration, including the degree to which it could displace domestic courts’ authority 
over regulatory disputes; i.e. disputes arising from the exercise o f public authority.
The ambit of international commercial arbitration was expanded in the Geneva 
Convention of 192787 in which the states parties agreed to enforce arbitration awards 
made in each other’s territory.88 This internationalized the enforcement o f arbitration 
awards by allowing a successful disputing party to enforce an award against assets of 
the losing party in the territory of any state party to the treaty.89 Arbitration awards 
became portable; they could be used to chase a losing party’s assets in different 
jurisdictions. Nonetheless, international commercial arbitration remained subject to 
important restrictions.90 To enforce an award, the successful party had to demonstrate
83 Protocol on Arbitration Clauses in Commercial Matters, 24 September 1923, 20 AJIL 194 (1926) 
(entered into force 28 July 1924) [hereinafter Geneva Protocol of 1923].
84 A. Nussbaum, “Treaties on Commercial Arbitration” (1942) 56 Harv. L.R. 219, 221-2 and 
234-6; Redfem and Hunter, supra note 6, 66.
85 Geneva Protocol of 1923, supra note 83, art. 1 and 4.
86 Redfem and Hunter, supra note 6,18 and 136-7.
87 Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 26 September 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 302, 27 
AJIL 1 (1929) (entered into force 25 July 1929) [hereinafter Geneva Convention of 1927].
88 Nussbaum, supra note 84.
89 Redfem and Hunter, supra note 6,14-16 and 67.
90 Redfem and Hunter, supra note 6, 67 and 454-5 (noting that the award was enforceable 
only if (1) the award was made pursuant to an agreement to which the Geneva Protocol of 1923
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that the award was consistent with the laws o f the state in which enforcement was 
sought as well as the state in which the arbitration was held.91 Also the subject matter 
o f the award had to be “capable of settlement” under the law o f the state in which 
enforcement was sought.92 Finally, states retained the right to limit their enforcement 
obligations to commercial disputes.93
In the early 1950s, the International Chamber o f Commerce lobbied for a 
more ambitious treaty to replace the Geneva Convention of 1927. In 1958, the United, 
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards was 
concluded in New York (the Neiv York Convention).94 The treaty’s negotiating history 
reflects a tension between expanding the recognition o f commercial arbitration and 
the preservation of domestic judicial autonomy. In the words o f the United Nations 
drafting committee:95
it would be desirable to establish a new convention which, while going further 
than the Geneva Convention in facilitating the enforcement o f foreign arbitral 
awards, would at the same time maintain generally recognized principles of 
justice and respect the sovereign rights of States.
To facilitate international commercial arbitration, the New York Convention expanded 
the scope for the enforcement of arbitration awards. The states parties undertook to 
recognize arbitration agreements that dealt with future disputes arising out o f a 
defined legal relationship, whether or not the relationship was contractual.96 Also, the 
New York Convention removed the requirement that an award had to comply with the 
laws of the state in which enforcement was sought. Instead, an award had to comply
applied and (2) the award was made in the territory of a state party, and (3) the parties to the 
award were subject to the jurisdiction of one of the states parties to the Geneva Convention of 
1927).
91 Geneva Convention of 1927, supra note 87, art. 1(c).
92 Geneva Convention of 1927, ibid., art. 1(b). Also, the award had to be consistent with the 
agreement to arbitrate and with the applicable procedural rules (art. 1(c) and 2(c)), and 
recognition and enforcement had to be consistent with the public policy and the principles of 
law of the country where enforcement was sought (art. 1(e)).
93 See the list of reservations by the states parties in (1929) 27 AJIL 1,11.
94 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 10 June 
1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 7 June 1959) [hereinafter New York Convention]. See 
A.J. Van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958 (Antwerp: Kluwer, 1981).
95 Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, UN ESC, 19th Sess., 
UN Doc. E/AC.42/4/Rev.l (28 March 1955), 5.
96 New York Convention, supra note 94, art. II. 1 and II.3. Redfem and Hunter, supra note 6,139.
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only with the laws o f the state in which the arbitration was held, subject to basic 
standards o f consent and due process. By agreeing to enforce awards on this basis, 
states relinquished judicial control over awards made in other jurisdictions. Mainly for 
this reason, the New York Convention has been described as “the single most important 
pillar on which the edifice of international arbitration rests” and as “perhaps... the 
most effective instance of international legislation in the entire history o f commercial 
law7’.97 Today, the New York Convention has wide geographic coverage: more than 120 
states have ratified the treaty, offering a smorgasbord of jurisdictions in which the 
successful party in an arbitration can seek enforcement o f an award against assets of 
the losing party.
Even so, the New York Convention fell short o f the International Chamber of 
Commerce’s proposal for a “fully international” award that would be globally 
enforceable without interference by any domestic court or legislature, even in the 
jurisdiction where the arbitration was held.98 Moreover, award enforcement under the 
New York Convention remained limited to disputes that were deemed capable of 
settlement by arbitration, and to awards that were consistent with the public policy of 
the country where enforcement was sought.99 Thus, domestic courts retained broad 
authority to limit the enforcement o f arbitration awards. Finally, the treaty continued 
to permit states to limit their obligations to commercial disputes.100
Domestic courts in different countries interpreted these restrictions on the 
scope of international commercial arbitration in different ways.101 This led to renewed 
efforts to harmonize domestic laws on international commercial arbitration.102 To this 
end, in 1985, the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
97 Quoting, respectively, G. Wetter, “The Present Status of the International Court of 
Arbitration of the ICC: An Appraisal” (1990) 1 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 91, 93; M.J. Mustill, 
“Arbitration: History and Background” (1989) 6 J. Int’l Arb. 43, 43.
98 Redfem and Hunter, supra note 6, 67, note 58.
99 New York Convention, supra note 94, art. 11(1) and V(2)(a) and (b).
100 New York Convention, supra note 94, art. 1(3). This was one of two permitted reservations. 
The other was a reciprocity reservation by which states could limit recognition to awards 
made in states that also recognized the treaty. By 2001, 39 of 125 states parties had entered a 
commercial reservation and 68 had entered a reciprocity reservation.
101 Note by the Secretariat: Further Work in respect of International Commercial Arbitration, UN, UN 
Doc. A/CN.9/169 (11 May 1979), 109.
102 Report of the Secretary-General: Analytical Compilation of Comments by Governments and International 
Organisations on the Draft Text of a Model Taw on International Commercial Arbitration, UN, UN 
Doc. A/CN.9/263 and Add. 1-3 (1985) [hereinafter Comments by Government,ir], 84.
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produced the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.103 The purpose of 
the Model Law was to facilitate the recognition and enforcement o f foreign 
arbitration awards. The Model Law can be adopted by states in their domestic 
legislation to establish a special regime for international commercial arbitration under 
domestic law.104 The Model Law requires courts to recognize and enforce an 
arbitration award “irrespective of the country in which it was made” and without any 
requirement for reciprocity, subject to minimum requirements o f consent and due 
process.105 Further, the Model Law adopted flexible definitions o f the terms 
“international” and “commercial” and explicitly gave arbitration tribunals the power 
to rule on their own jurisdiction.106 Importantly, the Model Law extended the New 
York Convention's provisions that limited judicial discretion to refuse recognition and 
enforcement of an award, in the place o f enforcement, to encompass the setting aside 
of awards in the place o f arbitration.107 In these respects, the Model Law addressed a 
number o f business complaints about domestic judicial supervision o f commercial 
arbitration under the New York Convention.108
Since the Model Law was published, roughly 40 developed and developing 
states have used it to reform their legislation on commercial arbitration in order to 
provide for greater deference by domestic courts to foreign arbitration awards.109 By
103 Model Caw on International Commercial Arbitration, 21 June 1985, UNCITRAL, UN Doc. 
A/40/17, Annex I, 24 I.L.M. 1302 [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law]. Comments by 
Governments, ibid., 84.
104 Report of the Secretary-General: Analytical Commentary on Draft Text of a Model Taw on 
International Commercial Arbitration, UN, UN Doc. A/CN.9/264 (25 March 1985), 16 Y.B. 
UNCITRAL 104 [hereinafter Model Caw Reporf[, 7.
105 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 103, art. 34-6. Redfem and Hunter, supra note 6, 67.
106 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 103, art. 1(3) and 16. art. 1(3).
107 Mustill, supra note 97, 52.
108 Report of the Secretary-General: Possible Features of a Model Caw on International Commercial 
Arbitration, UN, UN Doc. A/CN.9/207 (14 May 1981), (1981) 12 Y.B. UNCITRAL 77.
109 Mustill, supra note 97, 51-3; M. Tenenbaum, “International Arbitration of Trade Disputes 
in Mexico — The Arrival of the NAFTA and New Reforms to the Commercial Code” (1995) 
12 J. Int’l Arb. 53, 59-60 and 73-4; S. Kierstead, “Referral to Arbitration Under Article 8 of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law: The Canadian Approach” (1998) 31 Can. Bus. L.J. 98, 99-102; 
L. Biucovic, “Impact of the Adoption of the Model Law in Canada: Creating a New 
Environment for International Arbitration” (1998) 30 Can. Bus. L.J. 376, 381; K.-H. 
Bockstiegel, “An Introduction to the New German Arbitration Act Based on the 
UNCITRAL Model Law” (1998) 14 Arb. Int’l 19, 28-31; Redfem and Hunter, supra note 6, 
69; H. Smit and V. Pechota, World Arbitration Reporter; vol. 2 (Huntington, N.Y.: Juris, 2002); 
R. Nishikawa, “Arbitration Law Reform in Japan” (2004) 21 J. Int’l Arb. 303, 305-6. The list 
of grounds upon which an award may be set aside by a domestic court under the
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promoting a more uniform approach to enforcement, the Model Law enhanced the 
portability of awards under the New York Convention. That said, states can still limit the 
Model Law to commercial disputes and thus to the private realm.110
Before publishing the Model Law, the UN Commission on International 
Trade Law sought to promote international commercial arbitration by producing the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 1976.111 The UNCITRAL Rules are worth a 
mention because they are often incorporated into investment treaties to provide a 
procedural framework for investor claims.112 As such, the UNCITRAL Rules may 
govern the conduct o f investment arbitrations, including important matters such as 
the appointment of arbitrators, the selection o f the jurisdictional seat o f the 
arbitration, the openness o f the proceedings, and the binding nature o f an award. In 
general, the UNCITRAL Rules are similar to other sets o f arbitration rules113 that are 
incorporated into investment treaties.114 In particular, like other rules, the 
UNCITRAL Rules were intended for use in contract-based arbitration relating to
UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 103, art. 36, was imported from the list of grounds upon 
which an award may be denied recognition and enforcement under the New York Convention, 
supra note 94, art. V.
110 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 103, art. 1(1).
111 Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Taw, UN G.A. Res. 
31/98, UN GAOR, 31st Session, Supp. No. 17, UN Doc. A/31/17, c. V, s. C (1976) 
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules], preamble (stating that the UNCITRAL Rules were adopted 
as a set of “rules for ad hoc arbitration that are acceptable in countries with different legal, 
social and economic systems” and that “would significantly contribute to the development of 
harmonious economic relations”).
112 UNCTAD, Dispute Settlement: Investor-State, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements (New York: United Nations, 2003), 35.
113 ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings in ICSID, revised 26 September 1984 and 
1 January 2003 (original rules 1968), reprinted in Convention, Regulations and Rules (Washington: 
ICSID, 2003) [hereinafter ICSID Rules], 93, online: ICSID
www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm: Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the 
Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, revised 1 January 2003 (original rules 1978), 1 ICSID Reports 213 [hereinafter 
ICSID Additional Facility Rules], online: ICSID www.worldbank.org/icsid/facilitv- 
archive/l.htm: Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, revised 1 January 
1998 (original rules 1922) [hereinafter ICC Rules], online: ICC
www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/ rules.asp: and Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, revised 1 April 1999 [hereinafter Stockholm Rules], online:
SCC www.sccinstitute.com/uk/Rules.
114 The most important difference between the UNCITRAL Rules and other sets of rules is 
that the former are not connected to an established institutional structure. Muchlinski, supra 
note 28, 540.
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international trade and, as such, they provide a further example o f how investment 
arbitration relies on an adjudicative model that originates in commercial arbitration.115
By concluding the New York Convention, complemented by the UNCITRAL 
Model Law and other instruments,116 states established arbitration as an institution for 
the resolution o f international disputes -  primarily commercial in nature -  between 
private parties.117 As such, international commercial arbitration was conventionally 
limited to relations within the private sphere. As a private or alternative method of 
adjudication, arbitration could be subject to the preferences o f the disputing parties, 
thus allowing for the use o f rules o f confidentiality, and arbitrator appointment and 
remuneration, that differed from those of public courts.118 Most importantly, the New 
York Convention established a space in which arbitration could operate beyond the 
direct control o f domestic courts.119 That said, the extent to which commercial 
arbitration could be used to resolve public disputes was controlled by domestic courts. 
In particular, the jurisdiction o f a commercial arbitration tribunal did not extend to 
regulatory disputes arising from the state’s exercise o f public authority with respect to 
foreign nationals, including foreign investors. One o f the key aspects o f the emerging 
system o f investment arbitration is that it extends this private adjudicative model into 
the public sphere, giving private arbitrators the authority to make governmental 
decisions. Put differently, international commercial arbitration provided the 
foundation for the use o f a private model o f adjudication to resolve regulatory 
disputes between private individuals and the state.
115 E.g. Report of the Secretary General: Preliminary Draft Set of Arbitration Rulesfor Optional Use in 
A d  Hoc Arbitration Relating to International Trade (UNCITRAJL Arbitration Rades), UN, UN Doc. 
A/CN.9/97 (4 November 1974), 6 Y.B. UNCITRAL 163,164.
116 E.g. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, 21 April 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 
364 (applying to international arbitrations whether or not the states from which the parties 
come are European); Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, 30 January 
1975,14 I.L.M. 336 (modelled on the New York Convention and applying to various Latin 
American countries that have not ratified the New York Convention).
117 Abbott, supra note 22,139; M. Somarajah, “The UNCITRAL Model Law: A Third World 
Viewpoint” (1989) 6 J. Int’l Arb. 7,14; Redfem and Hunter, supra note 6, 68-69 and 475-7.
118 S. de Smith and R. Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Taw, 8th ed. (London: Penguin, 
1998), 370 and 374.
119 Redfem and Hunter, supra note 6,137.
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2. The expansion into the regulatory sphere
The first multilateral treaty in which states authorized the expansion o f compulsory 
international arbitration to encompass regulatory disputes between states and foreign 
investors was the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes o f 1965 (the ICSID  
Convention).1120 Moreover, the ICSID Convention played an important role in promoting 
the use o f investment arbitration by establishing a forum — the World Bank’s 
International Centre for Settlement o f Investment Disputes (ICSID) -  and a set o f 
arbitration rules dedicated to investment arbitration.121 Importandy, many investment 
treaties delegate to the ICSID Secretary General the authority to appoint presiding 
arbitrators o f investment arbitration tribunals, where the disputing parties do not 
otherwise agree.122 There is also an ICSID Secretariat to register and administer 
arbitrations, and a process for the annulment of awards which replaces domestic 
judicial review o f investment arbitration awards.123 More broadly, ICSID was 
established within the World Bank to add weight to ICSID awards, given the World 
Bank’s influence over international credit.124
Before examining the role of the ICSID Convention in the expansion o f 
international commercial arbitration into the public realm, it is important to address a 
key issue in investment arbitration: the state’s consent. States can consent to the 
international arbitration o f future investment disputes in three ways: by contract, by 
domestic legislation, and by treaty.125 The form of a state’s consent is important 
because it correlates strongly with the positioning o f investment arbitration in the 
private or the public sphere. First, a state can accept a compulsory arbitration clause
120 Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 18 March 1965, 4 I.L.M. 524 (entered into 
force 14 Oct 1966) [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. A. Broches, “Development of 
International Law by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development” (1965) 
59 Am. Soc’ty Int’l L. Proc. 33, 34-8; M. Hirsh, The Arbitration Mechanism of the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), 11-15; 
Muchlinski, supra note 28, 540-2; J.G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, 3rd ed. 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1998), 113; UNCTAD, supra note 43,115. See generally C. Schreuer, The 
ICSID Convention: A  Commentary (Cambridge: CUP, 2001).
121 ICSID Rules, supra note 113. A.R. Parra, “The Role of ICSID in the Settlement of 
Investment” (1999) 16(1) ICSID News 5.
122 E.g. NAFTA, infra note 156, art. 1124(1).
123 Muchlinski, supra note 28, 551-3.
124 Delupis, supra note 75, 3; Peter, supra note 21, 321; Redfem and Hunter, supra note 6, 445.
125 Parra, supra note 121; UNCTAD, supra note 112, 53.
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in a contract with a foreign investor, in which case the state typically acts in a private 
capacity and the state’s consent is limited to a commercial relationship with another 
private party.126 Second, a state can consent to investment arbitration by enacting a 
law that authorizes foreign investors to submit any investment dispute with the state 
to compulsory international arbitration.127 Third, a state can conclude a treaty that 
likewise provides for the compulsory arbitration o f disputes with foreign investors.128 
In the latter two cases, the state consents generally to compulsory investment 
arbitration, pursuant to either domestic law or international law.129 The state’s consent 
is general because it authorizes the compulsory arbitration o f any future dispute 
concerning the state’s exercise of public authority in relation to a foreign investor. 
These issues are discussed in more detail in chapter six o f this thesis. Suffice it to say 
here that the general consent essentially transforms investment arbitration from a sub­
category of commercial arbitration, based on a reciprocal legal relationship between 
the disputing parties, into a type o f governing arrangement.
This thesis focuses on treaty-based investment arbitration because it involves 
the use o f investment arbitration as a governing arrangement at the international level. 
Unlike contract-based investment arbitration, which relies on the specific consents of 
private parties to a contract, treaty-based investment arbitration is based on a general 
consent by the state and thus forms part o f the state’s governing apparatus. 
Legislation-based investment arbitration, on the other hand, entails the use of 
international arbitration as a governing arrangement. However, unlike treaty-based
126 Early ICSID arbitrations were all founded on consents recorded, in the traditional manner, 
by a clause in an investment contract. E.g. Holiday Inns S A . v. Morocco (Jurisdiction) (12 May
1974), 1 ICSID Rep. 645; Kaiser Bauxite Company sr. Jamaica (Jurisdiction) (6 July 1975), 1 
ICSID Rep. 296; Adriano Gardella v. Cote d’Ivoire (Merits) (29 August 1979), 1 ICSID Rep.
283; AGIP S.pA. v. People’s Republic of Congo (Merits) (30 November 1979), 1 ICSID Rep. 306, 
21 I.L.M. 726.
127 E.g. Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt (Jurisdiction) (14 
April 1988), 3 ICSID Rep. 131 [hereinafter SPP\, 161. See Parra, supra note 121 (noting that, 
during 1965-1999, 30 countries included references to ICSID in domestic investment 
legislation).
128 E.g. Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v. Sri Lanka (Merits) (27 June 1990), 4 ICSID 
Rep. 246, 30 I.L.M. 577 [hereinafter AAPL], para. 2-6.
129 J. Paulsson, “Arbitration without Privity” (1995) 10 ICSID Rev. 232,233 and 240. When 
the consent is given in domestic legislation, it is subject to domestic law and can be 
withdrawn or amended according to domestic law: Delupis, supra note 75, 27. On the other 
hand, when the consent is given in a treaty, it is subject to the terms of the treaty and can 
only be withdrawn or amended with the consent of the states parties or by abrogation of the 
treaty.
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investment arbitration, the state’s consent is subject to domestic public law and 
therefore it does not establish an international obligation on the part o f the state to 
accept compulsory investment arbitration. These aspects o f the state’s consent 
distinguish treaty-based investment arbitration as a governing arrangement, 
established at the international level, and as the subject of this thesis.
This returns us to the ICSID Convention. For ICSID to have jurisdiction over 
an investment dispute, the state and the investor must both consent to the arbitration, 
whether by contract, statute, or treaty.130 In the latter two cases, where the authority 
for international arbitration comes from a state’s general consent, ICSID arbitration 
enters the public sphere in a way that international commercial arbitration under the 
New York Convention never did. Indeed, this is the m ost important aspect o f the ICSID  
Convention', it laid a foundation for states to extend investment arbitration beyond the 
private realm and use it as a governing arrangement.
In the negotiation of the New York Convention during the 1950s there were 
proposals to expand international commercial arbitration by explicitly broadening the 
treaty’s definition of the term “commercial”. These proposals were motivated largely 
by the growing importance of state entities in international trade.131 Negotiators from 
Western states, in particular, pressed for a treaty that would clearly apply, not only to 
private companies, but also to state agencies when they entered into international 
contracts.132 In the end, the treaty applied to state agencies, although states could limit 
their obligations to disputes arising out of commercial relationships.133 Also, the treaty
130 Schreuer, supra note 120,191-224.
131 Besides this factor, some states and the International Chamber of Commerce took the 
view that the use of the term commercial in the Geneva Protocol of 1927 was uncertain and that 
this made it difficult for the parties to an arbitration agreement to predict whether their 
agreement would be upheld: e.g. Comments by Governments on the draft Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement ofForeign Arbitral Awards, UN ESC, UN Doc. E/2822/Add.4 (3 April 1956), 4 
(comment by the United Kingdom); Report by the Secretary-General on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Annex I and II, UN ESC, 21st Sess., UN Doc. E/2822 
(31 January 1956) [hereinafter Award Enforcement Report], 13 (Annex I, comment by 
Switzerland) and 7 (Annex II, comment by the ICC).
132 E.g. Award Enforcement Report, ibid., 11 (Annex I, comment by Austria).
133 Although this should not be taken to mean that the treaty was intended to encompass the 
public sphere for those states that did not make such a reservation. The negotiating history 
of the New York Convention indicates that this was not the intention: e.g. Report of the Committee 
on the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, UN ESC, UN Doc. E/AC.42/SR.3 (Third 
Meeting, 23 March 1955) [hereinafter Draft Convention Rjepori\, 6 (comment by Belgium);
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negotiators reported that the treaty’s application to state entities did not need to be 
expressly limited to cases in which the state was acting in a private capacity because 
such language “would be superfluous and that a reference in the present report [of the 
drafting committee] would suffice”.134 Therefore, to the extent the New York 
Convention encompassed disputes involving state entities, it was broadly limited to 
cases in which the state acted in a private capacity.135 As such, the New York Convention 
encompassed contract-based investment arbitration, but did not extend to investment 
arbitration in the public sphere based on the general consent.
Unlike the New York Convention, the ICSID Convention does not limit ICSID 
arbitration to commercial disputes between investors and states, thus allowing the use 
of investment arbitration as a governing arrangement. In particular, the ICSID  
Convention extends the jurisdiction o f ICSID tribunals to “any legal dispute arising 
directly out o f an investment”136 but without defining the term “investment”.137 As a 
result, the scope o f ICSID arbitration is left to the contract, statute, or treaty that 
authorizes the arbitration and, in most investment treaties, the term “investment” is
Award Enforcement Report, ibid., 23 (Annex II, comment by the Society of Comparative 
Legislation) and 5-6 (comment by the ICC).
134 Quoting Draft Convention Report, ibid., 7. The negotiating history of Article I of the New 
York Convention reveals an intention both to extend the treaty to the commercial activities of 
state agencies and to limit the treaty to the private sphere: e.g. Award Enforcement Report, ibid.,
11 (Annex I, comment by Austria) and 9 (Annex II, comment by the Society of Comparative 
Legislation); Draft Convention Report, ibid., 7 (comment by Belgium).
135 Tension about the appropriate scope of international commercial arbitration also arose 
during negotiation of the UNCITRAL Model Law with respect to definition of the term 
commercial: Comments by Governments, supra note 102, 57 (comment by the United States) and 
57-8 (comment by UNCTAD). The compromise that was reached was to avoid either 
defining the term commercial in the text of the Model Law or leaving the definition to 
domestic law, as in the case of the New York Convention. Instead, a footnote was included with 
art. 1(1) to provide guidance on the possible meaning of the term, which stated, inter alia, that 
commercial relationships included “investment” (ModelLaw Report, supra note 104,11). The 
inclusion of this language in a footnote rather than the text highlighted the discretion of 
states to decide for themselves whether to include an expanded definition in their domestic 
legislation. See also Model Law Report, supra note 104,10; Comments by Governments, supra note 
102, 84 (comment by the ICC).
136 ICSID Convention, supra note 120, art. 25.
137 E.g. First Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, Annotated Text, 
World Bank, UN Doc. SID/63-15 (9 August 1963), 16 (article II, comment), reprinted in 
ICSID, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 
— Documents Concerning the Origins and the Formulation of the Convention, vol. 2 (World Bank, 1968), 
149; World Bank, Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (18 March 1965), reprinted in Convention, 
Regulations and Rales (Washington: ICSID, 2003), para. 27.
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defined broadly. Thus, the scope of ICSID arbitration — based on investment treaties 
— extends beyond international commercial arbitration to encompass disputes within 
the public sphere, including regulatory disputes between investors and the state.138 
The expansion of investment arbitration into the public realm makes the ICSID  
Convention the starting point for the establishment o f the system of investment 
arbitration.
One final aspect of ICSID should be mentioned. Under the ICSID Convention, 
access to ICSID arbitration was originally limited to states, and to investors of those 
states, that were signatories o f the ICSID Convention. Thus, where an investor and a 
state consented to ICSID arbitration, the arbitration could only take place if the 
investor’s home state and the respondent state were parties to the ICSID Convention. 
Naturally, this restricted ICSID’s availability and appeal to non-party states and their 
investors. To remedy this, the ICSID system was opened to disputes involving non­
signatory states in 1978 with the creation of the ICSID Additional Facility.139 The 
Additional Facility authorized ICSID to administer disputes involving non-signatory 
states and their investors.140 It also extended ICSID arbitration to disputes that did 
not arise directly out of an investment as long as the dispute related to a transaction 
that had “features that distinguish it from an ordinary commercial transaction”.141 
However, the Additional Facility is not governed by the ICSID Convention and, as a 
result, an award under the Additional Facility does not fall within the ICSID
138 Put differendy, the notion of an investment dispute under the ICSID Convention overlaps 
with the concept of a commercial dispute under the New York Convention'. SGS Societe Generate 
de Surveillance v. Philippines (Jurisdiction) (29 January 2004), 16(3) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 
91, para. 10.
139 Additional facility Pules, supra note 113. The Additional Facility was established by a 
majority decision of the ICSID Administrative Council of 27 September 1978: see 1 ICSID 
Rep. 218.
140 Ibid., art. 2.
141 Ibid., art. 2 and 4(3). When it approved the Additional Facility, the ICSID Administrative 
Council commented that the following transactions are distinguishable from “an ordinary 
commercial transaction”:
Economic transactions which (a) may or may not, depending on their terms, be 
regarded by the parties as investments for the purposes of the [ICSID] Convention, 
which (b) involve long-term relationships or the commitment of substantial resources 
on the part of either party, and which (c) are of special importance to the economy of 
the State party, can be clearly distinguished from ordinary commercial transactions. 
Examples of such transactions can be found in various forms of industrial 
cooperation agreements and major civil works contracts.
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enforcement system.142 Rather, it is normally enforceable under the New York 
Convention and other instruments o f commercial arbitration.143 In essence, the 
Additional Facility allows access to ICSID’s facilities by states (or their investors) that 
were unwilling to relinquish ultimate control over investment arbitration to the ICSID 
enforcement system.
The ICSID Convention played an integral part in emergence of investment 
arbitration because it opened the way for investment treaties that establish the general 
consents of states to compulsory international arbitration o f disputes between states 
(acting in a public capacity) and private parties, rather than between private parties 
alone. Yet, one should not overstate the role o f the ICSID Convention,144 First, ICSID 
arbitration does not constitute the full system o f investment arbitration because many 
investment arbitrations take place in forums other than ICSID,145 under different 
arbitration rules,146 and subject to other appointing authorities.147 Above all, the 
ICSID Convention did not constitute the system o f investment arbitration because the 
treaty did not establish the all-important consents of states to the compulsory 
arbitration o f investment disputes.148 Thus, while the seed o f the system of 
investment arbitration was planted with the ICSID Convention, it did not fully emerge 
until a large number o f investment treaties were concluded.149
ICSID Additional Facility Rules, reprinted in (1993) 1 ICSID Rep. 217 at 220 (art. 4(3), 
commentary).
142 Ibid., art. 3 and 53. Instead, an Additional Facility arbitration award is subject to the rules 
of recognition and enforcement of the seat of the arbitration (art. 3, commentary and art. 20).
143 E.R. Leahy, “Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Issued by the Additional Facility of the 
International Centre of Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)” (1985) 2 J. Int’l Arb. 15, 
15-16.
144 E.g. P. Malanczuk, “State-State and Investor-State Dispute Settlement in the OECD Draft 
Multilateral Investment Agreement” (2000) 3 J. Int’l Econ. L. 417, 436-7 (arguing that there 
is a modem standard as to the non-applicability of the local remedies rule under the ICSID 
Convention, without referring to BITs).
145 E.g. the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC or the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration.
146 Supra note. 113.
147 E.g. the President of the International Court of Justice or the Secretary General of the 
United Nations.
148 ICSID Convention, supra note 120, preamble (“Declaring that no Contracting State shall by 
the mere fact of its ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention and without its 
consent be deemed to be under any obligation to submit any particular dispute to 
conciliation or arbitration”).
149 M.S. Bergman, “Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties: An Examination of the 
Evolution and Significance of the U.S. Prototype Treaty” (1983) 16 N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1,
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3. The emergence o f investment arbitration
The first investment treaties to incorporate states’ general consents were a handful o f 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) signed in the late 1960s.150 In the 1970s and 1980s, 
general consents in BITs became more common, though not universal.151 Only in the 
1990s did the inclusion o f general consents to investment arbitration — based on 
broad jurisdictional concepts and liberal investment standards -  become the rule.152 
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), there are now nearly 2,200 BITs in force, the bulk o f which contain 
general consents by states to compulsory investment arbitration, relying on the New 
York Convention or ICSID Convention, or both, for the enforcement o f awards.153 Given 
that the primary purpose of these treaties is to promote and protect investments 
between the states parties, the use o f investment arbitration ensures a high level of 
investor protection.154
3-4 and 8-9; M. Somarajah, The Pursuit of Nationalised Property (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff,
1986), 38-9; K.J. Vandevelde, “The Bilateral Treaty Program of the United States” (1988) 21 
Cornell Int’l L.J. 201; J.W. Salacuse, “BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries” (1990) 14 Int’l 
Law. 655, 657; Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 21,120 and 126; UNCTAD, supra note 31, 8- 
10; A.R. Parra, “ICSID and Bilateral Investment” (2000) 17(1) ICSID News 7.
150 Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 21,126 (noting that earlier BITs, such as the Germany- 
Pakistan BIT of 1959, did not provide for compulsory investment arbitration, and that the 
first BIT to include an ICSID clause was a Netherlands-Indonesia BIT, signed in 1968, 
followed by Italy-Chad and Italy-Cote d’Ivoire BITs, signed in June and July 1969). At the 
same time, in 1969, ICSID published a set of model BIT clauses in order to encourage states 
to consent to treaty-based investment arbitration: Model Clauses Pflating to the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes Designedfor Use in Bilateral Investment Agreements (1969), 8 I.L.M. 
1341.
151 UNCTAD, supra note 31, 8-10; Parra, supra note 149 (noting that the first BITs that 
incorporated general consents were concluded in the late 1960s. Then, 86 BITs were 
concluded by European countries during the 1970s, usually including the consent of each 
state to the submission to ICSID of “any dispute”, between the state and a national of the 
other state party, regarding investment. In the 1980s, another 211 BITs were concluded, 
including some with developing countries that had previously refrained (such as China), and 
the U.S. launched its BIT program.).
152 UNCTAD, supra note 31,10 and 89-90; UNCTAD, supra note 72,10 and 45-6.
153 UNCTAD, supra note 31, 62-4 and 97-8; Vandevelde, supra note 76, 621; Parra, supra note 
149.
154 Salacuse, supra note 149, 659; Vandevelde, supra note 76, 628-33; UNCTAD, supra note 53, 
97, note 22.
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The system of international investment arbitration clearly emerged only in the 
1990s. Most importandy, in that decade, roughly 1,500 bilateral investment treaties 
were concluded.155 Further, a number o f groundbreaking regional investment treaties 
were concluded in the 1990s, including the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)156 and the Energy Charter Treaty,151 both of which authorized compulsory 
investment arbitration.158 Ratifications of the ICSID Convention, which had increased 
gradually in the 1980s, grew more rapidly in the 1990s with the accession o f former 
Soviet Bloc and major developing countries, and ICSID became the leading forum for 
investment arbitration.159 Moreover, in the 1990s, investment treaties expanded 
beyond conventional relationships between capital-exporting and capital-importing 
states to include many BITs among developing and former Soviet Bloc states.160 
Before the 1990s, nearly all investment treaties were concluded between capital- 
exporting and capital-importing states, usually based on model BITs adopted by the
155 CMS, supra note 69, para. 45. UNCTAD, supra note 72, 44; UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment 
Treaties— 1959-1999 (New York: United Nations, 2000), 1 and 4 (reporting that the number 
of BITs quintupled during the 1990s, from 385 in 1989 to 1,857 by 1999, involving 102 
countries in 1989 and 173 countries in 1999); UNCTAD, supra note 28, xix (reporting that by 
2004 most countries had concluded investment treaties with their principal investment 
partners). See Parra, supra note 149; Juillard, supra note 37, 477-8; Malanczuk, supra note 144, 
420; Muchlinski, supra note 10,1045-6.
156 North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 December 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296 and 605 (entered 
into force 1 January 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA], art. 1116 and 1117.
157 Energy Charter Treaty, 17 December 1994, 35 I.L.M. 509, art. 26 (adopted by approximately 
50 countries, mostly OECD members, central and eastern European countries, and members 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States; and limited to the energy sector).
158 Paulsson, supra note 129, 233; T.W. Walde, “Investment Arbitration Under the Energy 
Charter Treaty — From Dispute Settlement to Treaty Implementation” (1996) 12 Arb. Int’l 
429, 434-6. Other regional treaties that authorize compulsory investment arbitration include: 
A S E A N  Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 15 December 1987, 27 I.L.M. 
612; Protocolo de Coloniapara la Promotiony Protection Rectproca de Inversiones en el MERCOSUR, 17 
January 1994, adopted by Mercosur/CMC/Dec No. 11/93, art. 9(2) and (4), online: SICE 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/MRCSR/colonia/pcolonia s.asp: Treaty on Free Trade Between 
the Republic of Columbia, the Republic of Venezuela and the United Mexican States, 13 June 1994 
(entered into force 1 January 1995), art. 17-17 and 17-18, online: SICE 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/G3 E/G3E TOC.asp: The Dominican Republic — Central 
America — United States Free Trade Agreement, 5 August 2004 (not in force), art. 10.17 and 10.18, 
online: SICE http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/CAFTA/CAFTADR e/CAFTADRin e.asp.
159 See ICSID www.wotidbank.org/icsid/constate/constate.htm (reporting that, by 25 March 
2005,142 states had ratified the ICSID Convention, including Turkey (ratification in 1989), 
China (1993), Argentina (1994), and Venezuela (1995)). However, some significant capital- 
importing states, such as Brazil, Canada, India, Mexico, and South Africa, have not signed 
the ICSID Convention and others have excluded important economic sectors, such as oil and 
natural gas, from their consents to ICSID jurisdiction.
160 UNCTAD, supra note 72,33-4.
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major capital-exporting countries.161 The wide geographic coverage o f investment 
treaties and the corresponding availability o f investment arbitration to multinational 
enterprises has taken investment arbitration beyond a collection o f disparate 
procedures in individual treaties to establish it as a general system o f international 
adjudication within the regulatory sphere.162 The system is complex, fragmented, and 
at times incoherent, given variations under different treaties.163 There are notable 
variations among investment treaties including differences in scope, the definition of 
investment standards, and the relevant arbitration rules and arbitration institutions.164 
These differences should not be underestimated as they have important ramifications 
for how investment arbitration unfolds in specific cases. Further, the system is clearly 
not a global system, especially in the absence of BITs between capital-exporting 
states.165 But there remains an emerging system of investment arbitration — based on 
investment treaties — which protects investors from the exercise o f public authority, 
whose unifying feature is the use of international investment arbitration as a 
governing arrangement.166
An actual investment arbitration normally begins when the investor provides 
notice o f a claim to the respondent state, to a relevant arbitration institution (such as 
ICSID), and in some cases to the investor’s home state or other states parties to the 
treaty. In the normal course, once an investor files a claim, a tripartite tribunal is 
established, consisting o f two arbitrators appointed by the investor and the
161 Peter, supra note 21, 332-3; Juillard, supra note 37, 477. After the ICSID Convention was 
concluded, more and more capital-exporting countries adopted policies in favour of BITs 
with capital-importing states, culminating in the U.S. adoption of a BIT program in 1982: 
Bergman, supra note 149, 3-4; Soloway, supra note 62, 99. For texts of model BITs, see 
UNCTAD, International Investment Instruments: A  Compendium, vol. 3 (New York: United 
Nations, 1996).
162 J.W. Salacuse, “Toward a Global Treaty on Foreign Investment: The Search for a Grand 
Bargain” in N. Horn, ed., Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2004), 68-70; UNCTAD, supra note 28, 221.
163 UNCTAD, supra note 2,166; D. Schneiderman, “Investment Rules and the New 
Constitutionalism” (2000) 25 Law & Social Inq. 757, 781.
164 Paulsson, supra note 129, 240; DoLzer and Stevens, supra note 21, 64; UNCTAD, supra note 
31,139-40; UNCTAD, supra note 72, 53-86; UNCTAD, supra note 28,223-4.
165 M. Shapiro, “The Globalization of Law” (1993) 1 Ind. J. Global Legal Studies 37, 37-8; 
Malanczuk, supra note 144, 436-7; C.N. Brower, C.H. Brower II, andJ.K. Sharpe, “The 
Coming Crisis in the Global Adjudicative System” (2003) 19 Arb. Int’l 415, 415-18.
166 UNCTAD, supra note 72, 45-6; Schneiderman, supra note 163, 769-70 and 781; Z. Douglas, 
“The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2003) 74 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 151, 
159.
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respondent state (respectively) and a presiding arbitrator appointed by agreement or 
by an outside appointing authority. Common appointing authorities include the 
Secretary General of ICSID, the ICC International Court o f Arbitration, and the 
President o f the International Court o f Justice.167 In providing for compulsory 
arbitration, investment treaties incorporate different sets o f arbitration rules. Initially, 
bilateral investment treaties authorized compulsory arbitration only under the ICSID 
Rules; however, later treaties incorporated other arbitration rules such as the 
UNCITRAL Rules, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, and the ICC Rules.168 Where 
a treaty incorporates more than one set o f rules, investors typically may choose the 
rules under which they wish to file a claim, although the different sets o f rules are 
similar in how they govern an arbitration.
Once a tribunal has been constituted, an arbitration generally proceeds as 
follows.169 First, the tribunal resolves procedural matters, the most important o f 
which is the selection of the jurisdictional seat o f the arbitration, which in turn 
determines the domestic law that will govern applications to set aside the arbitration 
agreement or award. The tribunal also resolves other matters, such as the production 
of documents, the openness of the proceedings, and any challenges to the impartiality 
of an arbitrator. Once preliminary matters are resolved, the tribunal hears any 
objections by the respondent state to the tribunal’s jurisdiction or to the admissibility 
of the investor’s claim. These objections usually raise various issues, such as whether 
the claimant qualifies as an “investor” who has made an “investment” under the 
treaty. Where the tribunal finds that it has jurisdiction, the arbitration proceeds to the 
merits o f the claim as to whether the respondent state has violated a substantive 
standard o f investor protection under the treaty. I f  the tribunal finds that the state
167 E.g. Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the Government of the Republic of India, 14 March 1994, [1995] U.K.T.S. No. 27, Cmd 2797 
(entered into force 6 January 1995), art. 9(3)(c)(ii); NAFTA, supra note 156, art. 1124(1).
168 E.g. NAFTA, supra note 156, art. 1120(1) (allowing an investor to choose to file a claim 
under any of the UNCITRAL Rules, the ICSID Rules, or the ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules which, in turn, will govern the arbitration); Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 157, art. 
26(4) (allowing an investor to choose from the UNCITRAL Rules, the ICSID Rules, the 
ICSID Additional Facility Rules, or the Stockholm Rules).
169 See generally G.N. Horlick and A.L. Marti, “NAFTA Chapter 11B: A Private Right of 
Action to Enforce Market Access through Investments” (1997) 14 J. Int’l Arb. 43; T.W. 
Walde, supra note 158, 449-56; M.J. Staff and C.W. Lewis, “Arbitration Under NAFTA 
Chapter 11: Past, Present, and Future” (2003) 25 Houston J. Int’l L. 301, 308-16; UNCTAD, 
supra note 112, 40-64.
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violated the treaty, the tribunal may award damages to the investor, as well as costs to 
either party. Finally, should the state refuse to comply with an award, the investor may 
pursue enforcement o f the award against the state’s assets, most commonly under the 
ICSID Convention or the New York Convention.
The fact that the system of investment arbitration only emerged in the 1990s is 
reflected by the recent explosion o f claims by investors under investment treaties. The 
first ICSID awards based on the general consent of a state were made in 1988 and 
1990, pursuant to a statute and a treaty, respectively.170 All previous ICSID 
arbitrations were based on arbitration clauses in investment contracts. Since then, the 
proliferation o f investment treaties has fuelled an explosion o f investment arbitration, 
as indicated below in relation to ICSID.
170 SPP, supra note 127; AAPL, supra note 128.
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Table 1: ICSID claims registered annually: 1965-2005
H  N o o f claims annually
1965 '69 '73 '77 '81 '85 '89 '93 '97 '01 '05
After 1996, in particular, “the floodgates... seemed to open” in the words o f one 
ICSID staff member.171 From 1995 to 2004, ICSID registered four times as many 
claims as the previous 30 years and the growth trend appears to be sustaining. By July 
2005 there were 91 claims pending, more than all o f  the claims registered at ICSID 
during its entire history until 2001.
Table 2: ICSID claims registered in total: 1965-2005
Total no. of 
claims
171 Parra, supra note 149.
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The growth o f ICSID arbitration is only part of the explosion in investment 
arbitration.172 For one, it does not include cases in which an investor and a state have 
settled a dispute after the investor threatened a claim, but before the claim was 
registered by ICSID. More importandy, ICSID is the only international arbitration 
forum that is required to publicize investor claims. Other forums, such as the ICC’s 
International Court of Arbitration or ad hoc tribunals established under the 
UNCITRAL Rules, normally presume that claims should remain confidential unless 
both disputing parties agree otherwise. Thus, it is impossible to assess the full extent 
to which the use of investment arbitration has expanded.173 A t a minimum, the 
experience with respect to ICSID arbitration indicates rapid and continuing growth in 
investment arbitration.174
The explosion of investment arbitration demonstrates that multinational 
enterprises have become increasingly prepared to use investment arbitration to 
resolve disputes with states. As such, investment arbitration has become an important 
means for investors to resist regulation by the state and to pursue compensation for 
costs that flow from the exercise of public authority. According to one practitioner at 
the London-based international law firm Herbert Smith:175
I do think... that what we see developing is an unstoppable process. In 
particular, this is because more and more corporations are becoming aware 
that, quite apart from what they might have negotiated in their contracts, they 
may have direct rights o f recourse bestowed upon them by the energy o f their 
own governments.... And I suspect that what we have seen emerging in the 
last five years will be just the tip of the iceberg.
For these reasons, the emergence o f the system o f investment arbitration is a 
significant aspect of contemporary globalization.
172 Brower et al., supra note 165, 416.
173 An important exception is NAFTA, under which the states parties have adopted a general 
practice of publishing materials that relate to Chapter 11 arbitration, regardless of the 
applicable arbitration rules: Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 
Provisions (31 July 2001), 13(6) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 139, art. A, online: DFAIT 
www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/ma-nac/NAFTA-Interpr-en.asp.
174 A. Cosbey et al., “Investment and Sustainable Development” (Report by the International 
Institute for Sustainable Development, 2004), 15-16.
175 C. McLachlan, “Commentary: The Broader Context” (2002) 18 Arb. Int’l 339, 343.
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C. Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
In this thesis, aspects o f the argument are elaborated by examining the text and 
jurisprudence o f the investment chapter (Chapter 11) o f the North American Free Trade 
Agreement.176 Focusing on a single treaty allows for more detailed and comprehensive 
analysis, while avoiding the confusion that could result from a more varied analysis of 
arbitrations under multiple investment treaties. NAFTA Chapter 11 provides a useful 
case study because, like other treaties, it includes consents by the NAFTA states to 
compulsory investment arbitration based on broad jurisdictional concepts and liberal 
standards o f investor protection.177 Also, the conclusion o f NAFTA Chapter 11 was a 
watershed in the 1990s’ wave o f investment treaties because it applies to extensive 
capital flows between Canada, Mexico, and the United States.178
Nevertheless, NAFTA differs from other investment treaties. NAFTA is a 
regional trade and investment agreement that contains 20 chapters on economic 
integration, only one o f which directly engages investment and investment arbitration. 
The positioning of the NAFTA investment chapter alongside chapters on trade in 
goods, intellectual property rights, government procurement, and so on, has 
implications for how NAFTA Chapter 11 is interpreted and applied.179 Also, the 
language used to define core provisions of Chapter 11 — such as the precise definition 
o f the scope o f investment arbitration, the wording o f the general consents, and the 
content o f the substantive standards — naturally differs from other treaties.180 For this 
reason, not all o f the conclusions reached about Chapter 11 arbitration apply fully to
176 NAFTA, supra note 156. An investor can bring a claim under the NAFTA compulsory 
investment arbitration mechanism based on certain substantive obligations of NAFTA 
Chapter 11 and NAFTA Chapter 15.
177 Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 21,120-6; Horlick and Marti, supra note 169, 43-5; Rugman 
and Gestrin, supra note 53,162-6; UNCTAD, supra note 31,137-40.
178 M. Trebilcock and R. Howse, The "Regulation of International Trade (London: Routledge, 1995), 
295-7; Rugman and Gestrin, supra note 53,156-62.
179 J.C. Thomas, “Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven” (Paper 
presented to the NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Disputes: Litigating Against Sovereigns 
conference, Canadian Bar Association, March 2000), 5-7.
180 UNCTAD, supra note 31,139-40 (noting that differences in the language of investment 
treaties reflect the fact the treaties were negotiated in different time periods, with innovations 
by one country tending to be adopted in later treaties by other countries).
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other investment treaties. Each treaty is unique in its language, its negotiating history, 
and — in the case o f trade and investment agreements — the surrounding text.
Yet, one should not lose sight o f the forest for the trees. To the extent that 
NAFTA obligations are subject to compulsory investment arbitration, NAFTA is 
clearly part o f the network of treaties that make up the international system of 
investment arbitration.181 The text of NAFTA Chapter 11 was based on the U.S. 
model bilateral investment treaty and, since NAFTA was concluded, both the U.S. 
and Canada have used Chapter 11 as the starting point for other investment 
treaties.182 To the extent that it uses investment arbitration, NAFTA has more in 
common with other investment treaties than with international trade regimes. Finally, 
the inclusion of the NAFTA investment chapter in a broader treaty structure, if 
anything, limits the scope and intensity o f investment arbitration. Therefore, the focus 
on Chapter 11 tends to moderate, not exaggerate, the significance o f the system of 
investment arbitration as a governing arrangement. For these reasons, Chapter 11 is a 
useful example o f investment arbitration and the conclusions drawn in this thesis are 
generally applicable to investment arbitration under other treaties.
In fact, NAFTA Chapter 11 is arguably the most important single example of 
a treaty incorporating investment arbitration. This is because Chapter 11 has 
generated a large number o f publicly-available awards and other materials.183 Indeed, 
NAFTA has led to more claims and a more comprehensive body o f jurisprudence 
than any other investment treaty.184 The early experience under Chapter 11 drew
181 Salacuse, supra note 162, 35-6; M.-F. Houde and K. Yannaca-Small, Relationships between 
International Investment Agreements, OECD Working Paper on International Investment No. 
2004/1 (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, May 2004), 5-6.
182 J.W. Boscariol, “Canada and the New International Investment Regime — Canada’s 
Foreign Investment Protection Agreements” (Presentation to the Canadian Bar Association 
— Ontario International Law Section, March 1999); P.D. Ehrenhaft, “Chapter 11 and 
Federalism” (Paper presented to the NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Disputes: Litigating 
Against Sovereigns conference, Canadian Bar Association, March 2000), 6; Soloway, supra 
note 62, 99-100; M. Kantor, “The New Draft Model U.S. BIT: Noteworthy Developments” 
(2004) 21 J. Int’l Arb. 382, 382.
183 Because the NAFTA states have adopted a practice of publishing materials arising from 
NAFTA Chapter 11 claims, documents on investment arbitration are more accessible in the 
case of NAFTA. Other treaties typically prohibit publication, according to the applicable 
arbitration rules, unless authorized by the disputing parties.
184 There have been 39 notices of intent by investors to submit a claim under NAFTA 
Chapter 11, of which at least 20 have led to arbitration proceedings. Of these, ten have 
resulted in final awards on the merits, including two in claims against Canada, five in claims
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attention to the availability of investment arbitration and helped trigger the rapid 
growth in claims under other investment treaties since the mid-1990s.185 Finally, 
under Chapter 11, there have been multiple claims against each states party, including 
multiple claims against significant capital-exporting states (Canada and the United 
States). As such, the text and jurisprudence o f Chapter 11 provide a focused empirical 
base for broader conclusions about the system o f investment arbitration.
Conclusion
The system o f investment arbitration did not emerge overnight and from scratch. The 
trickle of investment treaties in the 1960s that grew into a torrent in the 1990s is itself 
tied to a diverse collection of treaties, sets o f arbitration rules, and implementing 
statutes. Foremost among these are the New York Convention o f 1958 and ICSID  
Convention o f 1965; the ICSID Rules, ICSID Additional Facility Rules, and 
UNCITRAL Rules; and the UNCITRAL Model Law. Most o f these instruments were 
not originally intended for adjudication o f regulatory disputes in the public sphere. 
Rather, they were restricted to the arbitration o f disputes arising from commercial 
transactions between private parties. The extension o f the model of international 
commercial arbitration to encompass regulatory disputes between private investors 
and the state explains, in part, the tendency o f some commentators to approach 
treaty-based investment arbitration as if  it were a reciprocally consensual system of 
dispute resolution. The purpose o f this thesis is to establish that investment 
arbitration is in fact a governing arrangement; that is, an adjudicative instrument 
adopted by the state to regulate relations between public entities and individuals who 
are subject to the exercise o f public authority. In turn, this thesis is intended to 
demonstrate that the emergence o f the system of investment arbitration, though 
complex and varied in its content, is an important development. In the next chapter, 
the uniqueness o f investment arbitration is examined in the wider context of public 
international law.
against Mexico, and three in claims against the United States. Of the ten awards on the merits 
to date, damages were awarded in two claims against Canada and two claims against Mexico. 
Each of the three claims against the United States was unsuccessful.




Investment arbitration based on a general consent by the state individualizes 
international adjudication. Individuals — in this case foreign investors -  are granted 
the ability to directly initiate, maintain, and enforce claims against states before 
arbitration tribunals that are constituted under international law. However, unlike 
other cases of individualization in international law, the ability o f investors to bring 
international claims is prospective. In other words, the state’s consent to arbitration is 
not limited to an existing dispute or series o f disputes arising from a past historical 
event. Instead, the state consents to the arbitration of any future dispute between the 
state and a foreign investor, at the instance o f the investor. This endows international 
tribunals with compulsory jurisdiction over any regulatory dispute involving the 
exercise o f public authority by the state.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the significance o f the general 
consent and the prospective individualization o f international claims in treaty-based 
investment arbitration. As used in this thesis, the term “general consent” refers to a 
prospective consent by a state to the compulsory arbitration of disputes with 
investors as a group.1 The general consent can be distinguished from a specific 
consent that is limited either to an existing dispute that is known in advance to the 
party giving the consent, or to disputes arising from a specific legal relationship 
between private parties. Under investment treaties, the general consent allows foreign 
investors to trigger the international arbitration o f disputes with a host state in the
1 E.g. under NAFTA Chapter 11 each NAFTA state “consents to the submission of a claim” 
by investors of another NAFTA state “in accordance with the procedures set out in this 
Agreement”: North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 December 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296 and 605 
(entered into force 1 January 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA], art. 1116 and 1117 (providing for 
the general consents of the NAFTA states), and art. 1120(2) (incorporating the applicable 
arbitration rules, as selected by the investor when filing a claim, as arbitration “procedures”). 
See J. Paulsson, “Arbitration without Privity” (1995) 10 ICSID Rev. 232, 256; T.W. Walde, 
“Investment Arbitration Under the Energy Charter Treaty — From Dispute Settlement to 
Treaty Implementation” (1996) 12 Arb. Int’l 429, 434-6; A. Afilalo, “Constitutionalization 
Through the Back Door: A European Perspective on NAFTA’s Investment Chapter” (2001) 
34 N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1, 4; J.C. Thomas, “Notes on Investor-State Arbitration in the 
North American Context” (Address to the International Bar Association conference, San 
Francisco, 9-14 September 2003), 2-4.
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absence o f any contract between the investor and the state. As a result, the general 
consent exposes the state to claims by a broad class of potential claimants in relation 
to any governmental activity affecting foreign investors.2 Unlike commercial 
arbitration, investment arbitration fully engages the regulatory relationship between 
foreign investors and the state.
The general consent is a significant development in international law and, 
beyond a small number of human rights treaties, an innovation in international 
adjudication. Because the general consent is prospective and wide-ranging, 
individualization under investment treaties has two notable outcomes. First, it results 
in more frequent and intensive application of international standards to protect 
investors in the regulatory sphere. Second, it makes the analytical framework of public 
law — conventionally developed in domestic law — more relevant to international 
adjudication, particularly in relation to matters of state liability. Further, the far- 
reaching nature o f the general consent, combined with its limitation to “investors”, 
means that only a select group of wealthy individuals — primarily multinational 
enterprises — are able to benefit from the ability to bring international claims. The 
discussion in this chapter reviews these two outcomes of individualization, before 
turning to the role of multinational enterprises as investors and to the implications of 
forum-shopping for investment arbitration. This is followed by a critical analysis of 
the claim that investment treaties bestow fundamental rights on investors.
A. The uniqueness of the general consent
By focusing on the general consent one can distinguish investment arbitration from 
other forms of international adjudication. In particular, investment arbitration can be 
distinguished from conventional international adjudication between states, and 
between individuals and states. Investment arbitration is distinct from inter-state 
adjudication before an international court or tribunal for the straightforward reason 
that it allows individual claims. Investment arbitration is distinct from historical claims 
tribunals, before which individuals could make claims against states, because the
2 Paulsson, ibid., 233.
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state’s consent is prospective. Further, the individualization o f international claims is 
more far-reaching under investment treaties than in the case o f other international 
arrangements which allow individual claims, such as human rights treaties, because 
investment treaties typically limit the investor’s duty to exhaust local remedies, adopt 
damages against the state as the main remedy, and authorize the direct enforcement 
o f  damages awards by domestic courts in a large number of countries. In terms o f the 
use o f international adjudication to resolve public disputes, therefore, the advent of 
investment arbitration is a unique and significant development.
Customary international law presumes that the resolution o f a domestic 
regulatory dispute involving a foreign national is, in the first place, a matter of 
domestic law of the host state.3 States are not subject to compulsory adjudication of 
disputes within their territory, whether by international tribunals or foreign courts.4 A 
dispute arising from one state’s treatment o f an investor of another state could 
conventionally trigger a claim o f diplomatic protection by the investor’s home state,5 
but the investor could not make an independent claim under international law.6 
Moreover, a claim of diplomatic protection by the home state could only be made 
after the investor had exhausted local remedies in order to give the host state the 
opportunity to address the investor’s complaint before any resort to international 
law.7 Even then, the dispute could only be referred to international adjudication with
3 Case Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued In France (France v. Serbia) (1921), 
P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 20, para. 41.1. Delupis, Finance and Protection of Investments in Developing 
Countries (Epping: Gower Press, 1973), 123; W. Pete?., Arbitration and Renegotiation of 
International Investment Agreements (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1995), 167-9 
(arguing that the conclusion of the ICSID Convention indicates that the dictum in Serbian Loans 
can no longer be upheld in light of the changing structure of international law).
4 E.g. Status ofFastem Carelia, Advisory Opinion (1923), P.C.I.J. Ser. B, No. 5, 21 \ Ambatielos 
Claim (Greece v. United Kingdom) (1956), 12 R.I.A.A. 83 [hereinafter Ambatielos], 103.
5 E.g. Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 4 [hereinafter Nottebohm], 23-4; 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain), [1970] I.C.J. Rep. 3, 9 I.L.M. 227 
[hereinafter Barcelona Traction], para. 35-6. E.M. Borchard, “Basic Elements of Diplomatic 
Protection of Citizens Abroad” (1913) 7 AJIL 497, 576.
6 Mavrommattis Palestine Concessions {Greece v. Great Britain) (1924), P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 2 
[hereinafter Mavrommattis], 12. M.O. Hudson, International Tribunals (Washington: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace and the Brookings Institution, 1944), 67-9 and 198.
1 Ambatielos, supra note 4,118-19; Interhandel Case (Switzerland v. United States) [1959] I.C.J. Rep. 
6 [hereinafter Interhandel\, 26-7. C. Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law (New 
York: NYU Press, 1928), 70; Hudson, ibid., 189-90; P. Okowa, “Admissibility and the Law 
on International Responsibility” in M.D. Evans, ed., International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 
493-4.
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the consent o f the host state.8 With one exception, no international tribunal -  
including the International Court o f Justice -  has been given general jurisdiction over 
disputes between states and foreign nationals.9 Moreover, the reluctance o f many 
states to refer investment disputes to the International Court o f Justice has meant that 
few cases involving the regulatory relationship between states and foreign investors 
have come before that court.10 Before the recent proliferation o f general consents by 
states to investment arbitration, international disputes that engaged the regulatory 
relationship between the state and investors were normally resolved by inter-state 
diplomacy.
This conventional method o f resolving regulatory disputes in the international 
sphere rests on the assumption that an investor’s entitlement to protection under 
international law in the territory o f a foreign state derives from the rights o f the 
investor’s home state.11 In seeking diplomatic protection of one o f its nationals, an 
investor’s home state was conventionally assumed to be acting on its own rights, not 
those o f the individual.12 An investor could participate in the adjudication o f the 
dispute only where the home state and the host state both consented to a process in 
which the investor was given this capacity.13 Further, the investor was obliged to
8 Hudson, ibid., 69; D.J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 5th ed. (London: Sweet 
& Maxwell, 1998), 985.
9 The exception is the Central American Court of Justice of 1907 to 1918: see H.M. Hill, 
“Central American Court of Justice” in R. Doher et al., eds., Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1987), 41-2. States may submit generally 
to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice by filing a declaration to 
this effect; 65 states had done so as of July 2002.
10 See Barcelona Traction, supra note 5; Elettronica Sicula S.pA. (United States v. Italy), [1989] I.C.J. 
Rep. 14; and Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (United Kingdom v. Iran) [1952] I.C.J. Rep. 93. L.B. 
Sohn, “The Role of Arbitration in Recent International Multilateral Treaties” in T.E. 
Carbonneau, ed., Resolving Transnational Disputes Through International Arbitration 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1984), 26; M. Somarajah, The Settlement of Foreign 
Investment Disputes (Boston: Kluwer, 2001), 19-20.
11 Barcelona Traction, supra note 5, para. 78. M. Whiteman, Damages in International Taw, vol. 1 
(Washington, 1937-43), 82-3.
12 Mavrommattis, supra note 6,12; Administrative Decision No. V  (1924), 7 R.I.A.A. 119,19 AJIL 
612 [hereinafter Administrative Decision No. V\, 626-7 (U.S.-Germany Mixed Claims 
Commission); Nottebohm, supra note 5, 24; Barcelona Traction, supra note 5, para. 78-9. But see 
Iran-United States No. A l  18, Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (Full Tribunal) (1984), 5 Iran-U.S. 
C.T.R. 251,23 I.L.M. 489,498.
13 In a number of cases, states have consented under diplomatic pressure to adjudicate 
disputes with foreign nationals after the dispute has arisen, with varying degrees of 
participation in the proceedings by individuals. Hudson, supra note 6, 3-6 and 196-7; I. 
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Taw, 6th ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2003), 500 (noting that in
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accept any settlement obtained by the home state, which could be limited to partial 
compensation or none at all at the home state’s discretion.14
The individualization of claims within the regulatory sphere reflects the 
uniqueness o f investment arbitration in the context of international law. The general 
consent subjects the regulatory relationship between the state and foreign investors to 
international standards to a greater extent than any form of regulation based on 
international adjudication since the colonial era. Historically, individuals were 
sometimes authorized to make claims against states before claims tribunals created in 
the aftermath o f war or revolution.15 Thus, it is true that states have allowed 
individual claims under international law before the general consent, as contained in 
contemporary investment treaties. Indeed, from the Jay Treaty o f 179416 to the Iran- 
U.S. Claims Tribunal,17 states have authorized international tribunals to resolve 
regulatory disputes arising from one state’s treatment o f the nationals of another and,
the century after 1840 some 60 mixed claims commissions were established to resolve 
disputes arising from injury to the interests of aliens, including between Mexico and the U.S. 
in 1839,1848,1868, and 1923; between Venezuela and ten other states in 1903, and between 
Great Britain and the U.S. in 1853,1871, and 1908). See also e.g. Compania del Desarrollo de 
Santa Elena, S A . v. Republic of Costa Rica (Merits) (17 February 2000), 15 ICSID Rev. 169 
[hereinafter Santa Elena] (based on a consent to investment arbitration by Costa Rica after the 
dispute had arisen, prompted by the United States’ blocking of a loan to Costa Rica by the 
Inter-American bank).
14 Administrative Decision No. V, supra note 12, 626-7; Barcelona Traction, supra note 5, para. 79.
B.A. Wortley, Expropriation in Public InternationalLaw (Cambridge: CUP, 1959), 124 and 146; 
UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s (Geneva: United Nations, 1998), 89-90.
15 E.g. the Alabama Claims Arbitration established after the American Civil War, the Mixed 
Tribunals and Claims Commissions after World War One, the Iran-United States Claims 
Commission after the Islamic revolution in Iran, and the UN Compensation Commission 
after the Gulf War of 1990-91. Hudson, supra note 6, 3-6 and 196-7; J. Collier and V. Lowe, 
The Settlement of Disputes in International Law (Oxford: OUP, 1999), c. 1 and 3; A. Redfem and 
M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
1999), 60-1.
16 Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and the United States, 19 
November 1794, 52 Cons. T.S. 243 (entered into force 28 October 1795) [hereinafter Jay 
Treaty]. Hudson, supra note 6, 3-4; H. Neufeld, The International Protection of Private Creditors 
From the Treaties of Westphalia to the Congress of Vienna (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1971), 68-77.
17 Established by the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria 
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Claims Settlement Declaration), 19 January 1981 
[hereinafter Algiers Declaration, art. 11(1). C.D. Gray, judicial Remedies in International Law 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), 181-5; M. Mohebi, The International Law Character of the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1991); C.N. Brower and D. 
Bmeschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (The Hague: Kluwer Law International,
1998); R.B. Tillich and D.B. Magraw, The Iran-United States Tribunal: Its Contribution to the Law 
of State Responsibility (Transnational Publishers, 1998).
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in some cases, claims could be brought directly by investors. Nevertheless, historical 
claims tribunals did not involve generalised investment arbitration because the authority 
o f  such tribunals was retrospective. Adjudicative authority was granted to an 
international tribunal only after the fact and that authority was limited to disputes 
arising from a distinct period, series of events, or subject matter.18 Take the example 
o f  the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. In 1981, after the Islamic Revolution o f 1979, Iran 
and the United States consented to the compulsory arbitration o f claims by each 
other’s nationals arising out of “debts, contracts..., expropriations or other measures 
affecting property rights”.19 Foreign nationals could make direct claims before the 
Tribunal if the claim amounted to (U.S.) $250,000 or more, and if the claim was 
“outstanding” on 19 January 1981.20 Thus, the Tribunal had compulsory jurisdiction 
over certain individual claims, limited to a roughly two-year period following the 
revolution.
This retrospective consent differs from an advance consent to the arbitration 
o f future disputes. In the case of a retrospective consent, a state is more able to 
anticipate the significance of its acceptance o f compulsory arbitration because the 
consent is given after the events in question have taken place.21 By giving a 
prospective consent in an investment treaty, the state exposes itself, in principle, to 
claims by any multinational enterprise with an economic interest that is subject to the 
exercise of public authority by the state. As a result, investment arbitration 
encompasses future disputes involving an indeterminate class o f claimants in relation 
to a very broad range of governmental activity. From the investor’s point o f view, to 
borrow a phrase from commercial arbitration, the general consent is like “a blank 
cheque which may be cashed for an unknown amount at a future, and as yet unknown, 
date”.22
Among others, Legum (who served as U.S. government counsel in early 
investment arbitrations under NAFTA Chapter 11) has argued that the
18 C. Kennedy, “Address” (1907) Am. Soc’ty Int’l L. Proc. 100,110-11; Hudson, supra note 6, 
3-6 and 11-12.
19 Algiers Declaration, supra note 17, art. II.
20 Ibid.
21 An agreement to arbitrate concluded after the dispute is typically called a compromis. 
Historically, in many states, this was the only means of consenting to arbitration even in 
commercial disputes: Redfem and Hunter, supra note 15, 21.
22 Redfem and Hunter, supra note 15, 21-2.
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individualization o f claims under contemporary investment treaties is not a radical 
departure and that its novelty is overstated.23 However, all but a few o f Legum’s 
examples o f other instances in which states have authorized individual claims under 
international law involve specific consents by states, not general consents.24 In the 
case o f the Jay Treaty of 1794 — one o f Legum’s primary examples25 — the consents to 
compulsory arbitration by Great Britain and the U.S. were limited to claims by foreign 
creditors and ship owners that related to events within a discrete period.26 Further, 
with respect to creditor claims, the Jay Treaty’s process o f arbitration led to a lump 
sum settlement without a single claim being heard, due to disagreements among the 
state-appointed arbitrators.27 Legum also identifies bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 
as evidence that investment arbitration is commonplace but, as argued in chapter two 
o f  this thesis, the rapid growth of BITs in the 1990s -  and the recent explosion o f 
investor claims — actually highlights the uniqueness of contemporary investment 
arbitration. Finally, Legum refers to just two historical cases in which states provided 
a prospective consent to international claims by foreign nationals, both dating from 
the early twentieth century.28
Investment arbitration can also be distinguished from international 
commercial arbitration. That is, it can be distinguished from international adjudication 
in the private sphere. This distinction is discussed in detail in chapter six. Suffice it to 
say here that, when a state consents — by contract — to the compulsory arbitration o f a 
commercial dispute with an investor, the state acts in a private capacity. In such cases, 
the arbitration deals not with a regulatory dispute but with a private dispute. On the 
other hand, when a state makes a general consent to compulsory arbitration o f
23 B. Legum, “The Innovation of Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA” (2002) 43 Harv. 
Int’l L.J. 531, 538. See also S.E. Eizenstat, “‘Fast Track’ needs protections for investors” The 
Boston Globe (2 May 2002).
24 Legum, ibid., 535-6 (referring to individual claims under a “significant number of treaty 
regimes”, such as the Mixed Claims Tribunals after World War I, the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal, and regional human rights tribunals, although conceding that few of these claims 
were based on prospective consents by the state).
25 Legum, ibid., 534-5.
26 Hudson, supra note 6, 3.
27 H.-J. Schlochauer, “Jay Treaty (1794)” in R. Dolzer et al., eds., Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1987), 109-10; Neufeld, 
supra note 16, 70-7.
28 Legum, supra note 23, 536 (noting states’ prospective consents in the case of the Central 
American Court of Justice 1907 and the Upper Silesian Arbitral Tribunal of 1922).
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investment disputes — whether by legislation or treaty — the state acts in a sovereign 
capacity. Only a state can exercise public authority so as to make a general consent. 
Where an investor consents to investment arbitration by seizing the opportunity 
afforded by the general consent, the investor takes advantage o f a governing 
arrangement that was established by states.29
The uniqueness o f the general consent is highlighted by another factor. In 
chapter two of this thesis, it was mentioned that a state can consent to compulsory 
investment arbitration by contract, by legislation, or by treaty, and that a contract- 
based consent is specific to a private law relationship. As it happens, contract-based 
arbitration is well-established. Until 1984, all arbitration at ICSID was based on 
mutual consents in an investment contract or an agreement to arbitrate after the 
dispute had arisen.30 Moreover, the World Bank’s Executive Directors, in their report 
on the ICSID Convention, noted that states could consent to ICSID arbitration not 
simply by contract but also by legislation.31 Yet, the Executive Directors did not 
explicitly mention the possibility o f consent by treaty. Moreover, there is scant 
reference to investment treaties in the negotiating history o f the ICSID Convention?2 
This supports the view that the explosion of treaty-based investment arbitration since 
the mid-1990s has caught many states by surprise.33 For present purposes, the
29 Redfem and Hunter, supra note 15, 61.
30 Until 1984, all ICSID arbitrations were based on consents recorded in the traditional 
manner by a clause in an investment contract or a post-dispute compromis. Since then, dozens 
of claims have been submitted to ICSID by investors lacking any prior contractual 
relationship with the host state and relying on domestic legislation or a treaty to establish the 
state’s consent to international arbitration. The rapid growth in ICSID claims since the mid- 
1990s further evidences the novelty and significance of the general consent. A.R. Parra, “The 
Role of ICSID in the Settlement of Investment” (1999) 16(1) ICSID News 5.
31 World Bank, Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes Retween States and Nationals of Other States (18 March 1965), reprinted in Convention, 
Regulations and Rjiles (Washington: ICSID, 2003) [hereinafter ICSID Convention Report|, para. 24.
32 E.g. Memorandum of the meeting of the Committee of the Whole, December 27, 1962, World Bank,
UN Doc. SID/62-2 (7 January 1963), 8; and A. Broches, “An Analysis of the Bank’s 
Tentative Proposals and of the Principal Issues Raised Thereby”, World Bank, UN Doc. 
SID/63-2 (18 February 1963), 15; both reprinted in ICSID, Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States — Documents Concerning the Origins and 
the Formulation of the Convention, vol. 2 (World Bank, 1968), 68 and 85.
33 E.g. comment of Abner Mivka, former congressman and U.S. federal appeals court chief 
justice, and member of the Laewen tribunal: “If Congress had known that there was anything 
like this [Chapter 11 arbitration] in NAFTA, they would never have voted for it” (A. Liptak, 
“Review of U.S. Rulings by NAFTA Tribunals Stirs Worries” New York Times (18 April 2004) 
20); C. McLachlan, “Commentary: The Broader Context” (2002) 18 Arb. Int’l 339, 340; D.
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omission is significant because it points to the uniqueness o f investment arbitration 
based on the general consent.
The uniqueness o f the general consent is also reflected in the fact that 
contemporary investment treaties allow individual claims for damages. Individualized 
damages claims are very rare in international law. Outside o f the European Union, no 
international regime allows individuals to direcdy seek damages through international 
adjudication, in response to a state’s alleged violation of international law. For 
example, individual claims were ruled out in the case of the World Trade 
Organization and non-investment chapters o f NAFTA, which limit dispute resolution 
to adjudication between states based on the remedies o f a declaration o f illegality and 
suspension o f trade concessions.34 In other areas o f international law, such as 
humanitarian law and environmental law, states have eschewed adjudication (let alone 
damages claims by individuals) to enforce international standards or compensate 
those harmed by unlawful conduct.35
Importantly, damages claims by individuals are also the exception in the field 
of human rights.36 Despite the expanded protection of human rights since 1945,
Brown, “Commentary” in L. Ritchie Dawson, ed., Whose Rights? The N A FTA Chapter 11 
Debate (Ottawa: Centre for Trade Policy and Law, 2002), 40-1.
34 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 15 April 1994, 33 
I.L.M. 112 [hereinafter DSU], para. 19 and 22; NAFTA, supra note 1, c. 19 and 20. P.M. 
Nichols, “Participation of Nongovernmental Parties in the World Trade Organization”
(1996) 17 U. Penn. J. Int’l Econ. L. 295, 297-8 and 302-3; B.R. Roland, “The Access of 
Individuals to International Trade Dispute Settlement” (1996) 13 J. Int’l Arb. 143,164; S. 
Dillon, International Trade and Economic Taw in the European Union (Oxford: Hart, 2002), 372-4.
35 E.B. Weiss, “Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-first Century” (2002) 96 AJIL 
798, 811-12; C. Greenwood, “The Law of War (International Humanitarian Law)” in M.D. 
Evans, ed., International Taw (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 817. The United Nations Convention on the 
Taw of the Sea [21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force 16 November 1994), art. 187(c) and 188(2); 
art. 5(4) and 13(15) (Annex III)] permits individuals to make claims before the International 
Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber, but only in contractual disputes: R.R. Churchill, ‘Dispute 
Settlement in the Law of the Sea” in M.D. Evans, Remedies in International Taw: The Institutional 
Dilemma (Oxford: Hart, 1998), 89; Sohn, supra note 10, 36-7.
36 E.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 
61 AJIL 870 (entered into force 23 March 1976), art. 41 (providing for an optional system of 
claims by states parties) and (First) Optional Protocol (1966) (providing for an optional 
system of individual petitions leading to consideration and an expression of views by an 
international committee, but not individual claims leading to compulsory arbitration or a 
damages award). D. Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Taw (Oxford: OUP, 1999), 
137-8 and 142-7; Weiss, ibid., 809-11; R. Bachand and S. Rousseau, “International 
Investment and Human Rights: Political and Legal Issues” (Background paper for Rights & 
Democracy, 11 June 2003), 14.
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individual claims for damages are authorized only under the European Convention on 
Human Rights37 and the American Convention on Human Rights.38 However, in both cases, 
the ability of individuals to claim damages is more limited than in investment 
arbitration. Under the European Convention, the European Court o f Human Rights may 
afford “just satisfaction” to an individual whose rights were violated, where this is 
considered necessary by the Court.39 However, the Court has declined to award 
damages for various reasons, including the adequacy of non-monetary remedies and 
the host state’s ability to pay.40 Under the American Convention, an individual can 
receive damages only if the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights brings the 
claim before the Inter-American Court, and the Commission has refused to bring 
claims on behalf o f corporations.41 Further, the Inter-American Court has adopted a 
cautious approach to awarding monetary compensation to remedy human rights 
violations.42 Above all, both conventions (unlike investment treaties) impose a duty 
on individuals to exhaust local remedies before bringing a claim.43 Finally, neither 
convention allows individuals to select the rules that govern the claim, to appoint 
members o f the tribunal, or to direcdy enforce an award against state assets.44
Beyond the field o f human rights, the only other instance in which individuals 
can claim damages pursuant to a treaty is under European Community law (EC law). 
In particular, the Francovich doctrine45 o f the European Court o f Justice introduced the 
principle that individuals are entitled to seek damages for an alleged violation o f EC
37 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 
1950, Eur. T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force 3 September 1953) [hereinafter 
ECHR], art. 34.
38 American Convention on Human Rights, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force 18 July 1978) 
[hereinafter ACHR], art. 44.
39 ECHR, supra note 37, art. 41.
40 Shelton, supra note, 36,101,154-9, and 218-20; J.-P. Costa, “The Provision of 
Compensation Under Article 41 of the European Convention on Human Rights” (Address 
to the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 7 December 2001), 1-3 and 
16-17; J.A. Weir, “Human Rights and Damages” (2001) 40 Washburn L.J. 412, 421-9 and 436.
41 ACHR, supra note 38, art. 44. E.g. Tabacalera Boqueron S A . v. Paraguay (1997), Inter-Am. 
Comm. H.R., Rep. No. 47/97, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 
1987, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98/Doc.7/rev. (1998) 225, para. 25 and 36. Shelton, supra note. 36, 
169-72.
42 ACHR, supra note 38, art. 63(1). Shelton, supra note 36, 221-3.
43 ECHR, supra note 37, art. 35; ACHR, supra note 38, art. 46(1).
44 Shelton, supra note 36, 90; Costa, supra note 40,15.
45 Francovich and Bonifaci v. Republic of Italy (No. 6 and 9/90), [1991] E.C.R. 1-5357, (1993) 2 
C.M.L.R. 66 [hereinafter Francovich].
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law by a member state.46 Outside o f investment arbitration, the Francovich doctrine is 
probably the most ambitious attempt to apply treaty-based state liability in the context 
o f economic integration 47 Even so, the Francovich doctrine is limited by various 
factors. For one, the Court has limited compensation to cases o f “sufficiently serious” 
state violations of EC law.48 Also, the Court has stated that “the decisive test” for the 
imposition o f state liability is whether the state “manifestly and gravely disregarded 
the limits o f its discretion” under EC law.49 Further, under the Francovich doctrine, the 
availability of damages is subject to domestic rules o f liability in the state responsible 
for the violation, subject to certain minimum requirements o f effectiveness and non­
discrimination.50 Finally, domestic courts play an important role in determining 
whether liability should be imposed in specific cases51 and this has allowed the courts 
in the United Kingdom, for instance, to refuse compensation out o f a fear that 
claimants “might thereby side-step limitations on liability in domestic tort law”.52
Notably, the European Court of Justice’s requirement for a “sufficiently 
serious” breach by a member state introduces a fault-based limitation on state
46 More precisely, damages must be available as a remedy before the domestic courts of the 
member states, subject to the overriding jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in 
matters of EC law: Francovich, ibid., para. 35 and 40. P. Craig and G. De Burca, EU  Law — 
Text, Cases, and Materials, 3rd ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2003), 257-274.
47 The Francovich doctrine applies to legislative acts and omissions (Brasserie du PecheurSA v. 
Germany,; Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. and Others (No. 46 & 48/93), 
(1996) 1 C.M.L.R. 889 [hereinafter Brasserie du Pecheui]), administrative decisions (R. v.
Ministiy of Agriculture and Fisheries, ex parte Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd. (No. 5/94), [1996] E.C.R. 
1-2553), judicial decisions (Koblerv. Austria (No. C-224/01), [2003] E.C.R. 1-10239, 3
C.M.L.R. 28), and acts of sub-national governments (Salomone Haim v. Kassen%ahnar%tliche 
VereinigungNordrhein (No. 424/97), [2000] E.C.R. 1-5123).
48 Brasserie du Pecheur, ibid., 990 (finding various fault-based factors relevant to the issue of 
whether a breach was sufficiently serious, including: the clarity and precision of the rule 
breached; the measure of discretion left by that rule to the national or Community 
authorities; whether the infringement and the damage caused was intentional or involuntary; 
whether any error of law was excusable or inexcusable; the fact that the position taken by a 
Community institution may have contributed towards the omission; and the adoption or 
retention of national measures or practices contrary to Community law).
49 Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques Bergaderm and Goupilv. Commission (No. 352/98), [2000] E.C.R. I- 
5291.
50 Francovich, supra note 45, para. 43.
51 Pxwe-ZentralFinan% eG v. Lanschwirtschaftskammerfur das Saarland (No. 33/76), [1976] E.C.R. 
1989. C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration (London: Butterworths, 1997), 632- 
3; T. Tridimas, “Liability for Breach of Community Law: Growing Up and Mellowing 
Down? (2001) 38 C.M.L Rev. 301, 317-21 and 331-2.
52 M. Lunney and K. Oliphant, Tort Law (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 524-5.
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liability.53 As well, the role o f domestic courts in this area o f EC law cushions the 
impact o f state liability on domestic governments.54 These limiting factors are not 
present in investment arbitration. Investment treaties do not provide for a minimum 
threshold o f culpability on the part of the state. Also, damages claims are brought 
directly before an international tribunal and the role of domestic courts is normally 
circumscribed by arbitration treaties like the New York Convention, as implemented by 
domestic law. As such, the ability of investors to claim damages under investment 
treaties is more extensive than in the case o f the Francovich doctrine.
N ot only is investment arbitration prospective; it also entails individual claims 
in a uniquely far-reaching form. In the first place, the general consent to investment 
arbitration entails a broad waiver of the state’s customary immunity from suit before 
an international tribunal, or before a domestic court that is called upon to enforce an 
international award.55 Moreover, under the terms o f many investment treaties, 
investors are not obliged to exhaust local remedies before bringing a claim.56 Further,
53 D. Fairgrieve, “The Human Rights Act 1998, Damages and Tort Law” [2001] Pub. Law 
695, 698-9.
54 Lunney and Oliphant, supra note 52, 524-5; Tridimas, supra note 51, 317-21 and 331-2;
Craig and De Burca, supra note 46, 231-3 and 268.
55 Under NAFTA Chapter 11, the investor’s duty to exhaust local remedies is limited and 
arguably removed: Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (Jurisdiction) (26 June 2002), 
41 I.L.M. 1315,14(6) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 203 [hereinafter Waste Management No. 2], 
para. 29-30; Waste Management Inc. v. United Mexican States (Merits) (30 April 2004), 43 I.L.M. 
967,16(4) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 3, para. 116; Mondev International hid. v. United States of 
America (Merits) (11 October 2002), 42 I.L.M. 85,15(3) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 273 
[hereinafter Mondev], para. 154; Marvin Roy Feldman Kaipa v. United Mexican States (Merits) (16 
December 2002), 15(3) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 157 [hereinafter Feldman\, para. 71-4. See 
also Robert A^nian et al. v. United Mexican States (Merits) (1 November 1999), 39 I.L.M. 537 
[hereinafter Aifnian], para. 97-9; The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond h. Loewen v. United States 
of America (Merits) (26 June 2003), 42 I.L.M. 811,15(5) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 97, para. 
142-57; GAMI Investments, Inc. v. Government of the United Mexican States (Merits) (15 November 
2004), 17(2) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 127 [hereinafter GAMI], para. 29-30, 38,101-3, and 
133. G.R. Delaume, “Sovereign Immunity and Transnational Arbitration” (1987) 3 Arb. Int’l 
28, 29-31; W.S. Dodge, “National Courts and International Arbitration: Exhaustion of 
Remedies and Res Judicata Under Chapter Eleven of NAFTA” (2000) 23 Hast. Int’l &
Comp. L.R. 357, 383; Foy, supra note 18, 49; P.I. Hansen, “Judicialization and Globalization 
in the North American Free Trade Agreement” (2003) 38 Tex. Int’l L.J. 489, 498-9.
56 Under some investment treaties, investors must forego domestic remedies in order to 
make a claim; under others, they must first exhaust them; under others, they may pursue 
treaty-based and/ or domestic remedies: e.g. Emilio Agustin Majfe^ini v. The Kingdom of Spain 
(Jurisdiction) (25 January 2000), 16 ICSID Rev. 212,124 I.L.R. 9, para. 19; CMS Gas 
Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina (Jurisdiction) (17 July 2003), 42 I.L.M. 788 
[hereinafter CMS], para. 73; SGS Societe Generate de Surveillances. Pakistan (Jurisdiction) (6 
August 2003), 18 ICSID Rev. 307,16(2) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 167, para. 151. P.G. Foy,
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investors are entitled to select the arbitration rules that govern the claim and to 
participate in the appointment of arbitrators. Unlike other forms o f international 
adjudication in the public sphere, investment treaties authorize the direct enforcement 
o f awards by investors under the ICSID Convention or the New York Convention,57 As a 
result, investors can seek enforcement o f an award against assets o f the respondent 
state in any state that is a party to these treaties. This powerful element o f investment 
arbitration — direct enforceability in over 160 states — makes investment arbitration 
awards more widely enforceable than any judicial decision by a domestic or 
international court.58 Overall, the scope and potency of the ability o f investors to 
make international claims under investment treaties is exceptional.
“Effectiveness of NAFTA’s Chapter Eleven Investor-State Arbitration Procedures” (2003) 
18 ICSID Rev. 44, 66; UNCTAD, Dispute Settlement: Investor-State, UNCTAD Series on Issues 
in International Investment Agreements (New York: United Nations, 2003), 31-7.
57 E.g. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1130 (providing that a Chapter 11 arbitration must be held 
in the territory of a NAFTA state that is a party to the New York Convention unless the 
disputing parties agree otherwise). E.R. Leahy, “Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Issued by 
the Additional Facility of the International Centre of Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID)” (1985) 2 J. Int’l Arb. 15,15-16; Redfem and Flunter, supra note 15, 474 and 481; 
UNCTAD, ibid., 62-4.
58 The issue of enforcement calls for elaboration. First, in refusing to make good on an 
investment arbitration award, a host state may be subjected to diplomatic and economic 
pressure from the investment community, international financial institutions, the investor’s 
home state, and other capital-exporting states. Indeed, one reason for the decision to locate 
ICSID within World Bank was to draw on the World Bank’s ability to encourage 
enforcement by its influence over host states’ access to credit (see chapter two of this thesis, 
note 124). In addition, investment treaties commonly obligate the states parties to recognize 
and enforce awards under the treaty (e.g. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1136(2) and (4)
[requiring each state party to “abide by and comply with an award without delay” and to 
“provide for the enforcement of an award in its territory”]). Thus, an investor can directly 
seek recognition and enforcement of an award by a domestic court — pursuant to the 
investment treaty and applicable implementing legislation — in one of the states parties to the treaty 
on the basis that the host state’s ratification of the treaty constitutes a waiver of its sovereign 
immunity from enforcement. Finally, where the investment treaty provides for enforcement 
under the ICSID Convention or the New York Convention, an investor can seek recognition and 
enforcement of an award by a domestic court in any state party to either of these treaties based on 
the terms of the treaty and applicable implementing legislation (although enforcement and 
recognition under the ICSID Convention is possible only where both the host state and the 
investor’s home state are parties to that treaty). This method of direct enforcement by 
investors is exceptionally powerful given the large number of states that are parties to these 
treaties. Approximately 165 states are parties to either the New York Convention or the ICSID 
Convention or both.
To illustrate, NAFTA Chapter 11 refers for purposes of enforcement to both the 
ICSID Convention and the New York Convention. The question of which treaty’s enforcement 
structure applies to an arbitration award under Chapter 11 depends on the arbitration rules 
under which the investor files its claim. Investors may file a claim under one of three sets of
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B. Outcomes of individualization
This prospective and far-reaching individualization o f international claims has two 
inter-related outcomes. First, because investment treaties apply international law in 
order to constrain the exercise of public authority, investment arbitration leads to 
more frequent and intensive application of international standards to protect investors 
in the regulatory sphere.59 This is because the authorization of individual claims, 
combined with the remedy of damages, makes it more likely that states will be subject 
to international claims, and that those claims will be vigorously pursued. Moreover, 
the advent o f far-reaching individual claims makes the analytical framework o f public 
law, conventionally developed in domestic adjudication o f regulatory disputes, more
rules: the ICSID Rules, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, or the UNCITRAL Rules. If an 
investor selects the ICSID Rules, the arbitration proceeds under the ICSID Convention, which 
provides that an ICSID award has the force of a final court judgment of a state party under 
its domestic law and that the award cannot be reviewed by domestic courts: Convention for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes, 18 March 1965, 4 I.L.M. 524 (entered into force 14 Oct 1966) 
[hereinafter ICSID Convention], art. 54 (providing that “Contracting States will recognise an 
award as if it was a final judgment of a court in that State”) and 53(1) (providing that “The 
award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other 
remedy except those provided for in this Convention. Each party shall abide by and comply
with the terms of the award ”). See also Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the
Administration of Proceedings bj the Secretariat of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, 27 September 1978, revised 1 January 2003,1 ICSID Reports 213 [hereinafter 
ICSID Additional Facility Rules], art. 53(4). Thus, an ICSID award is recognizable and 
enforceable, independent of the New York Convention, although domestic courts may refuse to 
execute an ICSID award against state assets for reasons of sovereign immunity. (Note that 
enforcement under the ICSID Convention is currently unavailable in investment arbitration 
under NAFTA Chapter 11 because neither Canada nor Mexico have signed the ICSID 
Convention.)
Alternatively, if the investor selects the ICSID Additional Facility Rules or the 
UNCITRAL Rules, the Chapter 11 arbitration proceeds under the New York Convention, 
which provides that an award shall be recognized as binding by the states parties to the treaty 
and that a domestic court may review an award only on limited grounds: United Nations 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 10 June 1958, 330 
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 7 June 1959) [hereinafter New York Convention\, art. I, III, and 
V. Finally, the award may also be enforced under the Inter-American Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration, 30 January 1975, 14 I.L.M. 336 [hereinafter Inter-American Convention, 
which contains provisions that are similar to those under the New York Convention’, art. 1, 4, 
and 5.
59 See E. Denza, “The Relationship Between International and National Law” in M.D. Evans, 
ed., International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 415; B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch, and R. Stewart, 
“The Emergence of Global Administrative Law” (International Law and Justice Working 
Paper 2004/1, Institute for International Law and Justice, New York University School of 
Law, 2004), 5-6 and 41-2.
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clearly and direcdy relevant to international adjudication. These outcomes are 
examined in this section, focusing on the remedy o f damages.
By allowing individual claims for damages, investment treaties expand the 
scope o f international adjudication to encompass regulatory disputes that would 
otherwise be resolved through domestic adjudication. Thus, individualization removes 
a buffer between international law and the domestic sphere. Under customary 
international law, the claim o f diplomatic protection was that o f the home state and 
individuals had no right to bring a claim on their own behalf.60 Conventionally, a host 
state could moderate disputes involving foreign nationals by negotiating with the 
home state.61 Diplomatic deals could be cut at the expense o f individuals; powerful 
states could ignore claims on behalf o f nationals of weaker states. By authorizing 
investors to directly advance a claim and seek damages for an alleged violation o f 
international law, investment treaties allow investors to decide when and how to 
threaten, initiate, or settle a claim.62 The investor appoints counsel and approves the 
legal argument. In short, the investor has custody o f the claim and can make decisions 
about the manner and extent to which international adjudication will be used to 
resolve a regulatory dispute.63
In this context, the protection o f the investor’s interests is not moderated by 
the home state’s consideration o f its own interest as a representative entity. When a
60 Administrative Decision No. V, supra note 12, 626-7; Barcelona Traction, supra note 5, para. 79. 
Hudson, supra note 6, 67-9; P.T. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1999), 534-6; UNCTAD, supra note 14, 89-90; R. McCorquodale, “The Individual 
and the International Legal System” in M.D. Evans, ed., International Law (Oxford: OUP, 
2004), 308.
61 Hudson, supra note 6,191-4; J. Merrills, “The Means of Dispute Settlement” in M.D. 
Evans, ed., International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 541.
62 Under customary international law, where an award was made by an international tribunal 
to remedy an international wrong that harmed a foreign national, the home state had the 
discretion to pass on only part or none of the compensation, and to divide lump sum 
payments among the home state’s nationals: Administrative Decision No. V t supra note 12, 626- 
7. G.A. Christenson, “The United States-Rumanian Claims Settlement Agreement of March 
30,1960” (1961) 55 AJIL 617, 618-20; E.F. Mooney, Foreign Seizures — Sabbatino and the Act of 
State Doctrine (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), 130. Even after the award was 
obtained, a state could choose not to enforce the award, leaving the investor without further 
recourse under international law. In investment arbitration, damages awards are granted to, 
and enforceable by, investors, making investment arbitration more attractive to investors as a 
means to obtain compensation.
63 See R. Baldwin and C. McCrudden, Regulation and Public Law (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1987), 57 and 65.
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home state makes decisions about an international claim, those decisions are made on 
behalf of its people in the context of international relations.64 At each stage, an 
international claim is subject to the home state’s consideration o f its interests and to 
good faith considerations.65 These filters are removed by the introduction of 
individual claims. Investors are private parties, legally responsible only for their own 
interest.66 An investor can make a claim without any immediate intervention by the 
home state to block the claim. Further, the context for an investor’s decisions about a 
claim is the investor’s business strategies as opposed to the interests o f the home 
state.67 Unlike states, investors do not face the prospect o f defending a claim.68 An 
investor is more likely to argue for an expansive approach to investor protection. 
Indeed, legal counsel have an incentive to promote investment arbitration in order to 
generate business,69 as the market for legal services in international adjudication is 
greatly expanded by individualization.70 Thus, investors are likely to bring claims more 
often and to represent their interests more vigorously than would the home state
64 Administrative Decision No. V, supra note 12, 626-7. Hudson, supra note 6, 191-4 and 198;
D.C. Ohly, “A Functional Analysis of Claimant Eligibility” in R.B. Lillich, ed., International 
haw of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia,
1983), 284.
65 E.g. Atfnian, supra note 55, para. 104 and 121-4 (noting apparent misrepresentations by the 
claimant). M.A. Luz, “NAFTA, Investment and the Constitution of Canada: Will the 
Watertight Compartments Spring a Leak” (2001) 32 Ottawa L.R. 35, 87.
66 J.C. Thomas, “Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven” (Paper 
presented to the NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Disputes: Litigating Against Sovereigns 
conference, Canadian Bar Association, Toronto, March 2000), 4-5; Foy, supra note 56, 50 
(commenting that claimants in investment arbitration have no interest in the interpretation of 
substantive provisions of the treaty; they are interested only in a damages award).
67 R.K. Paterson, “A New Pandora’s Box? Private Remedies for Foreign Investors under the 
North American Free Trade Agreement” (2000) 8 Willamette J. Int’l L. and Dispute Res. 77, 
82.
68 Paulsson, supra note 1, 232; J. Wemer, “The Trade Explosion and Some Likely Effects on 
International Arbitration” (1997) 14J. Int’l Arb. 5, 6.
69 This introduces a market dynamic, concerning the initiation of international claims, which 
encourages law firms to promote investment arbitration among clients. For law firms’ 
promotional material, see e.g. R.D. Bishop, S.D. Dimitroff, and C.S. Miles, “Strategic 
Options Available When Catastrophe Strikes” (2001) 36 Texas Int’l L.J. 635; Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer, “The Argentine Crisis — Foreign Investors’ Rights” (Report, January 
2002); Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, “Dispute Resolution in the Caspian Region” (Report, 
June 2002).
70 See M. Shapiro, “The Globalization of Law” (1993) 1 Ind. J. Global Legal Studies 37, 59- 
60.
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because investors have no reason to moderate or setde a claim for reasons o f public 
interest.71
Moreover, most investment treaties limit or remove the customary rule that a 
foreign national must exhaust local remedies before an international claim can be 
brought.72 There are at least four rationales for this rule.73 First, foreign nationals were 
thought to have a duty to take into account the domestic means to redress wrongs. 
Second, local courts were presumed capable o f delivering justice out of respect for the 
equality and independence o f states. Third, where an injury to a foreign national was 
committed by a private individual or minor official, the exhaustion o f local remedies 
was required to ensure that the wrongful act or denial o f justice was the deliberate act 
o f the host state. Fourth, the rule provided an opportunity for the host state’s legal 
system to correct wrongs suffered by foreign nationals. By limiting or removing the 
local remedies rule, investment treaties limit the state’s ability to respond to the 
mistreatment o f investors through its judicial system.74 They also introduce the 
prospect of multiple claims in relation to the same underlying dispute, under both an
71 E.g. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. United Mexican States (Jurisdiction) (17 July 2003), 
15(6) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 3 [hereinafter Fireman’s Fund], para. 64 (rejecting the 
claimant’s submission that “as a general policy consideration, direct investor recourse to 
arbitration has become the rule in modem investment agreements, although there may be 
exceptions, and that the value of investor-state arbitral mechanism is so substantial that it 
should only be foreclosed when that result is unmistakably required by treaty provision”); 
Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic (Jurisdiction) (3 August 2004), ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/8 [hereinafter Siemens], para. 116,120 and 135 (accepting the claimant’s submission 
that the inclusion of a most-favoured-nation clause in a BIT “implies the right [of the 
claimant] to select those aspects of provisions in different treaties that favor the [investor] 
most”, thus allowing investors to pick and choose from the provisions of different treaties 
and to construct them into the most desirable collection of procedural and substantive rights 
in relation to a claim), online: ITA http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Siemensjurisdiction- 
English-3August2004.pdf.
72 UNCTAD, supra note 56, 31-7; V.L. Been and J.C. Beauvais, “The Global Fifth 
Amendment: NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an 
International ‘Regulatory Takings’ Doctrine” (2003) 78 N.Y.U. L.R. 30, 83-6.
73 Eagleton, supra note 7, 79, 96, and 100; E.M. Borchard, “The Access of Individuals to 
International Courts” (1930) 24 AJIL 359, 362-3; Okowa, supra note 7, 493-4.
74 Exceptions to the duty to exhaust local remedies are customarily limited to circumstances 
in which an effective local remedy was unavailable: Certain Norweigen Loans (France v. Norway), 
[1957] I.C.J. Rep. 9, 39. Wortley, supra note 14, 23-4 and 140-2.
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investment treaty and domestic law.75 All o f this makes it more likely that disputes 
traditionally dealt with by domestic courts will be subject to international adjudication.
Conventionally, individuals faced difficulties in attempting to enforce the 
adjudication o f a regulatory dispute, or enforce an award, in domestic courts other 
than those o f the state in which the regulatory dispute arose. Under customary 
international law, courts commonly declined to rule on the sovereign actions of 
foreign states (whether for reasons o f sovereign immunity, act o f state, or non­
justiciability).76 The government o f the home state might itself object to the courts 
ruling on a foreign dispute in order to preserve the government’s executive discretion 
to manage foreign affairs.77 In contrast, investment treaties incorporate the 
enforcement structure o f the ICSID Convention and the New York Convention, under 
which investors can directly seek recognition and enforcement o f awards in foreign 
courts. Thus, unlike judgments of domestic courts, an investment arbitration award is 
backed by the coercive authority o f a large number o f states to enforce awards within 
their territory, based on treaties that mandate the enforcement o f foreign arbitration 
awards.
This collective coercive authority is absent in other cases o f international 
adjudication within the public sphere. For example, human rights treaties that allow 
individuals damages claims do not authorize the enforcement o f awards by domestic 
courts.78 Judgments o f the International Court o f Justice, although binding on states 
that consent to the Court’s jurisdiction, can be enforced only by the UN Security 
Council.79 A successful state would depend on the support o f a majority of Security 
Council members, including the five permanent members, to obtain enforcement. In 
contrast, in investment arbitration, a successful investor can seek enforcement against
75 E.g. CMS, supra note 56, para. 78 and 80; A^urix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic (Jurisdiction) 
(8 December 2003), 16(2) World Trade and Arb. Mat. I l l  [hereinafter A%urix], para. 99-100; 
Siemens, supra note 71, para. 151 and 160.
76 E.g. Bladv. Bamfield (1674), 3 Swan 604, 36 Eng. Rep. 992; Duke of Brunswick v. King of 
Hannover (1844), [1848] 6 Beav. 1, 2 H.L.C. 1; Oetjenv. Central Heather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918), 
303-4. Mooney, supra note 62, 7-9 and 22; A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, “Internationalization of 
Foreign Investment Agreements — Some Fundamental Issues of International Law” (2000) 1 
J. World Investment 293, 315; Denza, supra note 59, 436-8.
77 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 3 I.L.M. 381, 398 (1964).
78 Supra note 44; Hudson, supra note 6,128-9.
79 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, [1945] U.S.T.S. No. 993, [1946] U.K.T.S. No. 67, 
[1945] Can. T.S. No. 7, art. 94(2) (entered into force 24 October 1945). Harris, supra note 8, 
989; M.N. Shaw, International Taw, 5th ed. (Cambridge: CUP, 2003), 996-7.
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state assets in the courts o f any state party to an applicable arbitration treaty, such as 
the ICSID Convention or the New York Convention.
These factors intensify the application o f international standards to protect 
investors in the regulatory sphere. Under customary international law, individual 
interests are subordinated to the decisions o f states and to inter-state dispute 
resolution. This does not mean that individual rights and interests do not exist under 
international law. What it means is that individual rights and interests are rarely 
actionable and enforceable.80 In turn, the application of international standards to 
protect individuals is limited. Disputes between states and individuals -  i.e. regulatory 
disputes — are instead resolved through an exclusively domestic process and 
international adjudication is insulated from considerations that often arise, in 
domestic courts, in the context of regulatory disputes. However, where investors 
directly can make international claims, arising from a regulatory dispute, this alters the 
dynamic o f international adjudication. Far-reaching individualization makes it more 
likely that regulatory disputes involving investors will lead to international 
adjudication. In turn, governments face greater pressure to abide by international 
standards o f investor protection when they exercise public authority. As mentioned, 
this altered dynamic advantages investors, but not other individuals who are ineligible 
to bring claims under investment treaties. As a result, investment arbitration 
prioritizes the interests of investors in the governing apparatus at the expense of 
those who would benefit from the regulation o f investors.
As a result o f this far-reaching yet selective individualization, investment 
arbitration engages the regulatory sphere in ways that conventional international 
adjudication does not. In fact, conventional inter-state adjudication -  although it 
generally relates to disputes arising from the exercise o f public authority by a state — is 
more akin to the domestic adjudication o f a private dispute than to the domestic 
adjudication o f a regulatory dispute. This is because legal relations between states in 
the international sphere are more analogous to domestic legal relations between
80 E.g .Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion (1928), P.C.I.J. Ser. B, No. 15 
[hereinafter Courts ofDan^ig\, 17-18; Lagrand (Merits) (Germany v. United States), [2001] I.C.J. 
Rep. 466, 40 I.L.M. 1069 [hereinafter Lagrand\, para. 77; Legal Consequences of the Construction of 
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) (9 July 2004), I.C.J. General List 
No. 131 [hereinafter Construction of a Wall\, para. 147 and 152.
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private parties than to those between the state and an individual.81 Put differently, the 
relationship between a state and a foreign investor is not a relationship between 
sovereigns, each representing a political group in the international sphere. Rather, it is 
a regulatory relationship between the state and a private party who is subject to the 
exercise o f public authority.82 Through prospective and far-reaching individualization, 
investment arbitration deals with disputes arising directly from the regulatory 
relationship and thus engages the regulatory sphere to a much greater degree than 
conventional international adjudication. In this context, international adjudication 
resembles the domestic adjudication o f individual claims against the state under 
domestic administrative or constitutional law.83 However, investors are able to invoke 
international principles that are unavailable in domestic adjudication o f a regulatory 
dispute.84 This gives investors an incentive to bring international claims in lieu of, or 
alongside, domestic remedies since investment arbitration tends to provide greater 
legal protection from regulation than domestic law, especially in relation to the 
availability o f damages as a public law remedy.
Thus, with far-reaching individualization, the nature o f the adjudication is 
fundamentally transformed. International obligations between states establish 
actionable rights for investors, but not other individuals. The adjudicator is directly 
oriented toward the state’s treatment of investors in the regulatory sphere rather than 
the state’s legal relations with another state on the international plane. The disputing
81 T.J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law (London: Macmillan and Co., 1923), 47 and 
51; H. Lauterpacht, Private Sources and Analogies of International Law (Longmans, Green and Co., 
1927), 3-5; V.S. Mani, International Adjudication (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), 3-4.
82 A. Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation” (1976) 89 Harv. L.R. 1281, 
1294-5 and 1302; D. Cohen and J.C. Smith, “Entitlement and the Body Politic: Rethinking 
Negligence in Public Law” (1986) 64 Can. Bar. Rev. 1,7-8; Shelton, supra note 36, 39 and 47- 
50.
83 Brownlie, supra note 13, 503-4; Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, supra note 59,12-13 and 
41-2.
84 E.g. Eeldman, supra note 55, para. 62 (invoking the international principle of estoppel in 
claims arising from boundary disputes); Santa Elena, supra note 13, para. 35 (international 
standard of compensation, calculated without accounting for existing environmental 
legislation that would restrict the commercial development of expropriated property); Tecnicas 
Medioambientales Teemed, S A . v. United Mexican States (Merits) (29 May 2003), 43 I.L.M. 133 
[hereinafter Tecmed\, para. 70-1 and 173 (international principle of good faith); A^urix, supra 
note 75, para. 34 (international principle of unity of the state). See Pepublic of Ecuador v. 
Occidental Exploration and Production Company (29 April 2005), [2005] E.W.C.H. 774 (Comm.
Ct.) [hereinafter Ecuador v. Occidental Petroleum], para. 32 (international principle of non­
justiciability).
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parties to the arbitration no longer have reciprocal rights and duties, even though 
rules and principles developed in the context o f inter-state adjudication may still be 
applied.85 Finally, the public interest o f a sovereign is replaced by the private interests 
o f  investors.86 Overall, this disadvantages any individual who would benefit from state 
regulation that harms investors.
C. Individual claims and state liability
The expansion of the scope of international adjudication to encompass the regulatory 
sphere makes the analytical framework o f public law, developed in domestic 
adjudication o f regulatory disputes, more relevant to international adjudication.87 This 
can be demonstrated by examining the main remedy in investment arbitration: the 
damages award. In making a claim under an investment treaty, an investor usually 
seeks damages for harm caused by a state’s alleged breach o f the treaty’s standards of 
investor protection.88 Where an arbitration tribunal concludes that a state violated the 
treaty, the tribunal may award damages to the investor.89 Awards are compensatory 
and usually do not include exemplary or punitive damages.90 That said, damages have 
a deterrent effect on the state because they sanction state conduct that was found to
85 Walde, supra note 1, 435-6 and 447-8.
86 A.A. Fatouros, “Transnational Enterprise in the Law of State Responsibility” in R.B. 
Lillich, ed., International Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens (Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 1983), 364.
87 E.g. Feldman, supra note 55, para. 61-3 (referring to the domestic law of the NAFTA states 
on claims of estoppel to block tax enforcement); Mondev, supra note 55, para. 149-50 
(domestic law on the tortious immunity of public authorities); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of 
Canada (Merits) (12 November 2000), 40 I.L.M. 1408,15(1) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 184 
[hereinafter S.D. Myers], para. 249 (domestic law on equality rights); United Parcel Service of 
America, Inc. v. Government of Canada (Jurisdiction) (22 November 2002) [hereinafter UPS], 
para. 85 (domestic competition law), online: ITA http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/UPS- 
Jurisdiction.pdf. The change here is one of degree given that international tribunals have 
examined or analogi2ed issues of domestic law in the past: e.g. Fabiani Case (France v. 
Venezuela) (1896), 10 R.I.A.A. 33 (state responsibility for the official acts of its agents).
88 E.g. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1116 and 1117; Agreement between the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of India, 14 March 
1994, [1995] U.K.T.S. No. 27, Cmd 2797 (entered into force 6 January 1995), art. 9.
89 E.g. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1135.
90 E.g. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1135(3).
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have been unlawful.91 As noted, this arrangement for compensating investors and 
enforcing international law differs from other trade agreements that rely on inter-state 
adjudication and non-monetary remedies. In contrast to these other international 
mechanisms, investment treaties establish an individualized regime of state liability to 
remedy the unlawful exercise o f public authority.92
Damages are traditionally a private law remedy.93 The theory of damages is 
based on a private law conception of the legal relations between disputing parties; i.e. 
a theoretical framework based on reciprocal relations between juridical equals. Thus, 
damages are classically awarded in the context o f a reciprocal rather than a regulatory 
relationship. Damages are paid by one party to another for the violation of a legal 
duty and both the victim and the wrongdoer are protected by the law and liable to 
sanction. Either disputing party can be the claimant or respondent in a claim.
In the international law o f state responsibility, the use o f damages (or 
reparation) as a remedy does not undermine this conceptual framework because a 
dispute between juridically equal states is broadly analogous to a dispute between 
private parties (likewise, a contractual dispute between an individual and a state is 
conventionally treated as private dispute, subject to the law o f the contract).94 In inter­
state adjudication, damages are awarded in the context of a dispute between juridical
91 C.T. Oliver, “Legal Remedies and Sanctions” in R.B. Lillich, ed., International Law of State 
Responsibility forlnjuries to Aliens (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1983), 61-5; 
J.H.H. Weiler, “Emerging Issues on Compliance and Effectiveness of Community Law”
(1997) 91 ASIL Proc. 172,173; Shelton, supra note 36, 41 and 279; J.A. VanDuzer, “NAFTA 
Chapter 11 to Date: The Progress of a Work in Progress” in L. Ritchie Dawson, ed., Whose 
Rights? The NAFTA Chapter 11 Debate (Ottawa: Centre for Trade Law and Policy, 2002), 48-9.
92 Afilalo, supra note 1, 6. In this thesis, the term “state liability” is used rather than state 
responsibility to highlight the distinction between a damages award in investment arbitration 
and a damages award in conventional international adjudication. In investment arbitration, 
involving state liability, damages are paid to an individual in the context of a regulatory 
relationship between the individual and the state. In conventional international adjudication, 
damages are paid to a state in the context of a reciprocal relationship between two states.
93 Chayes, supra note 82,1287; Gray, supra note 17, 8; Shelton, supra note 36, 38-9.
94 C.N. Gregory, “Expropriation by International Arbitration” (1907) 21 Harv. L.R. 23, 23; 
W.W. Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law (New York: Macmillan, 1924), 322- 
4; Eagleton, supra note 7,16; Hudson, supra note 6,188; F.A. Mann, “State Contracts and 
State Responsibility” (1960) 54 AJIL 572, 573 and 582. See Whiteman, supra note 11, 6-7; 
International Law Commission, “Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts”, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session,
UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, Annex, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), 43, art. 42.
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equals; i.e. between parties equally capable of possessing legal rights and duties.95 On 
the other hand, in investment arbitration, damages are awarded to a private party who 
is subject to the exercise of public authority by the state.96 That is, damages are 
awarded in order to resolve a regulatory dispute and to compensate for harm caused 
by the unlawful exercise of public authority. Only an investor can make a claim and 
only the state, acting in a public capacity, can be a respondent to an investor claim. 
State liability arises in the context of the regulatory relationship. This distinguishes 
damages awards in investment arbitration from damages awards in private law or 
inter-state adjudication.
International rules o f state responsibility are more expansive than those which 
typically apply in the domestic law of state liability. For example, international law 
adopts a flexible approach to the attribution o f individual acts to the state, holding 
states responsible for ultra vires acts of its agents in order to encourage active state 
supervision o f public officials.97 For similar reasons, a claimant state does not have to 
prove intent on the part of a respondent state in order to establish liability for acts 
arising from official error.98 In general, international rules o f state responsibility adopt 
a more liberal approach to fault than do domestic rules of state liability.99 This more
95 J. Dutheil de la Rochere, “Member State Liability for Infringement of European 
Community Law” (1996) 11 Tul. Euro. Civ. L.F. 1,10; D. Bodansky and J.R. Crook, 
“Symposium: The ILC’s State Responsibility Articles — Introduction and Overview” (2002)
96 AJIL 773, 775-6 and 785-6; Weiss, supra note 35, 798-9; C. Warbrick, “States and 
Recognition in International Law” in M.D. Evans, ed., International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 
211-12. But see Construction of a Wall' supra note 80,147 and 152 (concluding that states have 
an obligation, having breached a rule of customary international law that protects individuals, 
“to make reparation for the damage caused to all the natural or legal persons concerned” and 
“to compensate, in accordance with the applicable rules of international law, all natural or 
legal persons having suffered any form of material damage” as a result of the breach); Janes 
Claim (United States v. Mexico) (1926), 4 R.I.A.A. 82, para. 23-6 (assessing the state’s liability 
for murder of a foreign national in terms of loss to the individuals concerned, rather than the 
home state, and awarding compensation to the relatives of the deceased).
96 Eagleton, supra note 7, 3, note 2; S.J. Toope, Mixed International Arbitration — Studies in 
Arbitration 'between States and Private Persons (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1990), 184-7.
97 Caire Claim (France v. Mexico) (1929), 5 R.I.A.A. 516 [hereinafter Caire Claim], 529-30.
98 Union Bridge Company Claim (United States v. Great Britain) (1924), 6 R.I.A.A. 138,141-2. See 
also Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v. Sri Lanka (Merits) (27 June 1990), 4 ICSID 
Rep. 246, 30 I.L.M. 577, para. 69 and 77; In the Matter of Cross-border Trucking Services (Merits)
(6 February 2001), 13(3) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 121, para. 214.
99 Caire Claim, supra note 97, 529-30; Corfu Channel (Merits) (United Kingdom v. Albania), [1949] 
I.C.J. Rep. 4,22. See also Tippetts v. TAMS-ATTA (1985), 6 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 219,226. 
Eagleton, supra note 7,18-20; M.T. Ahmedouamar, “The Liability of the Government in 
France as a Consequence of its Legal Activities” (1983) 11 Int’l J. Legal Info. 1, 6 and 10; A.
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permissive approach to state responsibility under international law reflects the 
reciprocity o f legal relations between states.100 Each state, in principle, enjoys the 
protection and assumes the risk that flows from a liberal approach to rules of 
attribution, intent, and fault.
The reciprocity of rights and duties breaks down in the adjudication of a 
regulatory dispute between the state and an individual.101 In a regulatory dispute, the 
state wields powers and assumes responsibilities that no private person can possess.102 
As a result, the protection of individuals from the exercise o f public authority requires 
the application o f norms that uniquely protect individuals from the state. In some 
cases, individuals may be allowed to claim damages from the state in order to 
compensate for harm suffered as a result o f the unlawful exercise o f public authority. 
But, in claiming damages, the individual invokes rights and entidements that adhere to 
the individual against the state and not the other way round.103 The state alone can 
exercise public authority over private parties, including foreign investors, in its 
territory. Likewise, the state has duties that arise only from the exercise o f public 
authority and, as such, that cannot be compared to acts o f private parties. Absent the 
exercise o f public authority, the prospect o f an individual claim arising out of a 
regulatory dispute simply does not exist.
Damages awards to individuals for unlawful state conduct raise thorny issues 
about the scope and purpose of state liability and the appropriate role o f 
government.104 Should damages be awarded to compensate individuals, or to deter
Nollkaemper, “Concurrence Between Individual Responsibility and State Responsibility in 
International Law” (2003) 52 I.C.L.Q. 615, 633.
100 Lauterpacht, supra note 81,134; Eagleton, supra note 7, 5.
101 Chayes, supra note 82,1302; Fatouros, supra note 86, 362-3; D.W. Bowett, “Claims 
Between States and Private Entities: The Twilight Zone of International Law” (1986) 35 
Cath. U. L. Rev. 929, 933-4; W. Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory (London: 
Butterworths, 2000), 51-3; Shelton, supra note 36, 39 and 47-50.
102 W.I. Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (London: University of London Press, 1959), 
312; Cohen and Smith, supra note 82, 5-6; Harlow and Rawlings, supra note 51, 5 and 41-5; 
Warbrick, supra note 95, 231-2.
103 Toope, supra note 96, 388.
104 See C. Harlow, Compensation and Government Torts (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1982), 51; 
Ontario Law Reform Commission (OLRC), Report on the Liability of the Crown (Toronto: 
OLRC, 1989), 7; C. Harlow, “Francovich and the Problem of the Disobedient State” (1996) 
2 Eur. L.J. 199; Dutheil de la Rochere, supra note 95; P.W. Hogg and P.J. Monahan, Liability 
of the Crown, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2000), 151.
90
inappropriate state conduct?105 Should liability be limited by requirements o f malice or 
fault on the part o f the state?106 Should liability be limited because o f the unique 
nature o f the state and the need to maintain flexibility and predictability in 
government?107 Should legislative or judicial acts be exempt from liability?108 These 
matters have previously been resolved, almost exclusively, by domestic public law. 
They were part o f the reserved domain o f domestic jurisdiction.109 However, with 
investment arbitration, these matters now come within the discretion o f international 
tribunals. In turn, approaches to state liability that evolved in domestic law are made 
more relevant to international adjudication.110
In the twentieth century, in most countries, the classical doctrine o f sovereign 
immunity from suit and from damages awards was whitded away.111 In its place, new 
rules were developed to delineate the scope o f state liability as a public law remedy.112 
For example, in the common law tradition, state liability was qualified by the principle 
of parliamentary sovereignty which limited the legislature’s liability where the passage 
or amendment o f laws caused losses to private individuals.113 Likewise, the liability o f
105 Gray, supra note 17,151; J.H.H. Weiler, supra note 91,172-3.
106 C. Morris, “The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions” (1949) 49 Col. L Rev.
21, 27-9; H. Street, Governmental Liability (Cambridge: CUP, 1953), 66; P.P. Craig, 
“Compensation in Public Law” (1980) 96 L.Q Rev. 413, 441-3; Harlow (1996), supra note 
104,209; Fairgrieve, supra note 53, 699-700.
107 J.M. Evans et al., Administrative Law — Cases, Text, and Materials, 4th ed. (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery, 1995), 1401.
108 E.g. R. v. Treasury ex parte British Telecommunications (No. 392/93), [1996] 3 W.L.R. 203 
[hereinafter British Telecomm], para. 40 (“A restrictive approach to state liability is justified.... 
in particular [because of] the concern to ensure that the exercise of legislative functions is not 
hindered by the prospect of actions for damages whenever the general interest requires the 
institutions or member states to adopt measures which may adversely affect individual 
interests”).
109 Brownlie, supra note 13, 291.
110 Harlow (1996), supra note 104, 205-6.
111 E.g. U.S. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. s. 1346(b), 2671-80; U.S. Crown Proceedings Act 
1947, c. 44. OLRC, supra note 104, 8-11; W.B. Lafferty, “The Persian Gulf War Syndrome: 
Rethinking Government Tort Liability” (1995) 25 Stetson L.R. 137,148-9.
112 E.g. Blanco (8 February 1873), Rec. ler Supp. 61 (recognizing the tort liability of the state 
in relation to its commercial activities, although noting that state liability is “neither general, 
nor absolute”, reflecting the need to balance the opposing and competing interests at stake). 
Street, supra note 106, 6-24; Ahmedouamar, supra note 99, 2-12; Weir, supra note 40, 418-20 
and 428-9.
113 Domestic courts may have the authority to award damages to individuals for legislative 
acts, but typically only in relation to constitutionally-protected rights. E.g. Guimond v. Quebec 
(Procureurgeneral), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 347,138 D.L.R. (4th) 647, para. 15. Street, supra note 106,11,
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the judiciary was limited to promote impartiality and finality in judicial decision­
making.114 Administrative acts could generally lead to tort liability on the part o f the 
state, although not where the tort flowed from a policy decision involving the 
expenditure o f public funds.115 Further, in some cases, state liability could arise from 
administrative acts in the context o f unique public law torts, but these too were 
subject to limitations on liability.116 Generally, in common law countries, the claimant 
had to show fault or malice on the part o f a public body or official in order to receive 
damages, and state liability could not be imposed based on illegality alone.117 Thus, a 
series o f compromise positions was reached between governmental immunity and the 
payment o f damages to individuals harmed by the exercise o f public authority. In 
every legal system, the resulting balance was specific and complex, reflecting the 
historical evolution o f norms regarding the role of the state in relation to the private 
sphere.118
Under an investment treaty, the award o f damages to an investor may be 
approached as a form o f state responsibility on the international plane. However, 
international rules o f state responsibility were developed in the context o f  reciprocal 
legal relations among states. Even in claims o f diplomatic protections on behalf o f a 
foreign national, the international dispute was formally conceptualized as a legal
45-6, and 70-2; F.L. Morrison, “The Liability of Governments for Legislative Acts in the 
United States of America” (1998) 46 Am. J. Comp. L. Supp. 531, 543-6.
114 E.g. Garnett v. Ferrand (1827), 6 B. & C. 611,108 E.R. 576, 581 (K.B.); Frayv. Blackburn 
(1863), 3 B. & S. 576,122 E.R. 217, 217 (Q.B.). Street, supra note 106, 41-5 and 69-70; 
Ahmedouamar, supra note 99, 6-9; OLRC, supra note 104,18-20.
115 The state’s liability in tort for administrative acts has been limited, e.g., to cases arising 
from “operational” decisions by the administration, to cases in which liability was warranted 
for policy reasons; to cases in which non-monetary remedies are unavailable, and to cases 
involving more than pure economic loss. E.g. Annsv. Merton (1977), [1978] A.C. 728, 2 All 
E.R. 492 (H.L.); Nielsen v. Kamloops, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2,10 D.L.R. (4th) 641; Brown v. British 
Columbia (Minister of Transportation and Highways, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 420,112 D.L.R. (4th) 1; 
Swinamerv. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 445,112 D.L.R. (4th) 18; Dalehite v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 15 (1953); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). See 
Harlow (1982), supra note 104, 53; Lunney and Oliphant, supra note 52, 501-3.
116 Such as the requirement, in the case of the public law tort of breach of statutory duty, that 
the statutory duty be intended to benefit a particular class of the public: Lunney and 
Oliphant, supra note 52, 501-3 and 527; Hogg and Monahan, supra note 104,151. Note that a 
“public law” tort is one that can only arise from the exercise of public authority.
117 Hogg and Monahan, supra note 104,147-8; Morrison, supra note 113, 533, 537-8, and 541; 
R.C. Evans, “Damages for Unlawful Administrative Action: The Remedy for Misfeasance in 
Public Office” (1982) 31 I.C.L.Q. 640; Harlow (1996), supra note 104, 209; Fairgrieve, supra 
note 53, 697-8.
118 Harlow and Rawlings, supra note 51, 605-6.
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relationship between the host state and the home state of the foreign national.119 The 
host state’s duty to protect the foreign national was owed to the home state, not to 
the individual, and — based on Vattel’s principle -  harm to a foreign national was 
treated as harm to the home state.120 In this context, the international law o f state 
responsibility did not confront the circumstances that prompted limitations on state 
liability in domestic law.121 There was less need to adapt rules o f state responsibility to 
accommodate the governmental implications o f using damages awards as a public law 
remedy because no sovereign exercised public authority for the world. Only with the 
individualization o f international adjudication in relation to regulatory disputes does 
the intricate dynamic of state liability fully enter the picture.
With individualization, the international law o f state responsibility comes to 
resemble the domestic law o f state liability. This is especially so where an investment 
treaty limits the duty to exhaust local remedies, thus withdrawing a basic check on the 
international responsibility o f states for the treatment o f foreign nationals.122 
However, it is o f fundamental importance that investment treaties do not expressly 
provide for general limitations on state liability in order to temper corrective justice 
and thus accommodate governmental discretion.123 Instead, a less compromising 
form o f state liability, originating in reciprocal inter-state relations, is applied to the 
regulatory relationship between the state and foreign investors. Investment treaties 
apply damages as a public law remedy without imposing conditions that would 
otherwise limit state liability under domestic law,124 and this allows investors to claim 
damages in circumstances where they otherwise could not under domestic law.125 
Thus, the principle o f the unity of the state in international law operates to trump 
domestic restrictions on state liability for legislative or judicial acts.126 Likewise, the 
international principle o f reparation is applicable, subordinating state liability to a
119 Hudson, supra note 6,192-3.
120 E. Vattel, he Droit degens, book II, c. VI, s. 74-5 and c. VIII, s. 108-9 (an injury to a citizen 
is an injury to the state).
121 Gray, supra note. 17, 8-9 and 18-19; Brownlie, supra note 13,17.
122 Eagleton, supra note 7,196; Borchard, supra note 73, 364.
123 K. Roach, “The Limits of Corrective Justice and the Potential of Equity in Constitutional 
Remedies” (1991) 33 Atiz. L.R. 859, 864-5.
124 Hogg and Monahan, supra note 104,122 and 149-54.
125 Been and Beauvais, supra note 72, 59-86.
126 Eagleton, supra note 7, 63-9; Bean and Beauvais, supra note 72, 81-2.
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private law construction o f compensation.127 Investment treaties adopt open-ended 
language to define standards o f investor protection without an express requirement 
for fault on the part o f the state. In these circumstances, the far-reaching character of 
individual claims, combined with the remedy o f damages, opens the door to a very 
expansive conception o f state liability.128
Thus, investment arbitration serves as a vehicle to expand the ambit o f state 
liability. Where investors are permitted to claim damages based on rules of state 
responsibility, they benefit from rules and principles that are usually reserved for 
claims by states, without assuming the corresponding duties that accompany a state’s 
representative role.129 As a result, the individualization o f international claims presents 
arbitrators with a choice. Either they artificially apply a reciprocal legal framework to 
the regulatory relationship between investor and state, or they read general principles 
to limit the scope o f state liability into investment treaties.130 The former denies the 
uniqueness of the state as a representative entity, whereas the latter may be seen to 
conflict with the express language o f the treaty.
D. Individual claims and multinational enterprises
It is important to demonstrate that to speak of investors as individuals is misleading. 
Today’s investors are typically sophisticated organizations: combinations of capital 
that have been legally organized as networks o f companies (or other legal entities),
127 The principle was established in The Chor^ ow Factory {Germany v. Poland) (1928), P.C.I.J. Ser. 
A., No. 17, 47, based on “the rules of international law in force between the two States 
concerned, and not the law governing relations between the State which has committed the 
wrongful act and the individual who has suffered the damage”. Regarding the application of 
the principle in the adjudication of an investment dispute, see e.g. Amoco International Finance 
Corp. v. Iran (1987), 15 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 189, para. 193 \Metalclad Corporations. United Mexican 
States (Merits) (30 August 2000), 40 I.L.M. 36,13(1) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 45, para.
122; CME Republic B. V. v. C%ech Republic (Merits) (13 September 2001), 14(3) World Trade 
and Arb. Mat. 109 [hereinafter CME], para. 616-17. See also Redfem and Hunter, supra note 
19, 370-1.
128 Toope, supra note 96,184-7.
129 Brownlie, supra note 13, 65.
130 E.g. British Telecomm, supra note 108, para. 40; Brasserie du Pecheur, supra note 47, para 45.
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which in this thesis are referred to as multinational enterprises.131 The central role o f 
multinational enterprises in the organization of international capital flows reflects 
their role as agents in the process o f globalization and makes them key actors in 
investment arbitration.132 Moreover, an inherent aspect o f the multinational enterprise 
is the ability to make decisions about the allocation o f capital, and about production 
and distribution, which transcend the boundaries o f national regulation.133 
Importantly, the legal characterization o f multilateral enterprises as investors — 
combined with the breadth and flexibility of corporate nationality under many 
investment treaties -  facilitates forum-shopping.134 This expands the scope of 
investment arbitration as a governing arrangement by allowing investors to effectively 
choose the treaty (or treaties) under which they can bring a claim and obtain 
protection.
In the first place, access to investment arbitration is restricted to multinational 
enterprises or to very wealthy humans. Under investment treaties, an “investor” is 
usually a natural or legal person (i.e. a corporation, trust, etc.) who owns foreign 
assets.135 Most natural persons, and many companies, do not own foreign assets and 
therefore do not satisfy this threshold. Among those that do, few own sufficient 
assets to credibly threaten a claim under an investment treaty. This is because
131 This follows OECD terminology: OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Revision 
2000 (Paris: OECD, 2000), 17-18. See A.A. Fatouros, “On Domesticating Giants: Further 
Reflections on the Legal Approach to Transnational Enterprise” (1976) 15 U. Western 
Ontario L. Rev. 151,161-2.
132 Y. Ghai, R. Luckham, and F. Snyder, “Law and the Internationalization of Capital - 
Introduction” in Y. Ghai, R. Luckham, and F. Snyder, eds., The Political Economy of Law 
(Oxford: OUP, 1987), 275; S. Picciotto, “Introduction: What Rules for the World 
Economy?” in S. Picciotto and R. Mayne, eds., Regulating International Business (Houndmills: 
Macmillan, 1999), 6-7.
133 A.C. Aman, “Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a New Administrative Law” 
(2003) 10 Ind. J. Global Legal Studies 125,137-8.
134 Waste Management No. 2 (Merits), supra note 55, para. 80; CME, supra note 127, para. 419.
135 As discussed in chapter four of this thesis, investment treaties generally define 
“investment” broadly to include, for example, “any asset”. Investment treaties adopt 
different definitions of “investor” but virtually all make access to investment arbitration 
available to both natural and legal persons who qualify as investors. In the case of NAFTA 
Chapter 11, the claimant are usually a foreign corporation, established in one state party to 
the treaty, that owns assets in another state party to the treaty. The claimant could also be a 
natural person, public entity, or other business vehicle such as a trust or partnership:
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 201 and 1139 (definitions of “enterprise” and “investor of a 
Party”). See A.cfnian, supra note 55, para. 77; S.D. Myers, supra note 87, para. 222-31; UPS, 
supra note 87, para. 6 and 18-21; Mondev, supra note 55, para. 49-50 and 80; Waste Management 
No. 2 (Merits), supra note 55, para. 77.
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investors must pay for half of the cost o f an investment arbitration and the cost is 
prohibitive.136 In the CME case, for example, the arbitrators’ fees were (U.S.) $1.35 
million divided equally between the investor and the host state.137 This practically 
limits access to investment arbitration to investors who have a significant monetary 
interest in the outcome of a dispute with a state. In nearly all cases, these are 
multinational enterprises.138
To elaborate, in order to bring a claim under an investment treaty, an investor 
must also be “foreign”. In other words, the claimant must establish that it is a national 
o f a state party to the treaty, other than the host state, whether as a natural or legal 
person.139 Under NAFTA Chapter 11 as well as other treaties, a natural person who is 
an investor in one state party to the treaty must demonstrate that he or she is a 
national of another state party based on the laws o f citizenship o f that other state.140 
An investor that is a legal person must show that he or she or it satisfies the home 
state’s relevant laws o f incorporation or business establishment.141 Thus, the question 
o f whether an investor is foreign is determined by the rules o f nationality o f the 
investor’s home state, not those of the host state.142 This facilitates forum-shopping
136 M.J. Mustill, “Arbitration: History and Background” (1989) 6 J. Int’l Arb. 43, 54; L.E. 
Peterson, “Bilateral Investment Treaties and Development Policy-Making” (Report for the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, November 2004), 24-6.
137 CME Republic B. U. v. Cyech Republic (Damages) (14 March 2003), 15(4) World Trade and 
Arb. Mat. 83 and 245 [hereinafter CME], para. 650 (summary of decision).
138 Somarajah, supra note 10, 8; Z. Douglas, “The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty 
Arbitration” (2003) 74 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 151,152.
139 Nottebohm, supra note 5, 24; Barcelona Traction, supra note 5, para. 70. R. Donner, The 
Regulation of Nationality in International Taw, 2d ed. (Ardsley, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers,
1994), 19 and 34-42.
140 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1117 and 1138. Marvin Ray Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States 
(Jurisdiction) (6 December 2000), 18 ICSID Rev. 469, para. 24-38. UNCTAD, Scope and 
Definition, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements (New York: 
United Nations, 1999), 35.
141 R. Dolzer and M. Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), 
33-6 (noting that, for companies and other legal entities, BITs rely on three basic criteria to 
determine nationality: the place of incorporation (e.g. U.S.); the location of seat or actual 
management of the company (e.g. Germany); and the nationality of controlling shareholders); 
Muchlinski, supra note 60, 622-4.
142 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1139 (definition of “enterprise of a Party”). F. Green, 
“Corporations as Persons, Citizens, and Possessors of Liberty” (1946) 94 U. Pa. L. Rev. 202, 
204-5 and 224; R.R. Wilson, “Postwar Commercial Treaties of the United States” (1949) 43 
AJIL 262, 265-6; H. Walker, “Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign 
Investment: Present United States Practice” (1956) 5 Am. J. Comp. L. 229, 233.
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by investors where the home state has liberal rules of incorporation.143 Multinational 
enterprise that do not have a substantial business connection to the home state can 
nevertheless acquire its nationality by incorporating in its territory.144 By establishing a 
holding company in one state party to an investment treaty, a multinational enterprise 
can acquire separate legal personality and the nationality o f that state, and thus obtain 
protection under the treaty for its assets in other states parties to the treaty.145
With respect to forum-shopping, the underlying strategy o f multinational 
enterprises — in adopting the nationality that is most convenient for a particular 
transaction, tax assessment, or legal claim -  is to exploit variations among regulatory 
regimes in different jurisdictions.146 This is the flip side o f inter-state competition to 
attract investment: forum-shopping by international capital.147 Investment treaties 
offer abundant opportunities for forum shopping because they establish varying levels 
o f  legal protection for capital flows between different states — depending on whether
143 Waste Management No. 2 (Merits), supra note 55, para. 80. See S. Timberg, “International 
Combines and National Sovereigns” (1947) 95 U. Penn. L.R. 575, 588; Walker, ibid., 232-3, 
236, and 238-9; W.W. Bratton et al., “Introduction: Regulatory Competition and Institutional 
Evolution” in W.W. Bratton et al., eds., International Regulatory Competition and Coordination 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 21; S. Picciotto, International business Taxation (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1992), 94-6; W.-H. Roth, “From Centros to Ueberseering. Free 
Movement of Companies, Private International Law, and Community Law” (2003) 52 
I.C.L.Q. 177,177-8. Note that some investment treaties, including NAFTA and the Energy 
Charter Treaty, allow a state party — subject to prior notification and consultation — to deny the 
benefits of the treaty to a foreign investor of another state party, or their investments, that is 
a company which is owned or controlled by investors of a non- state party and which has no 
substantial business activities in the state in which it is established: NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 
1113(2); Energy Charter Treaty, 17 December 1994, 35 I.L.M. 509, art. 17(1).
144 E. Gaillard, “Commentary” (2002) 18 Arb. Int’l 247, 248; G.A. Alvarez and W.W. Park, 
“The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11” (2003) 28 Yale J. Int’l L. 
365, 372; R.G. Dearden, “Arbitration of Expropriation Disputes between an Investor and 
the State under the North American Free Trade Agreement” (1995) 29 J. World Trade 113, 
115; UNCTAD, supra note 140, 37-8.
145 AmcoAsia Corp. v. Indonesia (Jurisdiction) (25 September 1983), 23 I.L.M. 351, para. 14; 
Societe Ouest-Africaine des Be'tons Industriels v. Senegal (Merits) (25 February 1988), 6 ICSID Rev. 
125,17 Y.B. Com. Arb. 42, 48. See also A. Broches, “Development of International Law by 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development” (1965) 59 Am. Soc’ty Int’l L. 
Proc. 33, 37 (noting that, during the drafting of the ICSID Convention, a number of 
developing countries objected to foreign-controlled domestic corporations being allowed to 
make an ICSID claim, but were overruled by capital-exporting states); Douglas, supra note 
138,175.
146 Peter, supra note 3, 37-8; Bratton et al., supra note 143, 9 and 40-1; R. Palan, “Trying to 
Have Your Cake and Eating It: How and Why the State System Has Created Offshore”
(1998) 42 Int’l Studies Q. 625, 630.
147 UNCTAD, Taxation, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements 
(New York: United Nations, 2000), 62; Fatouros, supra note 86, 362.
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a treaty is in place and on its terms — which in turn creates an incentive for 
multinational enterprises to adapt their corporate structure to maximize their legal 
security.148 By implication, an investor o f a state party to an investment treaty might 
be ultimately owned by an investor o f a non-state party149 or by an investor o f the 
host state itself.150 The nationality of an investor is not always stable or identifiable 
because multinational enterprises can adopt different nationalities at different points 
in their corporate structure.
This flexibility of access to investment arbitration is an essential aspect o f 
investment arbitration as a governing arrangement. The flexible approach to 
corporate nationality, in particular, overrides rules that would otherwise limit access to 
the system. In the Barcelona Traction case, the International Court o f Justice concluded 
that, under customary international law, a corporation has the nationality o f the state 
in which it is incorporated and in whose territory it has its registered office, and only 
the state o f incorporation can make a claim for diplomatic protection on behalf of the 
corporation.151 If  this rule was applied in investment arbitration, only the immediate 
owner o f an investment would qualify as an investor for the purposes of bringing an 
investment treaty claim, barring exceptional circumstances.152 Therefore, only the 
immediate foreign owners of investments could make an international claim, and no 
claim could be brought -  by lifting the corporate veil -  on behalf o f indirect owners 
o f the investment where they had a different nationality.153 Applied to contemporary 
investment arbitration, the rule in Barcelona Traction would prevent multinational
148 M.-F. Houde and K. Yannaca-Small, Relationships between International Investment Agreements, 
OECD Working Paper on International Investment No. 2004/1 (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, May 2004), 4.
149 Fireman’s Fund, supra note 71, para. 5; Mondev, supra note 55, para. 79.
150 Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Fgjpt (Jurisdiction) (25 May 1999), 41 I.L.M. 881, 888; Tokios Tokelesv. 
Ukraine (Jurisdiction) (29 April 2004), 16(4) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 75 [hereinafter 
Tokios], para. 21 and 38. But see Vacuum Salt Products, hid. v. Republic of Ghana (Jurisdiction) 
(16 February 1994), 9 ICSID Rev. 72, 20 Y.B. Comml Arb. 11, para. 17-20 and 29-30 
(concluding in relation to an investment in Ghana that a company owned 20 percent by 
Greeks and the remainder by Ghanians was not foreign controlled for the purposes of 
ICSID jurisdiction).
151 Barcelona Traction, supra note 5, para. 70 and 99-103. N.S. Rodley, “Corporate Nationality 
and the Diplomatic Protection of Multinational Enterprises: The Barcelona Traction Case” 
(1971) 47 Ind. L.J. 70, 82.
152 Barcelona Traction, supra note 5, para. 64-9 (identifying potential exceptions such as where 
the corporation has ceased to exist or where the home state lacks the capacity to take action 
on behalf of the corporation).
153 Muchlinski, supra note 60, 535-6.
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enterprises from shopping for protection by requiring a claim to be made from the 
country in which the first link in the corporate chain o f international ownership was 
located.154
The decision in Barcelona Traction in 1970 posed a problem for multinational 
enterprises whose business activities were linked to more than one country, whose 
ownership was dispersed among shareholders in many countries, and whose 
corporate structure was fragmented among different countries.155 Some 
commentators criticized the ICJ’s decision as unworkable.156 Indeed, Barcelona Traction 
prompted capital-exporting states to expand their BIT programs in the 1980s and 
1990s in order to assure legal protection o f multinational enterprises.157 Thus, most 
investment treaties override Barcelona Traction by allowing investment treaty claims by 
any foreign shareholder of an investment, regardless o f whether the shareholder’s 
ownership rights extend through a chain of companies in other jurisdictions.158 A 
claim can be made at any point in the chain o f international ownership so long as the 
actual claimant has the nationality of another state party and, under some treaties, so 
long as the claimant has a minimum amount o f ownership or control of the 
investment.159 This gives multinational enterprises more flexibility to select the point 
in their corporate structure from which to launch an investor claim.
One o f the ICJ’s rationales for its ruling in Barcelona Traction was the need to 
avoid a proliferation o f international claims in light of fragmented international 
ownership o f investments in the world economy.160 The underlying concern was that,
154 Fatouros, supra note 86, 381.
155 Fatouros, supra note 86, 367-70; F. Johns, “The Invisibility of the Transnational 
Corporation: An Analysis of International Law and Legal Theory” (1994) 19 Melb. U. L. Rev. 
893, 895-6.
156 Ohly, supra note 64, 299-300.
157 Barcelona Traction, supra note 5, para. 68. Rodley, supra note 151, 84.
158 Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 141, 35-6.
159 E.g. GAMI, supra note 55, para. 29-30 and 38 (permitting a U.S. shareholder of 14% of a 
Mexican company’s shares to make a claim against Mexico under NAFTA Chapter 11 
regarding alleged injuries to the domestic company — as opposed to direct injuries to the 
shareholder itself — despite the domestic company’s pursuit of relief in the Mexican courts); 
Waste Management No. 2 (Merits), supra note 55, para. 85 (“The nationality of any intermediate 
holding companies is irrelevant to the present claim”). See also e.g. Compania deAguas del 
Aconquija S A . <& Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic (Annulment) (3 July 2002), 6 ICSID 
Rep. 340, para. 50; A^urix, supra note 75, para. 21 and 42; CMS, supra note 56, para. 47 and 
55; Siemens, supra note 71, para. 137.
160 Barcelona Traction, supra note 5, para. 96.
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if  international claims could be brought on behalf o f any foreign shareholder o f an 
investment, then investment disputes would generate large numbers o f claims by 
different states, and multinational enterprises would have an incentive to structure 
their investments so as to entangle as many powerful states as possible in a potential 
dispute.161 This is what has come to pass in contemporary investment arbitration. 
Under investment treaties, investment disputes have in some cases lead to multiple 
claims by different investors under different treaties. In CME, as discussed in chapter 
one o f this thesis, a U.S. investor used a holding company in the Netherlands to 
launch parallel claims against the Czech Republic under two separate investment 
treaties, in relation to the same dispute, and to collect (U.S.) $350 million in damages, 
even though only one o f the claims was successful.162 In Tokios, investors in the 
Ukraine used a holding company in Lithuania to make a claim against their own
161 Administrative Decision No. K, supra note 12, 613-14. W. Bames, “Remarks” (1907) Am. 
Soc’ty Int’l L. Proc. 100, 142; Ohly, supra note 64, 283-4; Okowa, supra note 7, 484. For 
example, a well-known risk management strategy of multinational enterprises is to 
internationalize the economic stake in a business venture, and thus engage the nationals and 
governments of as many powerful states as possible, in order to have more leverage in the 
event of a dispute with the host state. This can be illustrated by the case of Kennecott and 
the nationalization of the Chilean copper industry (Peter, supra note 3, 241-3). In the 1960s, 
Kennecott agreed to sell 51% of its interest in the copper industry to the Chilean 
government and committed to the terms of a new joint venture based on a 10-year 
management contract. Kennecott insured, with U.S. AID, the (U.S.) $80 million that 
Kennecott had committed to the joint venture. Fresh capital was supplied by an Eximbank 
loan and by the Chilean Copper Corporation. Kennecott also raised funds by concluding 
long-term contracts for future production with European and Japanese firms, and sold the 
collection rights on these contracts. Peter, at 242, quotes a Kennecott executive: “The aim of 
these arrangements is to ensure that nobody expropriates Kennecott without upsetting 
relations to customers, creditors and governments in three continents”. This strategy proved 
successful when, in the early 1970s, Chilean President Allende proposed to expropriate 
Kennecott’s interest, with payment of partial compensation, due to windfall profits. In 
response, the assets of the Chilean national airline and Copper Corporation were seized in 
the United States based on guarantees given by the Chilean state, and European and Asian 
creditors pressured the Paris Club of creditors to use the renegotiation of Chile’s external 
debt as leverage to secure compensation for Kennecott.
162 CME (Merits), supra note 127, para. 396; CME (Damages), supra note 137, para. 432-3 
(concluding that the claimant could make claims under two investment treaties, in relation to 
the same underlying dispute, by channelling ownership of its investment through a holding 
company in the Netherlands). UNCTAD, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, UNCTAD Series 
on Issues in International Investment Agreements (New York: United Nations, 1999), 11.
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state.163 In both cases, flexible rules o f nationality in investment treaties were used to 
dramatically expand the system of investment arbitration.
As capital moves beyond the domestic sphere, so too does the regulatory 
relationship between investors and the state. As foreign ownership expands and 
fragments164 so too does the risk that the exercise o f public authority will trigger an 
international claim. The ownership of assets in one country will often be split among 
investors o f other countries, leaving the host state unaware o f whether and to what 
extent a particular business activity is protected by an investment treaty.165 Given that 
it is sometimes impossible to track foreign ownership, governments are left in a 
position where they must assume that any economic activity that involves substantial 
capital within their territory could lead to an international claim under an investment 
treaty. Moreover, the dynamic of forum-shopping means that investment treaties may 
protect much more than actual flows of capital between the states parties, since actual 
flows do not necessarily correspond to legal arrangements for the ownership of 
assets.166 An investor can become foreign by establishing a holding company or by a 
paper transfer o f assets among companies without any commitment o f new capital to 
the host economy.167 As such, existing networks o f investment treaties create 
overlapping state obligations that are highly accessible by multinational enterprises. 
Viewed against a wider canvass, investment arbitration emerges as a governing
163 Tokios, supra note 150, para. 21 and 38 (allowing an ICSID claim against the Ukraine by a 
Lithuanian company that was 99% owned by Ukranian nationals who also comprised 2/3 of 
the company’s management).
164 E.g. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Foreign 
Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2003, UN Doc. E /04/11/G.54 (2004), 13 (noting 
continued transnationalization in Latin America, reflected by the growth and concentration 
of ownership by foreign investors; in 2000-2002, TNCs accounted for 55% of the top 100 
manufacturing firms’ sales and 37% of the 100 largest banks’ assets in the region).
165 Waste Management No. 2 (Merits), supra note 55, 78-9 (dismissing Mexico’s submission that 
local government entities in Mexico were unaware of the claimant’s corporate structure — 
including the use of holding companies in the Cayman Islands — and that the claimant 
therefore failed to satisfy the NAFTA definition of “investor”). McLachlan, supra note 33, 
341; UNCTAD, supra note 140, 37.
166 Peter, supra note 3,17; UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004 (Geneva: United Nations, 
2004), 238, note 15; G. Xiao, “People’s Republic of China’s Round-Tripping FDI: Scale, 
Causes and Implications”, Asian Development Bank Institute Discussion Paper No. 6 (ADB, 
2004), 2.
167 E.g. FedaxN.V. v. Republic of Venezuela (Jurisdiction) (11 July 1997), 37 I.L.M. 1378, 5 
ICSID Rep. 186, para. 18 and 24; Tradex Hellas S A . v. Republic of Albania (Merits) (29 April
1999), 14 ICSID Rev. 161, para. 109; Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v. Slovak Republic 
(Jurisdiction) (24 May 1999), 14 ICSID Rev. 251, para. 78; Tokios, supra note 150, para. 80-2.
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arrangement that applies generally to the regulatory relationship between states and 
multinational enterprises.
E. Individual claims and investor rights
Earlier in this chapter, the far-reaching individualization o f claims under investment 
treaties was compared to the more limited individualization of claims under human 
rights treaties. In fact, the individualization o f international adjudication has prompted 
some commentators to regard investment arbitration as itself creating investor rights. 
In particular, commentators and arbitrators have endorsed this view by comparing 
investment treaties to the European Convention on Human Rights and to international 
human rights instruments.168 The investor rights view is connected to the broader 
argument that recent developments in international economic law, at the European 
Union and the WTO, have established property and economic rights for individuals 
so as to advance freedom and prosperity in a liberal international society.169 This view 
is contested in the context o f investment treaties, as well as the European Union and 
the W TO.170
168 E.g. Mondev, supra note 55, para. 143-4 (citing decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights under Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights as providing “guidance 
by analogy as to the possible scope of NAFTA’s guarantee” under Article 1105). See also S.D. 
Myers, supra note 87 (Merits — Separate Opinion of B. Schwartz), para. 229; Teemed, supra note 
84, para. 122;A%urix, supra note 75, para. 72; CMS, supra note 56, para. 45; Siemens, supra note 
71, para. 141. R. Lillich, “The Law Governing Disputes Under Economic Development 
Agreements: Re-examining the Concept of ‘Internationalization’” in R. Lillich and C.N. 
Brower, International Arbitration in the 21st Century: Towards Judiciali^ ation and Uniformity? (Ardsley, 
N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 1994), 67-8; Walde, supra note 1, 434-6 and 444; C.H. Brower 
II, “Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back” (2001) 40 Colum. J. 
Transnat’l L. 43, 87-8; C.H. Brower II, “NAFTA’s Investment Chapter: Initial Thoughts 
About Second-Generation Rights” (2003) 36 Vanderbilt J. Transnat’l L. 1533,1546-8;
Alvarez and Park, supra note 144, 394; J.P. Trachtman & P.M. Moreman, “Costs and Benefits 
of Private Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Whose Rights Is It Anyway?” (2003) 44 
Harv. Int’l L.J. 221, 225; O. Spiermann, “Individual Rights, State Interests and the Power to 
Waive ICSID Jurisdiction under Bilateral Investment Treaties” (2004) 20 Arb. Int’l 179,187.
169 E. Sik, “Concept of Acquired Rights in International Law” (1977) 44 Neth. Int’l L.R. 120, 
127-9; Lillich, ibid., 112-13; T. Cottier, “Trade and Human Rights: A Relationship to 
Discover” (2002) 5 J. Int’l Econ. L. I l l ,  114-5 and 129-31; E.U. Petersmann, “Taking 
Human Dignity, Poverty and Empowerment of Individuals More Seriously: Rejoinder to 
Alston” (2002) 13 Eur. J. Int’l L. 845, 850.
170 Fatouros, supra note 86, 372-3; M. Somarajah, “Power and Justice in Foreign Investment 
Arbitration” (1997) 14 J. Int’l Arb. 103,133; P. Alston, “Resisting the Merger and
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To an extent, the use o f the language o f rights to describe investor claims is an 
unsurprising outcome o f far-reaching individualization, as well as the common 
tendency to highlight the threats to individuals that originate in state activity, instead 
o f the privileges and benefits.171 But, to speak of investment treaties as creating 
investor rights is misleading and ultimately inconsistent with the idea o f a human right. 
O f course, if one defines a “right” as simply a legally enforceable claim,172 then 
international standards which are enforceable through investment arbitration clearly 
pass muster. No international standard that protects individuals would be as 
enforceable, and thus as obviously a right, as standards that investment treaties adopt 
to protect investors. On this basis, investment treaties establish individual rights at the 
international level, although those rights may be limited by the instrumental purposes 
o f the states that conferred them.173 Even so, the investor rights view goes farther 
than this by arguing that investment treaties establish more than simply an 
enforceable claim. Investor rights are given a normative content, consistent with the 
idea of a human right, in that they are used to enhance the legitimacy of investment 
arbitration tribunals and to support an interpretive presumption in favour o f investor 
protection.174 In the result, this view serves to exaggerate the importance o f investor 
interests in investment arbitration.
Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann” (2002) 13 Eur. J. Int’l 
L. 815; Afilalo, supra note 1, 31-43; P. Juillard, “Freedom of Establishment, Freedom of 
Capital Movements, and Freedom of Investment” (2000) 15 ICSID Rev. 322, 326-9; D.2. 
Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization (Oxford: OUP, forthcoming 2005), 
c. 5.
171 E.g. M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and L. Chen, “The Protection of Aliens From 
Discrimination and World Public Order: Responsibility of States Conjoined with Human 
Rights” (1976) 70 AJIL 432, 435-6; P. Allott, “State Responsibility and the Unmaking of 
International Law” (1988) 29 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1,14-16. See generally M.M. Carrow, The 
Background ofA.dministrative Law (Newark: Associated Lawyers, 1948), 20-1; P. McAuslan, 
“Administrative Law, Collective Consumption, and Judicial Policy” (1983) 46 Mod. L.R. 1, 
11-12; G. Huscroft, “Rights, Bills of Rights, and the Role of Courts and Legislatures” in G. 
Huscroft and P. Rishworth, eds., Litigating Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2002), 4-5; Bodansky and 
Crook, supra note 95, 775; Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, supra note 59, 32-3.
172 E.g. ICSID Convention Report, supra note 31, para. 26 (commenting that a “legal dispute”, 
for the purposes of the ICSID Convention, concerns “the existence or scope of a legal right or 
obligation, or the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for breach of a legal 
obligation”).
173 UPS, supra note 87, para. 80; SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance v. Philippines (Jurisdiction)
(29 January 2004), 16(3) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 91, para. 154.
174 An obvious parallel is to the liberal interpretation of human rights in favour of the 
protection of individuals: Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24 on Reservations to the
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In the first place, although investment treaties contain standards that constrain 
states in order to protect investors and that identify governmental actions which may 
require the payment of compensation, they do not use rights-affirming language to 
describe those standards.175 Thus, NAFTA Chapter 11 is not called a Bill o f Investor 
Rights. In contrast, human rights instruments usually explicitly state that individuals 
have “rights” under the treaty.176 This extends to rights of foreign nationals. For 
instance, the Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the 
Country in which They Uve refers to rights o f persons living in states of which they are 
not nationals, including the right to life and security o f the person, the right to 
equality before the courts, and the right to own property.177 The omission of such 
language from investment treaties suggests that they were not intended to establish 
investor rights.178 Instead, investment arbitration can be seen as a mechanism to 
enforce standards governing the exercise o f public authority. Consistent with an inter­
state bargain to allow private enforcement o f the treaty through investor claims, the 
investor is akin to a private attorney general, rather than the victim of a rights 
violation.179
More importantly, there is an important difference between a formal legal right 
and a human or fundamental right.180 Human rights are universal in that they protect 
all persons by the nature o f the human condition and our common entitlement to 
dignity and, as such, they are given higher recognition by the community. As such, 
human rights treaties typically protect all persons from the prohibited exercise of
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1994), (1995) 15 H.R.L.J. 464, 2 I.H.R.R. 10, 
para. 10-11 and 17. See Huscroft, supra note 171, 3-4; Nollkaemper, supra note 99, 630-1.
175 Courts of Danzig, supra note 80,17-19; Lagrand, supra note 80, para. 77-8; Construction of a 
Wall,’ supra note 80, para. 126-31,134, and 137. McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen, supra note 
171, 460-4; M. Koskenniemi, “What Is International Law For?” in M.D. Evans, ed., 
International Taw (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 106.
176 E.g. Construction of a Wall' supra note 80, para. 126-31.
177 Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in which They 
Uve, GA Res. 40/144, UN GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. 53, UN Doc. A/40/53 (1985) 252, art. 5.
178 M. Somarajah, The Pursuit of Nationalised Property (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), 31- 
2; Juillard, supra note 184, 338 and 329.
179 C. Tollefson, “Metalclad v. United Mexican States Revisited: Judicial Oversight of 
NAFTA’s Chapter Eleven Investor-State Claim Process” (2002) 11 Minn. J. Global Trade 
183, 203-5; Walde, supra note 1, 435-6 and 444; J.H.H. Weiler, supra note 91,172.
180 P.P. Craig, “Once Upon a Time in the West: Direct Effect and the Federalization of EEC 
Law” (1992) 12 Ox. J. Legal Studies 453, 453-8; Weir, supra note 40, 419-20 and 445-6; J. 
Allan, “Rights, Paternalism, Constitutions and Judges” in G. Huscroft and P. Rishworth, eds., 
Utigating Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2002), 34-5.
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public authority.181 Likewise, rights-based systems of state liability are by definition 
open to any individual.182 Investor rights, on the other hand, are restricted to those 
individuals who own sufficient foreign assets to make an investor claim and, in most 
cases, investors are multinational enterprises.183 Protection under an investment treaty 
is limited to foreign nationals who own investments There is no protection for investors 
who are exclusively domestic or for foreign nationals who do not own foreign assets. 
Thus, a foreign-owned business whose profitability was reduced by state regulation 
could make a claim under an investment treaty, but a foreign natural person who was 
imprisoned, tortured, and then executed without trial could not. A natural person 
could call upon the Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of 
the Country in which They Live, for example, to protect himself or herself from abusive 
and arbitrary treatment by a state, but this declaration -  like most human rights 
instruments — is not enforceable through international adjudication, let alone a 
damages award.185
All systems o f individual rights can be critici2ed on the grounds that “the rich 
and powerful not only have more rights but also have the means to enforce them”.186 
In investment arbitration, though, wealth is a legal as well as practical precondition for 
accessing investment arbitration. Moreover, the primary class o f claimants under 
investment treaties are multinational enterprises, which can use holding companies to 
vary the content o f the legal protections that they enjoy. Where the enjoyment and 
enforcement o f a right is limited to large combinations of capital, it is difficult to 
characterize the right as universal given that the great majority o f the world 
population does not have enough wealth to ever contemplate making a claim. More 
than anything, it is this selectivity o f formal access to investment arbitration that 
undermines the investor rights view.
181 Shelton, srtpra note 36, 39-40.
182 Eagleton, supra note 7,139-141; Harlow (1996), supra note 104, 204-15.
183 The cost of an investor claim typically includes not only legal fees but also 50 percent of 
the fees of the arbitrators as well as administrative fees charged by the arbitration institution 
(e.g. ICSID charges (U.S.) $7,000 to file a claim). In NAFTA Chapter 11 awards to date, 
where these arbitration costs were reported by the tribunal, they averaged roughly (U.S.) 
$1,540,000 per claim.
184 J.E. Alvarez, “Critical Theory and the North American Free Trade Agreement’s Chapter 
Eleven” (1997) 28 Inter-Am. L.R. 303, 304-5 and 307-8.
185 Supra note 44.
186 J.A.G. Griffith, “The Brave New World of Sir John Laws” (2000) 63 Mod. L.R. 159,172-3.
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As a human rights system, investment arbitration would establish the right to 
property and freedom o f contract as uniquely actionable human rights, and then only 
by those with sufficient resources to finance the adjudication.187 As such, investor 
rights -  as property and economic rights -  would conflict with other human rights 
that depend on action by the state and on the regulation o f property and commerce 
for their realization.188 In human rights treaties, rights to property and contract are 
always subject to exceptions relating to the public welfare.189 If  investment treaties are 
human rights treaties, they appear to contradict the principles o f universality and 
balancing o f human rights.190 For this reason, investor rights conflict with the idea of 
a human right.
Investment arbitration originates, not in a movement to establish investor 
rights, but in governmental decision-making. The general consent represents a policy 
choice in favour o f prioritizing to the interests o f  foreign investors over those of 
other individuals, by excluding individuals who are not foreign investors from the 
right to seek damages for harm caused by the exercise o f public authority or, indeed, 
the state's failure to regulate investors.191 Allowing enforceable international claims by 
multinational enterprises constrains and deters governmental action that would 
otherwise benefit other individuals and groups. This includes governmental action to 
protect human rights — including civil-political rights (e.g. freedom o f expression), 
socio-economic rights (e.g. labour rights), or group rights (e.g. environmental rights) — 
all o f which may require the exercise of public authority for their realization. 
Governmental action to protect human rights, if  found to have violated an 
investment treaty, might very well generate a damages award against the state.192
187 Somarajah, supra note 178, 31; J.E. Stiglitz, “The Broken Promise of NAFTA” The New 
York Times (6 January 2004).
188 Cohen and Smith, supra note 82,12; E. Drake et al., “The Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment: A Step Backward in International Human Rights” (Report for the Human 
Rights Clinical Project Program, Harvard Law School, undated); Bachand and Rousseau, 
supra note 36,18-19; Koskenniemi, supra note 175,109-10.
189 E.g. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd Sess., Part I, 
UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71, art. 17 and 29.
190 M. DeMerieux, “Deriving Environmental Rights from the European Convention 
Protecting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” (2001) 21 Ox. J. Legal Studies 521, 
539-42.
191 See Baldwin and McCrudden, supra note 63, 65.
192 E.g. the NAFTA states entered reservations to NAFTA Chapter 11 for future state 
measures that provide rights or preferences to aboriginal peoples or to socially or
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Given that investment treaties do not usually contain human rights exceptions, they 
prioritize investor interests over the rights o f other individuals or groups who are 
represented by the state in the international sphere and who rely on the state, not only 
to promote investment, but also to protect them against abuses by multinational 
enterprises.193 This prioritization is best understood in terms o f government policy, 
not human rights.
It is ironic that the investor rights thesis is advanced not only by supporters 
but also by ardent critics of investment arbitration.194 The position o f the former is 
addressed above. In terms o f the critics, the argument that investment treaties create 
investor rights appears to be designed to emphasize how those treaties inordinately 
benefit big business. A difficulty with this criticism is that, in spite o f its concern for 
popular sovereignty and democracy, it tends to sideline the role o f states in 
establishing the system of investor arbitration. Large numbers o f officials in dozens o f 
countries were presumably not duped into abandoning the public interest when they 
signed investment treaties, even if awareness o f the risks flowing from international 
obligations was slow to materialize. A less patronizing view is that governments 
approach investment treaties as instruments o f development in light o f the perceived 
benefits of foreign investment. Whether this is a prudent strategy is open to debate, 
but there is no doubt that foreign investment can provide benefits as well as costs for 
a host economy.195 More importantly, if  the strategy fails, it can be changed, and the 
constraints imposed by investment arbitration on such change are over-stated.196 
Ultimately, the prospects for change lie in the political and economic circumstances o f 
globalization, rather than a somewhat obscure system o f international adjudication.
economically disadvantaged minorities: NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 2. Most investment 
treaties do not contain express reservations of this sort.
193 See Griffith, supra note 186, 173; Bachand and Rousseau, supra note 36, 25.
194 S. Gill, “Globalization, Market Civilisation and Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism” (1995) 24 
Millenium 399, 413; Alvarez, supra note 198; C. Tollefson, “Games without Frontiers: Claims 
and Citizen Submissions Under the NAFTA Regime” (2002) 27 Yale J. Int’l L. 141,151.
195 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003 (Geneva: United Nations, 2003), 139, note 21.
196 E.g. S. Clarkson, “Systemic or Surgical? Possible Cures for NAFTA’s Investor-State 
Dispute Process” (2002) 36 Can. Bus. L.J. 368, 373-81. While investment treaties clearly 
establish lasting obligations, it cannot be said that they are immutable since states retain the 
option to withdraw from the treaty. Also, the states parties to an investment treaty may 
together amend the treaty or, under the threat of abrogation, one state party could seek to re­
negotiate the treaty: Walde, supra note 1, 463-4.
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Whether adopted by champions or opponents o f investment arbitration, the language 
o f investor rights is more polemical than analytical.
Conclusion
Investment arbitration — based on the general consent — is a novel and significant 
development because o f the far-reaching individualization that it entails. For one, 
investment treaties are distinct from historical claims commissions in which 
international claims were made on behalf o f individuals because investment treaties 
contain a prospective consent by the state to the arbitration o f future disputes 
between the state and foreign investors. Also, the individualization o f international 
claims under investment treaties is more far-reaching than under other treaties that 
authorize individual claims, such as human rights treaties, because investment treaties 
typically limit the investor’s duty to exhaust local remedies, adopt damages against the 
state as the main remedy, and authorize the direct enforcement o f damages awards by 
domestic courts in a large number o f countries. Individualization based on the general 
consent intensifies the application of international standards in the regulatory sphere, 
making the analytical framework of public law more relevant to international 
adjudication. Further, individualization transforms a reciprocal legal relationship 
between states into a regulatory relationship between the state and an individual who 
is subject to the exercise of public authority. This transformation is the genesis of 
investment arbitration as a governing arrangement.
The emergence of investment arbitration as a governing arrangement flows 
from policy decisions by states to prioritize the protection o f foreign investors. Under 
investment treaties, states assume obligations amongst themselves which give 
investors the ability to claim for damages for violations o f treaty-based standards of 
investor protection. The obligations o f one state under the treaty correspond to rights 
of another.197 Further, these obligations establish standards which regulate states in 
order to protect investors.198 Like other individuals, foreign investors are affected by
197 Toope, supra note 96, 388-9; J.C. Thomas, “A Reply to Professor Brower” (2002) 40 Col. J. 
Transnat’l L. 433, 460.
198 Ecuador v. Occidental Petroleum, supra note. 84, para. 61. Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, supra 
note 59,11.
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the treaty; however, foreign investors also occupy a privileged position as beneficiaries 
o f the treaty. Even so, as claimants, investors are private parties and the ability to seek 
damages for a violation of international law -  viewed as a legal right199 — remains a 
treaty-based right. As such, the individualization of claims under investment treaties 
does not alter the nature of investment arbitration as a governing arrangement 
because individualization itself depends on the exercise of public authority by the 
state.
199 R. Bruno and J.H.H. Weiler, “Access of Private Parties to International Dispute 
Setdement: A Comparative Analysis”, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/97 
(NYU School of Law, 1997).
Chapter Four 
Scope and Substance
All treaties constrain states one way or another, and many treaties subject disputes 
about the meaning of the treaty to compulsory international adjudication.1 The 
uniqueness of investment treaties is that they allow investors to make international 
claims for damages based on a private model o f adjudication. However, the extent to 
which investor claims, damages awards, and the use of a private adjudicative model 
actually affect governmental decision-making depends on the breadth o f the 
jurisdiction of arbitration tribunals and the content of the standards that govern states 
in their treatment of investors.2 Outlining the scope of investment arbitration and the 
content o f the substantive standards3 o f investor protection reveals how investment 
arbitration controls the exercise of public authority, and its broader significance as a 
governing arrangement.
In the great majority o f investment treaties, the scope o f investment arbitration 
is expansive. Tribunals are authorized to determine their own jurisdiction and 
jurisdictional concepts -  such as “state measure” and “investment” — tend to be 
defined broadly. Further, the standards by which governmental decision-making is 
evaluated are drafted in broad language. As a result, investors can bring claims 
challenging a very wide range o f governmental activity.
In this chapter, NAFTA Chapter 11 is used as a case study to examine the 
language that is used to define concepts relating to the scope and substance of 
investment arbitration and the extent o f its implications for government. NAFTA 
Chapter 11 is representative o f contemporary investment treaties because it contains 
broadly-framed standards which apply in relation to a wide range o f governmental
1 G. Marceau and J.P. Trachtman, “The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement On Tariffs and Trade” 
(2002) 36 J. World Trade 811, 811.
2 UNCTAD, Scope and Definition, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements (New York: United Nations, 1999).
3 The term “standards” rather than “rules” is used to refer to the substantive obligations that 
states assume in investment treaties in order to reflect the level of generality at which those 
obligations are expressed. D. Kennedy, “Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication” 
(1976) 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685, 1687-1701; J.P. Trachtman, “The Domain of WTO Dispute 
Resolution” (1999) 40 Harv. Int’l L.J. 333, 334.
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acts and to virtually any investor asset. Nevertheless, there are important variations in 
the language and structure of different treaties and, as such, the use of NAFTA as a 
case study is intended to support a broader argument about the character of 
investment arbitration as a governing arrangement, and not to establish micro 
findings that apply to all investment treaties in every case.
A. The scope of investment arbitration
The scope o f investment arbitration encompasses all of the issues that are subject to 
regulation by the system and that fall within the discretion o f investment arbitration 
tribunals. Thus, the scope of investment arbitration reflects the degree to which 
adjudicative authority over regulatory disputes is shifted from domestic courts to 
international arbitrators. In this section, the scope of investment arbitration is 
explored by examining two key jurisdictional concepts under NAFTA Chapter l l . 4 
First, the term “state measure” is reviewed in order to show that a wide range of 
sovereign acts of the state are subject to challenge and review through investment 
arbitration. Second, the breadth of the term “investment” is examined to demonstrate 
that state measures affecting a wide range of economic activity are subject to review. 
The definition of these concepts in an investment treaty reveals that the main subject 
o f investment arbitration is disputes within the regulatory sphere.
1. State measures
A general consent to the compulsory arbitration o f future disputes with investors 
binds the state in relation to sovereign acts, as opposed to merely private or 
commercial acts. Typically, investment treaties apply to virtually any sovereign act of
4 These are not the only aspects of jurisdiction under NAFTA Chapter 11 or other 
investment treaties. In chapter three of this thesis, it was argued that the concept of 
“investor” — a jurisdictional concept — is often broad enough to open investment arbitration 
to multinational enterprises that organize their ownership of assets through an international 
structure of holding companies. Also, a tribunal’s characterization of the treaty’s substantive 
standards of investor protection may be treated as a matter of jurisdiction: United Parcel Service 
of America, Inc. v. Government of Canada (Jurisdiction) (22 November 2002) [hereinafter UPS], 
para. 37, online: ITA http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/UPS-Jurisdiction.pdf.
I l l
the state, including acts of the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary, and to acts 
o f both national and sub-national entities. In the case o f NAFTA Chapter 11, the 
treaty applies to “state measures” which include “any law, regulation, procedure, 
requirement or practice” o f the states parties.5 As such, Chapter 11 constrains all 
branches of government, and all levels of government by imputing responsibility for 
the conduct o f sub-national governments to the state as a whole.6
Because Chapter 11 tribunals are authorized to award damages to remedy a 
breach o f the treaty, the broad definition o f state measures has significant implications 
for rules o f state liability under domestic public law.7 Take the principle o f 
parliamentary sovereignty (or ultimate authority o f the legislature) for example.8 
Under the domestic law of most states, legislative decisions are supreme in law, but 
for any constraints imposed by the constitution as interpreted by domestic courts.9 
Generally, the courts only award damages against the state for legislative acts in rare
5 North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 December 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296 and 605 (entered into 
force 1 January 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA], art. 201(1). See Ethyl Corporation v. Government of 
Canada (Jurisdiction) (24 June 1998), 38 I.L.M. 708 [hereinafter Ethy/\, para. 65; Waste 
Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (Jurisdiction) (2 June 2000), 40 I.L.M. 56 [hereinafter 
Waste Management No. /], para. 11-14 (dissenting opinion); Methanex Corporations. United States 
of America (Jurisdiction) (7 August 2002), 14(6) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 109 [hereinafter 
Methanex], para. 25-32; AD F Group Inc. v. United States of America (Merits) (9 January 2003), 
15(3) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 55 [hereinafter ADF\, para. 56-9; The Loewen Group, Inc. and 
Raymond L  Loewen v. United States of America (Merits) (26 June 2003), 42 I.L.M. 811,15(5) 
World Trade and Arb. Mat. 97 [hereinafter Loeiven], para. 39-40 and 218; Waste Management Inc. 
v. United Mexican States (Merits) (30 April 2004), 43 I.L.M. 967,16(4) World Trade and Arb. 
Mat. 3 [hereinafter Waste Management No. 2\, para. 174.
6 NAFTA, ibid., art. 105 (providing that the states parties shall “ensure that all necessary 
measures are taken” to give effect to the treaty, including its observance by sub-national 
governments, subject to exceptions for certain sub-national measures). See Metalclad 
Corporation v. United Mexican States (Merits) (30 August 2000), 40 I.L.M. 36,13(1) World Trade 
and Arb. Mat. 45 [hereinafter Metalclad\, para. 73; ADF, ibid., para. 164-5; Loeiven, ibid., para. 
40, 53, and 123. M.A. Luz, “NAFTA, Investment and the Constitution of Canada: Will the 
Watertight Compartments Spring a Leak” (2001) 32 Ottawa L.R. 35, 84; R.G. Dearden, 
“Arbitration of Expropriation Disputes between an Investor and the State under the North 
American Free Trade Agreement” (1995) 29 J. World Trade 113,121.
7 See chapter three of this thesis, page 91-3.
8 F. Pollock, “Sovereignty in English Law” (1894) 8 Harv. L.R. 243, 243-4; A.V. Dicey, A n  
Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution [1885] (London: Macmillan, 8th ed. 1915), 3- 
4 and 36-9; A.W. Bradley, K.D. Ewing, and E.C.S. Wade, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 
11th ed. (1993), 69; J. Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999), 1-2.
9 E.g. Authorson (Litigation Guardian of) v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 40, 227 
D.L.R. (4th) 385, para. 48-57. Dicey, ibid., 4,18-19, 68-72, and 103; M.T. Ahmedouamar,
“The Liability of the Government in France as a Consequence of its Legal Activities” (1983)
11 Int’l J. Legal Info. 1, 5.
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cases.10 However, under Chapter 11, a legislative decision falls within the definition o f 
a state measure and, as such, it is subject to compulsory investment arbitration. 
Chapter 11 tribunals are authorized to review the passage, amendment, or repeal of 
any law (or any “regulation, procedure, requirement or practice” o f the legislature) for 
its consistency with the NAFTA standards of investor protection, and they may 
award damages where the legislature is found to have acted unlawfully.11 The state 
cannot plead that its acts were justified under domestic law because by concluding 
NAFTA the state consented to investment arbitration subject to international law.12 
Thus, the principle o f parliamentary sovereignty is modified by the treaty to the extent 
that the treaty requires legislatures to pass muster before an international tribunal.
There is nothing startling about this from the perspective o f international law. 
The principle o f the unity o f the state — consistent with the representative role o f the 
state in the international sphere -  requires the state to be responsible for the acts o f 
its constituent elements, regardless o f how public authority is divided under domestic 
law. A basic principle o f state responsibility under international law is that a state 
cannot rely on its domestic law and governing structure to avoid an international 
obligation.13 What is unusual about investment arbitration is that it prompts the 
application o f these principles in the context o f a regulatory dispute as opposed to a 
dispute between states or between private parties. In effect, the individualization of 
international claims means that, in assuming treaty obligations to other states, the 
state also makes a de facto commitment to any individual who can make a claim under
10 J. Mashaw, R. Merrill, and P. Shane, Administrative Law: The American Public Law System,
Cases and Materials, 3rd ed. (West Publishing, 1992), 992; D. Mullan, “Damages for Violation 
of Constitutional Rights — A False Spring?” (1995) 6 Natil J. Constitutional Law 105,126; C. 
Harlow, “Francovich and the Problem of the Disobedient State” (1996) 2 Eur. L.J. 199, 213.
11 E.g. Ethyl, supra note 5, para. 65.
12 E.g. Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America (Merits) (11 October 2002), 42 I.L.M. 
85,15(3) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 273 [hereinafter Mondev], para. 154 (a local authority’s 
immunity from suit for interference with contractual relations, under domestic law, does not 
protect a state from NAFTA Chapter 11 claims because NAFTA has its own remedy of 
investment arbitration to which no local statutory immunity would apply); Marvin Roy Feldman 
Karpav. United Mexican States (Merits) (16 December 2002), 15(3) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 
157 [hereinafter Feldman], para. 78.
13 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 22 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force 
27 January 1980), art. 27. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina 
(Jurisdiction) (17 July 2003), 42 I.L.M. 788, para. 108. International Law Commission, “Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts”, Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. 
No. 10, Annex, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), 43 [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles], art. 3 and 4.
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the treaty. Applied as part o f a reciprocal obligation between states, the principle of 
the unity of the state permits states to make commitments to each other by acting as 
distinct units in the international sphere.14 O n the other hand, in the context of 
obligations undertaken by the state in relation to investors, the principle overrides a 
central feature of modern democracy: legislative supremacy. As such, by allowing 
individuals to make international claims, investment treaties transform the principle of 
the unity of the state, from a principle that facilitates inter-state bargains, into one that 
trumps a domestic rule that would otherwise preclude state liability in the regulatory 
sphere.
Investment arbitration tribunals apply treaty standards that constrain sovereign 
acts o f a state’s legislature, judiciary, and administration.15 The passage or amendment 
o f legislation is clearly a sovereign act; legislation cannot be enacted by a private party 
(acting in a private capacity).16 Likewise, both the adjudication o f disputes by a 
domestic court and governmental decision-making by the administration are 
inherently sovereign in nature. Because investment treaties apply to sovereign acts, 
they authorize tribunals to assume jurisdiction over regulatory disputes. By definition, 
a dispute between the state and an investor that arises from a sovereign act o f the 
state is a regulatory dispute, not a private or commercial dispute. This does not mean 
that the jurisdiction o f arbitration tribunals is unlimited; for example, an investor must 
still establish that the relevant dispute arises from an investment.17 Nevertheless,
14 T.J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law (London: Macmillan and Co., 1923), 51.
15 Some investment treaties authorize compulsory investment arbitration only in relation to 
disputes arising from investment contracts between the state and investors. In such cases, it 
is debatable whether the state acts in a private or in a sovereign capacity by participating in 
investment arbitration. If the state acted in a private capacity when it assumed contractual 
obligations to the investor, then it may be said that the state is acting in a private capacity in 
the treaty-based arbitration of a dispute arising from the contract. Alternatively, because the 
state acts in a sovereign capacity when it consents generally to compulsory international 
arbitration under a treaty, it may be said that the state is acting in a sovereign capacity in an 
arbitration that is authorized by the treaty. This issue highlights a gray area in the extent to 
which the treaty-based arbitration of disputes arising from a contract engages regulatory 
disputes in the public sphere (as opposed to commercial disputes in the private sphere). It is 
unnecessary to resolve the issue here given that so many investment disputes clearly arise 
from sovereign acts of the state.
16 See generally C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law andA.dministration (London: Butterworths, 
1997), 605; M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: OUP, 2003), 80.
17 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada (Merits) (12 November 2000), 40 I.L.M. 1408,15(1) 
World Trade and Arb. Mat. 184, para. 222-31; UPS, supra note 4, para. 118-21; Mondev, supra 
note 12, 49-50 and 79-80;ADF, supra note 5, para. 152-4.
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because they require the state to arbitrate disputes arising from sovereign acts, 
investment treaties establish investment arbitration as a governing arrangement to 
control the exercise o f public authority, as opposed to a consensual method of 
adjudication between private parties.18
2. Investment
Investment treaties limit the jurisdiction o f tribunals to disputes that arise from 
“investment”.19 However, the term investment is usually defined broadly so as to 
encompass a wide range of economic activity, including economic activity that is not 
covered by other international trade agreements or by conventional notions o f foreign 
direct investment.20 The employment of a broad definition of investment means that 
the arbitration o f investment disputes under investment treaties typically involves the 
arbitration o f regulatory disputes.
In conventional trade law, the main subject o f regulation was trade in 
“goods”.21 In this context, international standards applied to state measures that 
affected tangible products with distinct physical characteristics.22 As a result, trade 
rules could be defined in relation to state measures that affected the movement o f 
identifiable tangible products, normally when they crossed a border.23 This led to a 
system o f trade regulation that was based on elaborate systems o f product
18 B. Kingsbury, N. Ktisch, and R. Stewart, “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law” 
(International Law and Justice Working Paper 2004/1, Institute for International Law and 
Justice, New York University School of Law, 2004), 22-3.
19 UNCTAD, World Investment'Report 1996 (Geneva: United Nations, 1997), 173-4; UNCTAD, 
supra note 2,15-23.
20 Feldman, supra note 12, para. 96; FedaxN.V. v. Republic of Venezuela (Jurisdiction) (11 July 
1997), 37 I.L.M. 1378, 5 ICSID Rep. 186, para. 24; CMS, supra note 13, para. 52. R. Dolzer 
and M. Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), 26; J. 
Paulsson, “Arbitration without Privity” (1995) 10 ICSID Rev. 232, 238-9; P. Juillard, “MAI:
A European View” (1998) 31 Cornell Int’l L.J. 477, 483; C.M. Correa, ‘‘Bilateral Investment 
Agreements: Agents of New Global Standards for the Protection of Intellectual Property 
Rights?” (Report for GRAIN, August 2004), 6-7.
21 M.J. Trebilcock and R. Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (London: Routledge,
1995), 21 and 25-6.
22 J.H. Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on International Commercial, Financial and Trade Taw (Oxford: Hart,
2000), 351.
23 L. Ehring, “De Facto Discrimination in WTO Law: National and Most-Favored-Nation 
Treatment — or Equal Treatment?”, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 12/01 (NYU School 
of Law, 2001), 1.
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classification as well as detailed lists o f permissible tariffs and quotas with respect to 
different categories of products. Over time, states expanded the rules to encompass 
measures that had the equivalent effect o f a tariff or quota and this complicated the 
matter.24 Even so, the standards remained connected to cross-border movements o f 
tangible products and thus relatively definable.
Identifying an “investment” is more difficult. Goods are products; investment 
is a concept.25 Investment involves decisions, acts, and motives: the contribution of 
capital to a business venture for profit or return (for example).26 Also, cross-border 
investment takes place within a broader environment than the mere movement o f 
tangible things. Walker comments that investment is “a process inextricably woven 
into the fabric of human affairs generally” and that it is “inadequately dealt with 
unless set in the total ‘climate* in which it is to exist”.27 Thus, a system that controls 
the exercise of public authority over investment has the potential to impact on a 
much wider range of economic activity than a system that regulates trade in goods.28
Indeed, if the term investment is not narrowly defined using precise language 
from the start, it has the potential to encompass an extremely wide range o f economic 
activity.29 Take the example of water.30 Water could be classified as a good or product 
that moves across borders; i.e. as botded water or bulk water. In this case, state
24 Trebilcock and Howse, supra note 21, 21 and 31-3; J.H. Jackson, The World Trading System, 
2d ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), 49-50; J.H.H. Weiler, “Epilogue: Towards a 
Common Law of International Trade” in J.H.H. Weiler, ed., The EU, the WTO, and the 
N AFTA  (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 201 and 205-6.
25 W. Peter, Arbitration and Renegotiation of International Investment Agreements (The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, 1995), 18-19.
26 M. Daly, “Some Taxing Questions for the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)” 
(1997) 20 World Economy 787, 788.
27 H. Walker, “Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: 
Present United States Practice” (1956) 5 Am. J. Comp. L. 229, 244.
28 B.B. Ramaiah, “Towards a Multilateral Framework on Investment” (1997) 6 Transn’l Corp. 
117,118-19; A. Afilalo, “Constitutionalization Through the Back Door: A European 
Perspective on NAFTA’s Investment Chapter” (2001) 34 N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1,7; 
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003 (Geneva: United Nations, 2003), 99-101.
29 A. Landsmeer, “Movement of Capital and Other Freedoms” (2001) 28 Legal Issues of 
Econ. Integration 57, 67-9.
30 International Joint Commission, Protection of the Waters of the Great Takes — Final Report to the 
Governments of Canada and the United States (IJC, February 2002); P.H. Gleick et al., “The New 
Economy of Water” (Report for the Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, 
Environment, and Security, 2002), 11-14; A. Ostrovsky, R. Speed, and E. Tuerk, “GATS, 
Water and the Environment” (Report for the Center for International Environmental Law 
and the World Wide Fund for Nature, 2003), 23-4.
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measures that related to international trade in water as a good would be those that 
affected the movement o f bottled or bulk water across borders. Likewise, investments 
that related to international trade in water as a good would be those in which capital is 
committed to an endeavour to move water across borders, for a return. The 
characterization o f water as a good — and of investment as the commitment of capital 
to the trade o f water as a good — narrows the range of economic activity that is 
affected by international standards.
However, by expanding the concept of water-related investment, it is possible 
to dramatically expand the scope of the economic (and regulatory) activity that is 
affected. Hydroelectricity, commercial shipping, the manufacture of goods, mining, 
agriculture: all involve the use o f water as an economic activity and all are regulated by 
the state.31 All involve the expenditure of capital and all are subject to regulation for 
reasons o f resource management, pollution control, and public health. This reflects 
the nature o f water as an essential resource. It also reveals the significance o f applying 
international standards to water as a good, as an investment relating to a good, or as 
an investment in general.
The World Trade Organization agreements that impact on investment tend to 
limit the scope o f the concept in significant ways. For example, the Agreement on Trade- 
Related Investment Measures applies only to investments that are themselves related to 
trade in goods; i.e. to cross-border movement of tangible products.32 More broadly, 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services applies to “trade in services”, including 
services that are supplied by a foreign company through a commercial presence in the 
jurisdiction of the consumer.33 As such, the GATS applies to investments that are
31 Ostrovsky et al., ibid., 22.
32 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Investment Measures, 15 April 1994, art. 1, Annex LA of 
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Final Act Embodying the Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1994), 139; S. Dillon, International Trade 
and Economic Taw in the European Onion (Oxford: Hart, 2002), 101.
33 General Agreement on Trade in Services, 15 April 1994, 33 I.L.M. 44 [hereinafter GATS], art. 
1(2) (“For the purposes of this Agreement, trade in services is defined as the supply of a 
service: ... (c) by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the 
territory of any other Member;...”). WTO Secretariat, “An Introduction to the GATS” 
(October 1999), 3, online: WTO
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/serv e/gsintr e.doc: UNCTAD, World Investment 
Report 2004 (Geneva: United Nations, 2004), 222-3.
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connected to intangible products.34 Even so, unlike investment treaties, the GATS is a 
bottom-up (or positive list) agreement under which states must expressly consent to 
the application o f GATS standards in specific sectors and modes o f supply.35 If 
investment treaties were bottom-up treaties, like the GATS, then states could limit 
their commitments to particular sectors o f investment and, where a state did not 
make express commitments in a sector, it would be assumed that the treaty did not 
apply.
However, investment treaties are top down (or negative list) agreements since 
states may not limit their obligations to specific sectors o f economic activity. Instead, 
investment treaties apply generally to any form of investment that is not expressly 
excluded from the treaty. This makes the definition o f investment vital to delineating 
the scope of the treaty and of investment arbitration. Over time, investment treaties 
have tended to expand the definition o f investment so that it now covers a very wide 
range o f economic and regulatory activity connected to foreign-owned or controlled 
assets.36
NAFTA Chapter 11 provides an example of a broad definition o f “investment”:37
investment means:
(a) an enterprise;
(b) an equity security of an enterprise;
(c) a debt security of an enterprise
(i) where the enterprise is an affiliate o f the investor, or
34 Dalhuisen, supra note 22, 351; UNCTAD, ibid., 145.
35 The GATS is a bottom-up agreement because its most significant obligations only apply to 
those service sectors positively identified by the state party. UNCTAD, supra note 28,148-9.
36 Over time, the definition of investment in investment treaties has expanded to include e.g. 
“associated activities” of investment and short-term capital flows. J.E. Pattison “The United 
States-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty: A Prototype for Future Negotiations” (1983) 16 
Cornell Int’l L.J. 305, 316-17; Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 20, 27-31; UNCTAD, supra 
note 28, 99-101.
37 NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1139. See S.D. Myers (Merits), supra note 17, para. 229-32; Pope 
&  Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada (Merits, Phase 1) (26 June 2000), 13(4) World Trade and 
Arb. Mat. 19 [hereinafter Pope <& Talbot], para. 97-8; Mondev, supra note 12, 49-50 and 79-80; 
ADF, supra note 5, para. 152-4; Feldman, supra note 12, para. 96. See also e.g. Energy Charter 
Treaty, 17 December 1994, 35 I.L.M. 509, art. 1(5) and l(6)(f).
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(ii) where the original maturity o f the debt security is at least three years,
but does not include a debt security, regardless of original maturity, o f a state 
enterprise;
(d) a loan to an enterprise
(i) where the enterprise is an affiliate o f the investor, or
(ii) where the original maturity o f the debt security is at least three years,
but does not include a loan, regardless o f original maturity, to a state enterprise;
(e) an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in income or 
profits o f the enterprise;
(f) an interest in an enterprise that entities the owner to share in the assets of 
that enterprise on dissolution, other than a debt security or a loan excluded 
from subparagraph (c) or (d);
(g) real estate or other property, tangible or intangible, acquired in the 
expectation or used for the purpose o f economic benefit or other business 
purposes; and
(h) interests arising from the commitment o f capital or other resources in the 
territory o f a Party to economic activity in such territory, such as under
(i) contracts involving the presence o f an investor’s property in the territory of 
the Party, including turnkey or construction contracts, or concessions, or
(ii) contracts where remuneration depends substantially on the production, 
revenues or profits of an enterprise;
but investment does not mean,
(i) claims to money that arise solely from
(i) commercial contracts for the sale o f goods or services by a national or 
enterprise in the territory o f a Party to an enterprise in the territory o f another 
Party, or
(ii) the extension o f credit in connection with a commercial transaction, such 
as trade financing, other than a loan covered by subparagraph (d); or
(iii) any other claims to money,
that do not involve the kinds o f interests set out in subparagraphs (a) through 
(h).
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This definition is central to the wide scope o f investment arbitration under NAFTA. 
The definition is not limited to tangible property, as under the customary law of 
diplomatic protection, but includes “intangible [property] acquired in the expectation 
or used for the purpose of economic benefit or other business purposes”.38 The 
definition includes any asset that is legally or beneficially owned, directly or indirectly, 
by an investor, thus capturing interests beyond full and direct ownership.39 The 
definition includes enterprises as well as interests in enterprises, thus capturing 
foreign-owned domestic companies including the interests o f minority shareholders in 
those companies.40 The definition includes rights and privileges granted by the state 
such as licenses, permits, and concessions as well as intellectual property rights.41 
Overall, although the definition contains notable exceptions (such as certain forms of 
commercial contracts), it is broadly-framed, reflecting a trend among investment 
treaties.
Moreover, the NAFTA definition is broader than conventional notions of 
foreign direct investment (FDI).42 In economic analysis, FDI is generally defined as 
cross-border investment that involves control o f foreign assets.43 This distinguishes 
FDI from portfolio investment which involves the contribution of capital without
38 The inclusion of intangible property is significant because relevant customary standards of 
substantive international law evolved in the context of tangible property. For example, the 
customary minimum standard of treatment traditionally limited the scope of protected 
property rights to tangible assets: A.H. Roth, The Minimum Standard of International Taw Applied 
to Aliens (Leiden, 1949), 185-6.
39 B.A. Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 1959), 11; B. 
Appleton, Navigating NAFTA  (Scarborough: Carswell, 1994), 80-1.
40 This overrides Barcelona Traction to the extent that that case bars claims of diplomatic 
protection on behalf of the foreign owner of a domestically-incorporated enterprise: Barcelona 
Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain), [1970] I.C.J. Rep. 3, 9 I.L.M. 227, para. 70 and 
99-103. See GAMI Investments, Inc. v. Government of the United Mexican States (Merits) (15 
November 2004), 17(2) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 127 [hereinafter GAMI\, para. 29-30 and 
38; Emilio Agustin Majfetfni v. The Kingdom of Spain (Jurisdiction) (25 January 2000), 16 ICSID 
Rev. 212,124 I.L.R. 9 [hereinafter Maffec{ini\, para. 65; A^urix Corp. v. The Argentine Bjpublic 
(Jurisdiction) (8 December 2003), 16(2) World Trade and Arb. Mat. I l l ,  para. 60.
41 G.R. Delaume, “ICSID Arbitration and the Courts” (1983) 77 AJIL 784, 795; Correa, supra 
note 20, 7-9; M.-F. Houde and K. Yannaca-Small, Ikelationships between International Investment 
Agreements, OECD Working Paper on International Investment No. 2004/1 (Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, May 2004), 7.
42 Peter, supra note 25,17; Trebilcock and Howse, supra note 21, 274; P.T. Muchlinski, 
Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 620.
43 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Foreign Direct Investment Statistics — How Countries Measure 
FDI (IMF, 2001), 4 and 23.
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foreign control or managerial influence. Economic statistics on investment distinguish 
between these two types o f capital flows and analysis o f the costs and benefits of 
foreign investment tends to focus on FDI.44 However, the definition of investment in 
most investment treaties encompasses portfolio investment as well as FDI and this 
dramatically expands the scope of investment arbitration.45 In particular, this 
constrains a state’s ability to control portfolio investment and, in light o f the volatility 
o f short-term capital flows, this imposes potentially catastrophic risks on the state — 
relating to its financial stability — that do not arise in the context o f FDI.46 For this 
reason, many investment treaties include exceptions for capital controls imposed in a 
balance of payments crisis.47
The breadth of the NAFTA definition o f investment means that investment 
arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11 encompasses other areas o f trade liberalization 
under the treaty, including trade in goods and trade in services.48 For instance, a state 
measure that affects trade in goods may also affect investment where a foreign 
national has committed capital to the production, distribution, transport, or sale o f a 
traded product.49 Likewise, the cross-border provision of a service always involves, at 
some stage, the commitment o f capital.50 This creates potential overlaps between 
Chapter 11 and other NAFTA chapters, and between the different methods of 
dispute resolution that are used in different parts of the treaty. It is highly significant 
whether the NAFTA standards o f investor protection (under Chapter 11) apply to 
state measures that affect trade in goods or services (under other NAFTA chapters)
44 E.g. A. Mody and A.P. Murshid, “Growing Up with Capital Flows”, IMF Working Paper 
WP/02/75 (IMF, 2002), 5 and 24.
45 IMF, supra note 43, 7; Wortley, supra note 39, 38-9 and 46-7.
46 Mody and Murshid, supra note 44, 6; UNCTAD, supra note 28,100; J. Bhagwati, “The 
Capital Myth: the Difference between Trade in Widgets and Dollars” (1998) 77(3) For.
Affairs 7, 7-8; World Bank, World Development Report 1999/2000 (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 73-5.
47 Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 20, 85-6.
48 Landsmeer, supra note 29, 60-1; Afilalo, supra note 28, 5; Houde and Yannaca-Small, supra 
note 41, 6-7.
49 Pope <& Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada (Jurisdiction) (26 January 2000), para. 26 and 33, 
online: DFAIT http: /  / www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents7pubdoc6.pdf: Ethyl, supra 
note 5, para. 62; ADF, supra note 5, para. 155.
50 E.g. S.D. Myers (Merits), supra note 17, para. 93 and 226; S.D. Myers (Damages) (21 October 
2002), 15(1) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 103, para. 86 and 97-8 (characterizing, as investment, 
a cross-border service provider’s commitment of capital to foreign sales and marketing).
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since only the former are subject to compulsory investment arbitration and the 
remedy of damages against the state.
In a number o f Chapter 11 arbitrations, the respondent state has argued that 
the tribunal lacked jurisdiction where the subject matter o f the dispute was covered by 
other NAFTA chapters.51 Accepting this argument would have limited the overlap 
between investment arbitration and the inter-state dispute resolution methods that 
apply under other chapters of the treaty. However, this argument has been rejected by 
tribunals on the basis that the NAFTA states’ obligations under the treaty are 
cumulative.52 In reaching this conclusion, tribunals relied on the broad NAFTA 
definition o f investment as well as W TO jurisprudence that narrows the definition of 
a conflict between trade obligations.53 As a result, investments that are incidental to 
trade in goods or services can nevertheless lead to claim under Chapter 11.
This overlap between Chapter 11 and other NAFTA chapters is an overlap 
within the regulatory sphere: sovereign acts that are subject to inter-state adjudication 
because they affect trade in goods or services are also subject to investment 
arbitration. Yet, a broad definition of investment can also extend the scope o f 
investment arbitration into the private sphere. This occurs where the term investment 
is defined to include commercial disputes arising from private acts o f the state 
(although tied by the investment treaty to an international obligation to another 
state).54 Under some treaties, investors can claim that the state has breached a general 
treaty obligation to respect or abide by all o f its duties to foreign investors.55 Many
51 Ethyl, supra note 5, para. 62; Pope <& Talbot (Jurisdiction), supra note 49, para. 19; S.D. Myers 
(Merits), supra note 17, para. 289; ADF, supra note 5, para. 155.
52 Pope <& Talbot (Jurisdiction), supra note 49, para. 25-6; S.D. Myers (Merits), supra note 17, 
para. 294 and 299.
53 Pope &  Talbot (Jurisdiction), supra note 49, para. 25-6; S.D. Myers (Merits), supra note 17, 
para. 291-5 and 299; S.D. Myers (Damages), supra note 50, para. 130-8.
54 E.g. Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Prpublic of Ecuador (Merits) (1 July 2004), 
London Court of International Arbitration Administered Case No. UN 3467, para. 44, 
online: ITA http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Oxv-EcuadorFinalAward 001.pdf. K.-P. 
Berger, International Economic Arbitration (Deventer: Kluwer, 1993), 64; Paulsson, supra note 20, 
238-9; DoLzer and Stevens, supra note 20,14.
55 E.g. Accord entre la Confederation suisse et la PJpublique islamique du Pakistan concemant la promotion 
et la protection reciroque, 11 July 1995, No. 0.975.262.3 (entered into force 6 May 1996), art. 11. 
NAFTA Chapter 11 requires a breach of a treaty standard, beyond a simple breach of 
contract: Pjobert Atfnian et al. v. United Mexican States (Merits) (1 November 1999), 39 I.L.M. 
537 [hereinafter A^nian], para. 83-4; Waste Management No. 2 (Merits), supra note 5, para. 73 
and 116. However, the NAFTA definition of “investment” does include contractual rights:
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investment treaties -  unlike NAFTA — contain an “umbrella clause” that incorporates 
the states parties’ contractual obligations to investors under domestic law as 
international obligations under the treaty.56 An overlap arises with the private sphere 
because, by concluding a contract with an investor, a state acts in a private capacity, 
and the state’s contractual obligations are treated as private obligations subject to the 
law o f the contract rather than international law.57 Further, an arbitration authorized 
by the mutual consents o f the parties to a contract is a consensual method of 
adjudication between private parties (acting in a private capacity), even if one o f the 
parties is a state. Finally, in customary international law, the breach o f a contract by a 
state does not amount to a violation of international law and the right o f diplomatic 
protection only arises if there is a separate breach of an international obligation, such 
as a denial o f justice, in the provision o f domestic remedies allowing the investor to 
enforce the contract.58
Where an investment treaty requires that the states parties generally abide by 
their obligations to foreign investors, this potentially transforms the state’s contractual 
obligations (owed to a private investor) into international obligations (owed to 
another state).59 In such cases, the use of investment arbitration leads to the 
international adjudication o f disputes arising from the state’s commercial transactions 
with foreign investors. Put differently, some investment treaties define investment 
broadly enough to capture the commercial as well as the regulatory relationship
NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1139. See Salini Costruttori S.P^4. and Italstrade S.P^A. v. Kingdom of 
Morocco (Jurisdiction) (23 July 2001), 42 I.L.M. 609 [hereinafter Salini], para. 49.
56 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance v. Pakistan (Jurisdiction) (6 August 2003), 18 ICSID Rev. 
307,16(2) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 167 [hereinafter SGS v. Pakistan], para. 99; SGS Societe 
Generate de Surveillance v. Philippines (Jurisdiction) (29 January 2004), 16(3) World Trade and 
Arb. Mat. 91 [hereinafter SGS v. Philippiner], para. 90,113, and 132.
57 F.A. Mann, “State Contracts and State Responsibility” (1960) 54 AJIL 572, 573 and 582.
58 P.C. Jessup, “Responsibility of States for Injuries to Individuals” (1946) 46 Colum. L.R. 
903, 913; Mann, ibid., 573-4.
59 A.^nian, supra note 55, para. 87. See also SGS v. Pakistan, supra note 56, para. 156; SGS v. 
Philippines, supra note 56, para. 128. D.W. Bowett, “Claims Between States and Private 
Entities: The Twilight Zone of International Law” (1986) 35 Cath. U. L. Rev. 929, 936; T.W. 
Walde, “Investment Arbitration Under the Energy Charter Treaty — From Dispute 
Settlement to Treaty Implementation” (1996) 12 Arb. Int’l 429, 454-5; A.E.L. Tucker, “The 
Energy Charter Treaty and ‘Compulsory’ International State/ Investor Arbitration” (1998) 11 
Leiden J. Int’l L. 513, 523-4; A.T. Guzman, “Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: 
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties” (1998) 38 Va. J. Int’l L. 639, 655- 
6 .
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between investors and the state.60 This brings investment arbitration full circle. 
Having expanded beyond the realm o f commercial arbitration to include the 
arbitration o f regulatory disputes, the scope of investment arbitration returns to 
engulf contractual disputes that would otherwise be subject to the law o f the contract. 
International adjudication becomes an alternative method o f international redress for 
investors in the private as well as the regulatory sphere. Investors may choose to 
adjudicate a commercial dispute with the state under the relevant provisions o f the 
contract or under the treaty, or perhaps both, just as they may choose to adjudicate a 
regulatory dispute under domestic or international law.
The term investment need not be defined in an all-encompassing way. It can 
be limited by attaching qualifiers, such as the requirement that an investment must 
provide a benefit to the host economy.61 A number o f ICSID tribunals have 
concluded that, for a dispute to fall within ICSID’s jurisdiction, the relevant 
transaction must reflect typical features o f investment, including: a certain duration, a 
regularity o f profit and return, an element o f risk for both sides, a substantial 
commitment, and a contribution to the host state’s development.62 However, the 
ICSID Convention itself does not expressly limit the term investment in this way.63 
Thus, the definition o f investment is ultimately resolved when the state consents to 
investment arbitration, opening the door to the broad definitions adopted in 
contemporary investment treaties. By defining investment to encompass “every asset” 
o f an investor — including short-term capital flows, concessionary rights and 
intellectual property rights — investment treaties regulate the exercise o f public 
authority over economic activity in general.
60 This naturally depends on the wording of the treaty. Some investment treaties expressly 
exclude contractual claims from treaty-based investment arbitration where the contract 
provides for alternative means of dispute resolution, whereas others contain an umbrella 
clause as discussed above.
61 Alternatively, an investment treaty might impose an obligation on investors to reinvest the 
proceeds of a damages award as part of a duty to mitigate losses: Bowett, supra note 59, 941.
62 Fedax, supra note 20, para. 43; Sating supra note 55, para. 52; Autopista Concesionada de 
Venezuela v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Jurisdiction) (27 September 2001), 16 ICSID Rev. 
469, para. 101; SGS v. Pakistan, supra note 56, para. 133, note 153; SGS v. Philippines, supra 
note 56, para. 45.
63 J.T. Schmidt, “Arbitration Under the Auspices of the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes” (1976) 17 Harv. Int’l L.J. 90, 99-100.
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Dolzer and Stevens comment that the purpose of a broad definition of 
investment is “to ensure flexibility in the application o f the treaty, given that the 
meaning o f investment may change in the future”.64 Thus, the broader the definition, 
the more likely it is that treaty standards will apply to the exercise o f public authority. 
A broad definition expands the discretion o f arbitration tribunals to assume 
jurisdiction over investor claims. A broad definition also expands the state’s potential 
liability to investors. For states, the question is: what types of economic activity 
qualify as investments and thus engage international obligations o f the state? Does 
market share amount to investment?65 Does the mere establishment o f a sales 
office?66 What interests of multinational enterprises are 00/ investments?67 For state 
officials, faced with a broad definition o f investment in an investment treaty, it is 
prudent to assume that virtually any regulatory activity that impacts on a multinational 
enterprise could lead to investment arbitration and state liability.68 This reflects the 
use o f investment arbitration as a governing arrangement.
B. The substance of investment arbitration
Investment treaties would do little to regulate states if they did not apply rigorous 
substantive constraints to the exercise o f public authority by the state. As such, the 
standards o f investor protection in an investment treaty — linked to broad 
jurisdictional concepts like “state measure” and “investment” — play a key role in the 
regulatory control function of investment arbitration. It is by reference to the 
substantive standards that an investor frames a claim that the state has breached the 
treaty. Thus, the standards inform and justify the assessment o f state conduct and
64 Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 20, 26.
65 Pope <& Talbot (Merits, Phase 1), supra note 37, para. 96-8. See also S.D. Myers (U.S. 
Submission) (18 September 2001), para. 5, online: State Department
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/6029.pdf.
66 Supra note 50. J.A. Soloway, “Environmental Regulation as Expropriation: The Case of 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11” (2000) 33 Can. Bus. L.J. 92,123.
67 E.g. some bilateral investment treaties expressly require that the investment be made in the 
territory of the host state: SGS v. Philippines, supra note 56, para. 99.
68 P. Malanczuk, “State-State and Investor-State Dispute Settlement in the OECD Draft 
Multilateral Investment Agreement” (2000) 3 J. Int’l Econ. L. 417, 437-8; P. Ryan, “David v. 
Goliath” (2002) 11 National 30, 36 (citing Peter Kirby of Fasken Martineau: it is “practically 
impossible” to predict what government action will be questioned next under Chapter 11).
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determine the treaty’s impact on government. By interpreting these standards, 
tribunals specify and elaborate on the constraints imposed by investment treaties.
In this section, three core standards o f investor protection — national treatment, 
the minimum standard o f treatment, and compensation for expropriation69 — are 
reviewed, using NAFTA as an example.70 Under NAFTA Chapter 11, these core 
standards oblige the NAFTA states to:
treat foreign (NAFTA-based) investors/ investments no less favourably than 
domestic investors who are “in like circumstances” (national treatment),71
treat foreign investments “in accordance with international law” including “fair 
and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” (the minimum 
standard o f treatment);72 and
compensate investors for direct or indirect expropriation o f an investment, or 
any measure “tantamount to” an expropriation (compensation for 
expropriation).73
69 These are the standards that are most frequently called upon in investor claims under 
NAFTA and other investment treaties. Other treaty standards of investor protection oblige 
states to provide most-favoured-nation treatment to investors; to remove restrictions on 
capital flows and profit repatriation; to refrain from imposing performance requirements 
concerning the export of goods produced, the use of local materials, and the employment of 
local staff; to guarantee free movement of directors and senior management; and to require 
states to abide by any other commitments to foreign investors. Like the three core standards 
that are discussed here, these other standards regulate the exercise of public authority in 
relation to investors. However, these other standards tend to be more specifically defined, 
making their impact less uncertain than that of the core standards discussed here. An 
exception is most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment, which obliges host states to treat 
foreign investors no less favourably than other foreign investors in like circumstances, and 
which is open to widely divergent interpretations. In particular, MFN treatment may be 
broadly interpreted to require a state to provide, not only substantive standards included its 
other investment treaties, but also procedural advantages such as access to compulsory 
investment arbitration. See Maffe^ini, supra note 40, para. 40-2 and 64; Tecnicas Medioambientales 
Teemed, S A . v. United Mexican States (Merits) (29 May 2003), 43 I.L.M. 133 [hereinafter Tecmed\ , 
para. 69; Siemens A G . v. The Argentine Republic (Jurisdiction) (3 August 2004), ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/8 [hereinafter Siemens], para. 32 and 102-3, online: ITA
http: /  /  ita.law.uvic.ca/ documents /  SiemensJurisdiction-English-3August2004.pdf.
70 Most NAFTA Chapter 11 standards and all of these core standards are contained in the 
majority of investment treaties, although the language used to define them varies. That said, 
unlike NAFTA and U.S.-modeled BITs, a significant number of BITs do not extend national 
treatment to the pre-establishment stage of an investment (i.e. to the period before an 
investor has entered the host economy) or apply express prohibitions on performance 
requirements. See UNCTAD, supra note 19,182-4 and 189-92; UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment 
Treaties in the Mid-1990s (Geneva: United Nations, 1998), 137-8; UNCTAD, supra note 28,
102 and 108.
71 NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1102.
72 NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1105.
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These standards draw upon principles that are well-established in international law, 
although because they are defined using broad language they tend to impose relatively 
intrusive constraints on states. Further, in contemporary investment treaties, the 
standards are typically defined using language that is broad enough to capture general 
regulatory activity that does not directly target or predominandy affect foreign 
investors. For this reason, the standards have the potential to impact on virtually any 
governmental activity, including economic regulation, taxation, regional development, 
cultural diversity, land use planning, public health and environmental protection.74
Under NAFTA Chapter 11, the core standards expand on comparable 
standards under customary international law and domestic public law.75 Moreover, 
investors have argued for the standards to be interpreted expansively and in some 
cases tribunals have obliged. The intent here is not to argue for a particular 
interpretation of the standards but rather to shed light on the plausible range of 
meanings that can be attached to each. In doing so, the aim is to illustrate the 
potential implications o f an expansive interpretation for government and, as such, to 
highlight the significance o f investment arbitration as a governing arrangement.
1. National treatment
73 NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1110.
74 UNCTAD, supra note 19,184-9; D. Schneiderman, “Investment Rules and the New 
Constitutionalism” (2000) 25 Law & Social Inq. 757, 771-2; J. Werksman, K.A. Baumert, and 
N.K. Dubash, ‘‘Will International Investment Rules Obstruct Climate Protection Policies?” 
(Report for the World Resources Institute, April 2001); W.W. Park, “Arbitration and the 
Fisc: NAFTA’s ‘Tax Veto’” (2001) 2 Chi. J. Int’l L. 231, 236-8; T. Epps and C.M. Flood, 
“Have We Traded Away the Opportunity for Innovative Health Care Reform? The 
Implications of the NAFTA for Medicare” (2002) 47 McGill L.J. 747, 781-7; J.R. Johnson, 
“How Will International Trade Agreements Affect Canadian Health Care?” (Discussion 
Paper No. 22 for the Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, September 2002), 
9-17 and 26-32.
75 See V.L. Been and J.C. Beauvais, “The Global Fifth Amendment: NAFTA’s Investment 
Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International ‘Regulatory Takings’ Doctrine” 
(2003) 78 N.Y.U. L.R. 30, 50-1 and 59-60. This is especially so because a violation of the 
treaty leads to a damages award rather than conventional public law remedies: M. Lunney 
and K. Oliphant, Tort Law (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 527.
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The first core standard -  national treatment — is more limited under customary 
international law than under many investment treaties, including NAFTA. Under 
customary international law, a state may favour domestic over foreign investors so 
long as the state does not discriminate against foreign investors once they have been 
allowed into the host economy.76 In contrast, under NAFTA, the states parties must 
not favour domestic over foreign investors or prohibit the entry o f a foreign investor 
into the host economy.77 In principle, foreign investors must be treated at least as 
favourably as domestic investors who are in like circumstances. Alternatively: 
investors cannot be discriminated against because they are foreign.
The NAFTA standard o f national treatment is contained in Article 1102:
1. Each Party shall accord to investors o f another Party treatment no less 
favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with 
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, 
operation, and sale or other disposition of investments.
2. Each Party shall accord to investments of another Party treatment no less 
favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its investments o f its 
own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments.
National treatment is a fundamental norm in international economic law and public 
law generally.78 However, its application in the field o f investment is relatively 
recent.79 Also, applied to investment — in the context o f individualization — the scope
76 J.B. Moore, Digest of International Taw, vol. 4 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1906), 67; UNCTAD, supra note 28,102.
77 NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1102. Many BITs do not extend national treatment to the pre­
establishment stage of an investment: supra note 70.
78 H. Neufeld, The International Protection of Private Creditors From the Treaties of Westphalia to the 
Congress of Vienna (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1971), 96; M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and L. 
Chen, “The Protection of Aliens From Discrimination and World Public Order:
Responsibility of States Conjoined with Human Rights” (1976) 70 AJIL 432, 443; J.H.H. 
Weiler, supra note 24, 201.
79 Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 20, 57; UNCTAD, National Treatment, UNCTAD Series on 
Issues in International Investment Agreements (New York: United Nations, 1999), 9-13; H. 
Mann and K. von Moltke, “NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and the Environment: Addressing the 
Impacts of the Investor-State Process on the Environment” (Working Paper for the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, 1999), 12.
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o f national treatment is potentially vast.80 For this reason, the NAFTA standard had 
created interpretive challenges in some cases.81
By definition, national treatment is a relative standard in that it measures a 
state’s treatment o f foreign investors against the treatment o f similarly situated 
domestic investors. Thus, at the heart of national treatment is the fundamental maxim 
that like cases should be treated alike, as well as the dilemma o f how to identify 
appropriate criteria for comparison.82 Which domestic investors are in like 
circumstances to those o f the foreign investor?83 Does the fact that domestic 
investors operate in an economically depressed region distinguish them from foreign 
investors who operate in wealthy regions? What if the domestic investor has a better 
record of employing disadvantaged minorities or uses an environmentally-friendly 
production process; are these legitimate grounds upon which to favour domestic 
investors? Are U.S.-owned producers of canola seed pesticides that contain lindane in 
like circumstances to Canadian-owned producers of canola seed pesticides that are 
lindane-free?84 O r are they similarly situated so long as they produce substitute 
products? From the start, tribunals must distinguish between like and unlike 
circumstances. The more broadly a tribunal defines likeness, the more national 
treatment constrains governments’ ability to differentiate between economic actors 
for reasons o f public policy.
Already, the interpretation o f national treatment emerges as a complex and 
value-laden task.85 But this does not end the matter. Arbitration tribunals must also
80 Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 20, 62 (noting that, for a state to violate national treatment 
under customary international law, the state measure had to reflect an intention to harm a 
foreign national); R.K. Paterson, “A New Pandora’s Box? Private Remedies for Foreign 
Investors under the North American Free Trade Agreement” (2000) 8 Willamette J. Int’l L. 
and Dispute Res. 77, 95; Afilalo, supra note 28, 5.
81 E.g. Feldman, supra note 12, para. 166-7. J.H.H. Weiler, supra note 24, 213-14.
82 M. Loughlin, Sword and Scales (Oxford: Hart, 2000), 20.
83 Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 20, 63.
84 See Crompton Corp. v. Government of Canada (Notice of Claim) (6 November 2001), para. 28-9, 
online: DFAIT http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/CROMPTON- 
CORP.pdf.
85 J.R. Johnson, “Essential Disciplines of the National Treatment Obligation Under NAFTA 
Chapter Eleven” (Report on investment protection for the Ad Hoc Experts Group on 
Investment Rules, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2 December
2001), online: DFAIT http: / /www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/treatment-en.asp: J.A. 
VanDuzer, “NAFTA Chapter 11 to Date: The Progress of a Work in Progress” in L. Ritchie
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determine how far to cast the comparative net. Does a foreign investor have to show 
that any less favourable treatment o f investor reflects a pattern o f conduct in the 
state’s treatment o f foreign investors as a group}*6 O r can a violation arise from the 
circumstances o f a single investor?87 O n a narrow reading o f the standard, a foreign 
investor would have to show that any less favourable treatment was not an isolated 
event.88 On a broad reading, a state violates national treatment whenever it treats a 
foreign investor less favourably than a single domestic investor, in a single instance.89 
There is a wide gap between the ramifications, for governments, o f these 
interpretations. But the issue is vital because it determines the degree to which 
governments must alter their regulatory activity in order to avoid liability.
National treatment is especially complex because it captures de facto as well as 
de jure discrimination.90 A violation o f the standard may occur when a state measure, 
though neutral on its face, has a discriminatory effect on foreign investors relative to 
their domestic counterparts.91 In its original form as a standard to regulate trade in 
goods, the purpose o f prohibiting de facto discrimination was to counter disguised 
protectionism against imported products.92 Transplanted to the circumstances o f a 
single investor (as opposed to a group o f investors), de facto discrimination creates a 
possibility o f over-inclusion by capturing regulation which only incidentally affects the 
foreign investor.93 Applied broadly, de facto discrimination could bar any exercise of 
public authority that differentiated between investors.94 Yet, most governmental 
activity inherently involves differentiation among the subjects o f regulation and, if all
Dawson, ed., Whose Rights? The N AFTA Chapter 11 Debate (Ottawa: Centre for Trade Law 
and Policy, 2002), 72-3; Mann and von Moltke, supra note 79, 28-32.
86ILC Draft Articles, supra note 13, art. 15.
87 Feldman, supra note 12, para. 181 (award) and p. 269 (dissenting opinion).
88 Johnson, supra note. 85, 8-10.
89 Pope <& Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada (Merits, Phase 2) (10 April 2001), 13(4) World 
Trade and Arb. Mat. 61, para. 70-2. P.G. Foy, “Effectiveness of NAFTA’s Chapter Eleven 
Investor-State Arbitration Procedures” (2003) 18 ICSID Rev. 44, 49.
90 E.g. Feldman, supra note 12, para. 169. Contrast In the Matter of Cross-border Trucking Services 
(Merits) (6 February 2001), 13(3) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 121, para. 291-2.
91 UNCTAD, supra note 79, 40-1.
92 Jackson, supra note 24, 216-18; Ehring, supra note 23,1-2.
93 Paterson, supra note 80, 95 (commenting that, in the trade in goods context, discrimination 
is always based on nationality because imports are, by definition, of a different origin than 
the “like domestic product”).
94 Johnson, supra note 85, 4.
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such differentiation was prohibited, then investment treaties would scorch a very wide 
swath o f the regulatory landscape.95
Importantly, the meaning o f the standards of investor protection is affected 
and often expanded by individualization. In NAFTA Chapter 11 claims, investors 
have advocated far-reaching interpretations o f national treatment, arguing -  for 
instance — that the term “like circumstances” should be read broadly and that 
incidental de facto discrimination violates the treaty.96 This is not surprising. Allowing 
investors to make international claims in the context o f the regulatory relationship 
gives a private party the discretion to make arguments in its own interest, unburdened 
by considerations o f the public interest or by the possibility o f having to defend a 
similar claim. Investors can be expected to argue for broad interpretations in order to 
expand their opportunities to receive damages. What is noteworthy is that by allowing 
investors to make these arguments (although they are often rejected by tribunals) 
investment treaties create an adjudicative environment in which arbitrators are 
enabled to adopt more expansive readings o f the treaty, should they so choose, even 
where this conflicts with the submissions o f the states parties.97
The use of adjudication as a governing arrangement grants discretionary 
authority to adjudicators to constrain the exercise o f public authority. O n a narrow 
reading, national treatment affects a wide range o f governmental measures, although 
within limits based on, e.g., intent or negligence on the part o f the state. O n an 
expansive reading, national treatment imposes liability on states in isolated cases o f 
differential treatment, where a general regulation incidentally harms a foreign investor 
relative to a domestic investor.98 In chapter five o f this thesis, one tribunaPs broad
95 J. Bhagwati, “Afterword: The Question of Linkage” (2002) 96 AJIL 126,129-30.
96 E.g. Ethyl (Investor’s Submission) (2 October 1997), para. 31, online: DFAIT 
http: /  / www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/ documents /ethvl3.pdf: S.D. Myers (Investor’s 
Submission) (20 July 1999), para. 77, online: DFAIT http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna- 
nac/ documents/Julv201999.pdf: Pope &  Talbot (Investor’s Submission) (28 January 2000), 
para. 53-7 and 72, online: DFAIT http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/A- 
l.pdf: UPS (Investor’s Submission) (23 March 2005), para. 515-16, 521, 528, and 536-7, 
online: DFAIT http: / / www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/UPSMarch-05.pdf.
97 E.g. Pope <& Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), supra note 89, para. 79 (rejecting the submissions of 
the NAFTA Parties that Article 1102 is limited to the prohibition of discrimination on the 
basis of nationality', GAMI, supra note 40, para. 29-30. But see ADF, supra note 5, para. 177.
98 Pope <& Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), supra note 89, para. 78-9; Feldman, supra note 12, para. 181 
(award) and p. 269 (dissenting opinion).
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interpretation of national treatment is examined in more detail. Suffice it to say here 
that in interpreting the NAFTA standards tribunals have substantial discretion.
2. The minimum standard o f treatment
The assertion o f a minimum standard o f treatment for foreign nationals under 
international law has a contentious history." Since the nineteenth century, capital- 
exporting states traditionally asserted a minimum standard of fair treatment and 
protection for foreign investors, although the content o f the standard was not always 
consistent or precise.100 O n the other hand, former colonies and developing countries 
argued that the minimum standard was restricted to non-discrimination based on 
equal access to domestic remedies once a foreign national was allowed into a state’s 
territory.101 Investment treaties establish a minimum standard that goes beyond 
simple non-discrimination, reflecting a position historically preferred by capital- 
exporting states.102
The NAFTA minimum standard o f treatment is contained in Article 1105:
1. Each Party shall accord to investments of investors o f another Party 
treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable 
treatment and full protection and security.
99 M.N. Shaw, International Law, 5th ed. (Cambridge: CUP, 2003), 733-7; Center for 
International Environmental Law (CIEL), “International Law on Investment: The Minimum 
Standard of Treatment (MS'!)” (Issue Brief, August 2003), 1-2; I. Brownlie, Principles of Public 
International haw, 6th ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2003), 503-5.
100 E. Root, “Elihu Root’s Services to International Law” (1910) 4 ASIL Proc. 16, 21; C. 
Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Taw (New York: NYU Press, 1928), 109; 
Neufeld, supra note 78, 98; McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen, supra note 78, 446-51; J.C. 
Thomas, “Reflections on Article 1105 of NAFTA: History, State Practice and the Influence 
of Commentators” (2002) 17 ICSID Rev. 21, 39-51.
101 Responsibility of Statesfor Damage Caused in Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, 
League of Nations Conference for the Codification of International Law, Bases of 
Discussion, vol. 3, LN Doc. C.75.M.69.1929.V (1929), 15. E. Borchard, “The ‘Minimum 
Standard’ of Treatment of Aliens” (1940) Mich. L.R. 445, 445-7 and 450-1; M. Somarajah, 
The Pursuit of Nationalised Property (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), 29.
102 Mondev, supra note 12, para. 120.
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This standard represents an absolute minimum standard o f treatment that a NAFTA 
state must provide to foreign investors. That is, regardless of the treatment that a 
NAFTA state provides to its own investors, the treatment o f foreign investors must 
not fall below the floor that is set by Article 1105, which includes “fair and equitable 
treatment” and “full protection and security”. Thus, on a broad interpretation, a 
tribunal could find that a state breached NAFTA where its conduct was unfair or 
inequitable under international law.103 The meaning o f these adjectives does not leap 
from the page. Thus, as in the case o f national treatment, the minimum standard o f 
treatment is stated in broad and ambiguous terms.104
Under customary international law, the minimum standard o f treatment was 
not particularly stringent. Academic works typically refer to the 1926 decision o f the 
U.S.-Mexico General Claims Commission in Neerv. United Mexican States, which 
described the standard as such:105
... the treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency 
should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect o f duty, or to an 
insufficiency o f governmental action so far short o f international standards 
that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its 
insufficiency.
This conveys a sense o f egregiousness in the type o f state conduct that violates the 
customary standard.106 However, investors have argued for a broader interpretation of 
NAFTA Article 1105; one that incorporates standards contained in other treaties, for 
example, without applying customary limits on a state’s general duty of fair treatment 
and full protection.107
103 UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements (New York: United Nations, 1999), 10-12.
104 Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 20, 58-9; Thomas, supra note 100, 22.
105 Neer Claim (United States v. Mexico) (1926), 4 R.I.A.A. 60, 61-2. See Eagleton, supra note 100, 
84.;J.L. Brierly, The Law ojNations, 5th ed. (Oxford: OUP, 1955), 221-2; G. Schwarzenberger, 
International Taw as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, vol. 1, 3rd ed. (London: Stevens 
& Sons, 1957), 200; P. Malanczuk, Akehursfs Modem Introduction to International Taw, 7th ed. 
(London: Routledge, 1997), 261; Brownlie, supra note 99, 503.
106 Schwarzenberger, ibid., 201; A.A. Fatouros, “International Economic Development and 
the Illusion of Legal Certainty” (1963) 57 ASIL Proc. 117, 117-18; Thomas, supra note 100, 
29-39.
107 E.g. Tope <& Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), supra note 89, para. 107; S.D. Myers (Merits), supra 
note 17, para. 134; UPS, supra note 4, para. 81-2.
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In the early days of Chapter 11 arbitration, some tribunals adopted broad 
readings o f the minimum standard that went well beyond customary international 
law.108 For example, in Metalclad, the tribunal imposed as part o f the minimum 
standard a general duty on the NAFTA states to ensure transparency in the regulation 
of investment.109 The tribunal required the NAFTA states to ensure that “all relevant 
legal requirements” were made clear to foreign investors and to correct “any scope 
for misunderstanding or confusion”.110 In Pope <& Talbot, the tribunal rejected 
Canada’s argument that the standard required evidence of state conduct that crossed a 
high threshold o f impropriety based on Neer.m  Instead, the tribunal adopted a broad 
reading which encompassed “the fairness elements under ordinary standards applied 
in [the domestic law of] NAFTA countries.... without any threshold limitation that 
the conduct complained o f be ‘egregious,’ ‘outrageous,’ or ‘shocking,’ or otherwise 
extraordinary”.112 The NAFTA states objected to the Pope <& Talbot tribunal’s 
approach113 and later tribunals adopted a more restrained approach.114 Even so, the 
early experience in the interpretation o f Article 1105 revealed that arbitrators were 
prepared to assume wide-ranging authority to sanction governmental activity using 
broadly-framed standards o f investor protection.
Broad interpretations of the minimum standard of treatment have major 
implications for governments. Governments often make controversial decisions when 
exercising public authority; indeed, controversy is inherent in the act o f governing. In 
making policy decisions, governments may appear to misapprehend facts, apply
108 Metalclad\ supra note 6, para. 74-6; Pope <& Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), supra note 89, para. 110 
and 115-18; ST). Myers (Merits), supra note 17, para. 266. CIEL, supra note 99, 3-5; Thomas, 
supra note 100,113-14; C. Tollefson, ’’Metalclad v. United Mexican States Revisited: Judicial 
Oversight of NAFTA’s Chapter Eleven Investor-State Claim Process” (2002) 11 Minn. J. 
Global Trade 183, 207-13 and 224-5.
109 Metalclad,\ supra note 6, para. 76. See also United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation (2001), 
89 B.C.L.R. (3d) 359, 38 C.E.L.R. 284,13(5) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 219 [hereinafter 
United Mexican States], para. 68-73 (concluding that the Metalclad tribunal exceeded its 
jurisdiction by grounding its interpretation of Article 1105 in transparency obligations 
contained in parts of NAFTA that were not subject to investment arbitration).
110 Metalclad\ supra note 6, para. 76.
111 Pope &  Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), supra note 89, para. 108 and 118. See also Pope <& Talbot 
(Canada’s Submissions) (10 October 2000), para. 235-40, online: DFAIT http://www.dfait- 
maeci.gc.ca/ tna-nac/documents 7B-2.pdf.
112 Pope <& Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), supra note 89, para. 118.
113 E.g. Mondev, supra note 12, para. 106 and 108-10.
114 ADF, supra note 5, para. 179-86; Mondev, supra note 12, para. I l l ;  Ljoewen, supra note 5, para. 
131-3; Waste Management No. 2 (Merits), supra note 5, para. 98.
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misguided theories, emphasize wrong-headed priorities, or adopt counterproductive 
responses to problems. Under international law, the ordinary forum to resolve 
disputes arising from these decisions is the domestic political and legal system.115 An 
expansive reading of NAFTA Article 1105 transforms the customary standard from a 
protection of last resort for foreign nationals into a general guarantee of fairness, 
equity, and due process.116
3. Expropriation
Another historically disputed question in international law is whether, and the extent 
to which, a state must compensate foreign investors for an expropriation o f their 
assets.117 In the post-colonial era, the debate over the international law of 
expropriation has pitted the Western powers seeking to protect the foreign assets of 
their nationals against newly independent states aspiring to assert autonomy over their 
economy and resources.118 This debate reflects a deeper conflict about the 
relationship between property, the collectivity, and the state.119 In the domestic law of 
all countries, and under human rights treaties, the conflict has a varied legal history,
115 S.D. Myers (Merits), supra note 17, para. 261. See also Middle East Cement Shipping and 
Handling Co. SA I. v. Arab Republic of Egypt (Merits) (12 April 2002), 18 ICSID Rev. 602, para. 
155.
116 J.C. Thomas, “The Experience of NAFTA Chapter 11 Tribunals To Date: A Practitioner’s 
Perspective” in L. Ritchie Dawson, ed., Whose Rights? The N AFTA Chapter 11 Debate (Ottawa: 
Centre for Trade Law and Policy, 2002), 113-14.
117 J.F. Williams, “International Law and the Property of Aliens” (1928) 9 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 1, 
28; A.P. Fachiri, “International Law and the Property of Aliens” (1929) 10 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 
32, 33-4 and 49-51; Wortley, supra note 39,119-26; E.F. Mooney, Foreign Seizures— Sabbatino 
and the Act of State Doctrine (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), 85; N. Girvan, 
Corporate Imperialism: Conflict and Expropriation (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1978), 200; R. Dolzer, 
“New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property” (1981) 75 AJIL 553, 557- 
72; Peter, supra note 25,173-6; Muchlinski, supra note 42, 501-14; E. Lauterpacht, 
“International Law and Private Foreign Investment” (1997) 4 Indiana J. Global Legal Studies 
259, 263-7.
118 F.S. Dunn, “International Law and Private Property Rights” (1928) 28 Colum. L. Rev. 166, 
177-80; S. Friedman, Expropriation in International Taw (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 
1953), 4; S.K.B. Asante, Transnational Investment Eaw and National Development (Lagos:
University of Lagos, 1981), 31-2; C. Lipson, Standing Guard — Protecting Foreign Capital in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 29-30.
119 C.F. Randolph, “The Eminent Domain” (1887) 3 L.Q. Rev. 314; F.I. Michelman, 
“Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ‘Just 
Compensation’ Law” (1967) 80 Harv. L.R. 1165, 1202; L.S. Underkuffler-Freund, “Takings 
and the Nature of Property” (1996) 9 Can. J. Law &Jur. 161.
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especially in relation to questions o f the definition o f property, the recognition o f a 
constitutional right to property, the distinction between expropriation and regulation, 
the existence and extent o f police powers, the incorporation o f exceptions for 
emergency situations such as war or financial crisis, and the extension o f property 
protection to include compensation for non-material loss.120 In contemporary 
investment treaties, these issues have been brought within the discretion o f arbitration 
tribunals, applying a treaty standard of compensation for expropriation.
To review further: in terms o f the standard o f compensation that must be paid 
for an expropriation, capital-importing states historically asserted a right to 
expropriate property within their territory on payment o f “just” or “appropriate” 
compensation, calculating the value o f the property by assessing -  not only its market 
value — but also the host state’s ability to pay or any unjust enrichment by the 
investor.121 In contrast, major capital-exporting states advanced market-based 
standards such as the Hull standard122 o f “full, prompt, and adequate”
120 E.g. (United Kingdom) Attorney General v. De Keyser’s Royal Hofei, Ltd., [1920] A.C. 508 
(H.L.); Gallagherv. Lynn, [1937] A.C. 863 (H.L.); France Fenwick and Co. v. R., [1927] 1 K.B.
458, 467 (“A mere negative prohibition, though it involves interference with an owner’s 
enjoyment of property, does not... carry with it at Common Law any right to 
compensation”); H. Street, Governmental Liability (Cambridge: CUP, 1953), 120-4. (United 
States  ^U.S. Const, amend. V; Pennsylvania Central Transportation Company v. City of New York, 
438 U.S. 104 (1978); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); E.V. Abbot, 
“The Police Power and the Right to Compensation” (1889) 3 Harv. L.R. 189; R.A. Epstein, 
Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1985); W.A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1995). (Canada) Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v. R., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 101, 88 D.L.R. 
(3d) 462; British Columbia v. Tener, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 533,17 D.L.R. (4th) 1; A & L  Investments Ltd. 
v. Ontario (Minister of Housing) (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 799, 32 R.P.R. (2d) 1 (C.A. Ont.); Ontario 
Law Reform Commission, Report on the Basisfor Compensation on Expropriation (Toronto: OLRC, 
1967); E.C.E. Todd, The Law of Expropriation and Compensation in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1992), 1-7. (Europe) E.g. Sporrong andLonnroth v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R. Ser. A, No. 
52, [1983] E.H.R.R. 35; Hauerv. Rheinland-Pfat^  (No. 44/79), [1979] E.C.R. 3727, (1980) 3 
C.M.L.R. 42; M. Antinori, “Does Lochner Live in Luxembourg? An Analysis of the Property 
Rights Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice” (1995) 18 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1778, 
1803-5. (International) Friedman, supra note 118,10; Wortley, supra note 39, 52; Muchlinski, 
supra note 42, 501-4.
121 A.A. Fatouros, “International Law and the Third World” (1964) 50 Va. L.R. 783, 808-9; 
K.B. Asante, “International Law and Foreign Investment: A Reappraisal” (1988) 37 I.C.L.Q. 
588, 591; G.L. Sandrino, “The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment 
in Mexico: A Third World Perspective” (1994) 27 Vand. J. Tranat’l L. 259, 319.
122 The Hull standard is named after U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who elaborated the 
standard in correspondence with the Mexican Government responding to Mexico’s 
nationalization of U.S. oil companies in 1938: the correspondence is reprinted in 3 G.H.
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compensation.123 Virtually all investment treaties require payment o f compensation 
for expropriation and most (including NAFTA) apply the Hull standard as a 
minimum.124 Indeed, by adopting a broad definition of investment, some investment 
treaties afford protection that goes beyond the Hull standard.125 
Under NAFTA Article 1110:126
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment 
o f an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to 
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment, except:
for a public purpose;
on a non-discriminatory basis;
in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and 
on payment o f compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 to 6.
Thus, any expropriation by a NAFTA state (and any measure that is “tantamount to 
expropriation”) must be for a public purpose, non-discriminatory, in accordance with 
due process, and accompanied by full, prompt, and adequate compensation. An 
expropriation that fails to meet these requirements breaches the treaty and would 
entitle an investor to damages.
The NAFTA standard clearly requires compensation for direct seizures or 
nationalizations o f property by the state. For instance, if NAFTA applied to the
Hackworth, Digest of International Law (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940- 
44), 655-65.
123 P.M. Norton, “A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modem Tribunals and the 
International Law of Expropriation” (1991) 85 AJIL 474, 475-9.
124 I. Delupis, Finance and Protection of Investments in Developing Countries (Epping: Gower Press, 
1973), 39-41 (noting the absence of protection against “creeping” expropriation in earlier 
BITs); Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 20, 98 (noting that many BITs provide for a more 
general formula than the Hull standard, such as “just” compensation; and that most refer to 
“expropriation” or “nationalization”, although some to “taking”, “dispossession”, 
“deprivation”, or “privation”); L.A. O’Connor, “The International Law of Expropriation of 
Foreign-Owned Property: The Compensation Requirement and the Role of the Taking 
State” (1983) 6 Loyola L.A. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 355, 357-8 and 393.
125 Guzman, supra note 59, 680-1.
126 NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1110 (providing further that actual compensation must be 
equivalent to the fair market value of the investment on the date of the expropriation and 
must not reflect changes in value arising because the intended expropriation became known 
earlier. To determine fair market value, Article 1110 provides for valuation based on value as 
a going concern, asset value including declared tax value of tangible property, and other 
appropriate criteria).
137
Mexican oil industry, it would have prohibited Mexico’s nationalization of U.S. oil 
companies in 1938, which was followed by delayed payment of partial 
compensation.127 Thus, in itself, the requirement for full, prompt and adequate 
compensation in the event of a direct seizure has major implications for states seeking 
to pursue a state-led development strategy. Even so, for governments the obligations 
that flow from this aspect o f the standard are at least relatively determinable and 
predictable.128
However, the expropriation standard goes beyond direct seizures o f assets, 
although to an uncertain extent.129 In particular, the standard applies to measures 
“tantamount to ... expropriation”. A broad reading o f this term would require 
compensation for any exercise o f public authority that incidentally reduced the value 
o f an investment. Anticipating this possibility, critics of NAFTA Chapter 11 have 
condemned the expropriation standard as a backdoor takings doctrine that would cost 
out proactive regulation in public health and environmental protection.130 Some pro­
investor commentators have adopted a similar view, arguing that Article 1110 went 
beyond common law rules on expropriation by requiring compensation for mere 
prohibitions and constructive takings, including any unreasonable interference with 
the use, enjoyment, or disposal o f the property of investors.131 Finally, investors 
themselves obviously have favoured an expansive interpretation.132 For example, in 
Pope <& Talbot, the investor argued that Article 1110 “provides the broadest protection 
for the investments of foreign investors who may suffer harm by being deprived of 
their fundamental investment rights” and that the term ‘tantamount to . .. 
expropriation’ includes “even nondiscriminatory measures o f general application 
which have the effect of substantially interfering with the investments o f investors”.133
127 Delupis, supra note 124,103; T. Levi, “NAFTA’s Provision for Compensation in the 
Event of Expropriation: A Reassessment of the Trompt, Adequate and Effective’ Standard” 
(1995) 31 Stanf. J. Int’l L. 423, 426-9.
128 J.H.H. Weiler, supra note 24, 201 and 209-10.
129 Been and Beauvais, supra note 75, 51-9.
130 Ibid., 132-5; S. Ganguly, “The Investor-State Dispute Mechanism (ISDM) and a 
Sovereign’s Power to Protect Public Health” (1999) 38 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 113,119.
131 Dearden, supra note 6,117-21.
132 E.g. Waste Management No. 2 (Merits), supra note 5, para. 145. See e.g. CME Republic B. V. v. 
C%ech Republic (Merits) (13 September 2001), 14(3) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 109, para. 150. 
I.A. Laird, “NAFTA Chapter 11 Meets Chicken Little” (2001) 2 Chi. J. Int’l L. 223, 226.
133 Pope &  Talbot (Merits, Phase 1), supra note 37, para. 83-4.
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Some Chapter 11 tribunals have tended toward this expansive view.134 An 
especially broad reading o f the standard was adopted by the Metalclad tribunal, which 
concluded that expropriation under NAFTA included:135
... not only open, deliberate and acknowledged takings o f property, such as 
outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer o f title in favour of the host 
State, but also covert or incidental interference with the use o f property which 
has the effect o f depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, o f the use 
or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit o f property even if not 
necessarily to the obvious benefit o f the host State.
O ther tribunals have narrowed the standard by distinguishing expropriation from 
regulation or from breach of contract, and by limiting the “tantamount” expropriation 
to indirect or creeping expropriation.136 However, this approach tends to boomerang 
back to the dilemma o f how to differentiate (non-compensable) regulation or 
commerce from (compensable) indirect or creeping expropriation.137 For 
governments, the priority is to be able to distinguish in advance between state 
measures that expropriate and those that do not, in order to anticipate the cost of 
government. But, left to resolution through investment arbitration, it will be difficult 
to reach any stable definition of expropriation for years to come.138 The point here is 
not to ask whether the security that Article 1110 ensures for investors is desirable,
134 Pope &  Talbot (Merits, Phase 1), supra note 37, para. 99; Waste Management No. 2 (Merits), 
supra note 5, para. 143-5; GAMI, supra note 40, para. 131. See e.g. Compania del Desarrollo de 
Santa Elena, S A . v. Republic of Costa Rica (Merits) (17 February 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 172,13(1) 
World Trade and Arb. Mat. 81, para. 71-2 and 76 (concluding that the fact that a measure 
was taken for the public purpose of environmental protection made no difference as to the 
amount of compensation); Teemed, supra note 69, para. 113-15 and 121 (concluding that 
regulatory actions that are beneficial to society as a whole are not excluded from the duty to 
pay compensation).
135 Metalclad, supra note 6, para. 103. See also United Mexican States, supra note 109, para. 99 
(characterizing the Metalclad tribunal’s interpretation as “sufficiently broad to include a 
legitimate rezoning of property by a municipality or other zoning authority”).
136 A^inian, supra note 55, para. 90; Pope <& Talbot (Merits, Phase 1), supra note 37, para. 104; 
S.D. Myers (Merits), supra note 17, para. 281-2 and 285-6; Feldman, supra note 12, para. 100 
and 103; Waste Management No. 2 (Merits), supra note 5, para. 175.
137 B.H. Weston, ‘“Constructive Takings’ Under International Law: A Modest Foray into the 
Problem of Creeping Expropriation” (1975) 16 Virg. J. Int’l L. 103; R. Dolzer, “Indirect 
Expropriation of Alien Property” (1986) 1 ICSID Rev. 41, 59; Soloway, supra note 66,101-4; 
L.Y. Fortier, “Caveat Investor: The Meaning of ‘Expropriation’ and the Protection Afforded 
Investors Under NAFTA” (2003) 20(1) ICSID News 1.
138 D.M. Price, (2001) “NAFTA Chapter 11 — Investor-State Dispute Settlement: 
Frankenstein or Safety Valve?” 26 Can-U.S. L.J. 107, 111.
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although this is no doubt an important question. Rather, the point is that, given the 
breadth o f the standards o f investor protection, the state makes a major policy 
decision when it adopts investment arbitration as a governing arrangement.
Conclusion
Investment arbitration is designed to control the conduct o f states in relation to the 
economic activities o f investors. Absent strict limits on the scope and substance of 
investment arbitration, one must speak o f investment arbitration as controlling the 
regulation o f international business in general.139 In terms o f its scope, the system o f 
investment arbitration controls the exercise of public authority with respect to 
virtually any asset o f a foreign investor. In terms of substance, the system adopts 
standards that significantly constrain the discretion of states to regulate international 
business, although on a narrow interpretation these standards do preserve flexibility 
for governments based on rules of customary international law. Alternatively, on a 
broad interpretation, the core standards of investor protection under investment 
treaties would have a dramatic impact on governmental decision-making.
The breadth and intensity of these constraints means that the implications of 
investment arbitration for governments are both significant and uncertain. The 
ambiguity o f key terms introduces a realistic possibility that any exercise of public 
authority relating to foreign investors could result in a damages award against the state. 
Many treaties impose obligations the meaning o f which is ambiguous.140 But under 
investment treaties the prospect o f state liability raises the stakes. Linked to the wide- 
ranging scope and substance of investment arbitration, as well as individualization, the 
prospect o f state liability injects entirely new fiscal liabilities into the governing
139 Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, supra note 18, 22-3.
140 K.W. Abbott et al., “The Concept of Legalization” in J.L. Goldstein, Legalisation and World 
Politics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 30.
140
process.141 One is prompted to ask how much regulatory chill is warranted to protect 
investors.142
In this regard, the critical issue is the degree to which investment treaties 
increase the likelihood o f state liability in relation to general governmental activity. 
However, this issue is not resolved until a tribunal has ruled in the first instance on an 
investor claim. Expropriation may or may not include regulatory takings. The 
minimum standard o f treatment may or may not impose a broad guarantee of 
regulatory fairness or economic due process. National treatment may or may not 
require states to take positive steps to ensure equal treatment o f foreign investors.
The resulting uncertainty undermines the claim, made by promoters o f investment 
arbitration as a means to enforce international standards, that state liability will 
rationally deter disobedience.143 Instead, the system relies almost entirely on 
arbitrators to interpret and apply investment treaties in ways that are reasonably 
predictable for states, as well as investors. This discretionary role o f arbitrators is 
examined in the next chapter.
141 S. Picciotto, “A Critical Assessment of the MAI” in S. Picciotto and R. Mayne, eds., 
Regulating International Business (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1999), 86; D.J. Levinson, “Making 
Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs” (2000) 67 U. 
Chicago L.R. 345, 347-8 and 415-16.
142 UNCTAD, supra note 28,145-6.
143 E.g. World Bank, World Development Report 2005 (Washington, D.C.: IBRD, 2004), 179. See 





In investment arbitration, arbitrators have broad authority to adjudicate regulatory 
disputes. Investment treaties rely on arbitrators to resolve important questions about 
what the treaty means and about the role o f investment arbitration as a governing 
arrangement. Above all, because o f their authority to award damages against the state, 
arbitrators have wide-ranging discretion to make governmental decisions.1 Arbitration 
tribunals determine the legality o f sovereign acts and the cost and viability of 
government.2 They decide the appropriate role of the state with respect to 
international business and, by implication, investment arbitration awards resolve 
wider conflicts o f rights and interests between investors and those who benefit from 
the regulation o f investors.3
The argument of this chapter is that arbitrators make policy choices when they 
interpret investment treaties. Adjudication is not simply a process o f rational 
interpretation to sensibly and consistently apply rules that govern conduct in specific 
cases.4 That said, different adjudicative processes vary in the degree to which they 
afford discretion to adjudicators, based on the degree o f specificity of the language 
used to define the rules and standards and to delineate the circumstances to which
1 K.C. Davis, Discretionary Justice (Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press, 1969), 4-5; C.
Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration (London: Butterworths, 1997), 633-4.
2 As discussed in chapter three of this thesis, page 91-3, domestic legal systems limit state 
liability to individuals who are harmed by governmental activity. To adopt a broad 
conception of state liability in investment arbitration is a significant departure. To what 
extent will arbitrators take investment arbitration down this road?
3 D. Cohen and J.C. Smith, “Entitlement and the Body Politic: Rethinking Negligence in 
Public Law” (1986) 64 Can. Bar. Rev. 1, 9-10; M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: 
OUP, 2003), 148; M. Koskenniemi, “What Is International Law For?” in M.D. Evans, ed., 
International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 99-100.
4 G. Ganz, “Allocation of Decision-Making Functions” (1972) Pub. L. 215, 215-16; L.L. 
Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 373; J.P. 
Trachtman, “The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution” (1999) 40 Harv. Int’l L.J. 333, 336-7. 
Accepting the discretionary role of the adjudicator complicates the claim that Chapter 11 
arbitration is “a rule-based system that will be elaborated and enforced uniformly and 
consistently in each of the three NAFTA countries” (C.N. Brower and L.A. Steven, “Who 
Then Should Judge? Developing the International Rule of Law under NAFTA Chapter 11” 
(2001) 2 Chi. J. Int’l L. 193,196).
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they apply.5 Under investment treaties, the scope and substance o f investment 
arbitration is expressed at a very high level of generality and this gives substantial 
interpretive discretion to tribunals.6 In turn, this provides a great deal o f space for 
arbitrators to make policy decisions about the appropriate role o f government in 
relation to investors.7 O f course, any adjudicator who resolves a regulatory dispute 
may be called upon to make policy choices of profound significance.8 But the wide 
discretion o f arbitrators stands out, positioning them as important sovereign decision­
makers in any state that adopts investment arbitration as a governing arrangement.
A. Approaches to investment arbitration
In NAFTA Chapter 11 awards, the interpretative choices o f tribunals reveal two 
general approaches to the role o f investment arbitration. Both approaches reflect 
traditions in public law adjudication o f regulatory disputes and both represent ideals 
o f what public law should do. The first — the private protection approach — characterizes 
investment arbitration as a system designed to comprehensively and presumptively 
protect investors from government interference. The second — the public function 
approach — characterizes investment arbitration as an exceptional remedy for grave
5 D. Kennedy, “Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication” (1976) 89 Harv. L. Rev. 
1685,1687-9; Trachtman, supra note 4, 337-8.
6 E.g. Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States (Merits) (16 December 2002), 15(3) 
World Trade and Arb. Mat. 157 [hereinafter Feldma»], para. 98. See also e.g. SGS Societe 
Generate de Surveillance v. Pakistan (Jurisdiction) (6 August 2003), 18 ICSID Rev. 307,16 World 
Trade and Arb. Mat. 167 [hereinafter SGS v. Pakistan], para. 150.
7 F.I. Michelman, “Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 
‘Just Compensation’ Law” (1967) 80 Harv. L.R. 1165,1168-71; E. Schwartz andj. Paulsson, 
“Confronting Political and Regulatory Risks Associated with Private Investment in 
Infrastructure in Developing Countries: The Role of International Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism” (Draft presentation to the Private Infrastructure for Development conference, 
Rome, 8-10 September 1999), 3; M. Somarajah, The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes 
(Boston: Kluwer, 2001), 16.
8 A.V. Dicey, A n Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution [1885] (London: Macmillan, 
8th ed. 1915), 100-4; A. Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation” (1976) 89 
Harv. L.R. 1281,1304; P.N. Bhagwati, “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation” 
(1985) 23 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 561, 562-3; J.A.G. Griffith, “The Brave New World of Sir 
John Laws” (2000) 63 Mod. L.R. 159,160 and 163; M. Shapiro, “Administrative Law 
Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance” (2001) 8 Ind. J. Global Leg. 
Studies 369, 369-70.
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abuses o f authority by states. These ate simplified categories, no doubt, but they are 
useful as ideal type groupings for identifying the policy choices of arbitrators.9
1. The private protection approach
The private protection approach begins with the rights and interests o f investors. It 
emphasizes the purpose of investment arbitration as being to protect investors from 
arbitrary, discriminatory, and other inappropriate or undesirable treatment by states.10 
This is consistent with the broad scope and substance o f investment treaties and 
above all with the states' obligation to compensate investors for harm suffered as a 
result o f international wrongs. The ability to bring an international claim gives effect 
to investor rights by allowing a neutral tribunal to resolve disputes and award damages 
direcdy to individuals.11 Investment arbitration promotes investor security and the 
rule o f law in the exercise o f public authority through an expansive conception of 
state liability.12 As such, state liability should not be limited by fault-based thresholds 
or other general conditions; illegality should suffice.13
9 M. Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 59-61.
10 J. Byme, “NAFTA Dispute Resolution: Implementing True Rule-Based Diplomacy 
Through Direct Access” (2000) 35 Texas Int’l L.J. 415, 416-20; M.M. Hart and W.A. 
Dymond, “NAFTA Chapter 11: Precedents, Principles, and Prospects” in L.R. Dawson, ed., 
Whose Rights? The N AFTA Chapter 11 Debate (Ottawa: Centre for Trade Law and Policy,
2002), 149-51; T. Weiler, “NAFTA Investment Arbitration and the Growth of International 
Economic Law” (2002) 3 Bus. Law Int’l 158, 189; R.G. Dearden, “Arbitration of 
Expropriation Disputes between an Investor and the State under the North American Free 
Trade Agreement” (1995) 29 J. World Trade 113,113; C.H. Brower II, “Investor-State 
Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back” (2001) 40 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 43, 
77-80 and 88; I.A. Laird, “NAFTA Chapter 11 Meets Chicken Litde” (2001) 2 Chi. J. Int’l L. 
223, 229.
11 A^urix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic (Jurisdiction) (8 December 2003), 16(2) World Trade 
and Arb. Mat. I l l  [hereinafter A^urix], para. 72; CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The 
Republic of Argentina (Jurisdiction) (17 July 2003), 42 I.L.M. 788, para. 28 and 45; Siemens A.G. 
v. The Argentine Republic (Jurisdiction) (3 August 2004), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 
[hereinafter Siemens], para. 102 and 141, online: ITA
http: /  /ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SiemensJurisdiction-English-3August2004.pdf. R. Bruno 
and J.H.H. Weiler, “Access of Private Parties to International Dispute Settlement: A 
Comparative Analysis”, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 13/97 (NYU School of Law,
1997).
12 Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States (Merits) (30 August 2000), 40 I.L.M. 36,13(1) 
World Trade and Arb. Mat. 45 [hereinafter Metalclad], para. 76, 89, and 99; CME Republic B. V. 
v. Csych Republic (Merits) (13 September 2001), 14(3) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 109
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The private protection approach tends to resolve doubts arising from silence 
or ambiguity in the text o f an investment treaty in favour o f investor protection.14 
This makes for an expansive approach to the jurisdiction o f tribunals.15 With respect 
to the investment standards, ambiguity favours the availability o f compensation and 
states should be required to answer for official conduct wherever there is prima facie 
evidence o f harm to an investor.16 Encouraging investor security take precedence over 
other policy concerns such as potential disruption of government, the wider 
coherence o f rules under different treaties, or the legitimacy o f economic
[hereinafter CME\, para. 522. Laird, supra note 10, 229; Brower and Steven, supra note 4,195- 
7.
13 Waste Management Inc. v. United Mexican States (Merits) (30 April 2004), 43 I.L.M. 967,16(4) 
World Trade and Arb. Mat. 3 [hereinafter Waste Management No. 2], para. 79; GAMI 
Investments, Inc. v. Government of the United Mexican States (Merits) (15 November 2004), 17(2) 
World Trade and Arb. Mat. 127 [hereinafter GAMI\, para. 94. See e.g. Asian Agricultural 
Products Ltd. (AAPL) v. Sri Lanka (Merits) (27 June 1990), 4 ICSID Rep. 246, 30 I.L.M. 577, 
para. 69 and 77; Tecnicas Medioamhientales Teemed, S~A. v. United Mexican States (Merits) (29 May
2003), 43 I.L.M. 133 [hereinafter Tecmed\, para. 70-1.
14 Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (Jurisdiction) (2 June 2000), 40 I.L.M. 56 
[hereinafter Waste Management No. /], para. 33-4 (dissenting opinion); Waste Management No. 2 
(Merits), supra note 13, para. 85. See e.g. Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Egypt (Jurisdiction) (25 May 1999), 
41 I.L.M. 881, 888; Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v. Slovak Republic (Jurisdiction) (24 May
1999), 14 ICSID Rev. 251 [hereinafter CSOB], para. 57; SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance v. 
Philippines (Jurisdiction) (29 January 2004), 16(3) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 91 [hereinafter 
SGS v. Philippinej], para. 116 (“The object and purpose of the BIT supports an effective 
interpretation of Article X(2). The BIT is a treaty for the promotion and reciprocal 
protection of investments. According to the preamble it is intended ‘to create and maintain 
favourable conditions for investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory 
of another’. It is legitimate to resolve uncertainties in its interpretation so as to favour the 
protection of covered investments”); Tokios Tokelesv. Ukraine (Jurisdiction) (29 April 2004), 
16(4) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 75, para. 31-2 and 52; Siemens, supra note 11, para. 85. R. 
Dolzer and M. Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), 17; 
W.S. Dodge “National Courts and International Arbitration: Exhaustion of Remedies and 
Res Judicata Under Chapter Eleven of NAFTA” (2000) 23 Hast. Int’l & Comp. L.R. 357,
383.
15 Ethyl Corporations. Government of Canada (Jurisdiction) (24 June 1998), 38 I.L.M. 708 
[hereinafter Ethyl], para. 91; Pope &  Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada (Jurisdiction) (26 
January 2000) [hereinafter Pope &  Talbot], para. 25-6 and 33, online: DFAIT
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/pubdoc6.pdf. See e.g. Emilio Agustin 
Maffe^ini v. Kingdom of Spain (Jurisdiction) (25 January 2000), 16 ICSID Rev. 212,124 I.L.R. 9, 
para. 52-7 and 64 (finding jurisdiction based on the extension of MFN treatment to the 
dispute settlement provisions of another BIT); CSOB, ibid., para. 64; Siemens, supra note 11, 
para. 120.
16 Feldman, supra note 6, para. 173 and 176-8. Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 14, 60; Dearden, 
supra note 10,119-20.
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integration.17 The governmental function of an investment treaty is subordinate to 
international norms based on concepts of private adjudication and individualized 
justice, including investor rights and the need to limit state abuse.18
Underlying the private protection approach is a normative justification for 
investor protection: many commentators who advocate the private protection 
approach treat investor protection as an end in itself.19 That said, investor protection 
is also advocated as a means to advance efficiency and welfare maximization in the 
global economy.20 Thus, investor protection is given an instrumental role tied to 
general economic rationales for liberalizing capital flows. From this perspective, 
investor protection benefits states and their populations more or less as a rule. N ot 
only does foreign investment expand the pool of capital available to fuel domestic 
development, it also delivers new skills and technology, intensifies competition, and 
opens markets abroad.21 Even if foreign investment does not deliver demonstrable
17 Metalclad,’ supra note 12, para. 76; Waste Management No. 2 (Merits), supra note 13, para. 78- 
85; GAMI, supra note 13, para. 94. Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S A . v. Republic of 
Costa Rica (Merits) (17 February 2000), 15 ICSID Rev. 169, 39 I.L.M. 317 [hereinafter Santa 
Elena], para. 71-2; CME, supra note 12, para. 419, 602, and 613; Siemens, supra note 11, para. 
120. T. Weiler, supra note 10,173; R.K. Paterson, “A New Pandora’s Box? Private Remedies 
for Foreign Investors under the North American Free Trade Agreement” (2000) 8 
Willamette J. Int’l L. and Dispute Res. 77,120; C.N. Brower, C.H. Brower II, and J.K. 
Sharpe, “The Coming Crisis in the Global Adjudicative System” (2003) 19 Arb. Int’l 415, 
428-35.
18 Pope <& Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada (Damages) (31 May 2002), 41 I.L.M. 1347,14(6) 
World Trade and Arb. Mat. 44, para. 25-42; CME, supra note 12, para. 511-16. F. Orrego 
Vicuna, “Arbitration in a New International Alternative Dispute Resolution” (2001) 18(2) 
ICSID News 1.
19 Metalclad, supra note 12, para. 75-6, 89, and 99; Pope <& Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada 
(Merits, Phase 2) (10 April 2001), 13(4) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 61, para. 42, 72, and 116. 
Brower, supra note 10, 87-8; R. Lillich, “The Law Governing Disputes Under Economic 
Development Agreements: Re-examining the Concept of ‘Internationalization”’ in R. Lillich 
and C.N. Brower, International Arbitration in the 21st Century: Towards Judiciali^ ation and 
Uniformity? (Ardsley, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 1994), 67-8; C.N. Brower II, “NAFTA’s 
Investment Chapter: Initial Thoughts About Second-Generation Rights” (2003) 36 
Vanderbilt J. Transnat’lL. 1533,1546-8.
20 P.S. Gibbs, “Prospects for Sustainable Liberalization of Foreign Investment Laws as a 
Concomitant of Hemispheric Integration in the Americas” (1996) 28 Inter-Am. L.R. 95, 97, 
115, and 122; A.M. Rugman and M. Gestrin, “A Conceptual Framework for a Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment: Learning from the NAFTA” in P. Sauve and D. Schwanen, eds., 
Investment Rules for the Global Economy (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1996), 151-5; K.J. 
Vandevelde, “The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty” (1998) 92 AJIL 621, 
636-41.
21 S. Rao and A. Ahmad, “Formal and Informal Investment Barriers in the G-7 Countries” in 
P. Sauve and D. Schwanen, eds., Investment Rules for the Global Economy (Toronto: C.D. Howe
146
benefits on the short term, a state’s consent to high level investor protection signals 
its commitment to free markets.22 As a general rule, investment treaties should be 
interpreted in favour of investor protection and there is little need for detailed inquiry 
into the implications o f a particular interpretation for governments.23
Generally speaking, the private protection approach is consistent with a liberal 
normative tradition in public law, drawing on writers such as Hayek and Nozick.24 It 
supports the idea that rights precede the state and that it is possible to articulate and 
apply rationally-justifiable guiding principles of social order.25 Moreover, the approach 
reflects the view that an ideal society is permissive rather than purposive, and that the 
chief responsibility of government is “the specific and limited activity o f establishing 
and enforcing general rules of conduct which enable people to pursue their activities 
with the minimum degree of frustration”.26 Investment treaties are a recent and very 
effective incarnation of longstanding efforts to use law and adjudication — including 
the remedy o f damages — to constrain the state and protect private rights and 
freedoms.27
Institute, 1996), 176-7; UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003 (Geneva: United Nations,
2003), 139, note 138.
22 Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 14,12; UNCTAD, Trends in International Investment 
Agreements: A n Overview, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements 
(New York: United Nations, 1999), 47.
23 E.g. Siemens, supra note 11, para. 81. D.F. Donovan, “Introduction to Articles — Dallas 
Workshop on Arbitrating with Sovereigns” (2002) 18 Arb. Int’l 229, 229; T. Weiler, supra 
note 10,181.
24 F. von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944); F. von 
Hayek, Taw Legislation and Liberty, vol. 1 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973); R. 
Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974). See Harlow and Rawlings, supra 
note 1, 37-9; Loughlin, supra note 9, 60-1 and 91-9.
25 Loughlin, supra note 9, 88; D. Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (Oxford: 
OUP, 1999), 53-4.
26 Loughlin, supra note 9, 89.
27 E.g. Cooley, “Labor and Capital Before the Law” (1884) 139 North Am. Rev. 37. See M.M. 
Carrow, The background of Administrative Law (Newark: Associated Lawyers, 1948), 20-1; P. 
Cane, “Public Law and Private Law: A Study of the Analysis and Use of a Legal Concept” in 
J. Eckelaar andj. Bell, eds., Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 3rd series (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1987), 59-60; Harlow and Rawlings, supra note 1, 606 and 619-20; W.A. Fischel, Regulatory 
Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 7.
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2. The public function approach
The public function approach begins not with investors but with states. It emphasizes 
the role o f states in concluding and implementing the treaties that establish 
investment arbitration.28 Investor protection is provided for a public purpose because 
all investment treaties originate in the exercise o f public authority.29 Private parties 
have powers under investment treaties but these powers are authorized or delegated, 
by states, for a policy reason.30 Also, the regulation o f the exercise of public authority 
— through investment arbitration — should not undermine the general viability of 
government.31 The exercise o f public authority is not objectionable, absent evidence 
o f an abuse o f authority that specifically targets foreign investors.32 Investment
28 AD F Group Inc. v. United States of America (Merits) (9 January 2003), 15(3) World Trade and 
Arb. Mat. 55 [hereinafter ADF], para. 177; The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L  Loewen v. 
United States of America (Merits) (26 June 2003), 42 I.L.M. 811,15(5) World Trade and Arb. 
Mat. 97 [hereinafter Foe wen], para. 222-3 and 233.
29 E.g. North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 December 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296 and 605 
(entered into force 1 January 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA], preamble (describing the purpose 
of the treaty as being to encourage economic opportunities, growth, competition, and 
employment in the NAFTA states). Loewen, ibid., para. 222; Salini Costruttori S.PA. and 
Italstrade S.PA. v. Kingdom of Morocco (Jurisdiction) (23 July 2001), 42 I.L.M. 609, para. 52. A.A. 
Fatouros, “Transnational Enterprise in the Law of State Responsibility” in R.B. Lillich, ed., 
International Taw of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens (Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 1983), 364; P.I. Hansen, “Judicialization and Globalization in the North American 
Free Trade Agreement” (2003) 38 Texas Int’l L.J. 489, 502-3.
30 SGS v. Philippines, supra note 14, para. 154. See Tagrand (Merits) {Germany v. United States), 
[2001] I.C.J. Rep. 466, 40 I.L.M. 1069, para. 77-8 (“Although under modem international law, 
treaties may confer rights, substantive and procedural, on individuals, they will normally do 
so in order to achieve some public interest”).
31 Robert Asjnian et al. v. United Mexican States (Merits) (1 November 1999), 39 I.L.M. 537 
[hereinafter Atfnian], para. 87; S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada (Merits) (12 November
2000), 40 I.L.M. 1408,15(1) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 184, para. 261-3 and 282; ADF, 
supra note 28, para. 170 and 173; Loewen, supra note 28, para. 242; Waste Management No. 2 
(Merits), supra note 13, para. 161. J. Kurtz, “A General Investment Agreement in the WTO? 
Lessons from Chapter 11 of NAFTA and the OECD Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment”, Jean Monnet Working Paper (NYU School of Law, 2002), 69; D. Brown, 
“Commentary” in L. Ritchie Dawson, ed., Whose Rights? The N AFTA Chapter 11 Debate 
(Ottawa: Centre for Trade Policy and Law, 2002), 40-1; J.A. VanDuzer, “NAFTA Chapter 11 
to Date: The Progress of a Work in Progress” in L. Ritchie Dawson, ed., Whose Rights? The 
N AFTA Chapter 11 Debate (Ottawa: Centre for Trade Law and Policy, 2002), 95.
32 ADF, supra note 28, para. 156-7; Loewen, supra note 28, para. 135; Waste Management No. 2 
(Merits), supra note 13, para. 115 and 130-2.
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arbitration should be used to deter state conduct that flaunts international standards, 
but not to sanction general regulation.33
In investment arbitration, the public function approach imposes limits on the 
jurisdiction o f tribunals by looking to the precise language o f the treaty.34 Customary 
international law does not permit individuals to make claims against states; thus, clear 
language is required for a state to be found to have consented to such claims.35 
Investment arbitration is an exceptional remedy reserved for clear violations of the 
treaty.36 Because states are the main subjects o f regulation, tribunals should interpret 
investment treaties to promote predictability not only for investors but also for 
governments.37 Tribunals may need to consider wider concerns such as public 
opposition to a particular investment, the development of the host state, social and 
environmental priorities, and the coherence and legitimacy o f integration.38 State
33 J.A. McKinney, Createdfrom NAFTA  — The Structure; Function, and Significance of the Treaty’s 
Related Institutions (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 230-1; J.H.H. Weiler, “Emerging 
Issues on Compliance and Effectiveness of Community Law” (1997) 91 ASIL Proc. 172, 
173-4.
34 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America (Jurisdiction) (7 August 2002), 14(6) World 
Trade and Arb. Mat. 109 [hereinafter Methane^, para. 106; ADF, supra note 28, para. 147; 
Laewen, supra note 28, para. 234; Waste Management No. 1, supra note 14, para. 27-8 and 31; 
United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Government of Canada (Jurisdiction) (22 November 2002) 
[hereinafter UPS], para. 68, online: ITA http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/UPS- 
Jurisdiction.pdf.
35 Afinian, supra note 31, para. 82-4; UPS, ibid., para. 60-9; Laewen, supra note 28, para. 226; 
Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. United Mexican States (Jurisdiction) (17 July 2003), 15(6) 
World Trade and Arb. Mat. 3, para. 64. SGS v. Pakistan, supra note 6, para. 161,167, and 171; 
Tokios, supra note 14, para. 8 (dissenting opinion).
36 Afinian, supra note 31, para. 90; ADF, supra note 28, para. 157,184, and 191; Laewen, supra 
note 28, para. 242; Waste Management No. 2 (Merits), supra note 13, para. 115,130, and 139; 
GAMI, supra note 13, para. 83-4,104,108, and 114. A.A. Fatouros, “International Economic 
Development and the Illusion of Legal Certainty” (1963) 57 ASIL Proc. 117,124; J.C. 
Thomas, “Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven” (Paper presented to 
the NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Disputes: Litigating Against Sovereigns conference, 
Canadian Bar Association, Toronto, March 2000), 42; P.T. Muchlinski, “The Rise and Fall of 
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Where Now?” (2000) 34 Int’l Law. 1033,1051-2.
37 Methanex, supra note 34, para. 130 and 137-8. SGS v. Pakistan, supra note 6, para. 167. J.C. 
Thomas, “Reflections on Article 1105 of NAFTA: History, State Practice and the Influence 
of Commentators” (2002) 17 ICSID Rev. 21, 29; Center for International Environmental 
Law (CIEL), “International Law on Investment: The Minimum Standard of Treatment 
(MST)” (CIEL Issue Brief, August 2003), 6-7.
38 Waste Management No. 2 (Merits), supra note 13, para. 101 and 111-12; Laewen, supra note 28, 
para. 242. See e.g. Salim,, supra note 29, para. 52; SGS v. Pakistan, supra note 6, para. 167-8; 
Teemed, supra note 13, para. 133 and 146-8. A.A. Fatouros, “International Law and the Third 
World” (1964) 50 Va. L.R. 783, 813-14; McKinney, supra note 33,231; C. Tollefson, “Games 
without Frontiers: Claims and Citizen Submissions Under the NAFTA Regime” (2002) 27
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liability is tied to the public purpose of the treaty and, given the governmental 
implications o f state liability, tribunals should exercise prudence in awarding 
damages.39 Where an investor suffers harm as a result o f the non-culpable exercise of 
public authority, this may simply be part of the risk inherent in the investor’s decision 
to carry on business abroad.40
The public function approach is justified by the principle o f respect for the 
states’ consent.41 It recognizes that an important purpose o f investment treaties is to 
provide protection for investors in order to encourage investment. However, the 
public function approach is more likely to look for evidence o f the benefits of 
investor protection for the host economy and not rely solely on references to a liberal 
conception of the international economy.42 Investment should not be encouraged at 
the expense o f domestic government, which retains ultimate responsibility for the 
public welfare.43 Investor protection is a means to a public end and it should not 
undermine the viability of the state itself.44
Yale J. Int’l L. 141,153; J. Werner, “Some Comments on the NAFTA Chapter 11 Case — 
AD F Group Inc. and United States of Americd’ (2003) 4 J. World Investment 113,123-4; 
UNCTAD, supra note 21,117.
39 Atfnian, supra note 31, para. 99; Eoewen, supra note 28, para. 242. See e.g. CME Republic B.V. 
v. C e^ch Republic (Damages) (14 March 2003), 15(4) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 83 and 245 
[hereinafter CME], para. 74-8 (separate opinion); SGS v. Pakistan, supra note 6, para. 171.
40 Atfnian, supra note 31, para. 83; Waste Management Flo. 2 (Merits), supra note 13, para. 114 
and 177; GAMI, supra note 13, para. 85. See also Barcelona Traction, Eight and Power Co. (Belgium 
v. Spairt), [1970] I.C.J. Rep. 3, 9 I.L.M. 227 [hereinafter Barcelona Traction], para. 87; Emilio 
Agustin Maffe^ini v. The Kingdom of Spain (Merits) (13 November 2000), 16 ICSID Rev. 248,
124 I.L.R. 35, para. 64. W.L. Penfield, “Address: Is the Forcible Collection of Contract Debts 
in the Interest of International Justice and Peace?” (1907) 1 Am. Soc’ty Int’l L. Proc. 129, 
129-30; C. Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Eaw (New York: NYU Press, 
1928), 159.
41 Eoewen, supra note 28, para. 230, 233-4, and 238. Tokios, supra note 14, para. 16 (dissenting 
opinion). Thomas, supra note 36,16-19 and 29-30; Schwartz and Paulsson, supra note 7,13- 
14.
42 Fatouros, supra note 36,117-18 and 122.
43 Asfnian, supra note 31, para. 87; ADF, supra note 28, para. 170 and 173; Eoewen, supra note 
28, para. 242; Waste Management No. 2 (Merits), supra note 13, para. 161; GAMI, supra note 13, 
para. 114.
44 CME, supra note 39, para. 75 and 78 (separate opinion). D. Rodrik, The Global Governance of 
Trade A s I f Development Really Mattered (Report for the UN Development Programme, October 
2001), 22.
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The public function approach is consistent with a realist and functionalist 
tradition in public law.45 In this tradition, legal rights emanate from the state and the 
law is viewed as positivist and goal-oriented.46 Thus, the public function approach is 
more consistent with approaches that characterize public law as a facilitator of 
government rather than a control mechanism.47 This theoretical tradition is skeptical 
o f the use o f adjudication to control the state, and it adopts a moderated view o f the 
idea o f the rule o f law and the application of corrective justice in the public sphere.48
B. The policy choices of arbitrators
The balance o f this chapter explores these approaches to investment arbitration in the 
context o f NAFTA Chapter 11. At the outset, it is worth noting that these 
approaches involve more than a simple presumption in favour o f an expansive or 
restrictive interpretation of investment treaties even though it may appear, in some 
cases, that tribunals implicitly adopt such a presumption.49 Rather, the approaches are 
intended to suggest how interpretive quandaries can be resolved by arbitrators in 
different ways, with divergent implications for investors, states, and those formally
45 E.g. W.I. Jennings, The haw and the Constitution, 5th ed. (London: University of London Press, 
1959), 60-1, 78-9, and 217; J. Griffith and H. Street, Principles of Administrative haw, 5th ed. 
(London: Pitman, 1973), 4; R. Dussault and L. Bourgeat, Administrative haw —A  Treatise 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1985), 7-8. See Harlow and Rawlings, supra note 1, 67-75; Loughlin, supra 
note 9,131,134 and 168-9.
46 Fatouros, supra note 38, 813-14; Loughlin, supra note 9, 60-1 and 133-7; Loughlin, supra 
note 3, 86.
47 Carrow, supra note 27,15 and 22-3; J. Willis, “Canadian Administrative Law in Retrospect” 
(1974) 24 U.T.L.J. 225, 229; C. Sunstein, “In Defense of the Hard Look: Judicial Activism 
and Administrative Law” (1984) 7 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Policy 51, 58-9; Dussault and Bourgeat, 
supra note 45, 3; Cane, supra note 27, 59-60; Harlow and Rawlings, supra note 1, 67-72.
48 Fatouros, supra note 36,124-5; Davis, supra note 1, 25-6; Chayes, supra note 8,1302 and 
1316; K. Roach, “The Limits of Corrective Justice and the Potential of Equity in 
Constitutional Remedies” (1991) 33 Ariz. L.R. 859; T. Bingham, The Business of Judging 
(Oxford: OUP, 2000), 35.
49 A number of tribunals have rejected the view that NAFTA should presumptively be 
interpreted either expansively or restrictively: Ethyl, supra note 15, para. 55-6; The hoewen 
Group, Inc. and Raymond JL Eoewen v. United States of America (Jurisdiction) (5 January 2001), 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, para. 51, online: State Department
http: /  / www.state.gov/documents / organization/3921 .pdf: Methanex, supra note 34, para. 103- 
5; UPS, supra note 34, para. 40; Fireman’s Fund, supra note 35, para. 64. See also Southern Pacific 
Properties (Middle East) hid. v. Arab Republic of Egypt (Jurisdiction) (14 April 1988), 3 ICSID 
Rep. 131, para. 63.
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represented by states. Some Chapter 11 tribunals have used different interpretive 
techniques to resolve issues arising from silence or ambiguity in the treaty text. As 
argued below, tribunals that favour the private protection approach have interpreted 
ambiguity in the definition of the NAFTA standards in favour o f investor protection 
and, as such, in favour of arbitrator discretion to award damages. In contrast, other 
tribunals have adopted the public function approach by applying customary rules of 
international law so as to limit state liability.
In this discussion, the focus is on those Chapter 11 awards that most clearly 
reflect either the private protection or the public function approach. In particular, the 
Pope <& Talbot tribunal is highlighted as the clearest example of how ambiguity in the 
NAFTA text allows tribunals to make policy choices in favour o f investor 
protection.50 On the other hand, the Toewen tribunal most clearly shows how textual 
ambiguity leaves room for tribunals to limit the state’s consent to investment 
arbitration, consistent with the public function approach. More than other Chapter 11 
awards, the decisions o f these tribunals stand out as examples o f the discretionary 
choices o f arbitrators. That said, they also exemplify broader tendencies in investment 
arbitration in that their reasoning is echoed by other tribunals and by commentators, 
and in the submissions of investors or states.
The starting point for the interpretation of an investment treaty is Article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Taw of Treaties, which adopts an essentially textual 
approach to treaty interpretation, although leaving room for a teleological approach 
based on the corollary principles of integration and contemporaneity.51 Article 31 
directs adjudicators to interpret the text o f a treaty, first, by determining the ordinary
50 Feldman, supra note 6, para. 195-7 (distinguishing S.D. Myers and Pope &  Talbot “It is 
obvious that in both of these earlier cases, which as here involved non-expropriation 
violations of Chapter 11, the tribunals exercised considerable discretion in fashioning what 
they believed to be reasonable approaches to damages consistent with the requirements of
NAFTA”).
51 Vienna Convention on the Taw of Treaties, 22 May 1969,1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force 
27 January 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Conventiori\, art. 31. See In the Matter of Cross-border 
Trucking Services (Merits) (6 February 2001), 13(3) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 121, para. 220- 
2; Methanex, supra note 34, para. 97-9; UPS, supra note 34, para. 43-6 and 63; I. Sinclair, The 
Vienna Convention and the Taw of Treaties (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 130 
(“reference to the object and purpose of the treaty is, as it were, a secondary or ancillary 
process in the application of the general rules on interpretation”); M. Lennard, “Navigating 
by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO Agreements” (2002) 5 J. Int’l Econ. L. 17, 28-9.
152
meaning o f the words used by the states parties.52 If an issue can be resolved by 
examining the ordinary meaning, then this should end the inquiry.53 On the other 
hand, where the text is not clear on its face, an adjudicator must seek out the 
intentions o f the states parties by looking at the context surrounding the relevant 
provision and the treaty, as well as the object and purpose o f the treaty.54 Engaging in 
this wider search for meaning sometimes requires an adjudicator to resolve doubts 
arising from silence or ambiguity.55 In such cases, the adjudicator must often choose 
from alternative interpretations to determine the states parties, obligations.
The tendency for a legal text to be ambiguous is sometimes exaggerated.56 In 
most cases, legal language is sufficiendy clear to foreclose reasonable dispute about its 
meaning and, as such, the formalist proposition that rules can be rationally and 
consistently applied should not be dismissed as a meaningless concept. Even so, any 
interpretive process confronts moments of genuine contradiction and doubt. In 
investment arbitration, these moments are relatively common because key provisions 
in investment treaties are expressed at a high level of generality and because 
international adjudication is not normally used to resolve regulatory disputes.57 O n its 
face, NAFTA Chapter 11 — like other investment treaties — often supports a range of 
readings and this multiplies and inflates the interpretive choices open to tribunals.58
52 International Law Commission, Commentary to its Final Draft Articles, Commentary to draft 
article 27, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm., para. 12 (describing as the “very essence of the 
textual approach” the principle that “the parties are to be presumed to have that intention 
which appears from the ordinary meaning of the terms used by them”).
53 WTO Appellate Body, India — Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS50/AB/R (24 August 1998), para. 45.
54 Vienna Convention, supra note 51, art. 31(1).
55 First, the adjudicator must determine whether the text is ambiguous, and then resolve the 
ambiguity one way or another. In the process, the adjudicator can give different degrees of 
weight to the context of the provision, relative to the treaty text, or even search for textual 
ambiguity in order to look to the treaty’s “object and purpose” and thereby obtain greater 
discretion. See G.G. Fitzmaurice, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of 
Justice: Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points” (1951) 28 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 1, 
7-8; I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Daw, 6th ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2003), 607.
56 E.g. Trachtman, supra note 4, 339 (downplaying the importance of the text as the first 
indicator of intention).
57 T. Walde and S. Dow, “Treaties and Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Investment” (2000) 
34(2) J. World Trade 1, 45. See Loughlin, supra note 9, 92.
58 Feldman, supra note 6, para. 98 (the language of NAFTA Article 1110 is “of such generality 
as to be difficult to apply in specific cases”). See also e.g. SGS v. Pakistan, supra note 6, para. 
150. K. McGuire, “Commentary” in L. Ritchie Dawson, ed., Whose Rights? The N AFTA  
Chapter 11 Debate (Ottawa: Centre for Trade Policy and Law, 2002), 171-2.
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Arbitrators are implicitly required (sometimes they appear eager) to assess the 
underlying rationales for investor protection in relation to alternative readings, each 
reasonably defensible because of silence or ambiguity in the text. Textual ambiguity 
enhances arbitrator discretion, allowing divergent conceptions o f investment 
arbitration to emerge.
1. Expanding the standards o f investor protection: the Pope & Talbot award
In defining the NAFTA standards of investor protection, a number of Chapter 11 
tribunals have interpreted ambiguous language in a way that expands the authority of 
arbitrators to award damages to investors, and thus in favour o f investor protection. 
Examples o f this private protection approach to investment arbitration are reviewed 
in this section, focusing on the Pope &  Talbot tribunal.
a. National treatment
The rule o f national treatment under NAFTA Article 1102 exemplifies the 
interpretive discretion that is available to Chapter 11 arbitrators. As discussed in 
chapter four o f this thesis, the complexity of national treatment under Article 1102 
arises from the ambiguity of the term “in like circumstances” and from the need for a 
tribunal to determine how far to cast the comparative net in evaluating differential 
treatment between foreign and domestic investors. Also, Article 1102 can be 
interpreted as prohibiting de facto as well as de jure discrimination, making it possible 
for a tribunal to review a very wide range of governmental policies that have 
discriminatory effects on investors.
In the Pope &  Talbot dispute, the investor was a company based in Oregon that 
operated three sawmills in British Columbia, Canada. The investor’s claim under 
Chapter 11 related to Canada’s implementation of the Canada-United States Softwood 
Lumber Agreement o f 1996.59 Softwood lumber has long been a source of conflict
59 Softwood Lumber Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United 
States of America, Washington, 29 May 1996, C.T.S. 1996/16, 35 I.L.M. 1195 (entered into 
force 29 May 1996).
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between Canada and the United States, primarily relating to which country would be 
the host to value-added processing o f raw logs.60 This historical dispute was 
temporarily resolved by the Softwood Lumber Agreement in which Canada agreed (under 
the threat o f U.S. trade retaliation) to limit exports of softwood lumber to the U.S. To 
carry out this commitment, Canada imposed a quota on exports o f softwood lumber 
from the Canadian provinces that were targeted by the U.S. for trade retaliation. The 
quota was allocated among these provinces based on their past export levels to the 
U.S. Each province then distributed its share o f the quota among producers in the 
province.
In its Chapter 11 claim, the investor in Pope <& Talbot claimed, among other 
things, that Canada violated national treatment by instituting export controls under 
the Softwood Lumber Agreement in some provinces but not others.61 The investor’s 
sawmills were in British Columbia which was subject to the export controls. Thus, the 
investor’s operations were treated less favourably than sawmills in other provinces 
where the export controls did not apply. This, the investor argued, violated Article 
1102.62 In a strict sense the investor’s claim was true: by differentiating between 
investments according to the province in which they were located, Canada’s export 
controls were de facto discriminatory.63 However, in context, Canada’s differentiation 
between provinces was logical because of the circumstances o f the underlying dispute 
with the U.S. During the period that led to the Softwood Limber Agreement, the U.S. 
targeted some but not all provinces for trade retaliation.64 But for this threat, Canada 
would not have imposed export controls in the first place. Thus, the export controls 
were logically limited to those provinces that were subject to the U.S. threat of 
retaliation, including British Columbia. Moreover, Canada applied the export controls
60 R.W. Gorte, “Softwood Lumber Imports: The 1996 U.S.-Canada Agreement”, United 
States Congressional Research Service Report No. 96-540 (13 June 1996), 1-2.
61 Pope <& Talbot (Investor’s Submissions) (28 January 2000), para. 80-90, online: DFAIT 
http: /  /  www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca /  tna-nac /  documents /A-l .pdf.
62 Ibid.
63 The investor’s claim in Pope <& Talbot appeared to be one of de facto discrimination since 
Canada’s export controls did not explicitly target foreign investors, although the tribunal 
declined to characterize the claim as one of either de facto or dejure discrimination: Pope <& 
Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), supra note 19, para. 70.
64 The U.S. targeted softwood lumber imported from Canadian provinces that the U.S. 
claimed unfairly subsidized softwood lumber production through their forest management 
practices: Gorte, supra note 60,1-2.
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in the same manner to all o f the lumber operations in British Columbia whether 
foreign or domestic: all were subject to the limits on exports to the U.S.
Viewed from a public function perspective, the investor’s argument was 
tenuous given that the purpose of the Softwood Lumber Agreement was to maintain trade 
flows. Without the export controls under the Softwood Lumber Agreement, the investor 
would have had less access to the U.S. market or none at all. Accepting the investor’s 
claim would have the perverse effect of exempting the investor from general limits 
that were placed on the Canadian industry as a whole in furtherance of continued 
international trade. In these circumstances, the investor’s arguments were like those of 
the heart attack victim who, after being saved by emergency CPR, then sues the 
paramedic for bruised ribs.
Adopting the private protection approach, the Pope <& Talbot tribunal accepted 
the investor’s submissions that Canada’s differentiation between provinces violated 
national treatment. Before examining this finding, though, let us look more closely at 
the options that were available to the tribunal had it chosen to reject the investor’s 
argument. Doing so highlights the policy choices underlying the interpretation of 
Article 1102. For one, the Pope <& Talbot tribunal could have rejected the investor’s 
claim by adopting Canada’s argument — supported by the other NAFTA states 
including the investor’s home state — that a violation o f Article 1102 based on de facto 
discrimination must be connected to the nationality o f the affected investor or 
investment.65 According to this view it was insufficient for Canada’s export controls 
to have a less favourable effect on the investor in Pope &  Talbot. To violate Article 
1102, any less favourable effect had to be linked to the investor’s nationality and since 
the investor did not establish this, it was argued, the claim should fail.66
Alternatively, the panel could have adopted a proportionality-based approach 
to de facto discrimination. Adopting this approach, Canada argued, the investor should
65 Pope <& Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), supra note 19, para. 79; Pope <& Talbot (Canada’s 
Submission) (29 March 2000), para. 171 and 194; (Mexico’s Submissions) (3 April 2000), para. 
67-70; (U.S. Submissions) (7 April 2000), para. 3 and 6; online: DFAIT http://www.dfait- 
maeci.gc.ca/ tna-nac / phases-en.asp# 1. See also J.H.H. Weiler, “Epilogue: Towards a 
Common Law of International Trade” in J.H.H. Weiler, ed., The EU, the WTO, and the 
N AFTA  (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 209-10.
66 As an alternative, the investor needed to show that the softwood lumber industry in British 
Columbia had a higher proportion of foreign investors than provinces that received more 
favourable treatment. Since this was not the case, Canada argued, the claim should fail.
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be required to show that any less favourable effect of Canada’s export controls was 
experienced by a minimum proportion of foreign lumber operations in the softwood 
industry.67 In other words, the investor should have to show that any discriminatory 
effect exceeded a reasonable quantitative threshold. This approach was not without its 
difficulties. As the tribunal noted, it depended on an analysis o f foreign investors and 
investments in the Canadian industry.68 But the utility of this approach was that it 
made Article 1102 more predictable for governments faced with the task o f applying 
NAFTA to myriad domestic policies and programs that might affect investors.69
These interpretations o f national treatment were open to the Pope <& Talbot 
tribunal because o f the ambiguous language o f Article 1102. However, the tribunal 
rejected them on the basis that they depended on an unfeasible contextual inquiry and 
created too high a burden for investors to meet.70 For instance, the tribunal 
concluded that the analysis required for the quantitative approach was impractical 
because the relevant industry included “more than 500 softwood lumber quota 
holders operating in Canada”.71 Also, the tribunal concluded that applying a threshold 
of proportionality to Article 1102, even as a mere indicator o f protectionism, would 
“hamstring foreign owned investments seeking to vindicate their Article 1102 
rights”.72 Finally, the tribunal said that the NAFTA states’ argument that de facto 
discrimination must be linked to nationality “would tend to excuse discrimination that 
is not facially directed at foreign owned investments”.73 In each case, the tribunal 
avoided fettering its discretion even where it was urged to do so by the NAFTA 
states.74
67 Pope &  Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), supra note 19, para. 44.
68 Ibid., para. 71.
69 J.H.H. Weiler, supra note 65, 209-10.
70 Yet, two pages after rejecting Canada’s quantitative approach to de facto discrimination as 
impractical, the tribunal engaged in a similarly contextual analysis of whether investors were 
in “like circumstances”. The tribunal concluded, supra note 19, para. 75, that the resolution of 
this issue “will require evaluation of the entire fact setting surrounding, in the case, the 
genesis and application of the \SoftmodTumber Agreement”. It is a technique of flexible 
interpretation, in itself, to conclude that the need for a contextual analysis is impractical in 
relation to the analysis of de facto discrimination, but not “like circumstances”.
71 Ibid., para. 71.
72 Ibid., para. 72.
73 Ibid., para. 79.
74 Ibid.
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Instead, the tribunal adopted an expansive interpretation o f Article 1102 by- 
concluding that any difference in treatment between a foreign and domestic investment, 
however exceptional in the wider context, was a presumptive violation o f Article 
1102.75 Once the tribunal concluded that the investor in Pope <& Talbot had overcome 
this low threshold, it then asked whether differences in Canada’s treatment of the 
investor were justified. According to the tribunal, differences in treatment would be 
justified where:76
.... they have a reasonable nexus to rational government policies that (1) do 
not distinguish, on their face or de facto, between foreign-owned and domestic 
companies, and (2) do not otherwise unduly undermine the investment 
liberalizing objectives of NAFTA.
Thus, the tribunal fashioned a broad exception to its “presumptive violation” 
interpretation of Article 1102 based on the rationality and reasonableness of 
government decision-making.77 Relying on this exception, the tribunal found that 
Canada’s implementation o f the Softwood lumber Agreement did not violate national 
treatment. This allowed the tribunal to avoid the over-inclusive implications of the 
investor’s claim, but only by adopting an exception that was as broad as the original 
concept of de facto discrimination. When confronted by textual ambiguity the tribunal 
preferred an expansive approach to arbitrator discretion in order to further investor 
protection.78
The Pope <& Talbot tribunal’s interpretation of Article 1102 can be contrasted 
with tribunals that tend toward the public function approach. For instance, the A D F  
tribunal adopted a narrower view o f national treatment.79 Rather than emphasizing
75 Ibid., para. 78. See J.R. Johnson, “How Will International Trade Agreements Affect 
Canadian Health Care?” (Discussion Paper No. 22 for the Commission on the Future of 
Health Care in Canada, September 2002), 10-11.
76 Pope &  Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), supra note 19, para. 78. See also Teemed' supra note 13, para. 
122 (adopting a broad definition of expropriation, accompanied by a broad exception for 
proportionate regulatory measures).
77 For a critical reaction to this interpretation, from a private protection perspective, see T. 
Weiler, supra note. 10, 173.
78 J.H.H. Weiler, supra note 65, 213-14.
79 AD F , supra note 28, para. 157. See also Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America 
(Merits) (11 October 2002), 42 I.L.M. 85,15(3) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 273 [hereinafter 
Mondev\, para. 65; Toewen, supra note 28, para. 139 and 156; Feldman, supra note 6, 258-70 
(dissenting opinion); GAMI, supra note 13, para. 114.
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the tribunaFs authority to seek out discriminatory effects o f a regulatory measure, the 
A D F  tribunal held the investor to a higher burden of proof in establishing aprima facie 
case. Specifically, the A D F  tribunal rejected a claim by a Canadian steel producer that 
the United States’ Buy America program violated national treatment, finding that the 
investor’s evidence o f discrimination was:80
not sufficient to show what the relevant competitive situation o f Canadian 
fabricators and U.S. fabricators was in general, nor was it evidence of the 
comparative costs of steel fabrication in the U.S. and Canadian facilities, in 
particular.
Thus, the claim was rejected for lack o f evidence o f systemic discrimination, despite 
the outwardly protectionist character of the Buy America program.81 In contrast, the 
Pope <& Talbot tribunal’s presumptive violation test virtually removed the prima facie 
evidentiary burden in circumstances that had no obvious connection to protectionism. 
The A D F  tribunal’s more restrained approach reflects different assumptions about 
what NAFTA Chapter 11 was intended to do and about the extent o f discretion that 
it grants to Chapter 11 tribunals.82 That is, it reflects a policy choice about the degree 
to which investment arbitration should be used to constrain governmental activity.
b. The minimum standard o f treatment
The investor in Pope Talbot also argued that Canada violated the NAFTA minimum 
standard o f treatment (Article 1105) in the course of Canada’s implementation o f the 
Softwood Lumber Agreement and related treatment o f the investor’s sawmills in British 
Columbia.83 Article 1105 requires that the NAFTA states, among other things,
80 ADF, supra note 28, para. 157.
81 Ibid. See Wemer, supra note 38,122 (commenting that the tribunaFs decision “leaves a 
somewhat bitter taste” given the disproportionate impact of the Buy America requirements on 
foreign steel manufacturers).
82 J.H.H. Weiler, supra note 65, 225-6, citing Keck <&Mithouard (No. C-267 and 268/91),
[1993] E.C.R. 1-6097, para. 16.
83 Pope &  Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), supra note 19, para. 120-7,150-1,156 and 182. See also 
Pope <& Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada (Merits, Phase 1) (26 June 2000), 13(4) World Trade 
and Arb. Mat. 19, para. 79-80 and 104-5 (dismissing the investor’s claims that Canada 
violated NAFTA Articles 1106 (performance requirements) and 1110 (expropriation)). The
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provide a minimum standard o f treatment that is “in accordance with international 
law”, leading to the question in Pope <& Talbot of the meaning o f the term 
“international law”.84 The text of Article 1105 is arguably ambiguous on this point 
because it does not precisely lay out the elements o f international law that are 
applicable under NAFTA, other than general references to “fair and equitable 
treatment” and “full protection and security”. Further, the text does not expressly 
state whether these phrases -  or Article 1105 as a whole — reflect the minimum 
standard under customary international law alone or whether they also include other 
sources o f international law. Historically, the debate about the minimum standard for 
foreign nationals was rooted in customary international law and this might have 
provided a basis for the Pope <& Talbot tribunal to conclude that the meaning of 
“international law” in Article 1105 was limited to customary international law.85 Yet, 
the text leaves an opening, however narrow, for other interpretations.
Consistent with the view that textual ambiguity should be interpreted in favour 
o f investor protection, the investor in Pope <& Talbot argued that Article 1105 went 
beyond customary international law to incorporate standards from other sources o f 
international law.86 This “additive theory” posited that, because Article 1105 did not 
explicitly exclude additional sources o f international law, the NAFTA standard 
included all o f the sources of international law referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice*1 On this reading, the NAFTA standard emerges as a 
broad guarantee of fair treatment and economic due process.88 From a public 
function perspective, given the implications o f this interpretation for governments, 
one would expect the Pope <& Talbot tribunal to tread carefully. In particular, one 
might expect the tribunal to accept the unanimous submissions o f the NAFTA states
focus here is on the tribunal’s analysis of the investor’s claims under Articles 1102 and 1105 
because they most clearly demonstrate the private protection approach.
84 Pope Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), supra note 19, para. 107-10.
85 Mondev, supra note 79, para. Y2\\ A^nian, supra note 31, para. 92 (dismissing the investor’s 
claim under Article 1105 as indistinguishable from the more specific claim under Article 
1110). See Thomas, supra note 37, 22-7.
86 See Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 14, 58-9.
87 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, art. 38(1).
88 Thomas, supra note 37, 29; Fischel, supra note 27, 7.
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that Article 1105 was limited to customary international law and that the investor’s 
argument should be rejected.89
Instead, favouring the private protection approach, the Pope <& Talbot tribunal 
rejected the NAFTA states’ submissions in favour of the additive theory o f Article 
1105.90 But the additive theory raised a number of problems. For instance, one source 
of international law beyond customary international law is treaties, but this source 
raises doubts about the additive theory. If  the NAFTA states intended to incorporate 
standards from other treaties into NAFTA by way o f Article 1105, why did they not 
say so explicitly? Elsewhere in NAFTA the states parties do just this by listing the 
specific treaties that are relevant to particular provisions.91 It is difficult to contend 
that the states parties intended to bring standards from other treaties into NAFTA 
through Article 1105 without mentioning those treaties, especially since there are 
hundreds o f treaties that contain standards conceivably relevant to the treatment of 
investors.92
This presented a significant difficulty with respect to the additive theory. 
However, the Pope <& Talbot tribunal did not mention it. Instead, the tribunal adopted 
the additive theory based on the observation that the model bilateral investment 
treaties o f seven countries, including the U.S., contain broad wording resembling 
Article 1105 and that the prevalence o f this wording supported the additive theory.93 
An initial problem with this analysis was that BITs containing language similar to 
Article 1105 are a relatively recent phenomenon and therefore lack an established 
history o f interpretation. Also, the wording used to define minimum standards of 
treatment in BITs varies widely, falling short of any precise or well-accepted
89 Pope <& Talbot (Canada’s Submissions) (10 October 2000), para. 208-14; (Mexico’s 
Submissions) (1 December 2000), 3-5; (U.S. Submissions) (1 November 2000), para. 2-8; 
online: DFAIT http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/phases-en.asp#l.
90 Pope <& Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), supra note 19, para. 113-18.
91 E.g. NAFTA, supra note 29, art. 1701 (expressly incorporating substantive standards from 
four international conventions relating to intellectual property rights).
92 Take the example of international human rights treaties. Direct enforcement of those 
treaties by private parties is generally either not permitted or strictly limited. It is dubious to 
conclude that the NAFTA states intended to enforce standards contained in human rights 
treaties, for investors alone, through investment arbitration pursuant to NAFTA, art. 1105. 
But the additive theory makes the argument tenable. See Mondev, supra note 79, para. 121.
93 Pope <& Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), supra note 19, para. 110-18. The model BITs examined 
were those of Canada, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and Switzerland.
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meaning.94 Thus, from the outset, the Pope <& Talbot tribunal’s proposition to resolve 
ambiguous language in Article 1105 by looking to ambiguous language in other 
treaties was tenuous.
The tribunal overcame this by itself interpreting the model BITs that it had 
identified as relevant, concluding that they also adopted an additive minimum 
standard.95 This the tribunal did without reviewing the specific and varied wording in 
the BITs or their negotiating history, and without accepting the United States’ 
contrary interpretation of its own model BIT on the grounds that there was academic 
opinion to the contrary. The tribunal also rejected the U.S. submission that, regardless 
o f the BITs, Chapter 11 was limited to the customary standard on the ground that the 
U.S. did not provide enough evidence to support its “suggestions”.96 As a result, the 
U.S. submission did not “enjoy the kind o f deference that might otherwise be 
accorded to representations by parties to an international agreement”.97 Instead, the 
tribunal concluded that Article 1105 must logically establish the same additive 
standard that the tribunal had read into the model BITs: “A contrary reading”, the 
tribunal said, “would do violence to the BIT language”.98
Having adopted the additive theory, the tribunal then defined Article 1105 in 
broad terms.99 The tribunal rejected Canada’s claim that the minimum standard 
required evidence of state conduct crossing a high threshold o f impropriety.100 
Instead, the tribunal concluded that the standard encompassed “the fairness elements 
under ordinary standards applied in NAFTA countries... without any threshold 
limitation that the conduct complained of be ‘egregious,’ ‘outrageous,’ or ‘shocking,’ 
or otherwise extraordinary”.101 Applying this broadly-framed standard, the tribunal 
found that Canada breached Article 1105 by its treatment o f the investor’s lumber 
operations after the investor’s Chapter 11 claim was initiated, while rejecting all o f the
94 UNCTAD, Pair and'Equitable Treatment, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements (New York: United Nations, 1999), 22-41.
95 Pope <& Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), supra note 19, para. 111-13.
96 Ibid., para. 114.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid., para. 113.
99 Ibid., para. 118.
100 Ibid. See Pope <& Talbot (Canada’s Submissions), supra note 89, para. 235-40.
101 Ibid., para. 118.
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investor’s other claims.102 In general, the tribunal interpreted Article 1105 in a way 
that considerably widened its authority to sanction state conduct by awarding 
damages to investors.103
After the Pope <& Talbot tribunal and another tribunal104 adopted expansive 
readings o f Article 1105, the NAFTA states intervened by jointly interpreting the 
treaty.105 O n July 31, 2001, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission issued a statement 
that Article 1105 “prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment o f aliens as the minimum standard o f treatment to be afforded to 
investments o f investors of another [NAFTA] Party”.106 This effectively overruled the 
Pope <& Talbot tribunal’s expansive interpretation of Article 1105. What was the 
outcome o f this joint interpretation? The NAFTA text clearly states that the Free 
Trade Commission has the authority to issue an interpretation o f NAFTA that “shall 
be binding” on Chapter 11 tribunals.107 However, the Pope <& Talbot tribunal — which 
had not yet issued its damages award — was reluctant to adopt the joint interpretation. 
The tribunal responded first by engaging in an exchange o f letters with Canada’s 
lawyers and, in time, with those of the other NAFTA states.108 The tribunal also 
adopted the creative argument put forward by the investor that the Free Trade 
Commission’s statement was an “amendment” rather than an “interpretation” of
102 The tribunal, ibid., para. 121,123,125,128,155, and 185, dismissed the balance of the 
investor’s claims that Canada violated NAFTA Article 1105. The violation of Article 1105 
that was found, para. 156-81, arose from Canada’s treatment of the investor’s investment 
during a process to verify alleged discrepancies regarding the investor’s reports of its 
production and sales levels.
103 On the other hand, the tribunal awarded the investor only a small amount of damages of 
(U.S.) $460,000 and $120,000 in costs, thus limiting the impact of its approach to Article 
1105 in the circumstances of the case: Pope <& Talbot (Damages), supra note 18, para. 88-90; 
Pope <& Talbot (Costs) (26 November 2002), para. 18, online: DFAIT http://www.dfait- 
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents /CostsAward26Nov02.pdf.
104 S.D. Myers (Merits), supra note 31, para. 266 (concluding that a breach of Article 1102 also 
amounted to a violation of Article 1105).
105 NAFTA, supra note 29, art. 1131(2). The Free Trade Commission is made up of Canada’s 
minister of foreign trade, the U.S. trade representative, and Mexico’s secretary of trade and 
industrial development.
106 Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (31 July 2001), 
13(6) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 139, art. B(l), online: DFAIT www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna- 
nac/NAFTA-Interpr-en.asp.
107 NAFTA, supra note 29, art. 1131(2).
108 Pope <& Talbot (Letters of Lord Dervaird, Presiding Arbitrator) (14 August 2001 and 17 
September 2001), online: DFAIT http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/phases-en.asp#l.
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NAFTA and thus not binding.109 Here, the tribunal went so far as to assume authority 
over the conduct o f the states parties as a group and to interpret NAFTA provisions 
that are excluded from investment arbitration under Chapter l l . 110 In the end, the 
tribunal accepted the binding nature of the joint interpretation, but to maintain the 
original result in the arbitration the tribunal concluded that Canada’s conduct violated 
the clarified minimum standard based on customary international law alone.111
Subsequent tribunals rejected or distanced themselves from the Pope &  Talbot 
tribunaFs approach to Article 1105 and to the Free Trade Commission’s 
interpretation.112 For example, with respect to the argument that Chapter 11 tribunals 
have an implicit authority to overrule the Free Trade Commission as part o f their duty 
to determine the governing law of a dispute, the A D F  tribunal concluded that “such a 
theory o f implied or incidental authority, fairly promptly, will tend to degrade and set 
at naught the binding and overriding character o f FTC interpretations”.113 Even so, 
the reading of Article 1105 that was adopted in Pope dr Talbot showed that arbitrators 
may take a flexible approach in favour of investor protection when exercising their 
authority to scrutini2e state conduct and award damages.
109 Pope dr Talbot (Damages), supra note 18, para. 16. See also Brower, supra note 10, 56-7, 
note 71; T. Weiler, supra note 10,180-85; CIEL, supra note 37, 5.
110 The tribunal’s analysis required it to interpret NAFTA Article 2202, which deals with the 
amendment of NAFTA. However, the tribunal found that it had the authority to interpret 
any NAFTA provision on the basis that the tribunal was required “to decide the issues in 
dispute in accordance with NAFTA and applicable rules of international law”, despite the 
clear language of Article 1131(2) that a Free Trade Commission interpretation is binding: 
Pope dr Talbot (Damages), supra note 18, para. 23.
111 Pope dr Talbot (Damages), supra note 18, para. 67-9.
112 Mondev, supra note 79, para. I l l  and 121; UPS, supra note 34, para. 94-7; ADF, supra note 
28, para. 177-8 and 183; Waste Management No. 2 (Merits), supra note 13, para. 98.
113 ADF, supra note 28, para. 177.
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2 . Limiting the state’s consent: the Loewen award
The focus thus far has been on interpretations of Chapter 11 that reflect the private 
protection approach to investment arbitration. This is in part because the boldest 
examples o f flexible interpretation of NAFTA are provided by tribunals favouring the 
private protection approach, led by Pope &  Talbot. However, tribunals that favour the 
public function approach have also used techniques o f flexible interpretation to 
narrow the role o f investment arbitration. Such tribunals tend to adopt a presumption 
that, in the absence o f express treaty language to the contrary, textual ambiguity 
should be resolved in accordance with rules o f customary international law. Thus, 
where a state has not clearly consented to a particular form of investor claim, the 
dispute remains within the domestic domain and the tribunal is not authorized to 
adjudicate.114 Under Chapter 11, the clearest example o f this technique and o f the 
public function approach is the Loewen tribunal.115
The dispute in Loewen arose after a Canadian funeral home company had what 
could be called a near death experience in Mississippi, following a massive jury award 
o f (U.S.) $500 million against the company.116 The Canadian investor claimed that the 
judicial process that led to the jury award violated the NAFTA minimum standard 
(Article 1105).117 The sheer size of the jury award, combined with a Mississippi 
requirement that the investor post (U.S.) $625 million before being able to appeal, 
prompted the investor to settle the dispute on very unfavourable terms. This in turn 
contributed to the investor’s bankruptcy.
The Ijoewen tribunal agreed that the Mississippi trial judge failed to properly 
conduct the trial by allowing the plaintiff to appeal to the jury’s biases against the 
Canadian investor based on nationality, race, and class.118 The tribunal found that
114 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R (16 January 1998), para. 70, note 154 
(interpretive principle of in dubio mitius). See SGS v Pakistan, supra note 6, para. 171. Brownlie, 
supra note 55, 291.
115 See Afpnian, supra note 31, para. 83, 87, and 99; Methanex, supra note 34, para. 137-8 and 
154; Mondev, supra note 79, para. 121; A.DF, supra note 28, para. 154,187, and 191.
116 Loewen, supra note 28, para. 39.
117 Ibid., para. 139 and 141 (dismissing independent claims of violations of NAFTA Articles 
1102 and 1110, respectively).
118 Ibid., para. 70.
165
“[b]y any standard o f measurement” the trial was “a disgrace”, and that the judge’s 
failure to ensure due process amounted to an international denial o f justice which 
violated NAFTA Article 1105.119 Nevertheless, the Loewen tribunal dismissed the 
investor’s claim for two reasons. First, the tribunal found that the investor did not 
maintain continuous foreign nationality from the date o f the events giving rise to the 
claim through to the resolution o f the claim.120 This was because, after initiating 
bankruptcy proceedings in the U.S., the investor transferred all o f its assets -  with the 
sole exception o f its rights in the NAFTA claim -  to a U.S. company. Second, the 
Loewen tribunal concluded that the investor had not exhausted all reasonably available 
local remedies by failing to pursue an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.121 In 
reaching these conclusions, the tribunal used a particular interpretive technique: it 
resolved ambiguity in the NAFTA text by resorting, by default, to rules o f customary 
international law, which are part of the governing law o f Chapter l l . 122
a. The requirement o f continuous foreign nationality
To make a Chapter 11 claim, an investor must be a foreign investor.123 That is, the 
investor must be a national of a NAFTA state other than the NAFTA state against 
which the claim is made. Investors cannot, in principle, make a claim against their 
own state. Further, investors must have continuous foreign nationality. Consistent with 
customary international law, the investor must maintain the foreign nationality of a 
NAFTA state without interruption from the date o f the events giving rise to the claim 
until an appropriate endpoint.124 In Laewen, the tribunal had to determine whether the 
investor’s foreign nationality had lasted until an appropriate endpoint. But what was 
this endpoint? Did the investor have to maintain foreign nationality until the 
submission or until the final resolution o f the claim?
119 Ibid., para. 119.
120 Ibid., para. 222.
121 Ibid., para. 217.
122 NAFTA, supra note 29, art. 1131(1). See also Barcelona Traction, supra note 40, para. 51-2.
123 NAFTA, supra note 29, art. 1101(1), 1116(1), and 1117(1).
X2* Administrative Decision No. V  (1924), 7 R.I.A.A. 119, 613-14 (U.S.-Germany Mixed Claims 
Commission). D.C. Ohly, “A Functional Analysis of Claimant Eligibility” in R.B. Lillich, ed., 
International Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens (Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 1983), 283-4.
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O n this, the NAFTA text is unclear. Unlike other investment treaties, NAFTA 
contains no express waiver of the requirement for continuous foreign nationality after 
the initiation o f a claim.125 In Loewen, the investor argued that the requirement to 
maintain continuous foreign nationality lasted only until the submission of the claim. 
As such, the investor’s standing to maintain the claim was not affected by the 
investor’s reorganization of its business structure and, specifically, by the transfer of 
assets to a U.S. company. The Loewen tribunal rejected this argument in favour o f the 
view that the investor had to maintain continuous foreign nationality until the 
resolution o f the claim. Therefore, the investor’s claim became invalid when its 
corporate reorganization broke the chain of foreign nationality.126 Further, the 
tribunal concluded that -  although a cause of the investor’s bankruptcy and corporate 
reorganization was the Mississippi jury award itself -  this did not call for any 
relaxation o f the requirement to maintain continuous foreign nationality. In reaching 
this conclusion, the tribunal referred to the strict limits o f the NAFTA states’ 
consents to Chapter 11 arbitration based on the treaty text, stating: “this is an 
international tribunal whose jurisdiction stems from and is limited to the words o f the 
NAFTA treaty”.127 And: “NAFTA does not recognize [the investor’s] business 
choices as a substitute for its jurisdictional requirements under its provisions and 
under international law” .128
This interpretation o f the duty to maintain continuous foreign nationality can 
be contrasted with other Chapter 11 awards that deal with similar issues, including the 
Mondev tribunal.129 The facts in Mondev are convoluted. A Canadian investor made a 
Chapter 11 claim against the U.S. flowing from a failed real estate development 
contract between the investor and both the city of Boston and a city development 
agency. The deal collapsed and a U.S. bank foreclosed the investor’s mortgage on the 
real estate project. In turn, the investor sued the city and the development agency, and 
obtained a jury verdict in its favour. However, the trial judge overruled the finding of 
liability on the part of the development agency because the agency was immune from
125 NAFTA, supra note 29, art. 1116 and 1117. Loewen, supra note 28, para. 226.
126 Loewen, ibid., para. 220 and 234.
127 Ibid., para. 234.
128 Ibid., para. 238.
129 Mondev, supra note 79, para. 88-91. See also Waste Management Mo. 2 (Merits), supra note 13, 
para. 85.
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liability under state law. On appeal, the finding of immunity for the development 
agency was upheld and, worse for the investor, the trial judge’s finding o f liability on 
the part of the city was overturned. The investor petitioned for a rehearing o f the 
appeal and for a hearing by the U.S. Supreme Court, but both were denied.130
The investor’s claim under NAFTA Chapter 11 was dismissed by the Mondev 
tribunal for reasons that are irrelevant here. What is significant, however, is the 
Mondev tribunal’s response to a jurisdictional objection raised by the United States. 
The U.S. argued that, once the U.S. bank foreclosed the investor’s mortgage, the 
investor no longer had any right of action in relation to the real estate project.131 The 
Mondev tribunal concluded that it was unnecessary to decide this issue, in part because 
to do so would interfere with the ability of investors to rely on Chapter 11 following 
the failure o f an investment. According to the tribunal:132
Article 1105, and even more so Article 1110, will frequently have to be applied 
after the investment in question has failed. In most cases, the dispute 
submitted to arbitration will concern precisely the question o f responsibility 
for that failure. To require the claimant to maintain a continuing status as an investor 
under the law of the host State at the time the arbitration is commenced would tend to 
frustrate the very purpose of Chapter 1 /, which is to provide protection to investors 
against wrongful conduct including uncompensated expropriation of their 
investment and to do so throughout the lifetime o f an investment up to the 
moment of its “sale or other disposition” (Article 1102(2)). On that basis, the 
Tribunal concludes that N A F T A  should be interpreted broadly to cover any legal 
claims arising out of the treatment of an investment as defined in Article 1139, whether 
or not the investment subsists as such at the time of the treatment which is complained of
The issue in Mondev related to the claimant’s status as an investor, as opposed to the 
Ijoewen case in which the issue was the claimant’s status as a foreign investor. However, 
in both cases the question was whether aspects of the state’s consent to arbitration 
should be interpreted flexibly, in favour o f investor protection, or cautiously in light 
o f customary international law. The Mondev tribunal adopted a flexible interpretation 
o f the concept o f an “investor” by relaxing the requirement to own an investment 
until the submission of a Chapter 11 claim. In particular, the tribunal concluded that 
the investor’s failure “to maintain a continuing status as an investor... at the time the
130 Mondev, ibid., para. 1.
131 Ibid., para. 54.
132 Ibid., para. 91 [emphasis added].
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arbitration is commenced” should not interfere with the investor’s claim. In contrast, 
the Loewen tribunal adopted a narrow reading o f the concept o f “foreign” by requiring 
the investor to hold continuous foreign nationality, not only until submission o f the 
claim, but until its resolution. Moreover, in Loewen, the reorganization o f the 
investor’s corporate structure — like the foreclosure in Mondev — was prompted by an 
alleged violation of an investment treaty by the state, and the Loewen tribunal went 
much further than Mondev by finding that the investor had actually suffered “a 
miscarriage o f justice amounting to a manifest injustice”. Even so, the investor’s 
entire claim was defeated because the investor failed to maintain continuous foreign 
nationality. In Mondev, on the other hand, the tribunal characterized the proposed duty 
o f the claimant to maintain continuous status as an investor as a “technical question” 
that could “frustrate the very purpose of Chapter 11”.
Underlying these different outcomes are contrasting approaches to ambiguity 
in the NAFTA text. Consistent with the public function approach, the Loewen tribunal 
interpreted ambiguity in the meaning of “foreign” in a way that limited the NAFTA 
states’ consents to investment arbitration on the assumption that clear and explicit 
language is required to override an established rule of customary international law. In 
contrast, the Mondev tribunal interpreted ambiguity in the meaning o f “investor” so as 
to facilitate investor claims in line with the tribunal’s characterization o f the purpose 
o f NAFTA. In each case, the tribunal made a policy choice through its exercise o f 
interpretative discretion.
b. The duty to exhaust local remedies
The Loewen tribunal went on to conclude that, even if the investor had maintained 
continuous foreign nationality, the tribunal would still have dismissed the claim 
because the investor did not exhaust local remedies. Under NAFTA Chapter 11, an 
investor is expressly required to both consent to investment arbitration and waive the 
investor’s right to alternative domestic remedies.133 However, NAFTA is ambiguous 
on its face as to whether the relevant NAFTA provision (Article 1121) amounts to a 
waiver by the NAFTA states of the investor’s duty to exhaust local remedies before a
133 NAFTA, supra note 29, art. 1121. See chapter six of this thesis, page 204-7.
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Chapter 11 claim.134 One plausible reading of Article 1121 is that it entirely removes 
the duty to exhaust local remedies.135 However, in Ijoewen, the tribunal adopted a more 
nuanced reading by differentiating between the procedural and substantive aspects of 
the duty to exhaust local remedies under customary international law. On the one 
hand, the tribunal left open the possibility that the duty to exhaust local remedies, as a 
procedural precondition for an international claim, is removed by Article 1121.136 On 
the other hand, the Laewen tribunal found that the duty is also part o f some NAFTA 
standards o f investor protection, including the minimum standard o f treatment 
(Article 1105).137 Thus, based on customary international law, the duty to exhaust 
local remedies remained applicable to the investor’s claim as a substantive element of 
the minimum standard.
This issue was especially important in Ijoewen because the alleged breach o f the 
NAFTA minimum standard arose from a judicial decision o f the host state. In that 
context, the Ijoewen tribunal required the investor to show that the investor had 
exhausted all reasonably available opportunities to obtain justice from the host state’s 
courts.138 The investor’s failure to do so was fatal to the claim, regardless o f the 
investor’s consent and waiver under Article 1121. According to the tribunal, there was 
no violation of the NAFTA minimum standard because, under customary 
international law, a state is not responsible for a denial of justice to an individual 
unless final action has been taken by the state’s judicial system as a whole.139
In reaching this conclusion, the Ijoewen tribunal emphasized the importance of 
the duty to exhaust local remedies in the definition o f the minimum standard under 
customary international law. The tribunal said:140
134 Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (Jurisdiction) (26 June 2002), 41 I.L.M. 1315, 
14(6) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 203 [hereinafter Waste Management No. 2], para. 30.
135 Waste Management No. 2 (Jurisdiction), ibid., para. 30. See also Feldman, supra note 6, para. 
71-4.
136 Laewen, supra note 28, para. 149.
137 Ibid., para. 153-6. See also Waste Management No. 2 (Merits), supra note 13, para. 116 and 
174; GAMI, supra note 13, para. 133. Contrast CME, supra note 39, para. 398 and 412-13.
138 Laewen, supra note 28, para. 153 and 215 (concluding that the investor did not adequately 
explain why it setded the case that led to the jury award instead of pursuing other legal 
options, including an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. By failing to show why these other 
options were not reasonably available, the investor failed to establish a violation of the 
minimum standard for which the U.S. was responsible).
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid., para. 154.
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N o instance has been drawn to our attention in which an international tribunal 
has held a State responsible for a breach of international law constituted by a 
lower court decision when there was available an effective and adequate appeal 
within the State's legal system.
In addition, the tribunal stressed the need for clear language in NAFTA to override
an important customary rule:141
An important principle of international law should not be held to have been 
tacitly dispensed with by international agreement, in the absence o f words
making clear an intention to do so Such an intention may be exhibited by
express provisions which are at variance with the continued operation o f the 
relevant principle o f international law.
N or is there any basis for implying any dispensation o f that requirement. It 
would be strange indeed if sub silentio the international rule were to be swept 
away__
Thus, the tribunal relied on the presumption that, in the absence o f clear language to 
the contrary, the interpretation of NAFTA Chapter 11 requires the careful application 
o f customary international law. Although Chapter 11 may allow an investor to bring a 
claim after waiving alternative domestic remedies, this does not excuse the investor 
from the duty to exhaust local remedies in relation to a claim o f a denial o f justice 
under Article 1105. To allow an investor to make a claim in such circumstances, the 
Loewen tribunal concluded, would create serious problems in domestic legal 
systems.142 As such, the Loewen tribunal declined to expand its authority to award 
damages to protect investors and encourage investment. Rather, the tribunal restricted 
the reach o f investment arbitration in order to avoid disrupting an important 
sovereign activity carried out by domestic courts.143
In Loewen, the investor's bankruptcy was precipitated by the outcome o f a trial 
that was grossly unfair. Also, there were clear business reasons, stemming from U.S.
141 Ibid., para. 160 and 162. See also SGS v. Pakistan, supra note 6, para. 169. Contrast SGS v. 
Philippines, supra note 14, para. 122; Tokios, supra note 14, para. 52.
142 Loewen, supra note 28, para. 162.
143 See also A.sgnian, supra note 31, para. 87 and 99; Waste Management No. 2 (Merits), supra 
note 13, para. 116 and 128-30.
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bankruptcy law, for the investor to reorganize its corporate structure in the way that it 
did. Therefore, it was perhaps harsh for the tribunal to conclude that the investor’s 
reorganization led to the “spontaneous disappearance” o f the investor’s cause of 
action. Reacting to the award, Mr. Loewen said:144
I am deeply disappointed that the Tribunal has dismissed the NAFTA claims. I 
take some comfort in the fact that they found that the outrageous verdict and 
judicial rulings in Mississippi were a manifest injustice under international law. 
As they suggest, there was no clearer case for the ideals o f NAFTA to be given 
teeth, but the Tribunal has elected to leave investors confronted by a 
bewildering series o f procedural obstacles and technical requirements that 
frustrate NAFTA’s goal of free trade and investment.
The Eoewen tribunal itself acknowledged that, in spite o f the “injustices which were 
suffered by Loewen and Mr. Raymond Loewen in the Courts o f Mississippi... they 
emerge from the present long and costly proceedings with no remedy at all”.145 Even 
so, the tribunal found that this result was warranted in light o f the nature o f the 
investor’s claim, which fell within the realm of public international law rather than 
commercial arbitration. In what amounts to an elaboration o f the public function 
approach, the tribunal said:146
Far from fulfilling the purposes o f NAFTA, an intervention on our part would 
compromise them by obscuring the crucial separation between the 
international obligations o f the State under NAFTA, o f which the fair 
treatment o f foreign investors in the judicial sphere is but one aspect, and the 
much broader domestic responsibilities o f every nation towards litigants of 
whatever origin who appear before its domestic courts. Subject to explicit 
international agreement permitting external control or review, these latter 
responsibilities are for each individual state to regulate according to its own 
chosen appreciation of the ends o f justice. As we have sought to make clear, 
we find nothing in NAFTA to justify the exercise by this Tribunal o f an 
appellate function parallel to that which belongs to the courts o f the host 
nation. In the last resort, a failure by that nation to provide adequate means of 
remedy may amount to an international wrong but only in the last resort.... 
Too great a readiness to step from outside into the domestic arena, attributing 
the shape of an international wrong to what is really a local error (however
144 Fasken Martineau, News Release, “Raymond Loewen Responds to Decision on NAFTA 
Claim” (8 July 2003).
145 Loewen, supra note 28, para. 241.
146 Ibid., para. 242. See also Empresas Lucchetti, S*A. v. Lucchetti Peru, S~A. (Merits) (7 February 
2005), ICSID Case No. ARB/03/04, para. 61, online: ICSID
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/lucchetti-award.pdf.
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serious), will damage both the integrity o f the domestic judicial system and the 
viability of NAFTA itself. The natural instinct, when someone observes a 
miscarriage o f justice, is to step in and try to put it right, but the interests of 
the international investing community demand that we must observe the 
principles which we have been appointed to apply, and stay our hands.
Thus, the tribunal emphasized that investment arbitration originates in the obligations 
o f the NAFTA states assumed amongst themselves, not in direct obligations of the 
host state to investors. A state’s obligations to investors are part o f the “broader 
domestic responsibilities” o f any state toward all individuals in its territory and the 
scope o f Chapter 11 does not go beyond these obligations. Although NAFTA 
protects investors from regulatory abuse to encourage investment, this does not mean 
that the treaty was intended to compensate investors for any injustice at the hands of 
the state. Rather, Chapter 11 offers a last resort to remedy international wrongs, one 
that should be approached cautiously in light o f the availability o f domestic remedies. 
This more restrained approach to investment arbitration was clearly influenced by the 
fact that the case arose from a judicial decision. In particular, the tribunal reasoned 
that arbitrators must respect the “integrity of the domestic judicial system” and 
should not adopt an appellate function. Put differendy, tribunals should respect the 
autonomy o f the judicial process of the state even in the face o f a serious abuse that is 
linked to the foreign nationality o f an investor. Too ambitious an approach to 
investment arbitration could threaten the “integrity o f the domestic judicial system” 
and the “viability o f NAFTA itself’. By staying their hands, the tribunal subordinated 
investor protection to the public function of Chapter 11.
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Conclusion
The use o f international adjudication to regulate the exercise o f public authority 
entails policy choices about the role of government Each investor claim raises 
questions about the nature and degree of investor protection that an investment treaty 
provides. Did the host state consent to the investors’ claim in relation to the specific 
investment? Should the dispute remain within the exclusive domain o f domestic 
courts? Does the investment benefit the host economy? Did the state treat the 
investor fairly? Was a reduction in the value o f the investment caused by legitimate 
regulation? Is the purpose of damages to deter unlawful conduct or compensate 
investors? What degree of fault should be attached to state liability? Is the claim a 
matter o f business risk or international wrong? Answers to these questions are less 
clear although more pressing where international adjudication is compulsory -  in the 
context o f a regulatory dispute — and where the remedy is a damages award against 
the state.
Drafters o f investment treaties cannot anticipate all o f the potential claims that 
may arise in investment arbitration.147 An element o f discretion and policy choice is 
inherent in any adjudicative process and reasonable people will differ about how 
much discretion is appropriate.148 Even so, the extent o f the discretion delegated to 
arbitrators is striking.149 As a result, the scope and substance o f investment arbitration 
is relatively unclear, as illustrated by the different approaches of tribunals to the 
NAFTA standards o f investor protection and to the NAFTA states’ consents. The 
explosion o f claims under a bilateral investment treaties exacerbates an overall lack o f 
coherence in the system of investment arbitration.150 Even so, where a state has
147 S. de Smith and R. Brazier, Constitutional and A.dministrative Cam, 8th ed. (London: Penguin,
1998), 19.
148 Mondev, supra note 79, para. 127. Fuller, supra note 4, 373; Harlow and Rawlings, supra note 
1,100-7; Trachtman, supra note 4, 344.
149 P.G. Foy, “Effectiveness of NAFTA’s Chapter Eleven Investor-State Arbitration 
Procedures” (2003) 18 ICSID Rev. 44, 51.
150 E.g. SGS v. Pakistan, supra note 6, para. 168 and 171 (treating a dispute resolution clause in 
an investment contract as a jurisdictional limit on BIT arbitration) versus SGS v. Philippines, 
supra note 14, para. 97 (treating such a clause as an issue of admissibility and distinguishing 
SGS v. Pakistan “on issues of the interpretation of arguably similar language”: “In the 
Tribunal’s view, although different tribunals constituted under the ICSID system should in 
general seek to act consistently with each other, in the end it must be for each tribunal to
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inadvertently breached a provision that was vague on its face or subject to 
inconsistent interpretations by past tribunals, the state may nevertheless be required 
to pay damages.151
For investors, interpretive uncertainty is undesirable because it makes it 
difficult to anticipate the extent to which an investor will be entided to 
compensation.152 As a result, an investor might initiate a claim that turns out to be 
unfounded, wasting time and money, where the tribunal interprets an ambiguous 
provision more narrowly than anticipated. But, by a long shot, the greater hazard of 
uncertainty is for states.153 States alone can be ordered to pay damages for breaching 
the treaty and, for small states especially, unanticipated liabilities under investment 
treaties could be crippling. Multinational enterprises can weigh the costs and benefits 
o f investment arbitration before making a claim; in this regard, states are at their 
mercy. This reflects the dynamic of state liability in the context o f the regulatory 
relationship. As discussed in the next chapter, what is most significant about 
investment treaties is that such important policy choices about state liability in the 
regulatory sphere are assigned to arbitrators, based on a private model o f adjudication.
exercise its competence in accordance with the applicable law, which will by definition be 
different for each BIT and each Respondent State”).
151 NAFTA, supra note 29, art. 1135.
152 L.Y. Fortier, “Caveat Investor: The Meaning of “Expropriation” and the Protection 
Afforded Investors Under NAFTA” (2003) 20(1) ICSID News 11.
153 V.L. Been and J.C. Beauvais, “The Global Fifth Amendment: NAFTA’s Investment 
Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International ‘Regulatory Takings’ Doctrine” 
(2003) 78 N.Y.U. L.R. 30,125-6.
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Chapter Six 
From Contract to Governing Arrangement
Contemporary investment treaties rely on a private model o f adjudication and, in 
form, investment arbitration may appear little different from commercial arbitration.1 
Like commercial arbitration, treaty-based investment arbitration involves a claim by a 
private party before a tribunal of private arbitrators appointed by the disputing parties. 
The proceedings are governed by rules that originate in commercial arbitration. The 
primary remedy is a damages award that can be enforced under the New York 
Convention and other instruments of international commercial arbitration. Even so, it is 
a mistake to confuse investment arbitration, pursuant to a treaty, with commercial 
arbitration.
Commercial arbitration is a matter of private law, constituted by an agreement 
between private parties, acting in a private capacity, to arbitrate disputes between 
themselves.2 The authority for commercial arbitration is private authority in that it 
originates in the autonomy o f individuals to order their private affairs as they wish.3 
Investment arbitration, on the other hand, originates in the authority o f the state to 
use adjudication to resolve disputes arising from the exercise of public authority; i.e. 
disputes within the regulatory sphere.4 As such, investment arbitration is constituted 
by a sovereign act — as opposed to a private act -  o f the state.
Under investment treaties, the exercise of public authority is represented above 
all by the state’s consent to compulsory arbitration. A private party’s consent to 
commercial arbitration is specific to the dispute or to the private relationship in which 
the dispute has arisen. In contrast, the state, by consenting generally to investment 
arbitration, agrees to the compulsory arbitration of future disputes with investors.5 
Giving a general consent requires the exercise of public authority in order to delegate
1 A. Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation” (1976) 89 Harv. L.R. 1281, 
1282-4; A. Redfem and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), 1-11.
2 Redfem and Hunter, ibid., 135.
3 Ibid, 135
4 E.V. Abbot, “The Police Power and the Right to Compensation” (1889) 3 Harv. L.R. 189; 
L.L. Fuller, “Consideration and Form” (1941) 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799, 806-8; Chayes, supra 
note 1,1294-5 and 1302.
5 Redfem and Hunter, supra note 1, 61.
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adjudicative authority over regulatory disputes to international tribunals and ultimately 
to the domestic courts o f  a large number o f countries.
A. The use of a private model of adjudication
Investment treaties rely on a private model o f adjudication in three respects. First, the 
claim is resolved by private arbitrators, two o f whom are appointed by the disputing 
parties.6 Second, the arbitration is governed by procedural rules that originate in 
private arbitration.7 Third, the award is enforceable under the enforcement structure 
of international commercial arbitration based on the New York Convention and other 
instruments.8 In each case, the states parties to the treaty have extended a private 
model o f adjudication that was originally intended for commercial disputes into the 
public domain.
6 The presiding arbitrator is normally appointed, in the absence of agreement between the 
disputing parties, by a designated appointing authority.
7 E.g. ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings in ICSID, revised 26 September 1984 
and 1 January 2003 (original rules 1968), reprinted in Convention, Regulations and Rjtles 
(Washington: ICSID, 2003), 93 [hereinafter ICSID Rules]; Arbitration Rules of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Caw, UN G.A. Res. 31/98, UN GAOR, 31st Session, 
Supp. No. 17, UN Doc. A/31/17, c. V, s. C (1976) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules]; and 
Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, revised 1 January 1998 (original rules 
1922) [hereinafter ICC Rules], online: ICC
www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/rules.asp. See North American Free Trade Agreement, 
17 December 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296 and 605 (entered into force 1 January 1994) [hereinafter 
NAFTA], art. 1120(1) (giving investors the choice of filing a claim under the ICSID Rules, 
the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, or the UNCITRAL Rules).
8 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 10 June 
1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 7 June 1959) [hereinafter New York Convention, Inter- 
American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, 30 January 1975,14 I.L.M. 336 
[hereinafter Inter-American Convention]; Model Taw on International Commercial Arbitration, 21 June 
1985, UNCITRAL, UN Doc. A/40/17, Annex 1,24 I.L.M. 1302 [hereinafter UNCITRAL 
Model Law].
Arbitrations pursuant to the ICSID Rules are subject to recognition and enforcement 
under the Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 18 March 1965, 4 I.L.M. 524 
(entered into force 14 Oct 1966) [hereinafter ICSID Convention], which provides an 
enforcement structure for investment arbitration generally, as opposed to an enforcement 
structure that was clearly originally intended for international commercial arbitration alone. 
However, all other investment arbitrations — including those pursuant to the ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules, the UNCITRAL Rules, and the ICC Rules — are subject to 
recognition and enforcement under the New York Convention and other instruments of 
international commercial arbitration. See chapter three of this thesis, page 79-80, note 58.
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The extension of a private model into the public domain is demonstrated by 
the incorporation into investment treaties o f the enforcement structure o f the New 
York Convention. The New York Convention was intended to govern arbitration in the 
private sphere and, as such, states could limit their obligations under the treaty to 
those arising from commercial disputes.9 Thus, the New York Convention preserved 
domestic judicial control over the scope o f international arbitration. In investment 
arbitration, though, the requirement that an award must arise from a commercial 
dispute to be enforceable under the New York Convention undermines the 
enforceability o f investment arbitration awards in the arbitration o f disputes arising 
from the exercise o f public authority.10 That is, a domestic court could refuse to 
recognize and enforce an award on the basis that the award did not arise from a 
commercial dispute. To address this, NAFTA (like other investment treaties) 
expressly provides:11
A claim that is submitted to arbitration under this Section shall be considered 
to arise out o f a commercial relationship or transaction for purposes o f Article 
I o f the New York Convention and Article I o f the Inter-American 
Convention.
Thus, NAFTA provides that Chapter 11 disputes -  for enforcement purposes -  are to 
be treated as disputes arising from a commercial relationship. This limits the authority
9 New York Convention, ibid., art. I. Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of International 
Arbitral Awards, UN ESC, UN Doc. E/AC.42/SR.1-3, 5-6 (First Meeting, 1 March 1955) and 
7-8 (Second Meeting, 23 March 1955) [hereinafter Report of the Committee\. See chapter two of 
this thesis, page 53-4, note 132-4.
10 New York Convention, ibid., art. 1(3). E.g. United Nations Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention Act, 
R.S.C. 1985, c.16, s. 4(1) (“The Convention applies only to difference arising out of 
commercial legal relationships, whether contractual or not”); Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 
c. 2 [hereinafter Federal Arbitration Acf[, s. 202. SeeAD F Group Inc. v. United States of America 
(Procedural Order No. 2) (11 July 2001), para. 12, online: State Department
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/5965.pdf (noting the claimant’s argument 
that U.S. arbitration law is uncertain as to whether it calls for judicial deference to investment 
arbitration awards, given that such awards may not be regarded as commercial arbitration 
awards).
11 NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 1136(7). The relevant “purposes” of Article I of the New York 
Convention and Article I of the Inter-American Convention are to allow the states parties to those 
treaties to limit their obligations to recognize and enforce awards to the arbitration of 
commercial disputes. In addition, NAFTA — and many other investment treaties — expressly 
provide that the states parties’ consents to compulsory investment arbitration shall also 
satisfy the consent requirements of other arbitration treaties, including the New York 
Convention, the ICSID Convention, and the Inter-American Convention'. NAFTA, art. 1122(2).
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of a domestic court to decline to enforce a Chapter 11 award on the grounds that 
doing so would unduly intrude on the exclusive jurisdiction o f domestic courts in the 
public sphere.12 More broadly, the provision establishes an obligation for the NAFTA 
states to refrain from characterizing an investment arbitration award as a non­
commercial award under domestic law in order to deny recognition and enforcement. 
This facilitates the extension o f the enforcement structure o f the New York Convention, 
originally intended for the private sphere, to arbitration in the regulatory sphere.
1. Tensions arising from the use of a private model
The use o f a private model of adjudication to resolve regulatory disputes has created 
tensions in investment arbitration. One tension involves the role o f private arbitrators. 
As discussed in chapter five of this thesis, arbitrators make policy decisions when they 
interpret investment treaties. However, arbitrators are usually practicing lawyers or 
academics and they compete for appointments in an international market for 
adjudicative services.13 Thus, arbitrators are not part o f a tenured judiciary, appointed 
by a public institution for a set term and financially independent o f the parties, 
including non-judicial branches of government.14 Unlike judges, arbitrators have a
12 AD F  (Procedural Order No. 2), supra note 10, 7 (noting that the NAFTA states have taken 
the position that NAFTA Article 1136(7) deems arbitrations under NAFTA Chapter 11 to 
be commercial stricdy for the purpose of recognition and enforcement of award, and 
specifically not for the purposes of court review of awards).
13 J. Wemer, “The Trade Explosion and Some Likely Effects on International Arbitration” 
(1997) 14J. Int’l Arb. 5,10; Y. Dezaley and B.G. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International 
Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996), 33; Y. Dezaley, “Between the State, Law, and the Market: The Social 
and Professional Stakes in the Construction and Definition of a Regulatory Arena” in W.W. 
Bratton et al., eds., International Regulatory Competition and Coordination (Oxford: Clarendon,
1996), 84-6; A.S. Rau, “Integrity in Private Judging” (1997) 38 South Texas L.R. 455, 488, 
496-7, and 521.
14 E.g. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 
November 1950, Eur. T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force 3 September 1953) 
[hereinafter ECHR], art. 22 (providing for the election of judges by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe by a majority of votes from a list of three candidates 
nominated by the state party whose judge is to be elected) and art. 23.1 and 24 (providing 
that judges are elected for a six year period unless the other judges decide by two-thirds 
majority that the judge has ceased to fulfil the required conditions). J.H. Ralston, “Some 
Suggestions as to the Permanent Court of Arbitration” (1907) 1 AJIL 321, 322-4 and 328-9;
179
commercial interest to provide “an efficacious and economically valuable service for 
clients”.15 Unlike judges, arbitrators are not barred from political or professional 
activities that are incompatible with their independence and impartiality.16 Indeed, 
many arbitrators provide other legal services to investors and states, including in other 
investment disputes. It is not uncommon for prominent figures in investment 
arbitration to sit as an arbitrator in one case, while representing an investor or state in 
another, while generally advising other clients on investment law.17 Thus, in principle, 
arbitrators appear more susceptible than judges to influence by concerns about their 
reputation and by the need to secure future business.18
S. de Smith and R. Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 8th ed. (London: Penguin, 
1998), 370 and 374.
15 R. Wai, “Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of 
Private International Law in an Era of Globalization” (2002) 40 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 209, 
217. See Redfem and Hunter, supra note 1, 209-10 (noting that, in the early 1990s, a practice 
emerged for shortlisted prospective party-nominated arbitrators to be interviewed by 
representatives of the prospective appointer. Commenting further that “the analogy between 
a judge and an arbitrator in this context should not be taken too far. A judge is a servant of 
the state and has responsibilities flowing from public policy which go beyond those of an 
arbitrator, whose responsibilities may be determined by the parties or by an arbitral 
institution under whose auspices the particular arbitration is being held.”).
16 NAFTA establishes a code of conduct for arbitrators under NAFTA Chapters 19 and 20, 
but not Chapter 11. Chapter 11 arbitrators are required to be independent from the 
appointing party but there are no express rules e.g. barring ex parte contacts with the 
appointing party, barring post-arbitration retainers, or imposing an ongoing duty to disclose. 
Compare ECHR, supra note 14, art 21.1 (providing that judges “shall be of high moral 
character and must either possess the qualifications required for appointment to high judicial 
office or be jurisconsults of recognised competence”) and art. 21.3 (providing that judges, 
during their term of office, “shall not engage in any activity which is incompatible with their 
independence, impartiality or with the demands of a full-time office”). J.G. Wetter, The 
International Arbitral Process — Public and Private, vol. 3 (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 
1979), 355; Rau, supra note 13, 493-4; interview with J.C. Thomas (19 February 2004) The 
Mandarin Knightsbridge Hotel, London.
17 Republic of Ghana v. Telekom Malaysia Berhad,, D.C. The Hague, 18 October 2004 and 5 
November 2004, No. HA/RK 2004.667 and HA/RK 2004.788 (concluding that a party- 
nominated arbitrator in an investment arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules could not 
concurrendy act as counsel to an unrelated party in an ICSID annulment proceeding that 
raised similar legal issues). See Companla deAguas delAconquija S A . &  Vivendi Universalv. 
Argentine Republic (Decision on Challenge to the President) (3 October 2001), 17 ICSID Rev. 
168, para. 21, citing Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia (Decision) (24 June 1982), ICSID 
Case No. ARB/81 /1 [unpublished]. See also Dezaley and Garth, supra note 13, 49-50; A. 
Cosbey et al., “Investment and Sustainable Development” (Report for the International 
Institute for Sustainable Development, 2004), 6; O. Guglielmino, “Analista senala 
arbitrariedad del sistema judicial; Demandas inverosimiles” La Nacion [Argentina] (17 January 
2005).
18 Rau, supra note 13, 488 and 521; A.F. Lowenfeld, “The Party-Appointed Arbitrator in 
International Controversies: Some Reflections” (1995) 30 Tex. Int’l L.J. 59, 65.
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This supports the conclusion that arbitrators are less independent and neutral 
than judges.19 The business opportunities o f arbitrators direcdy reflect the popularity 
o f investment arbitration. The greater the utility o f investment arbitration for 
investors, the more claims will be filed, the greater the demand for arbitrators.20 In 
this light, one can reasonably connect the tendency o f tribunals to interpret their own 
jurisdiction expansively to the commercial interests o f arbitrators.21 How often would 
claimants in the courts succeed if  judges depended on them for business? How 
clogged would the courts be if judges, like arbitrators, were paid by the case or by the 
day? As such, it is argued, arbitrators will attempt to make arbitration useful and 
attractive to multinational enterprises so long as this does not undermine the system 
in general. Thus, it is said, many arbitrators have a bias in favour o f expanding the 
scope and remedial power o f investment arbitration.22 Along the same lines, it is 
argued that many arbitrators cannot credibly resolve the matters o f public concern 
that arise in investment arbitration, especially where their background is in 
commercial law and given their distance from those affected by their decisions.23
19 L. Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) 92 Harv. L.R. 353, 396; Rau, 
supra note 13, 493-5; “The Secret Trade Courts”, Editorial New York Times (27 September 
2004) 26.
20 M. Somarajah, “Power and Justice in Foreign Investment Arbitration” (1997) 14 J. Int’l 
Arb. 103,117.
21 G. Jaenicke, “The Prospects for International Arbitration: Disputes Between States and 
Private Enterprises” in A.H.A. Soons, International Arbitration: Past and Prospects (Dordrecht, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1990), 158; A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, “Internationalization of Foreign 
Investment Agreements — Some Fundamental Issues of International Law” (2000) 1 J. World 
Investment 293, 311 (“Although it is expected that an international arbitral tribunal will have 
a sympathetic ear to the pleading of international law by a foreign investor...”); E. Gaillard, 
“Commentary” (2002) 18 Arb. Int’l 247, 249; C. McLachlan, “Commentary: The Broader 
Context” (2002) 18 Arb. Int’l 339, 340.
22 S. Picciotto, “A Critical Assessment of the MAI” in S. Picciotto and R. Mayne, eds., 
Regulating International Business (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1999), 94; M. Somarajah, “The Clash 
of Globalisations and the International Law on Foreign Investment” (Presentation to the 
Centre for Trade Policy and Law, Ottawa, 12 September 2002), 15, online: CTPL
http: /  /  www.carleton.ca/ctpl/ pdf/ papers /  somarajah.pdf. 18.
23 S.J. Toope, Mixed International Arbitration — Studies in Arbitration Between States and Private 
Persons (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1990), 391; B. Stem, “Comments — International 
Economic Relations and the MAI Dispute Settlement System” (1999) 16 J. Int’l Arb. 118, 
127; H. Mann and K. von Moltke, “NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and the Environment: Addressing 
the Impacts of the Investor-State Process on the Environment” (Working Paper for the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, 1999), 19-23; J.A. Soloway, 
“Environmental Regulation as Expropriation: The Case of NAFTA’s Chapter 11” (2000) 33 
Can. Bus. L.J. 92,124-6; Somarajah, ibid., 16.
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Notably, tribunals that tend toward the public function approach to investment 
arbitration are often presided over by former judges.24
These criticisms should not be misconstrued. Many arbitrators have an 
outstanding reputation and their skills and objectivity are beyond repute. In private 
arbitration, the commercial interests of arbitrators may be a plus where the disputing 
parties have freely and knowingly consented to the process and where the underlying 
reciprocity o f the adjudication causes both parties to bear the risk o f potential bias.25 
The issue here is the nature of investment arbitration as a public institution and the 
role of a private model o f adjudication in the resolution of regulatory disputes. No 
matter how well arbitrators do their job, an investment arbitration award will always 
be open to an apprehension of institutional bias against the state given that expansive 
interpretations o f the treaty and the heightened prospect o f state liability clearly 
promote investment arbitration. Moreover, arbitrators make decisions about the cost 
and appropriate role of government with important implications for legislative, 
administrative, and judicial decision-making. Few would argue that domestic 
legislative authority should be transferred to an international committee o f skilled and 
reputable legal drafters, jointly appointed by investors and states. Why should the 
authority to resolve regulatory disputes be delegated to private adjudicators?
Let us turn to the arbitration rules. The rules that are most often used in 
investment arbitration are the ICSID Rules, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, the 
UNCITRAL Rules, the ICC Rules, and the Stockholm Rules.26 Each o f these sets of 
rules originates in a private model o f adjudication; i.e. in the adjudication of disputes 
between private parties (even if one o f those parties is the state, acting in a private
24 E.g. The Tioemn Group, Inc. and Raymond L  Laewen v. United States of America (Merits) (26 June
2003), 42 I.L.M. 811,15(5) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 97 [hereinafter Loewen], para. 222-3 
and 233 (presided over by Sir Anthony Mason); AD F Group Inc. v. United States of America 
(Merits) (9 January 2003), 15(3) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 55 (Judge F.P. Feliciano); SGS 
Societe Generale de Surveillance v. Pakistan (Jurisdiction) (6 August 2003), 18 ICSID Rev. 307, 
16(2) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 167 (Judge F.P. Feliciano).
25 Rau, supra note 13, 523-4.
26 ICSID Rules, supra note 7; Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of 
Proceedings by the Secretariat of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, revised 1 
January 2003 (original rules 1978), 1 ICSID Reports 213 [hereinafter ICSID Additional 
Facility Rules], online: ICSID www.worldbank.org/icsid/facilitv-archive/l.htm: UNCITRAL 
Rules, supra note 7; ICC Rules, supra note 7; and Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce, revised 1 April 1999 [hereinafter Stockholm Rules], online: SCC 
www.sccinstitute.com/uk/Rules.
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capacity). Also, some aspects o f these sets o f rules, because they are based on private 
law principles, are out o f place in the adjudication o f public disputes. For example, a 
fundamental principle o f public law adjudication for both domestic and international 
courts is openness.27 That is, adjudication in the public courts should take place in 
public, with limited exceptions,28 and relevant documents and decisions should be a 
matter o f public record. If  public law adjudication was not fully transparent in this 
way, it would not be subject to public scrutiny and matters affecting the wider 
community could be decided in secret. Openness in the adjudication o f regulatory 
disputes is a precondition for the public accountability o f decision-making.
These principles of openness and accountability conflict with rules o f 
confidentiality that govern private arbitration based on party autonomy.29 In 
commercial arbitration it is normally assumed that the existence o f an arbitration, the 
identity o f the arbitrators, the materials submitted, the arguments made, and the 
award itself should remain confidential unless the disputing parties agree otherwise.30 
This may be appropriate in the context of a commercial dispute that relates only to 
the parties and that does not engage matters o f broad public concern.31 In investment 
arbitration, though, the incorporation of rules o f confidentiality from commercial 
arbitration means that public disputes are resolved in private.32
27 E.g. ECHR, supra note 14, art. 40 (providing that hearings of the court shall take place in 
public and that documents deposited with the Registry made accessible to public). B. Legum, 
“Federalism, NAFTA Chapter Eleven and the Jay Treaty of 1783” (2001) 18(1) ICSID News 
6 .
28 Such as for reasons of public interest privilege, national security, and business 
confidentiality.
29 Cosbey et al., supra note 17, 4-5; M. Stevens, “Confidentiality Revisited” (2000) 17(1)
ICSID News 2, 2.
30 E.g. ICSID Convention, supra note 8, art. 48(5); ICSID Administrative and "Financial Regulations, 
reprinted in Convention, Regulations and Rules (Washington: ICSID, 2003), 51, reg. 22(2); ICSID 
Rules, supra note 7, rule 48(4) and 6(2); ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 26, art. 
4(5) and art. 13(2) and 53(3) (Schedule C); UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 26, art. 25(4) and 
32(5).
31 The primary rationale for allowing confidentiality in international commercial arbitration is 
respect for party autonomy: Report of the Secretary-General: Revised Draft Set of Arbitration Rulesfor 
Optional Use in A d  Hoc Arbitration Relating to International Trade (UNCITRAL, Arbitration Rules), 
UN, UN Doc. A/CN.9/112/Add.l (12 December 1975), 7 Y.B. UNCITRAL 166,175 (art. 
22(4), commentary); Report of the Secretary-General: Analytical Commentary on Draft Text of a Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration, UN, UN Doc. A/CN.9/264 (25 March 1985), 16 
Y.B. UNCITRAL 104 [hereinafter Model Law Report^ , 124 (art. 19, commentary).
32 NAFTA, supra note 7, annex 1137:4 (providing that, in a NAFTA Chapter 11 claim against 
Canada or the United States, either the host state or the investor can make an award public).
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Under NAFTA, the issue o f confidentiality arose in a number o f early Chapter 
11 arbitrations leading to different approaches by tribunals.33 The NAFTA text does 
not itself resolve the question of openness one way or the other, although the 
applicable arbitration rules appear to support a presumption in favour of 
confidentiality.34 Applying these rules, a number of Chapter 11 tribunals declined to 
publish materials or permit public access to proceedings without the consent of the 
parties to the dispute.35 However, in 2002, the NAFTA states intervened by 
announcing that they would publish all documents submitted to or issued by Chapter 
11 tribunals, and that they interpreted NAFTA so as not to prevent the NAFTA 
states from releasing materials relating to Chapter 11 claims against them.36 Thus, the 
arbitration rules were subordinated to the NAFTA states’ interpretation o f the treaty. 
Even so, confidentiality remains the dominant principle in investment arbitration 
under other investment treaties.37
The use o f a private model o f adjudication also causes tension in relation to 
the accountability o f arbitration tribunals to domestic courts. As mentioned,
Because this provision applied only to the publication of awards, it left open the possibility 
that other materials relating to a Chapter 11 claim could not be released without the consent 
of both the respondent state and the investor. This state of affairs was addressed by the Free 
Trade Commission’s interpretation of 31 July 2001: infra note 36). P.I. Hansen, 
“Judicialization and Globalization in the North American Free Trade Agreement” (2003) 38 
Texas Int’l L.J. 489, 500-1; B. Legum, “Trends and Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration” 
(2003) 19 Arb. Int’l 143,145.
33 See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada (Procedural Order No. 3 and 11) (10 June 1999 
and 11 November 1999) [hereinafter S.D. Myers], online: DFAIT http: / / www.dfait- 
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents 7myers5.pdf: Pope <& Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada 
(Merits, Phase 2) (10 April 2001), 13(4) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 61 [hereinafter Pope &  
Talbof[, para. 17. Compare Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States (Procedural 
Order No. 5) (6 December 2000), para. 10-11, online: Ministry of Economy
http://www.economia-
snci.gob.mx/sphp pages/importa/sol contro/consultoria/Casos Mexico/Marvin/ordenes 
/Order 5.pdf.
34 UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 26, art. 32(5) (“The award may be made public only with the 
consent of both parties”); ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 26, art. 44(2).
35 Fthyl Corporation v. Government of Canada (Procedural Order, 13 October 1997 and 
subsequent Procedural Order, undated), para. 9 and para. 2-3, online: DFAIT
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/ethvl5.pdf: S.D. Myers, supra note 33; Pope 
&  Talbot, supra note 33; Pope &  Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada (Merits, Phase 2) (10 April 
2001), 13(4) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 61, para. 17.
36 Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (31 July 2001), 
13(6) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 139, art. A, online: DFAIT www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna- 
nac/NAFTA-Interpr-en.asp.
37 Stevens, supra note 29, 2.
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investment treaties incorporate the enforcement structure o f international commercial 
arbitration, which governs the recognition and enforcement (and execution38) of 
awards. Reliance on this structure fragments and restricts judicial supervision o f 
investment arbitration. Judicial supervision is fragmented because investors can 
pursue enforcement of an award in any state that is a party to the New York Convention 
or other relevant treaty, thus dividing supervisory responsibility among the courts o f a 
large number o f countries.39 Judicial supervision is restricted because the enforcement 
structure limits the setting aside or non-recognition o f awards by domestic courts to 
the grounds enumerated in the treaty or relevant legislation. In international 
commercial arbitration, restricting judicial supervision was justified on the rationale 
that the courts should not interfere with choices of private parties to resolve 
commercial disputes in an alternative forum of their choosing. However, in the case 
o f investment arbitration, the enforcement structure tends to disperse and insulate the 
authority o f tribunals.
Moreover, the use o f the structure of international commercial arbitration 
gives arbitrators and investors direct control over the accountability o f investment 
arbitration tribunals to the courts. Tribunals often choose the legal seat of the 
arbitration,40 thus selecting the domestic law that will apply to an application to pre­
empt the arbitration or set aside an award.41 Investors decide where to seek
38 Once an award has been recogni2ed and enforced by the courts of a state party to the 
ICSID Convention, the New York Convention, or the Inter-American Convention, it is subject to 
execution against the respondent state’s assets in the enforcing state’s territory.
39 Republic of Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration and Production Company (29 April 2005), [2005] 
E.W.C.H. 774, para. 76 and 84 (Comm. Ct.). C.N. Brower, C.H. Brower II, and J.K. Sharpe, 
“The Coming Crisis in the Global Adjudicative System” (2003) 19 Arb. Int’l 415, 419.
40 E.g. NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 1130 (providing that tribunals “shall hold an arbitration in 
the territory of a [NAFTA state] that is a party to the New York Convention” unless the 
disputing parties agree otherwise). Also, tribunals are normally required to select the seat of 
the arbitration in accordance with the arbitration rules under which the investor claim is filed. 
The UNCITRAL Rules (supra note 26, art. 16(1)) and ICSID Additional Facility Rules (supra 
note 26, art. 21 of sched. C) grant tribunals the authority to choose the seat of the arbitration 
unless the parties agree otherwise. Arbitrations under the ICSID Rules are held at the seat of 
the ICSID, in Washington D.C., unless the parties agree to hold the arbitration at an 
institution with which ICSID has made arrangements (ICSID Convention, supra note 8, art. 62- 
3) or at another institution with the approval of the tribunal (ICSID Rules, supra note 26, rule 
13(3)).
41 W. Peter, Arbitration and Renegotiation of International Investment Agreements (The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, 1995), 284-5; W.M. Reismann, Systems of Control in International 
Adjudication and Arbitration (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992), 127.
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enforcement o f an award, thus determining the domestic law that will apply to the 
enforcement o f the award.42 In both cases, arbitrators and investors can choose from 
a variety o f jurisdictions in which domestic law provides for differing levels of 
deference to foreign arbitration awards. Moreover, in their efforts to attract 
international arbitration business, states typically attempt to raise their appeal to 
arbitrators by adopting liberal rules of enforcement for foreign awards.43
In sum, the use of a private model o f adjudication has created tensions in 
investment arbitration. Private arbitrators are open to the reproach that their 
decisions are influenced by their own business interests. Confidentiality provisions in 
the arbitration rules require public disputes to be adjudicated in private. The 
recognition and enforcement of awards based on the existing legal structure o f 
international commercial arbitration reduces the accountability o f tribunals to 
domestic courts. In each respect, the use o f a private model undermines the 
independence, openness, and accountability of investment arbitration. But this is so 
only if one accepts that investment arbitration is a method o f public law adjudication. 
In fact, the use of a private model has prompted commentators and adjudicators to 
characterize investment arbitration as a form of international commercial arbitration.
2. The confusion o f investment arbitration for private arbitration
Investment arbitration has been approached by some as a form o f international 
commercial arbitration.44 This approach treats the investor and the state simply as 
disputing parties in a private arbitration and, in so doing, it neglects the origins of 
investment arbitration in the exercise o f public authority. Two instances in which an 
arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11 was approached in this way are reviewed below.
42 Typically, this decision would be driven, first, by the location of assets of the state and, 
secondly, by the enforceability of awards in that jurisdiction.
43 Peter, supra note 41, 284-5; M.J. Mustill, “Arbitration: History and Background” (1989) 6 J. 
Int’l Arb. 43, 50; Dezaley and Garth, supra note 13, 7; Y. Dezaley, supra note 13, 84-6.
44 W. Mattli, “Private Justice in a Global Economy: From Litigation to Arbitration” (2001) 55 
Int’l Org. 919, 945; D.F. Donovan, “Introduction to Articles -  Dallas Workshop on 
Arbitrating with Sovereigns” (2002) 18 Arb. Int’l 229, 229; G.A. Alvarez and W.W. Park,
“The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11” (2003) 28 Yale J. Int’l L.
365, 393; Brower et al., supra note 39, 415 and 432-5. See Toope, supra note 23, 389 (noting 
the tendency to approach investment arbitration “purely as a subcategory of international 
commercial arbitration and thus infused with the values of that process”).
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In each instance, the misapprehension of investment arbitration led to over-emphasis 
o f rules and principles o f commercial arbitration at the expense o f principles that 
usually apply to the adjudication of a regulatory dispute.
The Pope &  Talbot dispute was discussed in chapter five of this thesis. In that 
dispute, the tribunal awarded damages to a U.S. investor after concluding that 
Canada’s implementation o f the Softwood Lumber Agreement violated the NAFTA 
minimum standard o f treatment (Article 1105). To reach this conclusion, the Pope <& 
Talbot tribunal interpreted the NAFTA minimum standard broadly and this 
interpretation was later rejected by the NAFTA states through a Free Trade 
Commission interpretation.45 In response, the Pope <& Talbot tribunal pursued an 
exchange o f letters with Canada (the respondent state) and the other NAFTA states 
about the validity o f the Free Trade Commission interpretation. For example, the 
tribunal asked Canada to explain how the interpretation should be applied and 
whether it should be viewed to have retroactive effect.46 The tribunal also challenged 
Canada to clarify the circumstances in which the interpretation was issued by the Free 
Trade Commission, asking to be informed of “what caused the Commission to take 
action in this manner and what the members were told about the effects o f their 
action on this case”.47 Finally, the tribunal took the position that it was improper for 
Canada, as a party to the dispute, to also participate in the deliberations of the Free 
Trade Commission.48 The tribunal stated that this violated the “rule of international 
law that no one shall be judge in his own case” .49
The concerns expressed by the Pope <& Talbot tribunal demonstrates a 
misconception regarding the character of a Chapter 11 dispute. The tribunal’s 
concerns may have been pertinent had the tribunal been a commercial arbitration 
tribunal, interpreting the contract that authorized the arbitration based on the 
intentions o f the disputing parties. But the authority o f a Chapter 11 tribunal
45 Free Trade Commission, supra note 36.
46 Pope dr Talbot (Letters of Lord Dervaird, Presiding Arbitrator) (14 August 2001 and 17 
September 2001), online: DFAIT http:/ / www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/phases-en.asp#l.
47 Pope dr Talbot (Letter, 17 September 2001), ibid., 2.
48 Pope dr Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada (Damages) (31 May 2002), 41 I.L.M. 1347,14(6) 
World Trade and Arb. Mat. 44, para. 13.
49 Ibid.
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originates in an agreement between states.50 Chapter 11 tribunals are authorized by a 
treaty and by the general consents of the states parties. Thus, the authority of a 
tribunal is bounded by the terms of the treaty which expressly provides that the 
NAFTA states — acting through the Free Trade Commission — can issue a binding 
interpretation of the treaty.51 This necessarily implies that the NAFTA states could 
take part in the Free Trade Commission while responding to a Chapter 11 claim. 
Indeed, it is difficult to see how else the NAFTA states could interpret the treaty 
other than in the context o f ongoing claims. However unfair this might seem from a 
private law perspective, a Chapter 11 tribunal must apply a Free Trade Commission 
interpretation because states are entitled to attach conditions to their consent to 
investment arbitration.52
The irony o f the overlapping functions o f the state manifests itself in domestic 
and international law. As the repository o f public authority, the state acts in a range of 
legal capacities based on a separation of powers.53 In the domestic sphere, different 
branches o f the state’s governing apparatus may wield authority over one another: a 
decision o f the administration may be overturned by the courts who are in turn 
subject to parliamentary supremacy. Likewise, in the international sphere, a state may 
be held accountable to an international tribunal that is in turn subject to the authority 
o f the states parties to a treaty. In NAFTA Chapter 11, this irony emerges in the dual 
role o f each NAFTA state as both respondent to investor claims and interpreter of 
the treaty. The Pope <& Talbot tribunal questioned the validity o f the Free Trade 
Commission’s interpretation because the tribunal saw Canada as merely a disputing 
party in a private arbitration. But there was more to Canada’s role. Canada was 
participating in an adjudicative system that Canada had itself established as part o f a
50 J. Paulsson, “Arbitration without Privity” (1995) 10 ICSID Rev. 232, 232.
51 NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 1131(2).
52 At the oral hearings in Pope &  Talbot, the presiding arbitrator reportedly asked whether the 
NAFTA Parties “can simply interpret [the treaty] as widely, as bizarrely... as they like, and 
that must be binding on all future tribunals” (Pope &  Talbot (Investor’s Submissions) (14 
December 2001), para. 29, online: DFAIT http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-
nac/documents/C-8.pdf). The answer must be yes: the NAFTA makes no provision for a 
tribunal to sit in judgment of the NAFTA Parties no matter how wrong their interpretation 
might appear to the tribunal.
53 W.W. Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Taw (New York: Macmillan, 1924), 49- 
50; E. Barendt, “Separation of Powers and Constitutional Government” (1995) Pub. L. 599, 
601.
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bargain with the other NAFTA states, and over which Canada exercised authority 
based on the treaty. From a public law perspective there was no basis for the Pope <& 
Talbot tribunal to question the structure of NAFTA by doubting the validity o f the 
Free Trade Commission’s interpretation. The tribunal mistook Canada’s sovereign 
acts — as a participant in the arbitration and the Free Trade Commission — for the acts 
o f a private party.
Another example o f the misapprehension o f Chapter 11 arbitration as 
commercial arbitration is provided by the Federal Court o f Canada’s decision to reject 
an application to set aside the S.D. Myers award under Chapter l l . 54 In that decision, 
Kelen J. adopted a deferential approach to Chapter 11 tribunals based on principles of 
international commercial arbitration. According to Kelen J.:55
Courts restrain themselves from exercising judicial review with respect to 
international arbitration tribunals so as to be sensitive to the need o f a system 
for predictability in the resolution o f disputes and to preserve the autonomy of 
the arbitration forum selected by the parties.
Once again, this characterisation o f Chapter 11 arbitration fails to account for its 
public law origins. In international commercial arbitration, the need to “preserve the 
autonomy of the arbitration forum selected by the parties” arises from the disputing 
parties’ agreement to arbitrate a dispute between them. In treaty-based investment 
arbitration, however, the arbitration forum was not chosen by the parties to the 
dispute. Rather, it was chosen by the Parties to the treaty via their general consents to 
compulsory arbitration. Only after the Parties to the treaty created this arbitration 
forum could an investor choose to make a claim.
Elsewhere in his decision, Kelen J. compared the respondent state’s duty to 
raise jurisdictional objections at an early stage to the domestic legal duty o f a party — 
under the Canadian Federal Court A c t— to raise constitutional issues in the initial notice 
o f claim.56 In fact, these duties operate quite differently, revealing the uniqueness of
54Attorney General of Canada v. S.D. Myers, Inc, [2004] 3 F.C.R. 368, 5 C.E.L.R. (3d) 166 
(F.C.T.D.), Kelen J. [hereinafter A.G. v. S.D. Myers]. See S.D. Myers Inc. v. Government of 
Canada (Merits) (13 November 2000), 40 I.L.M. 1408,15(1) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 184.
55 Ibid., para. 38 [emphasis added]. Note that Kelen J. also acknowledged the distinction 
between “international arbitration between two private parties” and “investor-State 
arbitration”.
56 Ibid., para. 54.
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investment arbitration. The Federal Court A ct requirement to raise a constitutional issue 
at an early stage falls on the individual who claims that the constitution was violated. 
The main purpose o f the rule is to allow the state to respond to constitutional claims 
in the first instance and to participate in the calling o f evidence. In contrast, the duty 
to object that an investment arbitration tribunal lacks jurisdiction can only fall on the 
respondent state. This is because only the state has reason to object to a tribunal’s 
overly broad interpretation of the tribunal’s jurisdiction. For investors, an overly 
broad interpretation of jurisdiction facilitates the bringing o f a claim. Thus, in 
investment arbitration, the duty to object works to the advantage of the claimant 
while, in a constitutional challenge, the rule advantages the state.
In analogizing these respective duties, Kelen J. effectively equated the state, in 
investment arbitration, to a private party under domestic law. In doing so, Kelen J. 
appeared not to identify an important distinction between investment arbitration and 
commercial arbitration. In treaty-based investment arbitration, the state only acts as 
the respondent to a claim that the state has breached a treaty. In other words, the 
state only acts in a public capacity. On the other hand, in commercial arbitration, the 
state acts in a private capacity. This distinction is elaborated below. Here the point is 
simply that the role of the state in investment arbitration should not be analogized to 
that o f a private party in domestic adjudication.
Other tribunals have distinguished investment arbitration from international 
commercial arbitration.57 In particular, the Uoewen tribunal described Chapter 11 
arbitration in these terms:58
It is true that some aspects of the resolution o f disputes arising in relation to 
private international commerce are imported into the NAFTA system..., and 
that the handling of disputes within that system by professionals experienced
57 E.g. Laewen, supra note 24, para. 233; United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Government of 
Canada (Participation by Amid Curiae) (17 October 2001), para. 70, online: DFAIT
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/IntVent oct.pdf. See e.g. Banro American 
Resources, Inc. and Societe Aurifere du Kirn et du Maniema SA.ILL. v. Democratic Rfpublic of the 
Congo (Jurisdiction) (1 September 2000), 17 ICSID Rev. 382, para. 24; CME Republic B.V. v. 
C e^ch Republic (Damages) (14 March 2003), 15(4) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 83 and 245, 
para. 74 (separate opinion); SGS Societe Generate de Surveillances. Philippines (Jurisdiction) (29 
January 2004), 16(3) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 91 [hereinafter SGS v. Philippines), para. 142; 
Tokios Tokelesv. Ukraine (Jurisdiction) (29 April 2004), 16(4) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 75, 
para. 24 and 28 (dissenting opinion).
58 Laewen, supra note 24, para. 233.
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in the handling of major international arbitrations has tended in practice to 
make a NAFTA arbitration look like a more familiar kind of process. But this 
apparent resemblance is misleading. The two forms o f process, and the rights 
which they enforce, have nothing in common. There is no warrant for 
transferring rules derived from private law into a field o f international law 
where claimants are permitted for convenience to enforce what are in origin 
the rights o f Party states.
Thus, principles o f private arbitration were considered irrelevant to investment 
arbitration despite the use o f a private model of adjudication. The Laewen tribunal 
supported this conclusion by positioning investment arbitration in the context of 
public international law:59
Rights of action under private law arise from personal obligations (albeit they 
may be owed by or to a State) brought into existence by domestic law and 
enforceable through domestic tribunals and courts. NAFTA claims have a 
quite different character, stemming from a corner o f public international law in 
which, by treaty, the power o f States under that law to take international 
measures for the correction o f wrongs done to its nationals has been replaced 
by an ad hoc definition of certain kinds of wrong, coupled with specialist 
means o f compensation. These means are both distinct from and exclusive o f 
the remedies for wrongful acts under private law....
Whatever one’s views o f the Laewen award as a whole, in these passages the tribunal 
captured an essential element of treaty-based investment arbitration. The tribunal 
showed an appreciation for the uniqueness of the use o f international adjudication 
beyond the domain o f “wrongful acts under private law”. Also, the tribunal 
acknowledged that the use of a private model of adjudication does not alter the public 
nature o f the dispute. The significance of using a private model lies in the form, not 
the substance, of the adjudication.
B. Distinguishing investment arbitration from commercial arbitration
At root, the misapprehension of investment arbitration as international commercial 
arbitration confuses public for private authority. This is demonstrated by the role of 
the general consent in transforming international arbitration from a reciprocally
59 Ibid.
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consensual method o f adjudication into a governing arrangement. Historically, 
international arbitration between private parties was limited to commercial disputes.60 
This held true even where the arbitration involved a dispute between an investor and 
a state: by agreeing to an arbitration clause in a contract, the state acted in a private 
capacity61 as part of a commercial relationship.62 In these circumstances, the scope of 
investment arbitration — culminating in the recognition and enforcement of an award 
— was limited to the private sphere. As discussed in chapter two of this thesis, states 
have only recently expanded the model o f international commercial arbitration to the 
regulatory sphere.
60 See chapter two of this thesis, page 53-4, note 132-4.
61 In some cases, the contract might arguably go beyond the private sphere, such as in the 
case of a long term concession that impacted fundamentally on the host state’s economy: 
S.K.B. Asante, Transnational Investment Taw and National Development (Lagos: University of 
Lagos, 1981), 65 and 69.
62 What emerges from the drafting history of the New York Convention is an intent to ensure 
that the treaty would apply to contracts involving states agencies, but not encompass the 
wider public sphere: Report of the Committee, supra note 9, 5 and 8 (Second Meeting, 23 March 
1955) and 6 (Third Meeting, 23 March 1955). Likewise, the drafting of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law indicates an intention to define “commerce” so as to capture commercial 
activities of state entities but not to apply arbitration within the public sphere: Model Taw 
Report, supra note 31,10-11; Report of the Secretary-General: Possible Features of a Model Taw on 
International Commercial Arbitration, UN, UN Doc. A/CN.9/207 (14 May 1981), (1981) 12 Y.B. 
UNCITRAL 77 [hereinafter Preliminary Model Taw Report, 82-3. An original draft of Article I 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law which proposed that the Model Law apply to “economic” 
rather than “commercial” transactions was rejected: Note by the Secretariat: Model Taw on 
International Commercial Arbitration: Draft Articles 1 to 24 on Scope of Application, Arbitration 
Agreement, Arbitrators, and Arbitral Procedure, UN, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.37 (1982), 51.
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1. The nature o f commercial arbitration
Commercial arbitration is a private form o f adjudication authorized by the will o f the 
disputing parties.63 As a matter o f private law, commercial arbitration is governed by 
private law principles beginning with the supremacy of party autonomy, which is the 
normative starting point for commercial arbitration.64 The principle o f party 
autonomy posits that voluntary decisions o f individuals about their affairs should be 
respected and enforced by the state. Honouring party autonomy means respecting the 
decision o f individuals who, in doing business, agree to arbitrate disputes that could 
arise between them. The mutual consent o f the parties creates an “agreement to 
arbitrate” which is the “foundation stone” of international commercial arbitration.65 
The arbitration exists as a result o f the agreement o f the parties and the authority for 
the arbitration is a matter o f contract.66
Commercial arbitration arose as an alternative to the public courts.67 
Individuals could agree to have disputes between them resolved by private arbitrators 
rather than by judges. The use o f arbitration may be preferred because it is faster and 
cheaper than the courts, governed by rules chosen by the parties, or kept 
confidential.68 At the international level, arbitration could also be used to fill gaps 
between legal systems and avoid problems in enforcing o f decisions of foreign 
courts.69 For states, one reason to endorse international commercial arbitration was to 
facilitate the efficient resolution of cross-border business disputes.70 International
63 Preliminary Model Law Report, ibid., 78 (“Probably the most important principle on which the 
model law should be based is the freedom of the parties in order to facilitate the proper 
fimctioning of international commercial arbitration according to their expectations. This 
would allow them to freely submit their disputes to arbitration and to tailor the ‘rules of the 
game’ to their specific needs.”). See also UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 8, art. 19(1).
64 Fuller, supra note 4, 806-8; Redfem and Hunter, supra note 1, 7 and 247; L.Y. Fortier, 
“Delimiting the Spheres of Judicial and Arbitral Power” (2000) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 143,147-8.
65 Redfem and Hunter, supra note 1,135.
66 Fuller, supra note 19, 392-3; Rau, supra note 13, 486-7; Redfem and Hunter, supra note 1, 8. 
But see H.-L. Yu and L. Shore, “Independence, Impartiality, and Immunity of Arbitrators — 
U.S. and English Perspectives” (2003) 52 I.C.L.Q 935, 965-7.
67 Dezaley and Garth, supra note 13, 27-30.
68 United States, Department of Commerce, Office of the Chief Counsel for International 
Commerce, International Arbitration (1998); Redfem and Hunter, supra note 1, 23-5.
69 Redfem and Hunter, supra note 1,12-13.
70 Report of the Committee (First Meeting, 1 March 1955), supra note 9, 5-6.
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commercial arbitration could be structured so as to take place in a neutral jurisdiction 
that did not favour one private party over the other.71 This facilitated commerce by 
building confidence among actors from different countries in the prospect for fair, 
prompt, and effective adjudication.
The principle o f party autonomy calls for the parties’ agreement to arbitrate to 
be respected by states and, in particular, by domestic courts.72 Thus: the agreement to 
arbitrate should be honoured by the home state o f each disputing party, and by other 
states. The arbitration process should be insulated from oversight by domestic courts 
within the bounds o f consent and basic procedural fairness.73 Where the arbitration 
falls within the scope of the agreement to arbitrate, an application by the unsuccessful 
party to stay the arbitration or set aside an award should be dismissed.74 Likewise, an 
award should be recognized and enforced by the courts so long as the process was 
not seriously unfair and so long as the arbitration did not exceed the scope o f the 
parties’ agreement.75 As a general principle, no one state’s conception o f justice or 
policy should be imposed where it conflicts with the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.76
This does not mean that the state does not exercise public authority in relation 
to private arbitration.77 Arbitration depends on the coercive power o f the state to 
permit the enforcement of awards.78 For this reason, the state may override 
agreements to arbitrate in order to limit the use o f private adjudication for various
71 Here, “neutrality” refers to neutrality between the disputing parties, not between the state 
and an investor in the context of a regulatory dispute: see chapter seven of this thesis, page 
228-9.
72 Preliminary Model Law Report, supra note 62, 78. See also Lord Saville, “Denning Lecture 
1995: Arbitration and the Courts” (1995) 61 Arbitration — J. Institute of Chartered 
Arbitrators 157,157.
73 A. Bucher, “Court Intervention in Arbitration” in R. Lillich and C.N. Brower, eds., 
International Arbitration in the 21st Century: Towards Judicialization and Uniformity? 
(Ardsley, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 1994), 29; Redfem and Hunter, supra note 1, 280-1.
74 E.g. Gulf Canada Resources Ltd. v. Arochem International Inc. (1992), 66 B.C.L.R. (2d) 113, 43 
C.P.R. (3d) 390, para. 43. Redfem and Hunter, supra note 1, 260; S. Kierstead, “Referral to 
Arbitration Under Article 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law: The Canadian Approach” (1998) 
31 Can. Bus. L.J. 98,101-2.
75 Redfem and Hunter, supra note 1, 70 and 135.
76 Rau, supra note 13, 539; Redfem and Hunter, supra note 1, 431-2 and 471-4.
77 Fuller, supra note 4, 808-9; Reismann, supra note 41,1; D.M. Gruner, “Accounting for the 
Public Interest in International Arbitration: The Need for Procedural and Structural Reform” 
(2003) 41 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 923, 924; E.H. Bouzari, “The Public Policy Exception to 
Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards: Implications for Post-NAFTA 
Jurisprudence” (1995) 30 Texas Int’l L.J. 205, 214 and 221.
78 Redfem and Hunter, supra note 1,11 and 341; Yu and Shore, supra note 66, 964.
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reasons, such as to protect the interests of the weaker party, third parties, or the 
public interest.79 That said, most states — in part to facilitate international commerce — 
have decided to limit their involvement with respect to private agreements to 
arbitrate.80 For this reason, the decision to consent to compulsory arbitration is 
portentous: “By agreeing to arbitrate, parties give up one o f the basic rights o f the 
citizens o f any civilised community — that is to say, the right to go to their own courts 
o f law”.81
This conceptual framework characterizes commercial arbitration as an 
autonomous system that is separate from the public sphere. So long as a dispute exists 
within the private sphere, individuals can choose an alternative forum for the 
resolution o f disputes between them. In turn, the courts should show deference to 
commercial arbitration, starting with the recognition o f agreements to arbitrate and 
ending with the execution o f an award. However, this approach is irrelevant to treaty- 
based investment arbitration. In investment treaties, states incorporate aspects o f the 
rules and structure o f private arbitration. Nevertheless, the authority for investment 
arbitration originates in the consents o f states, acting in a sovereign capacity.
2. Arbitration as contract: the specific consent
Private arbitration, and the principle of party autonomy, originates in the consent of 
private parties, acting in a private capacity. Private parties consent to arbitration by 
agreeing to arbitrate an existing or future dispute. The agreement to arbitrate can be 
concluded either after the dispute has arisen or in advance. Where the consent is 
given after the dispute has arisen, the consent is specific to the dispute. Where the 
consent is given in advance, the consent is specific to the relationship between the 
parties. In either case, the consent is limited to a particular dispute or private 
relationship.
79 C^amikow v. Roth, Schmidt &  Co. [1922] 2 K.B. 478, 488. O.M. Fiss, “Against Settlement” 
(1984) 93 Yale L.J. 1073,1085-6; Rau, supra note 13, 512; M.A. Scodro, “Arbitrating Novel 
Legal Questions: A Recommendation for Reform” (1996) 105 Yale L.J. 1927,1947-9.
80 As demonstrated by the number of states that have ratified the New York Convention (more 
than 120) and passed domestic legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law (more than 
40).
81 Redfem and Hunter, supra note 1, 5 and 22.
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The degree o f specificity of a consent to arbitration affects the jurisdiction of 
an arbitration tribunal.82 It also reflects the degree to which the disputing parties have 
conceded their right to adjudicate in the courts. In principle, arbitration that is 
authorized by an agreement to arbitrate based on a specific consent cannot go beyond 
the private relationship between the disputing parties. That is, the subject matter of 
the dispute cannot in principle engage matters that affect the interests o f either third 
parties or the state in the regulatory sphere. This is because neither third parties nor 
the state (acting in a public capacity) have consented to the arbitration.83
This does not mean that a state cannot specifically consent to private 
arbitration. On the contrary, a state can consent to private arbitration just like any 
other private party when the state acts in a private capacity. Public officials may 
contract with a company for the supply o f goods or services and agree to arbitrate 
disputes arising from the contract.84 Where the state consents to arbitration in a 
contract, the arbitration is a form of commercial arbitration (albeit unique in that it 
involves the state acting as a private party).85 The state’s consent flows from the 
state’s entry into private domain and forms part o f an agreement to arbitrate with 
another private party.86 Likewise, the state’s consent is specific either to the dispute or 
to the relevant commercial relationship. In principle, the consent does not affect third 
parties, investors in general, or the public at large, since the consent is limited to a 
private relationship.
International commercial arbitration may encompass disputes between a state 
and a foreign investor. In such cases, the arbitration is a form o f contract-based
82 Redfem and Hunter, supra note 1, 8.
83 In some cases a private arbitration may affect third parties or the state, although the degree 
to which this is the case is usually regulated by the state. Since the 1980s, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has adopted a pro-arbitration stance by allowing the arbitration of disputes that engage 
the interests of third parties and the general public: Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler 
Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627-37 (1985) [hereinafter Mitsubishi
84 E.g. Baccus v. S.R.L. Servicio Nacional delTrigo, [1957] 1 Q.B. 438 (C.A.) (regarding the 
arbitration of a dispute arising from a sales contract between a private company and an 
agency of the Spanish government).
85 J.P. Carver, “The Strengths and Weaknesses of International Arbitration Involving a State 
as a Party: Practical Implications” (1985) 1 Arb. Int’l 179,180; Toope, supra note. 23, 391-400; 
C. Larsen, “International Commercial Arbitration”, ASIC  Insights (April 1997), 1, online: 
ASIL http: /  /  www.asil.org/ insights /insight97041 .pdf.
86 See Bank of United States v. Planter's Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat. 904, 907 (U.S. 1824); Trendtex 
Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] Q.B. 529, 557-8 (C.A.) [hereinafter Trendtex].
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investment arbitration pursuant to a commercial relationship.87 The arbitration is 
authorized by the consents of each party, acting in a private capacity. Contracts 
between states and foreign investors — variably called investment agreements, 
economic development agreements, or state contracts — often include arbitration 
clauses.88 Most such contracts involve the state acting in a private capacity.89 In 
contract-based investment arbitration, the principle of party autonomy plays a central 
role because the dispute is between private parties. The dispute is an investment 
dispute within the private sphere. Put differendy, the dispute is a commercial dispute 
that happens to involve the state (acting in a private capacity) as a disputing party.
A specific consent to the arbitration of an investment dispute could have 
important implications for governmental decision-making. But these implications are 
dwarfed by the implications of a general consent to investment arbitration, whether in 
legislation or a treaty. Contract-based investment arbitration is far more predictable 
and manageable than other forms o f investment arbitration because its subject is 
confined to a specific dispute, investor, or project, and because the contracting parties 
and the disputing parties are the same.90 Thus, the state has a relatively clear sense of 
what it has agreed to arbitrate. Further, because the state acts in a private capacity 
when it consents, contract-based investment arbitration is also less likely to engage 
matters of public concern.
87 Redfem and Hunter, supra note 1, 53.
88 Peter, supra note 41,1-2.
89 Asante, supra note 61, 65 and 69; M. Somarajah, The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes 
(Boston: Kluwer, 2001), 5.
90 J. Merrills, “The Means of Dispute Settlement” in M.D. Evans, ed., International Taw 
(Oxford: OUP, 2004), 539.
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3. Arbitration as governing arrangement: the general consent
In investment treaties, states consent generally to the compulsory arbitration of 
disputes with foreign investors as a group.91 The consent is open to any natural or legal 
person who satisfies the conditions for bringing a claim. This opens investment 
arbitration to a class o f potential claimants whose identity is unknown to the state at 
the time o f the state’s consent.92 It also opens investment arbitration to a wide range 
o f potential disputes arising from any exercise o f public authority that affects the 
assets o f a foreign investor. The general consent transforms international arbitration 
from a form of private and reciprocally consensual adjudication into a governing 
arrangement.
In making a general consent, the state does not act in a private capacity. Rather, 
the state exercises public authority that the state alone possesses as a representative 
entity in the international sphere.93 Only the state, acting in a sovereign capacity, can 
consent generally to arbitration because only the state has the authority to regulate 
individuals in its territory, and to authorize the compulsory adjudication o f disputes 
between the state and individuals who are subject to public authority. A general 
consent is unlike the consent of any private party because it is an exercise o f public 
authority. For this reason, investment arbitration — based on the general consent — 
should be characterized as a governing arrangement.94
In an insightful article, Paulsson described treaty-based investment arbitration 
as “arbitration without privity”.95 This label has been widely adopted.96 However, it is
91 Paulsson, supra note 50, 256; T.W. Walde, “Investment Arbitration Under the Energy 
Charter Treaty — From Dispute Settlement to Treaty Implementation” (1996) 12 Arb. Int’l 
429, 434-6.
92 Paulsson, supra note 50, 233.
93 Willoughby, supra note 53, 307; W.I. Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (London: 
University of London Press, 1959), 312; W. Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society (London: 
Stevens & Sons, 1959), 351; D. Cohen and J.C. Smith, “Entitlement and the Body Politic: 
Rethinking Negligence in Public Law” (1986) 64 Can. Bar. Rev. 1, 5-6.
94 C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration (London: Butterworths, 1997), 5 and 
41-5; D. Lemieux and A. Stuhec, Review of Administrative Action Under NAFTA  (Scarborough: 
Carswell, 1999), 151-2; C. Warbrick, “States and Recognition in International Law” in M.D. 
Evans, ed., International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 231-2; M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law 
(Oxford: OUP, 2003), 6, 78, and 82.
95 Paulsson, supra note 50.
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misleading because it likens the general consent o f a state (arbitration without privity) 
to the specific consent o f a private party in commercial arbitration (arbitration with 
privity). The analytical framework remains one o f private law: although investment 
arbitration via the general consent lacks privity, it is still based on an agreement to 
arbitrate between the disputing parties.97 Alternatively, the general consent is 
sometimes described as a “standing offer” by the state to arbitrate disputes with 
investors.98 The offer is standing because investors can make a claim at any time. 
Although this label is also somewhat misleading, since it too borrows from the 
language o f private law, it does hint at the degree to which the general consent opens 
international adjudication to a wide class of potential claimants and disputes.
One way to illustrate the significance o f the general consent is to consider how 
a state, by the vehicle o f the specific consent, could commit to the level o f investor 
protection (and state liability) that flows from a general consent. To commit to a 
comparable level o f protection, the state would have to conclude a separate 
agreement to arbitrate with each foreign investor in its territory, and with each foreign 
investor considering entering its territory.99 Thus, for Mexico to achieve a comparable 
outcome to its general consent to investment arbitration in NAFTA, Mexico would 
have to conclude separate contracts with every natural or legal person with U.S. or 
Canadian nationality who direcdy or indirectly owns or controls (or who was seeking 
to direcdy or indirecdy own or control) assets in Mexico. The suggestion that Mexico 
might do so is absurd, revealing the sheer scope o f the obligations and liabilities that 
flow from the general consent. It also highlights how the label “arbitration without 
privity” downplays the role o f investment arbitration as a governing arrangement by 
characterizing the general consent as a type of blanket contractual obligation, on the
96 E.g. Werner, supra note 13, 6; A.K. Bjorklund, “Contract Without Privity: Sovereign Offer 
and Investor Acceptance” (2001) 2 Chi. J. Int’l L. 183; A.R. Parra, “ICSID and Bilateral 
Investment” (2000) 17(1) ICSID News 7. But see Somarajah, supra note 20,127.
97 See generally Redfem and Hunter, supra note 1, 65.
98 J.C. Thomas, “Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven” (Paper 
presented to the NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Disputes: Litigating Against Sovereigns 
conference, Canadian Bar Association, Toronto, March 2000), 17-18; C. Schreuer, The ICSID 
Convention: A  Commentary (Cambridge: CUP, 2001), 210; O. Spiermann, “Individual Rights, 
State Interests and the Power to Waive ICSID Jurisdiction under Bilateral Investment 
Treaties” (2004) 20 Arb. Int’l 179,180.
99 Many investment treaties include, in the definition of investor, those entities that are 
seeking to make an investment in the host state: e.g. NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 1139 
(“investor of a Party”).
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part o f the state, to all existing and future investors. In effect, the label reduces the 
state’s relationship with investors to an essentially commercial relationship, negating 
the state’s regulatory role.
Some commentators distinguish investment arbitration from commercial 
arbitration by looking to the implications o f investment arbitration awards for the 
general public.100 Because it originates in the exercise of public authority, investment 
arbitration does tend to engage matters o f public concern that go well beyond those 
arising from the state’s entry into commercial relationships.101 Unlike consensual 
adjudication between private parties, the adjudication o f a regulatory dispute 
determines the legality and appropriateness o f the exercise o f public authority in 
particular cases, often with important implications for wider governmental decision­
making and activity. For this reason, the adjudication o f a regulatory dispute is more 
likely to engage matters o f public concern. Even so, this is a less compelling basis for 
distinguishing investment arbitration from commercial arbitration because it 
introduces the question o f why, in some cases, the resolution o f a regulatory dispute 
through investment arbitration has less significant implications for the public at large 
than the resolution o f a commercial dispute.102 Thus, it is debatable whether the 
Feldman tribunal’s award under NAFTA Chapter 11 of (U.S.) $1.7 million in damages 
against Mexico, for Mexico’s decision not to rebate taxes to cigarette exporters,103 is 
more significant for Mexicans than the resolution of a contractual dispute worth 
hundreds of millions of dollars between Mexico’s state oil company and a major 
foreign buyer. In exceptional cases, some disputes in the private sphere affect the 
public interest to a greater degree than some investment disputes in the public sphere. 
It is therefore more difficult to characterize an investment dispute as essentially public 
or private based on the subject matter o f the dispute than to do so based on the fact
i°° q Tollefson, “Metalclad v. United Mexican States Revisited: Judicial Oversight of 
NAFTA’s Chapter Eleven Investor-State Claim Process” (2002) 11 Minn. J. Global Trade 
183,204-5.
101 C.H. Brower II, “Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back” 
(2001) 40 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 43, 45; Brower et al., supra note 39, 418.
102 Fuller, supra note 19, 357.
103 Marvin Feldman v. Mexico (Merits) (16 December 2002), 15(3) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 
157.
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that the dispute arises from the exercise of public authority and the adjudication is 
authorized by a sovereign act of the state.104
That said, the implications o f investment arbitration awards reveal the 
significance for governments of the general consent.105 A host state’s diverse 
regulatory relationships with foreign investors engage matters o f pubic concern that 
go well beyond those raised by a commercial relationship pursuant to an investment 
contract. The general consent removes decision-making about regulatory law and 
policy from the exclusive domain o f domestic courts and places it within the 
discretion o f arbitration tribunals. This allows private arbitrators to decide whether 
and how public authority may be used to restrict capital transfers, tax business, 
establish standards, control land use, establish product standards, deliver services, 
regulate technology use, and so on.106 Importandy, the general consent also delegates 
judicial supervision o f those arbitrators to foreign courts. The decision of a state to 
shift governmental discretion to international tribunals, and ultimately to foreign 
courts, is major policy choice in its own right, beyond any official decision to a 
contract with an investor. In fact, it is widely acknowledged that investment 
arbitration engages matters o f public concern.107 To illustrate, during the NAFTA 
Chapter 11 arbitration in Methanex, in which the U.S. was the respondent, the hearings 
on jurisdiction were attended by no less than nine U.S. government departments and 
agencies.108
104 Adjudicative authority is the authority to order a final remedy or sanction backed by the 
coercive power of the state and, as such, all adjudication involves the exercise of public 
authority, even where it deals with legal relationships in the private sphere that do not raise 
matters of public concern.
105 For a taste of the debate on the degree to which treaty-based investment arbitration 
constrains the state, and on the costs and benefits, see e.g. M. Barlow and T. Clark, MAI: The 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment and the Threat to Canadian Sovereignty (Toronto: Stoddart:
1997); D. Schneidermann, “Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism” (2000) 25 
Law and Social Inquiry 757; C.N. Brower and L.A. Steven, “Who Then Should Judge? 
Developing the International Rule of Law under NAFTA Chapter 11” (2001) 2 Chi. J. Int’l L. 
193; I.A. Laird, “NAFTA Chapter 11 Meets Chicken Little” (2001) 2 Chi. J. Int’l L. 223.
106 See chapter four of this thesis, page 127, note 74.
107 Wemer, supra note 13, 9-10; E. Obadia, “ICSID, Investment Treaties and Arbitration: 
Current and Emerging Issues” (2001) 18(2) ICSID News 4, 4; B.M. Cremades and D.J.A. 
Cairns, “The Brave New World of Global Arbitration” (2002) 3 J. World Investment 173,
208; J. Wemer, “Making Investment Arbitration More Certain — A Modest Proposal” (2003)
4 J. World Investment 767.
108 Department of State, U.S. Trade Representative, Department of Commerce, Department 
of Justice, Department of Treasury, Department of Labor, Environmental Protection Agency,
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One may object to the underlying distinction between sovereign acts (jure 
imperii) and commercial acts (juregestionis) o f the state. But this distinction, although 
sometimes difficult to nail down in specific cases, is nevertheless central to every 
domestic legal system and to public international law, just as the recognition o f the 
state as a unique entity is central to the organization o f modern society.109 Public law 
is based on the premise that there is authority that the state alone — acting through 
public officials and institutions -  can exercise, and that the state has corresponding 
obligations that do not exist for private individuals.110
This is demonstrated by the principle of sovereign immunity.111 The principle 
o f sovereign immunity under customary international law is that one state’s authority, 
within its territory, is not subject to adjudication in another state’s courts.112 However, 
many states recognize an exception from this principle for acts o f the state that are 
non-sovereign or commercial in nature. According to this restrictive doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, these acts of the state are not entitled to immunity.113 Public 
officials and institutions in states that recognize this restrictive doctrine apply varying 
legal tests to distinguish between sovereign and commercial acts o f the state.114 Yet,
California Environmental Protection Agency, and California State Water Resources Control 
Board: Methanex Corporation v. United States of America (Jurisdiction) (7 August 2002), 14(6) 
World Trade and Arb. Mat. 109, para. 16.
109 E.g. International Law Commission, “Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts”, Report of the International Eaw Commission on the Work of Its Fifty- 
third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), 43, art. 4 and 5. 
See also Claim against the Empire of Iran (1963), 45 I.L.R. 57, 80 (Ger. Fed. Const. Ct.); I 
Congrvso del Partido, [1983] 1 A.C. 244, 267 (H.L.) [hereinafter Congreso del Partido], E.M. 
Borchard, “Governmental Responsibility in Tort: VII” (1928) 28 Colum. L. Rev. 577, 588-9 
and 595-602; V. Lowe, “Jurisdiction” in M.D. Evans, ed., InternationalEaw (Oxford: OUP,
2004), 351-2.
110 F.W. Maitland, “The Crown as Corporation” (1901) 17 L.Q. Rev. 131,133; H. Street, 
GovernmentalUability (Cambridge: CUP, 1953), 14-15; Friedmann, supra note 93, 351; Cohen 
and Smith, supra note 93, 5-6 and 12-13; Harlow and Rawlings, supra note 94, 8-9; de Smith 
and Brazier, supra note 14, 608.
111 See M.N. Shaw, InternationalEaut, 5th ed. (Cambridge: CUP, 2003), 621-38.
112 R. Von Hennigs, “European Convention on State Immunity and Other International 
Aspects of Sovereignty Immunity” (2001), 9 Willamette J. Int’l L. & Disp. Resol. 185,186-7.
113 Trendtex, supra note 86, 557-8. G.R. Delaume, “Sovereign Immunity and Transnational 
Arbitration” (1987) 3 Arb. Int’l 28, 28-9; Shaw, supra note 111, 628-38 and 640-6.
114 European Convention on State Immunity, 16 May 1972, 74 Euro. T.S., 11 I.L.M. 470, art. 7(1) 
(entered into force 11 June 1976); Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C., 847 F. Supp. 61, s. 
1605(a) (1976) (U.S.); State Immunity Act 1978, c. 33, s. 3 (U.K.). The most commonly applied 
test is for the court to examine the nature of the act and to ask whether it is one that could 
be performed only by the state. A supplementary test is for the court to look at the purpose
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even where the scope of a sovereign act is defined narrowly, there remains a 
distinction between the public and the private sphere to permit the differentiation 
between those acts that are entided to immunity and those that are not. A state’s 
general consent to investment arbitration entails the waiver o f sovereign immunity 
from jurisdiction in foreign courts (though not necessarily from pre-judgment 
attachment or execution o f an award against the state’s assets).115 That a waiver of 
sovereign immunity is required to recognize and enforce investment arbitration 
awards reinforces the conclusion that investment arbitration exists within the public 
sphere, and that it is a unique form of governing arrangement based on a private 
model o f adjudication.
Investment treaties use international adjudication to control sovereign acts o f 
states in the context of the regulatory relationship between the state and foreign 
investors. This makes investment arbitration a governing arrangement as opposed to a 
reciprocally consensual method o f adjudication. Only the state can exercise public 
authority over investors in the regulatory sphere and only the state can subject the 
exercise o f public authority to compulsory adjudication. Investment arbitration is 
defined by the role played by public authority in its establishment and in the origins o f 
investment disputes. Because investment disputes arise from the exercise o f public 
authority, they are of interest to the general public, although the reverse is not always 
true. The mere fact that a dispute raises public concern does not mean that the 
dispute arose from a sovereign act of the state.
4. The investor’s consent
of the act and whether, in its origins, the act related to governmental objectives in the 
exercise of public authority: Congreso del Partido, supra note 109, 267; Kuwait Airways Co. v. Iraqi 
Airways Co. (1995), 1 W.L.R. 1147,1160; Waste Management Inc. v. United Mexican States 
(Merits) (30 April 2004), 43 I.L.M. 967,16(4) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 3 [hereinafter Waste 
Management No. 2], para. 75. P.L. Lee, “Central Banks and Sovereign Immunity” (2003) 41 
Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 327, 340-3.
115 A state can waive sovereign immunity under international law and, in principle, giving a 
general consent in an investment treaty amounts to a waiver of a state’s immunity from suit 
before an international tribunal or domestic court: e.g. State Immunity Act 1978, ibid., s. 9. See 
chapter three of this thesis, page 78, note 55.
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Treaty-based investment arbitration is distinguishable from international commercial 
arbitration given the nature o f the state’s consent. However, some commentators and 
arbitrators look to the investor’s consent to locate investment arbitration within the 
private sphere.116 They do so, in particular, by merging the investor’s consent with the 
state’s consent in order to create a classical agreement to arbitrate as understood in 
commercial arbitration. This conceptual approach is critically analyzed in this section.
The investor’s consent is best viewed as the acceptance o f an opportunity 
provided by states to foreign investors as a group. In particular, the investor’s consent 
accepts an opportunity to seek damages via international arbitration for a state’s 
alleged breach of an international standard. The investor’s consent has no significance 
absent the original consent o f the state. This differentiates the investor’s consent in 
treaty-based investment arbitration from the consent o f a private party in commercial 
arbitration. In investment arbitration, the investor’s consent is made possible by an 
inter-state bargain rather than a private agreement, and it relates to a regulatory 
dispute rather than a commercial dispute.
To illustrate further, in investment arbitration, an investor must decide 
whether to resort to investment arbitration only after a dispute has arisen. The 
investor’s consent is thus retrospective; i.e. it is specific to a dispute arising from the 
regulatory relationship.117 Unlike the state, the investor does not accept compulsory 
arbitration of any future dispute that arises with the host state (although the investor’s 
home state could enter such a consent on behalf o f its nationals). Moreover, the 
investor does not consent to compulsory arbitration o f disputes arising from acts of 
the investor. Tribunals do not have general jurisdiction to award damages against 
investors for violations o f international standards that regulate business. Generally 
speaking, only states are sanctioned and only investors are compensated.118 Indeed, as
116 E.g. Schreuer, supra note 98, 233. See also Rau, supra note 13, 386-7; Toope, supra note 23, 
389.
117 The investor’s consent is akin to a party’s conclusion of an agreement to arbitrate — or 
compromis — after a dispute has arisen. See also Compama del Desanvllo de Santa Elena, S^4. v. 
Republic of Costa Rica (Merits) (17 February 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 172,13(1) World Trade and 
Arb. Mat. 81 (providing an example of an ICSID arbitration based on a host state’s specific 
consent to the arbitration, given after the dispute had arisen). M. Habicht, Post-War Treatiesfor 
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931), 1041- 
3.
118 This is “generally speaking” only because some investment treaties allow counter-claims 
by the respondent state after an investor has made a claim under the treaty.
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private parties, investors cannot consent generally to investment arbitration, as does 
the state.119 As private parties, investors are subject to the exercise o f public authority 
by the state; the opposite is never true. For a foreign investor to be sanctioned via 
compulsory international arbitration in the context o f a regulatory dispute would 
require the consent o f the investor’s home state, not the investor. In treaty-based 
investment arbitration, the investor’s consent is always specific, just as the state’s 
consent is always general.
This does not make the investor’s consent insignificant. Depending on the 
terms of the relevant treaty, the submission o f a dispute to investment arbitration has 
important legal ramifications for the investor as well as the state. Above all, it may 
affect the availability o f alternative remedies under domestic or international law. In 
the case o f NAFTA, to make a Chapter 11 claim, an investor is required to waive legal 
remedies in the host state and in the other NAFTA states.120 This waiver has two 
elements. First, the investor must waive the right to pursue domestic proceedings. Put 
differendy, the investor cannot seek protection from the exercise o f public authority 
by the host state through adjudication in a NAFTA state (including the investor’s 
home state). Second, the investor retains the right to pursue domestic legal 
proceedings, in the host state alone, that do not involve the payment of damages.121 
Thus, the investor may seek domestic remedies other than a damages award, in the 
host state, but cannot seek damages before both a Chapter 11 tribunal and a domestic 
court.
Under NAFTA, the investor’s waiver establishes the exclusivity o f investment 
arbitration as a means for investors to seek damages and, in the case o f NAFTA states 
other than the host state, as a legal remedy for resolving the investor’s claim in
119 For an investor to consent generally to compulsory international arbitration, the investor 
would have to exercise public authority over foreign nationals. However, an investor can 
only exercise public authority where such authority has been delegated to the investor by a 
state. To illustrate, colonial companies were historically given wide-ranging powers to govern 
foreign territories on behalf of the home state. In such circumstances, the investor acts as a 
public entity and any general consent made by the investor would be on behalf of the home 
state. M.J. Farrelly, “Recent Questions of International Law: The British Government and 
the Chartered Companies in Africa” (1894) 10 L.Q.R. 254, 263.
120 NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 1121. See Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States 
(Jurisdiction) (2 June 2000), 40 I.L.M. 56 [hereinafter Waste Management No. /], para. 18-30.
121 In particular, the investor may pursue “proceedings for injunctive, declaratory or other 
extraordinary relief, not involving the payment of damages”.
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relation to the relevant acts of the state.122 Investment arbitration under NAFTA is 
exclusive because it bars domestic proceedings and because it finally resolves a 
damages claim arising out o f a particular regulatory dispute.123 The investor’s waiver 
thus establishes that the protection available through Chapter 11 arbitration takes the 
place o f the protection otherwise available through domestic proceedings in a foreign 
NAFTA state or through the remedy o f damages in the host state. For the host state, 
this exclusivity prevents investors from going to foreign courts to resolve regulatory 
disputes in the territory o f the host state and limits the prospect of state liability to 
that o f a damage award by a Chapter 11 tribunal.124
Thus, the investor’s consent is important because it requires the investor to 
relinquish rights that the investor would otherwise possess under domestic law. Put 
differently, to access investment arbitration, investors must conform to the conditions 
attached to such access by the NAFTA states. These conditions are part o f the 
bargain struck by Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. when they concluded NAFTA.125 
Chapter 11 is an element o f that bargain, one that established international arbitration 
as a governing arrangement.126 As discussed in chapter three of this thesis, the 
investor’s consent is more akin to the decision o f an individual to seek damages 
against the state under domestic public law than to the decision o f an individual to 
seek damages against another individual under domestic private law, or to the consent
122 But see Waste Management No. /, supra note 120, para. 13-14 and 59 (dissenting opinion); 
GAMI Investments, Inc. v. Government of the United Mexican States (Merits) (15 November 2004), 
17(2) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 127, para. 38. See also Middle East Cement Shipping and 
Handling Co. S A . v. Arab Republic o/Eg)pt (Merits) (12 April 2002), 18 ICSID Rev. 602, para. 
71; CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina (Jurisdiction) (17 July 2003), 42 
I.L.M. 788, para. 80.
123 Finality is a component of exclusivity. Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States 
(Jurisdiction) (26 June 2002), 41 I.L.M. 1315,14(6) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 203, para. 27.
124 Investors sometimes seek judicial relief before the courts of their own state in the event of 
a regulatory dispute abroad. To illustrate, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal was established as 
part of an agreement to release American hostages held in Iran in January 1981, in return for 
the release of Iranian assets that were frozen in the U.S. and the suspension — by presidential 
order — of hundreds of commercial lawsuits that were pending in the U.S. in relation to Iran. 
A fund of one billion dollars was released by the U.S. to a “depository bank”, to be held in 
escrow, and amounts awarded to U.S. claimants by the tribunal were discharged from that 
account, which Iran undertook to keep topped up: Redfem and Hunter, supra note 1, 59.
125 S. Clarkson, “Systemic or Surgical? Possible Cures for NAFTA’s Investor-State Dispute 
Process” (2002) 36 Can. Bus. L.J. 368, 373.
126 Many aspects of NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration work to the advantage of investors in the 
context of the regulatory relationship with host states; however, the exclusivity of the system 
clearly works against investors, to the advantage of the host state.
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of a private party in commercial arbitration. The investor’s consent is subject to 
conditions based, not on an agreement entered into by the investor, but on an inter­
state bargain. It is a consent of privilege rather than reciprocal obligation.
C. The exercise of public authority by arbitration tribunals
Acting on the general consent, an investment arbitration tribunal exercises authority 
that is delegated by states. This authority ultimately resides in the authority o f the state 
to adjudicate disputes in its territory.127 Regulatory disputes are normally adjudicated 
by domestic courts pursuant to domestic law.128 In some cases, such disputes might 
be resolved by specialized domestic tribunals, subject to court supervision.129 The 
general consent allows regulatory disputes to be adjudicated by an international 
tribunal endowed with the authority to determine the legality o f the state’s exercise of 
public authority. This is by definition a matter o f public law, whether resolved by 
resort to domestic or international law.
Once an investor provides notice of a claim under an investment treaty, a 
tribunal is constituted to adjudicate the claim.130 The tribunal has the authority to rule 
on its own jurisdiction and to admit the claim.131 The tribunal also has the authority to 
select the jurisdictional seat o f the arbitration and, consequendy, the domestic law 
under which the arbitration takes place.132 Upon finding that it has jurisdiction, a 
tribunal determines the facts of the dispute and applies the applicable law in order to 
resolve issues arising from the facts.133 If  the tribunal finds that the state breached an 
applicable treaty standard, the tribunal may award damages to the investor;
127 Yu and Shore, supra note 66, 965-6; Loughlin, supra note 94, 80.
1281. Delupis, Finance and Protection of Investments in Developing Countries (Epping: Gower Press, 
1973), 123; Peter, supra note 41,167-9; Lemieux and Stuhec, supra note 94,146.
129 de Smith and Brazier, supra note 14, 581-4.
130 NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 1123 and 1124.
131 ICSID Convention, supra note 8, art. 41; UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 8, art. 16; 
UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 26, art. 21(1) and (2); ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra 
note 26, art. 46. See also Model Law Report, supra note 31, 37; Redfem and Hunter, supra note 
1,264.
132 UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 26, art. 16(1); ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 26, 
art. 21 (Schedule C); UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 8, art. 20.
133 NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 1131.
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alternatively, the tribunal may dismiss the claim.134 An award is binding on the 
investor and the respondent state and, although it does not establish binding 
precedent, it may have persuasive value in future cases.135 Further, an award is 
insulated from judicial review by domestic courts.136 Overall, this process is part o f an 
adjudicative system in which arbitrators act in a public capacity to resolve investment 
disputes.
In exercising this adjudicative authority, tribunals depend, not only on states’ 
legal authority to authorize the resolution o f disputes within their territory, but also 
on their coercive power to enforce awards in domestic courts.137 The force o f an 
arbitration award ultimately rests on its domestic enforceability.138 Without the 
prospect o f domestic enforcement, investors would rely on the voluntary payment of 
awards by states (albeit under pressure from other states, the World Bank, financial 
firms, and so on).139 Without individualized enforcement, investment arbitration 
would resemble conventional forms o f international dispute resolution in which states 
reach diplomatic solutions without any direct involvement by the individuals whose 
rights and interests are at stake. Investment arbitration would have more in common 
with mediation or conciliation than with adjudication.140 Besides the actual 
enforcement o f awards, tribunals may also rely on the authority o f domestic courts in 
other respects, such as to order a party to respect an arbitration agreement,141 to 
compel attendance o f witnesses or production o f documents,142 to enforce interim 
measures,143 or as an ultimate resort in case o f a deadlock.144 O n the whole,
134 Ibid., art. 1135.
135 Ibid., art. 1136(2) and 1136(4).
136 Infra notes 155-6.
137 Dezaley and Garth, supra note 13,120-3; Redfem and Hunter, supra note 1, 249-51; Yu 
and Shore, supra note 66, 967.
138 Under investment treaties, this enforceability is based on the consent of the states parties 
to permit the enforcement of investment arbitration awards pursuant to the ICSID Convention, 
the New York Convention, and/ or the Inter-American Convention. See chapter three of this thesis, 
page 79-80, note 58.
139 Delupis, supra note 128, 3; Peter, supra note 41, 321; Redfem and Hunter, supra note 1, 445.
140 Habicht, supra note 117,1035.
141 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 8, art. 8 and 11(4).
142 Ibid., art. 6, 8, and 27.
143 NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 1134; ibid., art. 17.
144 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 8, art. 11(4) (appointment of arbitrators). Preliminary 
Model Law Report, supra note 62, 78.
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investment arbitration is a governing arrangement, established by treaty, and based on 
the authority and power of states.145
Let us examine how awards can be enforced by investors under the New York 
Convention.146 At the outset, one must distinguish between the seat o f the arbitration 
and the place o f enforcement. The seat of the arbitration is the place in which the 
arbitration is located, by the arbitration tribunal for purposes o f domestic 
jurisdiction.147 Under the New York Convention, an arbitration is subject to supervision 
by domestic courts in the seat of the arbitration, and a respondent state may apply to 
set aside an award only in the courts in that seat based on its domestic law. 
Importandy, this law determines the level of supervision that a court may carry out.148
The place of enforcement is the jurisdiction in which an investor seeks 
enforcement (including execution) of the award against assets o f the respondent state. 
Under the New York Convention, for an award to be executed, it must be recognized 
and enforced by the courts in the place o f enforcement, but not necessarily in the seat 
o f the arbitration.149 Also, a court in the place o f enforcement has the discretion to 
refuse to recognize and enforce an award based on the limited grounds stipulated in 
the New York Convention.150 This arguably includes the discretion to recognize and 
enforce an award even if the award was set aside in the seat o f the arbitration.151 Thus, 
an investor can seek enforcement o f an award against assets o f the respondent state 
before the courts in any state party to the New York Convention regardless of whether
145 Redfem and Hunter, supra note 1, 342.
146 At present, Chapter 11 awards are enforceable under the New York Convention and the Inter- 
American Convention, but not the ICSID Convention, because neither Canada nor Mexico have 
signed the ICSID Convention.
147 Under NAFTA Chapter 11, a tribunal must locate the seat of an arbitration in a NAFTA 
state that is a party to the New York Convention'. NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 1130. To June 2005, 
eight arbitrations under NAFTA Chapter 11 have been located in Canada, seven in the 
United States, and none in Mexico.
148 Federal Arbitration Act, supra note 10, c. 1, s. 10; Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.17 
(2nd Supp.) [hereinafter Commercial Arbitration Act], art. 34 (Schedule, Commercial Arbitration 
Code); Codigo de Comercio, Tit. IV, c. 1-9 (Commercial Arbitration), as amended 1989 and 1993 
[hereinafter Codigo de Comercio\, art. 1457. The domestic law of the seat of the arbitration may 
also determine other issues, such as whether the arbitration agreement was valid (in the 
absence of an agreement of the parties to apply another law to determine this issue); and 
whether composition of the arbitration tribunal and the arbitration procedure were lawful (in 
the absence an agreement of the parties on these matters).
149 New York Convention, supra note 8, art. V.
150 Ibid. See also UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 8, art. 34 and 35.
151 New York Convention, supra note 8, art. V(l)(e).
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the courts o f either the respondent state or the seat of the arbitration have upheld the 
award.152 That said, most courts would likely be reluctant to recognize and enforce an 
award that was set aside by a court in the seat of the arbitration.153
Thus, awards can normally be reviewed by the courts in the seat o f the 
arbitration and in the place o f enforcement, subject to the relevant treaties and 
legislation.154 As it stands, many states have enacted legislation implementing the New 
York Convention which directs domestic courts to defer to foreign arbitration awards.155 
Also, the trend in the jurisprudence, at least in North America and Europe, is to show 
a high level o f deference.156 For these reasons, investment arbitration tribunals are 
insulated from court review in the seat o f the arbitration.157
152 E.g. Sonatrach v. Ford Bacon &  Davis Inc. (1990), 11 Y.B. Comm’l Arb. 370; Hilmarton I  
(1995), 20 Y.B. Comm’l Arb. 663; Chromalloy Aeroservicesv. Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F.Supp. 
907 (D.D.C. 1996), 12(4) Int’l Arb. R. B-l (April 1997). Reismann, supra note 41,113-16; 
Brower et al., supra note 39, 428.
153 Redfem and Hunter, supra note 1, 415 and 484-5.
154 ICSID Convention, supra note 8, art. 53-55; New York Convention, supra note 8, art. V; Inter- 
American Convention, supra note 8, art. 4-5. E.g. UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 8, art. 34- 
35; ModelEaw Report, supra note 31, para. 44.
155 E.g. Federal Arbitration Act (U.S.), supra note 10 (governing actions in a U.S. federal court to 
vacate awards (c. 1, s. 10) and to recognize and enforce awards under the New York Convention 
(c. 2, s. 207) and the Inter-American Convention (c. 3, s. 304)); Commercial Arbitration Act 
(Canada), supra note 148, art. 34-36 (Schedule); Codigo de Comercio (Mexico), supra note 148, art. 
1415-1463. Many U.S. states have adopted arbitration laws based on the Uniform Arbitration 
Act, itself modelled on the Federal Arbitration Act, and some have adopted arbitration statutes 
based on the UNCITRAL Model Law. Canadian federal and provincial legislation (with the 
exception of Quebec) and the relevant provisions of Mexico’s Codigo de Comercio are also 
based on the UNCITRAL Model Law. See also Mustill, supra note 43, 51-3; Kierstead, supra 
note 74,100-2; Reismann, supra note 41,125-6; NAFTA Advisory Committee on Private 
Commercial Disputes, Summary of U.S. Arbitration Law by D. Enix-Ross and D.W. Rivkin 
(June 1995), 1; M. Tenenbaum, “International Arbitration of Trade Disputes in Mexico —
The Arrival of the NAFTA and New Reforms to the Commercial Code” (1995) 12 J. Int’l 
Arb. 53, 59-60 and 73-4; K.-H. Bockstiegel, “An Introduction to the New German 
Arbitration Act Based on the UNCITRAL Model Law” (1998) 14 Arb. Int’l 19,28-31; R. 
Nishikawa, “Arbitration Law Reform in Japan” (2004) 21 J. Int’l Arb. 303, 305-6.
156 E.g. Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 1907 (1972); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver 
Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Mitsubishi, supra note 83; Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 
482 U.S. 220 Quintette CoalLtd. v. Nippon Steel Corp. (1990), 50 B.C.L.R. (2d) 207 
(C.A.); Gulf Resources Etd. v. Arochem International Inc. (1992), 11 B.C.A.C. 145, 43 C.P.R. (3d) 
390; Corporation Transnational de Inversiones v. STET International (1999), 45 O.R. (3d) 183 (S.C.), 
affd 49 O.R. (3d) 414 (C.A.). Scodro, supra note 79,1929-37; C. Reymond, “The Channel 
Tunnel Case and the Law of International Arbitration” (1993) 109 L.Q. Rev. 337, 341; 
Redfem and Hunter, supra note 1, 286 and 342.
157 United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation (2001), 89 B.C.L.R. (3d) 359, 38 C.E.L.R. 284, 
13(5) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 219, para. 50-6; United Mexican States v. Marvin Roy Feldman 
Karpa (2003), 16(2) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 167, para. 77-86 (Ont. S.C.J.), affd 193
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This review o f enforcement under the New York Convention reveals the 
significance o f investment arbitration as a governing arrangement. Investment 
arbitration entails the delegation of authority, not only to international tribunals, but 
also to the courts o f the seat o f the arbitration and any prospective place of 
enforcement. Where an investment arbitration tribunal chooses the respondent state 
as the seat o f the arbitration, the tribunal is subject to supervision by the courts of 
that state, subject to its domestic law. Where a foreign state is chosen as the seat of 
the arbitration, the arbitration is subject to supervision by foreign courts, subject to 
foreign domestic law.158 Also, in investment arbitration, investors may seek 
enforcement o f an award in any state party to the New York Convention (or other 
arbitration treaties, including the ICSID Convention). This means that the states parties 
to an investment treaty, by consenting investment arbitration, have delegated 
authority over the adjudication o f regulatory disputes within their territory to the 
domestic courts of over 160 states.159
O.A.C. 216,248 D.L.R. (4th) 443, para. 34-43 (Ont. C.A.);s4.G. v. S.G. Myers, supra note 54, 
para. 42-4.
158 Further, where the foreign state in question is the home state of the investor, then the 
tribunal is supervised by the courts of the home state. In such cases, investment arbitration is 
reminiscent of the capitulation treaties of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which 
subjected nationals of colonial powers to their home state’s laws, and exempted them from 
local laws, in the territory of foreign states, such as China and the Ottoman Empire. See 
chapter two of this thesis, page 31-2.
159 Gaillard, supra note 21, 248. Approximately 165 states are parties to either the New York 
Convention or the ICSID Convention or both.
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Conclusion
Investment arbitration is a governing arrangement established under international law. 
An investment arbitration tribunal is a semi-autonomous international body that 
exercises authority within the public sphere. Tribunals are semi-autonomous because 
their decisions are insulated from court supervision; they are international because 
their authority derives from a treaty. But for the establishment of tribunals on the 
international plane, they would be akin to semi-autonomous domestic tribunals that 
resolve regulatory disputes. The international dimension o f investment arbitration 
distinguishes investment arbitration tribunals from domestic tribunals constituted 
under public law. The international dimension also alters how regulatory disputes are 
resolved under investment treaties in that a tribunal can be established under the law 
o f one state to resolve a regulatory dispute involving another state. However, the 
distinction between the international and domestic dimension o f a tribunal -  
established under public law — is less significant than the distinction between treaty- 
based investment arbitration and commercial arbitration. In short, the international 





For much o f the twentieth century, the role of the individual in international 
adjudication was limited to the private sphere o f commercial arbitration. This was 
because, in cases o f diplomatic protection under international law, individuals relied 
on their own state for representation. The advent of investment arbitration has of 
course expanded the role o f individuals by allowing investors to make international 
claims. But what is the precise character o f this new phenomenon?
The argument o f this thesis is that investment arbitration should be 
characterized as a unique form of governing arrangement. Investment arbitration is a 
governing arrangement because it is established by a sovereign act o f the state and 
because it is used to resolve disputes arising from the exercise o f public authority. 
Thus, the subject matter of investment arbitration is a regulatory dispute arising 
between the state (acting in a public capacity) and an individual who is subject to the 
exercise o f public authority by the state. This distinguishes investment arbitration 
from reciprocally consensual adjudication, as conventionally used to resolve 
international disputes (between states) and commercial disputes (between private 
parties). Investment arbitration engages the regulatory relationship between the state 
and an individual rather than a reciprocal relationship between juridical equals.
As a governing arrangement, investment arbitration involves the adjudication 
o f complex and contentious disputes that would otherwise be resolved by legislatures 
or executive governments.1 But this does not make investment arbitration unique; 
many forms o f adjudication do the same. Nor is investment arbitration unique 
because it involves the international adjudication of disputes that would otherwise be 
resolved through diplomacy.2 Indeed, the fact that investment arbitration removes 
sensitive disputes from the domestic legal systems of the host state and the home
1 L.L. Fuller, “Adjudication and the Rule of Law” (1960) 54 A.S.I.L. Proc. 1,1-5; L.L. Fuller, 
“The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 354 and 363; J. 
Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999), 277-8.
2 J.H.H. Weiler, “The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the 
Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement”, Harvard Jean Monnet 
Working Paper No. 9/00 (NYU School of Law, 2000), 4-10.
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state is in some ways a positive development. What is novel and problematic about 
investment arbitration is that it combines the prospective and far-reaching, yet 
selective, individualization o f international claims with the use o f a private model of 
adjudication, in order to resolve regulatory disputes.
Investment arbitration may appear similar to other forms o f international 
adjudication. For instance, investment treaties rely on a private model o f adjudication 
that was inherited primarily from the New York Convention. Likewise, investment 
treaties apply international standards to resolve disputes in a manner that is 
reminiscent o f historical claims commissions which allowed claims by or on behalf of 
foreign nationals. Yet, investment arbitration differs from both international 
commercial arbitration and conventional international adjudication. First, investment 
arbitration engages disputes in the public sphere rather than the private sphere and, 
second, investment arbitration is based on states’ prospective and far-reaching 
consent to compulsory international adjudication. In both respects, investment 
arbitration is best approached in the context of the regulatory relationship, rather than 
a reciprocal relationship, between the state and the individual.3 For this reason more 
than any other, investment arbitration is a unique feature o f contemporary 
globalization.
Investment arbitration involves the transfer of authority from domestic to 
international and from public to private. These will be examined in turn. The transfer of 
authority from domestic to international involves the delegation o f adjudicative 
authority, normally the exclusive domain of domestic courts, to international tribunals. 
Further, because investment arbitration awards are enforceable under the New York 
Convention and other arbitration treaties, investment arbitration involves the transfer of 
adjudicative authority to the courts o f 160 states, in order to allow enforcement of 
awards against foreign state assets that are located in the enforcing state’s territory.
This establishes investment arbitration as a (fragmented) international system based
3 CME Republic B. V. v. C^ ech Republic (Damages) (14 March 2003), 15(4) World Trade and 
Arb. Mat. 83 and 245, para. 74 (separate opinion). M.O. Hudson, International Tribunals 
(Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Brookings Institution, 
1944), 193; D.W. Bowett, “Claims Between States and Private Entities: The Twilight Zone of 
International Law” (1986) 35 Cath. U. L. Rev. 929, 933-4; D. Cohen and J.C. Smith, 
“Entitlement and the Body Politic: Rethinking Negligence in Public Law” (1986) 64 Can. Bar. 
Rev. 1, 7-8.
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on the delegation of authority to international tribunals whose awards are enforceable 
by the courts in many countries.
The transfer o f authority from domestic to international also occurs through 
the individualization o f international claims. Based on overlapping networks of 
investment treaties, individualization transforms international obligations between 
states into a complex but generalized system that is designed to regulate states’ 
treatment o f multinational enterprises. Virtually all investment treaties are broad in 
scope and apply liberal standards o f investor protection. Many treaties endorse 
forum-shopping while limiting the duty o f investors to exhaust local remedies.
Viewed as a system, investment treaties gready expand the scope o f state liability in 
the regulatory sphere by extending state liability to legislative and judicial acts and by 
allowing damages awards in the absence o f fault.4 As a result, investment arbitration 
affects the viability and anticipated cost o f any governmental measure that could 
significantly “harm” international business. Further, awards in favour o f investors are 
internationally enforceable pursuant to the New York Convention and other treaties. In 
short, individualization selectively intensifies the application o f international standards 
in the regulatory sphere, putting investment arbitration at the core o f a system to 
control the exercise o f public authority as it affects investors. These elements take 
investment arbitration well beyond other governing arrangements — with the possible 
exception o f the European Union — that allow the international adjudication of 
individual claims.
In an era o f expanding international economic activity, the movement from 
international to domestic is an unsurprising and often welcome development. But one 
must ask whether all manifestations o f this movement are appropriate. This brings us 
to the transfer o f authority from public to private institutions. In the modern democratic 
state, domestic courts have a “monopoly” over the adjudication o f public disputes for 
well-established and straightforward reasons. The adjudicative supremacy o f the 
courts is an expression of the principles of independence, openness, and balanced 
representation in judicial (i.e. sovereign) decision-making. Put differently, where 
adjudication is used as a governing arrangement it is based on the normative
4 C. Harlow, “Francovich and the Problem of the Disobedient State” (1996) 2 Eur. L.J. 199, 
205-6 and 208; P. Hogg and P. Monahan, The lJahility of the Crown, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 
2000), 122 and 149-54.
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framework of public law.5 It would be remarkable if individual claims for damages 
under a domestic constitution or the Universal Declaration on Human Rights were 
resolved, not in public hearings before a judge, but in confidence by privately- 
appointed arbitrators. Even if the disputing parties -  the individual and the state -  
agreed to do so, they could not themselves decide to eschew public law principles for 
the simple reason that their dispute raises matters of public concern about the role of 
the state as representative of a political group. Yet, investment arbitration transfers 
adjudicative authority not only from domestic to international institutions but also 
from public to private decision-makers.
Although investment arbitration involves the transfer o f public authority to 
private arbitrators, it depends on the public authority and coercive power of the 
state.6 Investment arbitration originates in the authority of states to establish a 
governing arrangement that controls the exercise of public authority. Because 
investment arbitration is treaty-based, it relies on the authority o f states to allow 
individual claims, establish the authority of arbitrators, apply binding standards, 
resolve issues o f scope and access, and provide for damages as a remedy. In doing 
these things, states exercise sovereign authority so as to condition the future use of 
sovereign power by their own public authorities and by those o f other states. Likewise, 
it is public international law -  not private law -  that governs the jurisdiction o f 
tribunals, the admissibility of claims, the resolution of the merits of the dispute, and 
the enforcement o f awards. Notably, investment treaties authorize public institutions 
to carry out key functions, including the appointment of presiding arbitrators. Where 
a respondent state does not abide by an investment arbitration award, the award is 
enforceable only by domestic courts subject to domestic law.7 Where the states parties 
to an investment treaty object to its interpretation by tribunals, they can collectively 
amend the treaty or, in the case of NAFTA, jointly issue an interpretation that 
overrides the adjudicative process.
5 The normative framework of public law carries with it public law rules and principles that 
arise from the recognition of the representative nature of the state, as juridical sovereign, and 
from the recognition by judges of their role as officers of the state. A. Chayes, “The Role of 
the Judge in Public Law Litigation” (1976) 89 Harv. L.R. 1281, 1284.
6 A. Stone Sweet, “Islands of Transnational Governance” in M. Shapiro and A. Stone Sweet, 
eds., On haw, Politics andJudicialiRation (Oxford: OUP, 2002).
7 Report of the Secretaiy-General: Possible Features of a Model haw on International Commercial 
Arbitration, UN, UN Doc. A/CN.9/207 (14 May 1981), (1981) 12 Y.B. UNCITRAL 77, 78.
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Thus, it is important to recognize the role o f the state in reforms that 
accompany contemporary globalization.8 Recognizing the role o f the state draws 
attention to the variable impacts o f investment arbitration on different states and on 
different groups of states.9 The division of countries into categories o f capital- 
exporting and capital-importing has become less clear cut in recent decades, but these 
categories are still relevant. The pressure to establish and maintain the system of 
investment arbitration clearly originates in major capital-exporting states, whose 
governments drafted and promoted the model treaties on which most investment 
treaties are based. Further, today’s predominant capital-importing states were once, in 
the colonial period, subject to foreign legal systems and foreign courts.10 This history 
still resonates in much o f the world and it continues to inform reactions to 
investment arbitration.11
Contemporary investment treaties differ from colonial and extraterritorial legal 
regimes. They are not commonly won by the threat o f force and they apply 
international law rather than foreign law to regulate states. They subject disputes to
8 M. Koskenniemi, “The Future of Statehood” (1991) 32 Harv. Int’l L.J. 397, 406; S.
Picciotto, “The Regulatory Criss-Cross: Interaction between Jurisdictions and The 
Construction of Global Regulatory Networks” in W.W. Bratton et al., eds., International 
Regulatory Competition and Coordination (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 120-2; F. Snyder,
“Governing Economic Globalisation: Global Legal Pluralism and European Law” (1999) 5 
Eur. L.J. 334, 341-2; S. Sassen, “Globalization or Denationalization?” (2003) 10 Rev. Int’l Pol. 
Econ. 1, 8.
9 M. Koskenniemi, “What Is International Law For?” in M.D. Evans, ed., International Law 
(Oxford: OUP, 2004), 96.
10 A. Anghie, “Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century 
International Law” (1999) 40 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1, 41.
11 M. Somarajah, “Power and Justice in Foreign Investment Arbitration” (1997) 14 J. Int’l 
Arb. 103,103-4; E. Schwartz and J. Paulsson, “Confronting Political and Regulatory Risks 
Associated with Private Investment in Infrastructure in Developing Countries: The Role of 
International Dispute Settlement Mechanism” (Draft presentation to the Private 
Infrastructure for Development conference, Rome, 8-10 September 1999), 4-5; A. Redfem 
and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1999), 289-90 (reproducing the 1984 comments of an African judge of the 
International Court of Justice: “... the notion that there is a system of international justice will 
not be shared by some countries, notably those of Africa, Asia and Latin America, who still 
see arbitration as a foreign judicial institution which is imposed upon them.... In Africa, 
governmental authorities and, in consequence, the judges, are hostile to international 
arbitration and no distinction is made between that and foreign arbitration. In addition, as 
everybody knows, in fact arbitration is seldom freely agreed to by developing countries. It is 
often agreed to in contracts of adhesion the signature of which is essential to the survival of 
these countries. Rendered abroad by foreigners, what is more, imposed, arbitration will only 
gradually obtain total Third World recognition.”).
217
adjudication by international tribunals, not imperial courts or foreign consuls. O n the 
other hand, investment treaties typically apply standards o f investor protection based 
on a Western conception o f international law that was resisted by newly independent 
countries, and most arbitrators are Western professionals.12 So, while investment 
arbitration is a unique phenomenon, one should not lose sight of its ancestry or the 
fact that the adjudication of investment disputes in much o f the world originally 
followed in the wake of foreign invasion and occupation.13 This history contributes to 
enduring suspicion in the Third World for international arbitration.14
Against this backdrop, the recent wave of investment treaties concluded by 
(and among) capital-importing states is a significant historical event. The flood o f 
general consents by capital-importing states to investment arbitration after decades of 
opposition to multilateral investment rules shows how contemporary globalization 
has altered states* views of foreign investment and their approaches to international 
law. Investment arbitration is now widely regarded as a means to encourage cross- 
border investment by instilling greater confidence that international business will be 
protected from interference by domestic government. The 1990s* wave o f investment 
treaties testifies to the widespread, though far from universal,15 endorsement o f this 
policy by governments all over the world.
Yet, this only brings us to the beginning of the process o f interpreting and 
implementing investment treaties. One must look beyond a simplified vision of 
investment arbitration as international adjudication and inquire into its particular 
method o f governmental decision-making.16 Above all, what do we mean by “investor 
protection**?17 Asking this question highlights the policy choices that arise in the
12 G.M. Wilner, “Acceptance of Arbitration by Developing Countries” in T.E. Carbonneau, 
ed., Hkesolving Transnational Disputes Through International Arbitration (Charlottesville: University 
of Virginia Press, 1984), 286.
13 A.A. Fatouros, “International Law and the Third World” (1964) 50 Va. L.R. 783, 817-18.
14 Hudson, supra note 3, 457; W. Peter, Arbitration and Renegotiation of International Investment 
Agreements (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1995), 205; M. Somarajah, “The Climate 
of International Arbitration” (1991) 8J. Int’l Arb. 47, 63.
15 In particular, major capital-exporting states have rarely concluded investment treaties 
between themselves and significant hold outs remain among important capital-importing 
states, such as Brazil.
16 N. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives — Choosing Institutions in Taw, Economics and Public Policy 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 3.
17 A.A. Fatouros, “International Economic Development and the Illusion of Legal Certainty” 
(1963) 57 ASIL Proc. 117,121; Komesar, ibid., 5.
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actual adjudication of investment disputes. Should the protection of investors take 
precedence in all cases o f textual ambiguity and interpretive doubt, or is it appropriate 
to apply treaties in a way that defers to domestic institutions and preserves 
governmental discretion? Most investment treaties make clear that outright 
nationalizations of foreign-owned assets must be accompanied by the payment of full 
compensation, but is compensation required for general regulation to protect public 
health or the environment? Investment treaties may prohibit socialism but do they bar 
social democracy? These questions highlight the discretionary role o f arbitrators in 
delivering on the promise of international adjudication as a neutral and rules-based 
system.18 With this promise comes the decision to use international adjudication as a 
governing arrangement. The idea of a neutral, rules-based system begs the question: 
what are the rules and how will they be interpreted and applied in specific cases? This 
leads us to two common criticisms of investment arbitration: its lack o f coherence 
and its lack o f accountability.
First, the lack o f coherence.19 The interpretation o f investment treaties is a 
matter o f concern, not only for investors seeking to plan their business activities 
under the law, but for all individuals who are represented by the state and who are 
affected by the system’s sanction or deterrence o f regulatory measures. Thus, there is 
a wider interest in the clarity and coherence of the law than in commercial arbitration. 
Yet, because there are so many investment treaties, establishing complex networks o f 
variable but overlapping international obligations, it is unavoidable that tribunals will 
interpret jurisdictional concepts and substantive standards in different ways. One can 
look to domestic courts to inject greater coherence into the system, but the role of the 
courts is divided among many jurisdictions which themselves apply varying standards 
o f review. Typically, domestic courts defer to arbitrators. For these reasons,
18 Fatouros, ibid., 123; S.J. Toope, Mixed International Arbitration — Studies in Arbitration Between 
States and Private Persons (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1990), 397-8; UNCTAD, World 
Investment Bjeport 2003 (Geneva: United Nations, 2003), 86; P.T. Muchlinski, Multinational 
Enterprises and the haw (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 11. See also e.g. North American Free Trade 
Agreement, 17 December 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296 and 605 (entered into force 1 January 1994) 
[hereinafter NAFTA], art. 1115 (referring to “due process before an impartial tribunal” as a 
purpose of Chapter 11 arbitration).
19 Hudson, supra note 3,197; A. Cosbey et al., “Investment and Sustainable Development” 
(Report for the International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2004), 6-7; C.N. Brower,
C.H. Brower II, and J.K. Sharpe, “The Coming Crisis in the Global Adjudicative System” 
(2003) 19 Arb. Int’l 415, 429-30.
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investment arbitration is at present characterized by uncertainty for both states and 
investors, though the financial implications for states are more serious.20 There is a 
grain o f truth in the quip that investment arbitration is becoming a legal casino in 
which investors and states roll the dice on whether a tribunal will award damages.21 It 
may be that states will find it necessary to create an appellate body with general 
jurisdiction over many investment treaties or risk collapse o f the system under the 
pressure o f fiscal uncertainty.22 But this is a matter of policy. Whether or not states 
decide to establish an appellate body, the nature of investment arbitration as a 
governing arrangement will not much change.
The second criticism o f investment arbitration, the lack o f accountability, 
flows from the use a private model o f adjudication to resolve public disputes.23 In 
public law, the notion o f accountability in adjudicative decision-making goes beyond 
accountability to the disputing parties as overseen by the state. In public law, the 
conduct o f the adjudicator is a matter of interest to the wider community because of 
it determines the legality of sovereign acts. However, in investment arbitration, the 
use o f a private model o f adjudication to resolve regulatory disputes undermines 
principles that typically apply in public law adjudication, including principles o f 
independence, openness, and balanced representation. For one, investment arbitration 
tribunals are not independent and impartial decision-makers, if we understand these 
concepts to mean freedom from dependence on executive governments or private 
entities, and from any interest in the outcome of the dispute. Arbitrators are not 
independent and impartial in this sense because their income depends on future
20 B. Legum, “Trends and Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration” (2003) 19 Arb. Int’l 143, 
146-7.
21 J. Wemer, “Making Investment Arbitration More Certain — A Modest Proposal” (2003) 4 J. 
World Investment 767, 782.
22 J.P. Fitzpatrick, “The Future of the North American Free Trade Agreement: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Role of Regional Economic Institutions and the Harmonization 
of Law in North America and Western Europe” (1996) 19 Houston J. Int’l L. 1, 91-3; D.P. 
Steger, “The Appellate Body and its contribution to WTO dispute setdement” in D.L.M. 
Kennedy and J.D. Southwick, eds., The Political Economy of International Trade Taw (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2002), 493-5; M. Kantor, “The New Draft Model U.S. BIT: Noteworthy 
Developments” (2004) 21 J. Int’l Arb. 383, 391-2.
23 J.A. Soloway, “Environmental Regulation as Expropriation: The Case of NAFTA’s 
Chapter 11” (2000) 33 Can. Bus. L.J. 92,108-11; H. Mann and K. von Moltke, “Protecting 
Investor Rights and the Public Good: Assessing NAFTA’s Chapter 11” (Report for the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2002), 21; Brower et al., supra note 19, 
418; Cosbey et al., supra note 19, 4-8.
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appointments from governments or companies and because they have a commercial 
interest in the appeal of investment arbitration to investors. Investment arbitration is 
a governing arrangement in which the conduct o f states is scrutinized not by judges 
but by businessmen.
Similar criticisms can be levelled in relation to the confidentiality and lack of 
balanced representation in investment arbitration.24 In the courts, the presumption is 
that cases are heard in public to allow public access and, consequendy, to ensure 
public accountability. Under investment treaties, arbitrations often take place in 
private. Even at the International Centre for the Settlement o f Investment Disputes, 
awards are publicized only with the consent o f the disputing parties, and other 
materials are not released at all. Moreover, the rules o f appointment in courts usually 
promote representative diversity among judges. In investment arbitration, the great 
majority o f arbitrators are from Western Europe or N orth America and virtually all 
are men. Each o f these criticisms, especially the matter of independence, is tied to the 
accountability of investment arbitration because each limits the degree to which the 
public has access to and confidence in the process.
Some commentators champion investment arbitration on the basis that it 
removes sensitive disputes from the political realm and subjects them to the rule o f 
law. For instance, Brower and Steven advocate arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11 
in these terms:25
W hat the NAFTA Parties set out to accomplish — the protection and 
promotion of investment through the uniform application o f rules and 
guarantees in all three NAFTA countries — can best be sustained through the 
enforcement of Chapter 11 by independent and impartial international tribunals.
No doubt there are advantages to the use o f adjudication as a governing arrangement 
(even if there is a tendency to exaggerate the degree to which adjudication is insulated 
from politics). But Brower and Steven’s description o f investment arbitration neglects
24 V.L. Been and J.C. Beauvais, “The Global Fifth Amendment: NAFTA’s Investment 
Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International ‘Regulatory Takings’ Doctrine” 
(2003) 78 N.Y.U. L.R. 30,46-7.
25 C.N. Brower and L.A. Steven, “Who Then Should Judge? Developing the International 
Rule of Law under NAFTA Chapter 11” (2001) 2 Chi. J. Int’l L. 193, 200 [emphasis added]. 
See also J. Byme, “NAFTA Dispute Resolution: Implementing True Rule-Based Diplomacy 
Through Direct Access” (2000) 35 Texas Int’l L.J. 415, 415-16 and 428-29.
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a key aspect o f the system: the reliance on a private model o f adjudication to resolve 
disputes that arise within the public domain. As a result, Brower and Steven disregard 
the fact that arbitrators lack accountability precisely because they are not appointed 
and paid, by states, as members o f an independent judicial body. Instead, they limit 
considerations o f independence and impartiality to freedom from the disputing 
parties, reflecting the assumption that investment arbitration is a private method of 
adjudication. By conceptualizing the relationship between investor and state as a 
relationship between equals, Brower and Steven avoid the more rigorous standards of 
independence and accountability that apply in public courts.26 In a public dispute, it is 
doubtful whether the rule of law can exist without an independent judiciary.27
A broader claim is often made that investment arbitration will depoliticize 
investment disputes.28 This myth is commonly associated with the use o f adjudication 
in the public sphere, especially when connected to economic reform.29 In fact, the use 
o f adjudication as a governing arrangement does not remove policy discretion from 
decision-making; it merely shifts discretion around.30 It is more accurate to say that 
investment arbitration is an attempt to legalize the political issues that inevitably arise 
in investment disputes. Just as the judicialization o f domestic decision-making 
politicizes the judiciary, so too will individualization politicize international 
arbitration.31 Politicization is an unavoidable outcome o f the transfer o f regulatory
26 Independence should mean freedom from financial dependence on the disputing parties, 
including both investors and executive governments. S. de Smith and R. Brazier, Constitutional 
and Administrative Law, 8th ed. (London: Penguin, 1998), 370 and 374; M. Loughlin, Sword and 
Scales (Oxford: Hart, 2000), 60.
27 F.A. Hayek, The Folitical Ideal of the Rule of Law (Lecture to the National Bank of Egypt, 
Cairo, 1955), 38; J. Rawls, A  Theory of Justice (1972), 210.
28 Banro American Resources, Inc. and Societe Aurifere du Kivu et du Maniema SA.R .L. v. Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (Jurisdiction) (1 September 2000), 17 ICSID Rev. 382, para. 16. J. A. 
McKinney, Createdfrom NAFTA  — The Structure, Function, and Significance of the Treaty’s Related 
Institutions (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 21-2; Brower et al., supra note 19, 430.
29 F.I. Michelman, “Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 
Just Compensation’ Law” (1967) 80 Harv. L.R. 1165, 1168-71; M. Loughlin, “Law and 
Politics in the Conversation of Mankind” (Presentation to the Faculty of Law, University of 
Toronto, 1997), 4 and 9.
30 R. Goodin, “Welfare, Rights and Discretion” (1986) 6 Ox. J. Legal Stud. 232, 232; Harlow, 
supra note 4, 211; C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration (London: Butterworths, 
1997), 106-7.
31 Hudson, supra note 3, 248-9; M. Shapiro, “The Globalization of Law” (1993) 1 Ind. J. 
Global Legal Studies 37, 47-50; Goldsworthy, supra note 1, 3; J.A.G. Griffith, “The Brave 
New World of Sir John Laws” (2000) 63 Mod. L.R. 159,159,163 and 165.
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disputes from the world of diplomacy to adjudication. Indeed, the use o f a private 
model o f adjudication exacerbates the politicization of investment arbitration because 
the use o f private arbitrators, rather than tenured judges, makes it less likely that 
decisions o f arbitrators will be viewed as independent and credible.
All o f that said, if viewed as an ill, the reliance on a private model o f 
adjudication could be remedied by states. Under NAFTA, Canada, Mexico and the 
United States — acting collectively — simply imposed the principle o f openness on 
Chapter 11 tribunals.32 They also acted to override some of the more startling 
interpretations of the treaty by tribunals. Should they so decide, the states parties to 
any investment treaty could direct, e.g., that arbitrators be appointed from a roster of 
sitting judges. Or, states could establish a representative body o f tenured investor- 
state adjudicators, paid and otherwise supported by a publicly-funded international 
organization and subject to institutional rules that apply to judges.33 These reforms 
would take much o f the wind from the sails o f critics o f investment arbitration whose 
most compelling argument stems from the role of private arbitrators. But again it is 
for states to decide whether they are persuaded by these arguments and to act 
accordingly.
At present, states evidently prefer arbitrators over judges in the context of 
investment disputes and there are plausible reasons for doing so. States may wish to 
avoid the expense o f new judicial institutions or they may welcome the cost o f private 
arbitration in order to deter claims.34 Some capital-exporting states are suspicious of 
the International Court of Justice in the field o f international economic law, whereas 
capital-importing states no doubt prefer international arbitration to the extraterritorial 
law and foreign courts.35 Treaty negotiators may wish to avoid the sensitivities
32 See also R. Singh, “The Impact of the Central American Free Trade Agreement on 
Investment Treaty Arbitrations: A Mouse that Roars?” (2004) 21 J. Int’l Arb. 329, 335-8.
33 J.H. Ralston, “Some Suggestions as to the Permanent Court of Arbitration” (1907) 1 AJIL 
321, 323-4; S. Timberg, “An International Trade Tribunal — A Step Forward Short of 
Surrender of Sovereignty” (1945) 33 Geo. L.J. 373, 386.
34 T.J. Farer, “Economic Development Agreements: A Functional Analysis” (1971) 10 Col. J. 
Transnat’l L. 200, 238; Brower and Steven, supra note 25,196, note 7.
35 C. Osakwe, “The Soviet Position on International Arbitration as a Method of Resolving 
Transnational Disputes” in T.E. Carbonneau, ed., Resolving Transnational Disputes Through 
International Arbitration (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1984), 184-5; M. 
Somarajah, The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes (Boston: Kluwer, 2001), 19-20.
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associated with new international or regional courts:36 few politicians have lost 
elections because of their support for international arbitration. States may wish to give 
the clearest possible signal to foreign investors that they will abide by international 
disciplines favouring private business.37 Whatever the reason, states alone can reform 
or withdraw from the system, just as they created it.
Thus, it is inaccurate to portray investment arbitration in terms o f the retreat 
o f the state or the demise o f sovereignty (understood as a juridical concept arising 
from the representative role of the state).38 Investment arbitration should be seen as a 
system that was established by states for a public purpose and that affects states and 
groups o f states in different ways, some of which are beneficial to individuals and 
organizations in a particular state and others not. The selectivity o f access to the 
system o f investment arbitration shifts bargaining power in favour o f multinational 
enterprises and away from others who remain dependent on the state as their legal 
representative in the international sphere. Even so, the main avenue available to non­
investors to reform how international adjudication is used as a governing arrangement
i
is the same as that which is available to investors: the state.
On the other hand, investment arbitration has the potential to transform the 
juridical concept o f sovereignty in one key respect. As a result, investment arbitration 
provides a rare example o f how contemporary globalization can undermine the state, 
understood as a unique entity with rights and duties that no private party can 
possess.39 This challenge does not arise from investment treaties per se but from the 
nature o f the adjudicative process of investment arbitration based on the use o f a 
private model o f adjudication in the regulatory sphere. In particular, the form o f 
individualization of international claims has prompted some adjudicators to adopt a 
private law framework in the context o f investment arbitration, and to treat the 
regulatory relationship between the state and investors as if it were a reciprocal
36 H.T. King et al., “Dispute Settlement Under the North American Free Trade Agreement” 
(1992) 26 Int’l Lawyer 855, 861; A. Porges, “Step by Step to an International Trade Court” in
D.L.M. Kennedy and J.D. Southwick, eds., The Political Economy of International Trade Taw 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2002), 535-6.
37 R. Dolzer and M. Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), 
12; Soloway, supra note 23,112-13.
38 R. Jackson, “Sovereignty in World Politics” (1999) 47 Pol. Studies 431, 432-4 and 453.
39 M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Taw (Oxford: OUP, 2003), 79-80.
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relationship between juridical equals.40 In particular, both tribunals and courts have 
regarded the specific consent of the investor and the general consent o f the state as if 
they constituted an agreement to arbitrate just like any commercial arbitration.41 This 
characterization of the legal relationship underlying investment arbitration is 
conceptually transformative because it fundamentally alters the nature o f the rights 
and duties o f states.42 When an adjudicator approaches the rights o f an investor under
40 E.g. Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic (Jurisdiction) (3 August 2004), ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/8, para. 63, online: ITA http:/ / ita.law.uvic.ca/ documents/ Siemensjurisdiction- 
English-3August2004.pdf (reproducing the claimant’s submissions that the power to bring a 
claim under an investment treaty is “a classical part of management” of an enterprise). J. 
Paulsson, “Arbitration without Privity” (1995) 10 ICSID Rev. 232, 243 (“The possibility of 
direct action — international arbitration without privity — allows the true complainant to face 
the true defendant. This has the immense merit of clarity and realism; these, and not 
eloquent proclamations, are the prerequisites of confidence in the legal process.”); N. Gal-Or, 
“Private Party Direct Access: A Comparison of the NAFTA and EU Disciplines” (1998) 21 
B.C. Int’l & Comp. L.R. 1, 40 (advocating investment arbitration as a means to regulate states 
and characterizing treaty-based investment arbitration as follows: “ .. .arbitration is arguably 
the preferable course to ensure states’ compliance with international agreements. Arbitration 
is based on the prerequisite that the parties to the dispute mutually consent to settle their disagreement. 
Therefore, unlike the formal adjudication procedure, which is independent of the parties’ will and is 
imposed on them, the arbitral award is more likely to be effectively enforced....” [emphasis 
added]); C. Schreuer, “Commentary on the ICSID Convention” (1996) 11 ICSID Rev. 336, 
391; D.M. Price, “NAFTA Chapter 11 — Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Frankenstein or 
Safety Valve?” (2001) 26 Can-U.S. L.J. 107,112 (commenting that the idea of bilateral 
investment treaties and NAFTA Chapter 11 was to take investor-state disputes “out of the 
political realm and put the more into the realm of commercial arbitration”); Brower et al., 
supra note 19, 415; Z. Douglas, “The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration” 
(2003) 74 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 151, 221-2 and 237. See generally Bowett, supra note 3, 933-4; 
Cohen and Smith, supra note 3, 7-8.
41 E.g. Ethyl Corporations. Government of Canada (Jurisdiction) (24 June 1998), 38 I.L.M. 708, 
para. 59-60; SGS Societe Generate de Surveillances. Philippines (Jurisdiction) (29 January 2004), 
16(3) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 91, para. 145 (characterizing “as two agreements of the 
same character between the same parties”: (1) an investment contract between host state and 
investor and (2) a subsequent agreement constituted by the general consent of the host state 
to ICSID arbitration (in a bilateral investment treaty) “in association with the Request for 
Arbitration” of the investor); Plama Consortium Limited s. Republic of Bulgaria (Jurisdiction) (8 
February 2005), ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, para. 198, online: ICSID
http: /  /www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases /plama-decision.pdf. Thus, investment arbitration is 
conceptualized based on an agreement to arbitrate between investor and state, as juridical 
equals, to remove their dispute from the courts in favour of a forum and law of their 
choosing. See also e.g. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka s. Slovak Republic (Jurisdiction) (24 May 
1999), 14 ICSID Rev. 251 [hereinafter CSOB], para. 34; Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed, S A . 
s. United Mexican States (Merits) (29 May 2003), 43 I.L.M. 133, para. 70-1 and 173 (applying 
the international minimum standard and good faith considerations as if the arbitration was 
based on an investor-state bargain). See generally Toope, supra note 18, 389.
42 W. Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1964), 276-7; Harlow and Rawlings, supra note 30, 41-5.
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an investment treaty as rights that are owed in the context o f a reciprocal relationship 
with the state, this means one of two things. Either it reduces the state to the status o f 
a private party or it elevates the investor to a quasi-sovereign status o f formal equality 
with the state, but without any sovereign responsibilities.43 In both cases, this 
approach to the investor-state relationship negates the concept o f the state as a 
unique entity endowed with authority that no private party can possess.44 Taken to its 
logical outcome, it ignores the regulatory relationship and destroys the notion o f 
public law based on the recognition of the uniqueness o f the state.
This conceptual approach is enabled by the use o f a private model of 
adjudication. The use o f a private model allows rules and principles that originate in 
private law to be applied in the context of a regulatory dispute, to the exclusion o f a 
public law framework. By characterizing the regulatory relationship as a reciprocal 
relationship, some adjudicators have eschewed public law principles, not because of 
an express inter-state agreement directing them to do so, but out of a misguided 
respect for the principle o f party autonomy. Thus: interpretation of the treaty should 
be based on the intent o f the disputing parties (rather than the states parties).45 Or: 
the courts should defer to the decisions of arbitration tribunals for reasons o f party 
autonomy (rather than legislative intent or international comity).46 Or: it is appropriate 
for investment arbitration to be kept confidential in deference to the disputing parties
43 A.A. Fatouros, “Transnational Enterprise in the Law of State Responsibility” in R.B. 
Lillich, ed., International haw ofState Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens (Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 1983), 385.
44 This is reminiscent of the debate about whether contracts between foreign investors and 
host states could be “internationalized”, thus elevating contractual obligations between 
private parties (one of which was the state) to the status of international obligations falling 
within the pubic sphere. See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. and California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Ubya 
(Merits) (1977), 53 I.L.R. 389,17 I.L.M. 1, para. 40-7. Bowett, supra note 3, 931; M. 
Somarajah, “The UNCITRAL Model Law: A Third World Viewpoint” (1989) 6 J. Int’l Arb. 
7,18; Toope, supra note 18, 387; R. Lillich, “The Law Governing Disputes Under Economic 
Development Agreements: Re-examining the Concept of ‘Internationalization’” in R. Lillich 
and C.N. Brower, International Arbitration in the 21st Century: Towards Judiciali^ ation and 
Uniformity? (Ardsley, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 1994), 64; Muchlinski, supra note 18, 
494-6.
45 Pope <& Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada (Merits, Phase 2) (10 April 2001), 13(4) World 
Trade and Arb. Mat. 61 [hereinafter Pope &  Talbol\, para. 79; CSOB, supra note 41, para. 49- 
55. Douglas, supra note 40,168.
46 United Mexican States v. Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa (2003), 16(2) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 
167, para. 84-5 (Ont. S.C.J.), affd 193 O.A.C. 216, 248 D.L.R. (4th) 443, para. 39 (Ont. C.A.); 
W.W. Park, “Duty and Discretion in International Arbitration” (1999) 93 AJIL 805, 808-10.
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(rather than because the states parties so agreed in clear and express terms).47 Or: a 
host state’s interference with an investor’s business in breach o f an investment treaty 
is akin to a private law tort.48 In general, the characterization o f the investor-state 
relationship as a reciprocal relationship enables the adjudicator to give precedence to 
the form of investment arbitration as a private method o f adjudication over its 
substance as public law. The general consents o f states are reduced to consents o f 
private parties and the private model of adjudication comes to dominate the treaty. 
The fact that private arbitrators can execute this transformation o f juridical 
sovereignty and re-draw the boundaries o f the regulatory sphere, with litde judicial 
supervision, is a perilous aspect o f investment arbitration, one that follows from the 
transfer to private contractors of an authority that was for well over a century the 
exclusive bailiwick of tenured judges.
The characterization o f the regulatory relationship as a reciprocal relationship 
is conceptually wrong. It confuses the inter-state bargain underlying an investment 
treaty with an agreement between an investor and the state.49 It may be that the states 
incorporated a private model of adjudication into investment treaties, but these rules 
play a subordinate and facilitative role. They were not originally intended to apply in 
the circumstances o f a regulatory dispute50 and, as such, they should be discarded 
where they conflict with the treaty, or where the treaty is silent or ambiguous and they 
conflict with customary rules of international law. Private law is less relevant to 
investment arbitration than rules and principles that are common to the domestic 
public law o f the states parties to an investment treaty. O n this point, it is worth 
reiterating the key difference between treaty-based investment arbitration and 
international commercial arbitration. The authority for commercial arbitration flows 
from the consent o f the disputing parties to resolve their dispute through private
47 F. Orrego Vicuna, “Arbitration in a New International Alternative Dispute Resolution” 
(2001) 18(2) ICSID News 1.
48 CME Republic B. V. v. C%ech Republic (Merits) (13 September 2001), 14(3) World Trade and 
Arb. Mat. 109, para. 582. Douglas, supra note 40,180, note 149.
49 Bowett, supra note 3, 933-4. See Republic of Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration and Production 
Company (29 April 2005), [2005] E.W.C.H. 774, para. 61 and 80 (Comm. Ct).
50 The Laewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Laewen v. United States of America (Merits) (26 June 
2003), 42 I.L.M. 811,15(5) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 97 [hereinafter Laewen], para. 233; 
United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Government of Canada (Participation by Amid Curiae) (17 
October 2001), para. 70, online: DFAIT http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-
nac/documents/IntVent oct.pdf.
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arbitration. In contrast, the authority for investment arbitration comes from the 
(treaty-based) general consents of states as part of an inter-state bargain. The general 
consent — both prospective and open-ended -  is a sovereign act o f the state as the 
legal representative o f its population; it is not an act of a disputing party, acting in a 
private capacity. Thus, the jurisdiction of an investment arbitration tribunal flows 
from an instrument of public international law, not private law, and the law governing 
the arbitration is that of the treaty rather than a contract.
Because investment arbitration is not a form of private adjudication, the 
principle o f autonomy -  as understood in international commercial arbitration — has 
no place in treaty-based investment arbitration. In investment arbitration, the investor 
does not agree with the host state to resolve a regulatory dispute through investment 
arbitration. Instead, the investor acts upon an opportunity, provided by an earlier 
inter-state bargain, to make an international claim for damages arising out o f the 
exercise o f public authority. The investor’s consent is most clearly analogous to an 
individual’s decision under domestic law to go to court to resolve a grievance against 
the state. The investor’s claim triggers the establishment o f a tribunal and delineates 
the nature o f the dispute, but it remains a personal rather than a sovereign consent.
An initial antidote to this characterization of investment arbitration is to 
reinvigorate the actual reciprocal relationship that underlies investment treaties: the 
inter-state bargain.51 Put differently, the promise of investment arbitration as a form 
of international adjudication lies in the idea of neutrality between states, not between 
investors and states. By understanding investment arbitration as a bargain between 
states, subject to international law, one advances the neutrality o f investment 
arbitration as an international institution. By analogizing investment arbitration to 
international commercial arbitration, on the other hand, one promotes the neutrality 
o f investment arbitration as a private order between state and investor.52 The former is 
a legitimate founding principle, the latter is an inappropriate policy choice. In
51 E.g. NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1115 (describing the purpose of Chapter 11 arbitration as 
being “to assure equal treatment among investors of the Parties in accordance with the principle 
of international reciprocity and due process before an impartial procedure” [emphasis 
added]). The reference is to equal treatment among investors, not between investors and 
states; and to international reciprocity and due process, not reciprocity between private 
parties and respect for party autonomy.
52 E.g. C.H. Brower II, “Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back” 
(2001) 40 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 43, 72-3; Brower and Steven, supra note 25, 196.
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investment arbitration, the neutrality o f the inter-state bargain requires the equal 
treatment o f foreign investors relative to each other and regardless of the power and 
influence o f an investor’s home state. Likewise, neutrality requires the equal treatment 
o f governments relative to each other and regardless o f the power or influence o f the 
host state. What neutrality does not require is equal treatment between investors and 
governments. Investment arbitration is a matter of pacta sunt servanda between the 
states parties, not between the disputing parties.
For this reason, public international law takes precedence over the use o f a 
private model o f adjudication. In defining the nature of the inter-state bargain, 
adjudicators should look to the intentions of the states parties to the treaty. Where the 
states parties to the treaty make unanimous submissions about how the treaty should 
be interpreted, a tribunal should adopt their view as a matter o f course.53 Further, the 
tribunal should not adopt an interpretation in favour o f investor protection that goes 
beyond the submissions o f the home state of the investor.54 This is because investors 
are not parties to investment arbitration as an inter-state bargain. O f course, most 
investment treaties favour the historical position of capital-exporting states and, as 
such, they favour investor protection, but there remains significant room for 
interpretive flexibility.
Two general interpretive approaches to the role o f investment arbitration can 
be identified. The private protection approach emphasizes investor protection as the 
dominant purpose of investment treaties; in contrast, the public function approach 
gives more consideration to the ongoing role o f governmental decision-making. Each 
o f these approaches faces a basic problem arising from the expansion o f international
53 AD F Group Inc. v. United States of America (Merits) (9 January 2003), 15(3) World Trade and 
Arb. Mat. 55, para. 177 (concluding in relation to the unanimous submissions of the NAFTA 
states parties: “—  we have the Parties themselves — all the Parties — speaking to the Tribunal. 
No more authentic and authoritative source of instruction on what the Parties intended to 
convey in a particular provision of NAFTA, is possible.”). See also Methanex Corporation v. 
United States of America (Jurisdiction) (7 August 2002), 14(6) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 109, 
para. 130-4 and 147; United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Government of Canada (Jurisdiction) 
(22 November 2002), para. 59, 79, and 96, online: DFAIT http://www.dfait- 
maeci.gc.ca/ma-nac/documents/Jurisdiction%20Award.22Nov02.pdf.
54 E.g. Pope (dr Talbot, supra note 45, para. 114; GAMI Investments, Inc. v. Government of the United 
Mexican States (Merits) (15 November 2004), 17(2) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 127, para. 29- 
30 (both tribunals rejecting the submissions of the investor’s home state (the U.S.) in favour 
of a more ambitious interpretation of NAFTA advanced by the investor).
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adjudication into the regulatory sphere and, for different reasons, each approach tends 
to undermine investment arbitration as an inter-state bargain.
First, the private protection approach undermines the inter-state bargain by 
emphasizing a purpose of investment treaties over the text o f the treaty, interpreted in 
context, including the context of customary international law. As a result, the private 
protection approach tends to eschew a textual approach to treaty interpretation, in 
favour o f the tribunal’s judgment o f ‘object and purpose’ and in conflict with the 
Vienna Convention on Treaties. This jeopardizes the credibility o f investment arbitration 
for states while advancing its utility for claimants. Further, this risks making 
investment arbitration the sop of international business, thus jeopardizing the viability 
and longevity o f the system to the extent that it depends on the support or 
compliance of states. Applied rigorously, the private protection approach negates the 
uniqueness o f the state by treating the regulatory relationship between investor and 
state as a reciprocal relationship.
The public function approach undermines the inter-state bargain by 
accommodating states in order to protect the system of investment arbitration.55 That 
is, the public function approach limits state liability where a damages award might 
disrupt government or generate controversy among decision-makers and the public, 
especially in powerful states. This sacrifices the reciprocity o f investment arbitration 
by creating pressure to tread softly on the governments o f major capital-exporting 
states, while championing investor protection as a means to discipline less powerful 
states. The inter-state bargain gives way to the accommodation o f powerful states 
according to the degree to which their support is thought necessary to maintain the 
institution.56 If  this approach becomes commonplace, investment arbitration will be 
associated with a bias in favour o f both international business and capital-exporting 
states. Investment treaties will become the new capitulation treaties.57
55 Robert A^nian et al. v. United Mexican States (Merits) (1 November 1999), 14 ICSID Rev. 538, 
39 I.L.M. 537, para. 87 and 99; Ijoewen^  supra note 50, para. 242. Paulsson, supra note 40, 257;
G.A. Alvarez and W.W. Park, “The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 
11” (2003) 28 Yale J. Int’l L. 365, 399; J. Werner, “Some Comments on the NAFTA Chapter 
11 Case —AD F Group Inc. and United States ofAmericd' (2003) 4 J. World Investment 113, 
123-4.
56 Paulsson, supra note 40, 246 and 257.
57 E.g. M. Somarajah, “The Clash of Globalisations and the International Law on Foreign 
Investment” (Presentation to the Centre for Trade Policy and Law, Ottawa, 12 September
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Adjudicators should reject approaches that give priority to private law 
principles or the selective accommodation of the powerful. At worst, the private 
protection approach co-opts globalization as a trojan horse for a private method of 
government, while the public function approach harkens back to an age of indirect 
colonialism. The first brings the triumph of the private model o f adjudication; the 
latter constructs a formally (as well as practically58) unequal treaty-based governing 
arrangement. The way to avoid these pitfalls is to apply the analytical framework of 
public law to the adjudication of regulatory disputes in the context o f the inter-state 
bargain.59 International adjudication of regulatory disputes is best analogized to the 
adjudication of claims by individuals in domestic public law, where governmental 
decision-making is assessed in light of the unique rights and duties o f the state.60
In investment arbitration, the conventional adjudicative framework of 
international law — based on the inter-state bargain — is correct but not itself sufficient. 
This is because the prospective and far-reaching individualization o f claims under 
investment treaties requires adaptation o f the conventional framework by the 
incorporation o f public law principles. Far-reaching individualization transforms 
international adjudication by expanding the degree to which it engages the regulatory 
sphere thus making the analytical framework of public law more relevant to 
investment arbitration. In adjudication between states (as in commercial arbitration 
between private parties), the public law framework is less applicable because the 
underlying legal relationship is reciprocal.61 In contrast, investment arbitration 
involves the direct adjudication of regulatory disputes between the state and 
individuals who are subject to the exercise of public authority. For this reason, 
principles o f international law that originate in the adjudication o f disputes arising
2002), 18, online: CTPL http://www.carleton.ca/ctpl/pdf/papers/somarajah.pdf: B. 
Kingsbury, N. Krisch, and R. Stewart, “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law” 
(International Law and Justice Working Paper 2004/1, Institute for International Law and 
Justice, New York University School of Law, 2004), 38.
58 R.R. Wilson, “Postwar Commercial Treaties of the United States” (1949) 43 AJIL 262, 286;
H. Walker, “Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present 
United States Practice” (1956) 5 Am. J. Comp. L. 229, 243-4; Anghie, supra note 10, 41.
59 Chayes, supra note 5,1284; K. Roach, “The Limits of Corrective Justice and the Potential 
of Equity in Constitutional Remedies” (1991) 33 Ariz. L.R. 859, 860; Jackson, supra note 38, 
454; Legum, supra note 20,147.
60 Harlow and Rawlings, supra note 30, 41-2.
61 V.S. Mani, International Adjudication (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), 3-4.
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from a reciprocal relationship between states must be modified or jettisoned. Perhaps 
most importantly, it is necessary to differentiate between state liability in investment 
arbitration and state responsibility in conventional international adjudication. In 
international law, rules of state responsibility are often defined more expansively than 
domestic rules of state liability because in international law damages are typically 
awarded in disputes between juridical equals. In this context, liberal rules o f state 
responsibility apply equally to the disputing parties.62 Investment arbitration, on the 
other hand, leads to damages awards in favour of investors and against the state but 
not the other way around. This calls for sensitivity to the governmental implications 
o f damages awards.
In all domestic legal systems, there is a regulatory space in which individuals 
cannot receive damages for unlawful state conduct and it would be surprising if this 
space did not exist at the international level.63 However, when sovereign acts o f the 
state are equated to the acts of a private party, investment arbitration infringes upon 
this fiscally risk-free domain. In determining the extent to which such a domain exists 
in the international sphere, adjudicators should bear in mind the limits o f international 
adjudication in the resolution of regulatory disputes, where damages are used as a 
public law remedy.64 It is unfortunate that some arbitrators (and many commentators) 
tend to act like lions when protecting investors but like ostriches when faced with the 
implications for governments. This has the potential to hijack the system of 
investment arbitration for a private lobby.65 It positions investment arbitration as a
62 M.N. Shaw, InternationalLaw, 5th ed. (Cambridge: CUP, 2003), 192-3.
63 Most, if not all, proponents of treating the state as a private person for purposes of state 
liability nonetheless accept limits on state liability in light of the uniqueness of public 
authority: e.g. Hogg and Monahan, supra note 4,151-3.
64 Cohen and Smith, supra note 3, 8 and 11-12; R. Baldwin and C. McCrudden, Regulation and 
Public Law (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), 60-1; Harlow, supra note 4, 220; J.H.H. 
Weiler, “Emerging Issues on Compliance and Effectiveness of Community Law” (1997) 91 
ASIL Proc. 172,173-4; Loughlin, supra note 39, 48-52; J.H.H. Weiler, “Epilogue: Towards a 
Common Law of International Trade” in J.H.H. Weiler, ed., The EU, the WTO, and the 
N AFTA  (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 230; J. Merrills, “The Means of Dispute Settlement” in M.D. 
Evans, ed., International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 545.
65 E.g. Vicuna, supra note 47 (professor and president of the World Bank Administrative 
Tribunal; member of the ICSID Panels of Conciliators and Arbitrators; arguing against 
making investment arbitrations public on the basis that they would more closely resemble 
ordinary public court proceedings and thus cease to be an alternative); Brower et al., supra 
note 19, 430-5. See J.E. Alvarez, “Critical Theory and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement’s Chapter Eleven” (1997) 28 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 303, 307-8.
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regime in which the public sphere is governed by rules o f private law that are skewed 
in favour o f international business at the expense of other individuals.66 Again, it is 
difficult to isolate these decisions from the interests o f arbitrators to expand the 
system of investment arbitration as a commercial enterprise.
A purpose of this thesis is to establish that the use o f investment arbitration as 
a governing arrangement calls for the application of a public law framework in 
investment arbitration. There has been little attempt to elaborate the specific 
implications or elements o f a public law framework because doing so would require 
careful review o f how rules and principles of public law in different countries govern 
the myriad issues that arise in the adjudication of regulatory disputes between 
individuals and the state. For purposes o f illustration, it may be useful to make clear 
that adopting a public law framework entails the application o f rules and principles of 
public law that have developed in domestic public law and, to a lesser extent, in 
international law in those cases in which international adjudication directly engages 
regulatory disputes. For instance, given the use o f damages as a public law remedy in 
investment arbitration, adjudicators may find it appropriate to adopt general limits on 
state liability that are consistent with limits on state liability in the domestic public law 
o f the investor’s home state and the host state.67 Likewise, adjudicators may find it 
appropriate to afford a margin o f appreciation for discretionary policy-making by 
domestic institutions68 and to defer to governmental decisions that are not specifically 
abusive or discriminatory.69 This would preserve a reasonably predictable space for 
the exercise o f public authority, undeterred by the prospect o f a retrospective 
damages award. That said, this thesis is concerned not with how a public law
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framework should be applied in specific cases, but with the identification of 
investment arbitration as a governing arrangement as opposed to a reciprocally 
consensual method o f adjudication.
The rapid conclusion of so many investment treaties in the 1990s attests to a 
broad convergence of opinion among states about the use o f law to protect 
investment in support o f international commerce and a liberal international 
economy.70 Indeed, it is a major diplomatic failure o f the twentieth century that 
adjudication did not play a more integral and balanced role in earlier stages of the 
world economy.71 But states should not be assumed by the mere conclusion of 
broadly-framed investment treaties to have mandated a radical transformation of the 
juridical nature of the state, even if  states have subjected the exercise o f public 
authority to new methods of control. Inherent in the decision of states to use 
adjudication as a governing arrangement is the recognition o f an ongoing role for 
government. Investment treaties constrain the policy options o f domestic 
governments without establishing international institutions to regulate multinational 
enterprises.72 Thus, the state remains the primary repository o f regulatory authority in 
a world that requires proactive and robust government for reasons beyond investor 
protection.73 In these circumstances, it is appropriate to adopt a deferential and 
accommodating stance toward governments. Otherwise, investment arbitration may 
become a vehicle for colonizing the public sphere with a private method of 
government and for formally subordinating the rights and interests of those who are 
represented by states alone on the global stage.
70 A.A. Fatouros, Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1962), 63; S.K.B. Asante, Transnational Investment Taw and National Development (Lagos: 
University of Lagos, 1981), 73 and 109.
71 A.A. Fatouros, “An International Code to Protect Private Investment — Proposals and 
Perspectives” (1961) 14U.T.L.J. 77,101.
72 A.C. Aman, “Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a New Administrative Law” 
(2003) 10 Ind. J. Global Legal Studies 125,139-40.
73 Fatouros, supra note 43, 364-5; R. Kozul-Wright and R. Rowthom, “Spoilt for Choice? 
Multinational Corporations and the Geography of International Production” (1998) 14 Ox. 
Rev. Econ. Pol. 74, 84-5; S. Picciotto, “Introduction: What Rules for the World Economy?” 
in S. Picciotto and R. Mayne, eds., Regulating International Business (Houndmills: Macmillan,
1999), 4-5 and 19-20; D. Rodrik, The Global Governance of Trade A.s I f Development Really Mattered 
(Report for the UN Development Programme, October 2001), 15-16 and 27; UNCTAD, 
World Investment Report 2004 (New York: United Nations, 2004), 233 and 236; Kingsbury, 




Accord, entre la Confederation suisse et la RJpublique islamique du Pakistan concemant la 
promotion et la protection reciproque, 11 July 1995, No. 0.975.262.3 (entered into force 6 
May 1996).
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the Government of the Republic of India, 14 March 1994, [1995] U.K.T.S. No. 27, Cmd 
2797 (entered into force 6 January 1995).
Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the C^ech and Slovak Federal Republic, 29 April 1991, online: UNCTAD 
h ttp :/Zwww.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs /bits/czech netherlands.pdf.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Investment Measures, 15 April 1994, art. 1, Annex LA 
o f the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Final Act Embodying the 
Results o f the Uruguay Round o f Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1994).
American Convention on Human Rights, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force 18 July 
1978).
A S E A N  Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 15 December 1987, 27 
I.L.M. 612.
Central American Free Trade Agreement, 20 December 1993 (not in force), 32 I.L.M. 605.
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, UN GA Res. 3281 (XXIX), UN GAOR, 
29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, UN Doc. A/9631 (1974) 50,14 I.L.M. 251.
Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, [1945] U.S.T.S. No. 993, [1946] U.K.T.S. 
No. 67, [1945] Can. T.S. No. 7 (entered into force 24 October 1945).
Chile-United States Free Trade Agreement, 6 June 2003 (2003), online: USTR 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade Agreements/Bilateral/Chile FTA/Final Texts/Section 
Index.html.
Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 18 March 1965, 4 I.L.M. 524 (entered 
into force 14 Oct 1966) [ICSID Convention].
Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 26 September 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 
302, 27 AJIL 1 (1929) (entered into force 25 July 1929) [Geneva Convention of 1927].
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the 
Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran (Claims Settlement Declaration), 19 January 1981 [Algiers Declaration].
235
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order; UN GA Res. 3201 
(S-VI), UN GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, UN Doc. A/9559 (1974) 3, 13 I.L.M. 
715.
Declaration on the Human Eights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in which 
They Uve, GA Res. 40/144, UN GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. 53, UN Doc. A /40/53 
(1985) 252.
The Dominican Republic— Central America — United States Free Trade Agreement, 5 August 
2004 (not in force), online: SICE
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/CAFTA/CAFTADR e/CAFTADRin e.asp.
Energy Charter Treaty, 17 December 1994, 35 I.L.M. 509.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Eights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 
November 1950, Eur. T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force 3 September 1953).
European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, 21 April 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 
364.
European Convention on State Immunity, 16 May 1972, 74 Euro. T.S., 11 I.L.M. 470 
(entered into force 11 June 1976).
Final A ct of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment Havana Charterfor an 
International Trade Organisation, UN Conference on Trade and Employment, UN Doc. 
1948 II.D.4.1 (1948), online: WTL http: /  / www.worldtradelaw.net/misc /havana.pdf.
General Agreement on Trade in Services, 15 April 1994, 33 I.L.M. 44.
Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, 30 January 1975,14 
I.L.M. 336.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Eights, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
61 AJIL 870 (entered into force 23 March 1976).
North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 December 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296 and 605 
(entered into force 1 January 1994) [NAFTA].
Protocol on Arbitration Clauses in Commercial Matters, 24 September 1923, 20 AJIL 194 
(1926) (entered into force 28 July 1924) [Geneva Protocol of 1923\.
Protocolo de Coloniapara la Promociony Proteccion Reciproca de Inversiones en el M ERCOSUR, 
17 January 1994, adopted by Mercosur/CMC/Dec No. 11/93, online: SICE 
http://w w w .sice.oas.org/Trade/MRCSR/colonia/pcolonia s.asp.
236
Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, United Nations G.A. Res. 1803 
(XVII), UN GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, UN Doc. A/5217 (1962) 15, 57 AJIL 
710.
Singapore-United States Free Trade Agreement, 6 May 2003 (2003), online: USTR 
http://www.ustf.gov/Trade Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore FTA/Final Texts/Sec 
don Index.html.
Softwood Lumber Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United 
States of America, Washington, 29 May 1996, C.T.S. 1996/16, 35 I.L.M. 1195 (entered 
into force 29 May 1996).
Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055.
Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and the United States, 19 
November 1794, 52 Cons. T.S. 243 (entered into force 28 October 1795) [Jay Treaty].
Treaty on Free Trade Between the Republic of Columbia, the Republic of Venezuela and the United 
Mexican States, 13 June 1994 (entered into force 1 January 1995), online: SICE 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/G3 E /G 3 E  TOC.asp.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 15 April 1994, 33 
I.L.M. 112 [DSU\.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force 16 
November 1994).
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 10 
June 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 7 June 1959) [New York Convention].
Universal Declaration ofFluman Rights, GA Res. 217 A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd Sess., Part I, 
UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 22 May 1969,1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into 
force 27 January 1980).
237
Statutes
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority A ct of2002, Div. B, Title XXI, Trade A ct of2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-210,116 U.S.C. 933, s. 2102(3) (2002).
Codigo de Comercio, Tit. IV, c. 1-9 (Commercial Arbitration), as amended 1989 and 1993. 
Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.17 (2nd Supp.).
Crown Proceedings A c t 1947, c. 44.
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. c. 2.
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. s. 1346(b), 2671-80.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C., 847 F. Supp. 61, (1976) (U.S.).
State Immunity A c t 1978, c. 33, s. 3 (U.K.).
United Hations Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.16.
238
International cases
A D F  Group Inc. v. United States of America (Merits) (9 January 2003), 15(3) World Trade 
and Arb. M at 55. 
Administrative Decision No. V  (1924), 7 R.I.A.A. 119,19 AJIL 612 (U.S.-Germany 
Mixed Claims Commission). 
Adriano Gardella v. Cote d’Ivoire (Merits) (29 August 1979), 1 ICSID Rep. 283. 
A G IP  S .pA . v. People’s Republic of Congo (Merits) (30 November 1979), 1 ICSID Rep. 
306, 21 I.L.M. 726.
Ambatielos Claim (Greece v. United Kingdom) (1956), 12 R.I.A.A. 83.
Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia (Decision) (24 June 1982), ICSID Case No. 
A R B /81/I [unpublished]. 
Amco Asia Corp. v. Indonesia (Jurisdiction) (25 September 1983), 23 I.L.M. 351.
Amoco International Finance Corp. v. Iran (1987), 15 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 189.
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (United Kingdoms. Iran) [1952] I.C.J. Rep. 93.
Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. fAA PL) v. Sri Lanka (Merits) (27 June 1990), 4 ICSID 
Rep. 246, 30 I.L.M. 577.
Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Jurisdiction) (27 
September 2001), 16 ICSID Rev. 469.
A ^urix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic (Jurisdiction) (8 December 2003), 16(2) World 
Trade and Arb. Mat. 111.
Bamv American Resources, Inc. and Societe Aurifere du Kivu et duManiema S A .R .L  v. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Jurisdiction) (1 September 2000), 17 ICSID Rev. 382.
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain), [1970] I.C.J. Rep. 3, 9 I.L.M. 
227.
Brasserie du Pecheur S A  v. Germany', Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. 
and Others (No. 46 & 48/93), (1996) 1 C.M.L.R. 889.
Cain Claim (France v. Mexico) (1929), 5 R.I.A.A. 516.
Case Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued In France (France v. Serbia) 
(1921), P.C.I.J. S et A, No. 20.
239
Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Bankas. Slovak Republic (Jurisdiction) (24 May 1999), 14 ICSID 
Rev. 251.
The Chor^ow Factory {Germany v. Boland) (1928), P.C.I.J. Ser. A., No. 17.
CM E Republic B .V. v. C^ech Republic (Merits) (13 September 2001), 14(3) World Trade 
and Arb. Mat. 109.
CM E Republic B. V. v. Cvgch Republic (Damages) (14 March 2003), 15(4) World Trade 
and Arb. Mat. 83 and 245.
CME Republic B. V. v. C^ech Republic (SVEA Judgment) (15 May 2003) (C.A. Sweden), 
15(5) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 171.
CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina (Jurisdiction) (17 July 2003), 
42 I.L.M. 788.
Compama deAguas del Aconquija S A . <& Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic (Decision 
on Challenge to the President) (3 October 2001), 17 ICSID Rev. 168.
Compama de Aguas del Aconquija S A . &  Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic 
(Annulment) (3 July 2002), 6 ICSID Rep. 340.
Compama del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S A . v. Republic of Costa Rica (Merits) (17 February
2000), 15 ICSID Rev. 169.
Corfu Channel (Merits) (United Kingdom v. Albania), [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4.
Crompton Corp. v. Government of Canada (Notice o f Claim) (6 November 2001), online: 
DFAIT http: /  / www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/ documents/ CROMPTON- 
CORP.pdf.
Elettronica Sicula S .pA . (United States v. Italy), [1989] I.C.J. Rep. 14.
Emilio Agustin Maffe^ini v. The Kingdom of Spain (Jurisdiction) (25 January 2000), 16 
ICSID Rev. 212,124 I.L.R. 9.
Empresas Lucchetti, S A . v. Lucchetti Peru, S A . (Merits) (7 February 2005), ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/04, online: ICSID http: / / www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/lucchetti- 
award.pdf.
Ethyl Corporations. Government of Canada (Procedural Order, 13 October 1997 and 
subsequent Procedural Order, undated), online: DFAIT http://www.dfait- 
maeci.gc.ca/ tna-nac/ documents/ethv!5.pdf.
Ethyl Corporations. Government of Canada (Jurisdiction) (24 June 1998), 38 I.L.M. 708. 
Fabiani Case (Frances. Venezuela) (1896), 10 R.I.A.A. 33.
240
Fedax N . L . v. Republic of Venezuela (Jurisdiction) (11 July 1997), 37 I.L.M. 1378, 5 
ICSID Rep. 186.
Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. United Mexican States (Jurisdiction) (17 July 2003), 
15(6) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 3.
Francovich and Bonifaci v. Republic of Italy (No. 6 and 9/90), [1991] E.C.R. 1-5357, (1993) 
2 C.M.L.R. 66.
G A M I Investments, Inc. v. Government of the United Mexican States (Merits) (15 November 
2004), 17(2) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 127.
Hauer v. Rhein land-Pfatz (No. 44/79), [1979] E.C.R. 3727, (1980) 3 C.M.L.R. 42.
Holiday Inns S A . v. Morocco (Jurisdiction) (12 May 1974), 1 ICSID Rep. 645.
In the Matter of Cross-border Trucking Services (Merits) (6 February 2001), 13(3) World 
Trade and Arb. Mat. 121.
Interhandel Case {Switzerland v. United State?) [1959] I.C.J. Rep. 6.
Iran-United States No. A / 18, Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (Full Tribunal) (1984), 5 Iran- 
U.S. C.T.R. 251, 23 I.L.M. 489.
Janes Claim (United States v. Mexico) (1926), 4 R.I.A.A. 82.
Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion (1928), P.C.I.J. Ser. B, No. 15.
Kaiser Bauxite Company v. Jamaica (Jurisdiction) (6 July 1975), 1 ICSID Rep. 296.
Koblerv. Austria (No. C-224/01), [2003] E.C.R. 1-10239, 3 C.M.L.R. 28.
Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques Bergaderm and Goupil v. Commission (No. 352/98), [2000] 
E.C.R. 1-5291.
Lagrand (Merits) {Germany v. United States), [2001] I.C.J. Rep. 466, 40 I.L.M. 1069.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory 
Opinion) (9 July 2004), I.C.J. General List No. 131.
The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L  Loewen v. United States of America (Jurisdiction) (5 
January 2001), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, online: State Department 
http: /  /www. state.gov/ documents/organization/3921 .pdf.
The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L  Loewen v. United States of America (Merits) (26 
June 2003), 42 I.L.M. 811,15(5) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 97.
241
Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States (Jurisdiction) (6 December 2000), 18 
ICSID Rev. 469.
Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States (Procedural Order No. 5) (6 
December 2000), online: Ministry of Economy http://www.economia- 
snci.gob.mx/sphp pages/im porta/sol contro/consultoria/Casos Mexico/Marvin/o 
rdenes/Order 5.pdf.
Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States (Merits) (16 December 2002), 15(3) 
World Trade and Arb. Mat. 157.
Mavrommattis Palestine Concessions {Greece v. Great Britain) (1924), P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 2.
Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States (Merits) (30 August 2000), 40 I.L.M. 36, 
13(1) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 45.
Methanex Corporation v. United States of America (Jurisdiction) (7 August 2002), 14(6) 
World Trade and Arb. Mat. 109.
Middle Fast Cement Shipping and Handling Co. SA.. v. Arab Republic of Egypt (Merits) (12 
April 2002), 18 ICSID Rev. 602.
Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America (Merits) (11 October 2002), 42 I.L.M. 
85,15(3) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 273.
Neer Claim (United States v. Mexico) (1926), 4 R.I.A.A. 60.
Certain Norweigen Loans {Frances. Norway), [1957] I.C.J. Rep. 9.
Nottebohm (Liechtenstein V. Guatemala), [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 4.
Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Republic of Ecuador (Merits) (1 July 2004), 
London Court of International Arbitration Administered Case No. UN 3467, online: 
ITA http:/ /ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Oxy-EcuadorFinalAward 001 .pdf.
Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria (Jurisdiction) (8 February 2005), ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/24, online: ICSID http: / / www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/ plama- 
decision.pdf.
Pope <& Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada (Jurisdiction) (26 January 2000), online: 
DFAIT http: / / www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/pubdoc6.pdf.
Pope <& Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada (Merits, Phase 1) (26 June 2000), 13(4) World 
Trade and Arb. M at 19.
Pope <& Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada (Merits, Phase 2) (10 April 2001), 13(4)
World Trade and Arb. Mat. 61.
242
Pope <& Talbot Inc. s. Government of Canada (Damages) (31 May 2002), 41 I.L.M. 1347, 
14(6) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 44.
Pope &  Talbot (Costs) (26 November 2002), online: DFAIT http://www.dfait- 
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/docum ents/CostsAward26Nov02.pdf.
K  v. Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, ex parte Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd. (No. 5/94), 
[1996] E.C.R. 1-2553.
K  v. Treasury ex parte British Telecommunications (No. 392/93), [1996] 3 W.L.R. 203.
Ps£public of Ghana v. Telekom Malaysia Berhad, D.C. The Hague, 18 October 2004 and 5 
November 2004, No. H A /R K  2004.667 and H A /R K  2004.788.
Rem-ZentralFinan^eGs. Lanschmrtschaftskammerfur das Saarland (No. 33/76), [1976] 
E.C.R. 1989.
Robert A^inian et al. v. United Mexican States (Merits) (1 November 1999), 39 I.L.M. 537.
Ronald S. Lauder v. C^ech Republic (Final Award) (3 September 2001), (2002) 4 World 
Trade and Arb. Materials 35.
Salim Costruttori S. P A . and Italstrade S .P A . v. Kingdom of Morocco (Jurisdiction) (23 July
2001), 42 I.L.M. 609.
Salomone Haim v. Kassen%ahnar\tliche i/ereinigung Nordrhein (No. 424/97), [2000] E.C.R. 
1-5123.
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada (Procedural Order No. 3 and 11) (10 June 1999 
and 11 November 1999), online: DFAIT http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna- 
nac/ documents/mvers5.pdf.
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada (Merits) (12 November 2000), 40 I.L.M. 1408, 
15(1) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 184.
SGS Societe Generale de Surveillances. Pakistan (Jurisdiction) (6 August 2003), 18 ICSID 
Rev. 307,16(2) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 167.
SGS Societe Generale de Surveillances. Philippines (Jurisdiction) (29 January 2004), 16(3) 
World Trade and Arb. Mat. 91.
Siemens A .G . s. The Argentine Republic (Jurisdiction) (3 August 2004), ICSID Case No. 
A RB/02/8, online: ITA http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Siemensjurisdiction- 
English-3August2004.pdf.
Societe OuestAfricaine des Be'tons Industriels s. Senegal (Merits) (25 February 1988), 6 
ICSID Rev. 125,17 Y.B. Com. Arb. 42.
243
SporrongandlJonnrothv. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R. Ser. A, No. 52, [1983] E.H.R.R. 35.
Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt (Jurisdiction) (14 
April 1988), 3 ICSID Rep. 131.
Status of Eastern Care Ha, Advisory Opinion (1923), P.C.I.J. Ser. B, No. 5.
Tabacalera Boqueron S.A. v. Paraguay (1997), Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Rep. No. A l/91, 
Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 1987,
O EA /Ser.L /V /II.98/D oc.7/rev. (1998) 225.
Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed, S A . v. United Mexican States (Merits) (29 May 2003), 43 
I.L.M. 133.
Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. and California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Libya (Merits) (1977), 53
I.L.R. 389,17 I.L.M. 1.
Tippetts v. TA M S-A TTA  (1985), 6 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 219.
Tokios Tokelesv. Ukraine (Jurisdiction) (29 April 2004), 16(4) World Trade and Arb. 
Mat. 75.
Tradex Hellas S A . v. Republic of Albania (Merits) (29 April 1999), 14 ICSID Rev. 161.
Union Bridge Company Claim (United States v. Gnat Britain) (1924), 6 R.I.A.A. 138.
United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation (2001), 89 B.C.L.R. (3d) 359, 38 C.E.L.R. 
284,13(5) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 219.
United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Government of Canada (Participation by A m id Curiae) 
(17 October 2001), online: DFAIT h ttp ://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna- 
nac/docum ents/IntVent oct.pdf.
United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Government of Canada (Jurisdiction) (22 November
2002), online: ITA http: /  /ita.law.uvic.ca/documents /UPS-Jurisdiction.pdf.
Vacuum Salt Products, Ltd. v. Republic of Ghana (Jurisdiction) (16 February 1994), 9 
ICSID Rev. 72, 20 Y.B. Comm’l Arb. 11.
Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (Jurisdiction) (2 June 2000), 40 I.L.M. 56.
Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (Jurisdiction) (26 June 2002), 41 I.L.M. 
1315,14(6) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 203.
Waste Management Inc. v. United Mexican States (Merits) (30 April 2004), 43 I.L.M. 967, 
16(4) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 3.
Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Egypt (Jurisdiction) (25 May 1999), 41 I.L.M. 881.
244
WTO Appellate Body Report, E C  Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
WTO Doc. W T /D S26/A B /R  and W T/D S48/A B /R  (16 January 1998).
WTO Appellate Body, India —Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products,, W TO Doc. W T/D S50/A B /R  (24 August 1998).
245
Domestic cases
A & L  Investments Ltd. v. Ontario (Minister of Housing) (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 799, 32 R.P.R. 
(2d) 1 (C.A. Ont.).
A nnsv. Merton (1977), [1978] A.C. 728, 2 AH E.R. 492 (H.L.).
Attorney General v. De Keyser’s Loyal Hotel, Ltd., [1920] A.C. 508 (H.L.).
Attorney General of Canadav. S.D. Myers, Inc, [2004] 3 F.C.R. 368, 5 C.E.L.R. (3d) 166 
(F.C.T.D.).
Authorson (Litigation Guardian of) v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 40, 227
D.L.R. (4th) 385.
Baccus v. S .R .L  Servicio Nacional del Trigo, [1957] 1 Q.B. 438 (C.A.).
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 3 I.L.M. 381, 398 (1964).
Bank of United States v. Planter’s Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat. 904, 907 (U.S. 1824).
Bladv. Bamfield (1674), 3 Swan 604, 36 Eng. Rep. 992.
Blanco (8 February 1873), Rec. le r Supp. 61.
Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 1907 (1972).
British Columbian. Tener, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 533,17 D.L.R. (4th) 1.
Brown v. British Columbia (Minister of Transportation and Highways, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 420,
112 D.L.R. (4th) 1.
Chromalloy AeroservicesY. Arab Lepublie of Egypt, 939 F.Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996), 12(4) 
Int’l Arb. R. B-l (April 1997).
Claim against the Empire of Iran (1963), 45 I.L.R. 57, 80 (Ger. Fed. Const. Ct.).
I  Congreso delPartido, [1983] 1 A.C. 244, 267 (H.L.).
Corporation Transnational de Inversiones v. ST E T  International (1999), 45 O.R. (3d) 183 
(S.C.), affd  49 O.R. (3d) 414 (C.A.).
C^amikow v. Loth, Schmidt &  Co. [1922] 2 K.B. 478.
DalehiteY. United States, 364 U.S. 15 (1953).
Duke ofBrunswick v. King of Hannover (1844), [1848] 6 Beav. 1, 2 H.L.C. 1.
246
Fray v. Blackburn (1863), 3 B. & S. 576,122 E.R. 217, 217 (Q.B.). 
Gallagher v. Lynn, [1937] A.C. 863 (H.L.); France Fenwick and Co. v. K , [1927] 1 K.B. 
458. 
Gamettv. Ferrand (1827), 6 B. & C. 611,108 E.R. 576, 581 (K.B.). 
Guimond v. Quebec (Procureurgeneral), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 347,138 D.L.R. (4th) 647.
G ulf Canada Resources Ltd. v. Arochem International Inc. (1992), 66 B.C.L.R. (2d) 113, 43 
C.P.R. (3d) 390.
G ulf Resources Ltd. v. Arochem International Inc. (1992), 11 B.C.A.C. 145, 43 C.P.R. (3d) 
390. 
Hilmarton I  (1995), 20 Y.B. Comm’l Arb. 663.
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
Kuwait Airways Co. v. Iraqi Airways Co. (1995), 1 W.L.R. 1147.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v. R , [1979] 1 S.C.R. 101, 88 D.L.R. (3d) 462.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627-37 (1985).
Nielsen v. Kamloops, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2,10 D.L.R. (4th) 641.
Oetjenv. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918), 303-4.
Pennsylvania Central Transportation Company v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp. (1990), 50 B.C.L.R. (2d) 207 (C.A.).
Republic of Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration and Production Company (29 April 2005), [2005] 
E.W.C.H. 774 (Comm. Ct).
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
Shearson I  American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
Sonatrach v. Ford Bacon &  Davis Inc. (1990), 11 Y.B. Comm’l Arb. 370.
Swinamerv. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 445,112 D.L.R. (4th) 18.
Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] Q.B. 529, 557-8 (C.A.).
247
United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation (2001), 89 B.C.L.R. (3d) 359, 38 C.E.L.R. 
284,13(5) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 219.
United Mexican States v. Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa (2003), 16(2) World Trade and Arb. 
Mat. 167, para. 77-86 (Ont. S.C.J.), a ffd  193 O.A.C. 216, 248 D.L.R. (4th) 443 (Ont. 
C.A.).
248
Documents of international organizations
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Foreign 
Investment in Fatin America and the Caribbean, 2003, UN Doc. E /0 4 /II/G .5 4  (2004).
Free Trade Commission (NAFTA), Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions 
(31 July 2001), 13(6) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 139, online: DFAIT www.dfait- 
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-Interpr-en.asp.
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24 on Preservations to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Fights (1994), (1995) 15 H.R.L.J. 464, 2 I.H.R.R. 10.
International Centre for Setdement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), Pules of Procedure 
for Arbitration Proceedings in ICSID, revised 26 September 1984 and 1 January 2003 
(original rules 1968), reprinted in Convention, Pegulations and Pules (Washington: ICSID,
2003) [ICSID Rules], online: ICSID 
www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm.
ICSID, Model Clauses Pelating to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Designedfor Use in Bilateral Investment Agreements (1969), 8 I.L.M. 1341.
ICSID, Pules Governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by the 
Secretariat of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, revised 1 January 
2003 (original rules 1978), 1 ICSID Reports 213 [ICSID Additional Facility Rules], 
online: ICSID www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility-archive/l.htm.
ICSID, Administrative and Financial Pegulations, reprinted in Convention, Pegulations and 
Pules (Washington: ICSID, 2003).
International Joint Commission, Protection of the Waters of the Great Fakes — Final Peport 
to the Governments of Canada and the United States (IJC, February 2002).
International Law Commission (ILC), Summary Pecords of the 9th Session, 1957, UN Doc. 
A /CN .4/106, [1957] 1 Y.B. Int’l Law Comm. 155.
ILC, Commentary to its Final Draft Articles [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm.
ILC, “Draft Articles on Responsibility o f States for Internationally Wrongful Acts”, 
Peport of the International Faw Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 
56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, Annex, UN Doc. A /56 /10  (2001).
International Monetary Fund, Foreign Direct Investment Statistics — How Countries Measure 
FD I (IMF, 2001).
League of Nations, Responsibility of States for Damage Caused in Their Territory to the Person 
or Property of Foreigners, Conference for the Codification o f International Law, Bases o f 
Discussion, vol. 3, LN Doc. C.75.M.69.1929.V (1929).
249
NAFTA Advisory Committee on Private Commercial Disputes, Summary of U.S. 
Arbitration Law by D. Enix-Ross and D.W. Rivkin (June 1995). 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), The M A I 
Negotiating Text, Paris (1998).
OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Revision 2000 (Paris: OECD, 
2000).
United Nations (UN), Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of International Arbitral 
Awards, UN ESC, UN Doc. E/AC.42/SR.1 (First Meeting, 1 March 1955).
UN, Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, UN ESC, 
UN Doc. E/AC.42/SR.2 (Second Meeting, 23 March 1955).
UN, Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, UN ESC, 
UN Doc. E/AC.42/SR.3 (Third Meeting, 23 March 1955).
UN, Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, 19th Sess., 
UN ESC, UN Doc. E /A C .42/4/R ev.l (28 March 1955).
UN, Report by the Secretary-General on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, Annex I and II, UN ESC, 21st Sess., UN Doc. E/2822 (31 January 1956).
UN, Comments by Governments on the draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, UN ESC, UN Doc. E/2822/A dd.4 (3 April 1956).
UN, Report of the Secretary General: Preliminary Draft Set of Arbitration Rulesfor Optional Use 
in A d  Floe Arbitration Relating to International Trade (U N C ITRAL Arbitration Rules), UN, 
UN Doc. A /C N .9/97 (4 November 1974), 6 Y.B. UNCITRAL 163.
UN, Report of the Secretary-General: Revised Draft Set of Arbitration Rulesfor Optional Use in 
A d  Hoc Arbitration Relating to International Trade (U N C ITR AL Arbitration Rules), UN, 
UN Doc. A /C N .9 /112/Add.l (12 December 1975), 7 Y.B. UNCITRAL 166.
UN, Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UN 
G.A. Res. 31/98, UN GAOR, 31st Session, Supp. No. 17, UN Doc. A /31/17 , c. V, s. 
C (1976) [UNCITRAL Rules].
UN, Note by the Secretariat: Further Work in respect of International Commercial Arbitration, 
UN, UN Doc. A /CN .9/169 (11 May 1979).
UN, Report of the Secretary-General: Possible Features of a Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration, UN, UN Doc. A /CN .9/207 (14 May 1981), (1981) 12 Y.B. 
UNCITRAL 77.
250
UN, Note by the Secretariat: Model Taw on International Commercial Arbitration: Draft Articles 
1 to 24 on Scope of Application, Arbitration Agreement, Arbitrators, and Arbitral Procedure, 
UN, UN Doc. A /CN .9/W G .II/W P.37 (1982).
UN, Peport of the Secretary-General: Analytical Compilation of Comments by Governments and 
International Organisations on the Draft Text of a Model Taw on International Commercial 
Arbitration, UN, UN Doc. A /CN .9/263 and Add. 1-3 (1985).
UN, Peport of the Secretary-General: Analytical Commentary on Drcft Text of a Model Taw on 
International Commercial Arbitration, UN, UN Doc. A /C N .9/264 (25 March 1985), 16 
Y.B. UNCITRAL 104.
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Model Taw on 
International Commercial Arbitration, 21 June 1985, UN Doc. A /40/17 , Annex I, 24 
I.L.M. 1302.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), International 
Investment Instruments: A  Compendium, vol. 3 (New York: United Nations, 1996).
UNCTAD, World Investment Peport 1996 (Geneva: United Nations, 1997).
UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s (Geneva: United Nations, 1998).
UNCTAD, Pair and Equitable Treatment, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements (New York: United Nations, 1999).
UNCTAD, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, UNCTAD Series on Issues in 
International Investment Agreements (New York: United Nations, 1999).
UNCTAD, National Treatment, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements (New York: United Nations, 1999).
UNCTAD, Scope and Definition, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements (New York: United Nations, 1999).
UNCTAD, Trends in International Investment Agreements: A n  Overview, UNCTAD Series 
on Issues in International Investment Agreements (New York: United Nations, 1999).
UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties — 1959-1999 (New York: United Nations, 2000).
UNCTAD, Taxation, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements (New York: United Nations, 2000).
UNCTAD, Dispute Settlement: Investor-State, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements (New York: United Nations, 2003).
UNCTAD, World Investment Peport 2003 (Geneva: United Nations, 2003).
251
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004 (New York: United Nations, 2004).
World Bank, Memorandum of the meeting of the Committee of the Whole, December 27, 1962, 
World Bank, UN Doc. SID/62-2 (7 January 1963), reprinted in ICSID, Convention on 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States — Documents 
Concerning the Origins and the Formulation of the Convention, vol. 2 (World Bank, 1968).
World Bank, First Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 
Annotated Text, World Bank, UN Doc. SID/63-15 (9 August 1963), reprinted in 
ICSID, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States — Documents Concerning the Origins and the Formulation of the Convention, vol. 2 
(World Bank, 1968).
World Bank, Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (18 March 1965), reprinted in 
Convention, Regulations and Rules (Washington: ICSID, 2003).
World Bank, World Development Report 1999/2000 (Oxford: OUP, 2000).
World Bank, World Development Report 2005 (Washington, D.C.: IBRD, 2004).
World Trade Organization Secretariat, “An Introduction to the GATS” (October 
1999), online: WTO http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/serv e/gsintr e.doc.
252
Secondary sources
E.V. Abbot, “The Police Power and the Right to Compensation” (1889) 3 Harv. L.R. 
189.
A.F. Abbott, “Latin America and International Arbitration Conventions: The 
Quandary o f Non-Ratification” (1976) 17 Harv. Int’l L.J. 131.
K.W. Abbott et al., “The Concept o f Legalization” in J.L. Goldstein, legalisation and 
World 'Politics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001).
H. Abs and H. Shawcross, “The Proposed Convention to Protect Private Foreign 
Investment” (1960) 9 J. Public L. 115.
A. Afilalo, “Constitutionalization Through the Back Door: A European Perspective 
on NAFTA’s Investment Chapter” (2001) 34 N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1.
M.T. Ahmedouamar, “The Liability of the Government in France as a Consequence 
of its Legal Activities” (1983) 11 Int’l J. Legal Info. 1.
J. Allan, “Rights, Paternalism, Constitutions and Judges” in G. Huscroft and P. 
Rishworth, eds., Litigating Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2002).
P. Allott, “State Responsibility and the Unmaking o f International Law” (1988) 29 
Harv. Int’l L.J. 1.
P. Alston, “Resisting the Merger and Acquisition o f Human Rights by Trade Law: A 
Reply to Petersmann” (2002) 13 Eur. J. Int’l L. 815.
A. Alvarez, “Latin America and International Law” (1909) 3 AJIL 269.
G.A. Alvarez and W.W. Park, “The New Face o f Investment Arbitration: NAFTA 
Chapter 11” (2003) 28 Yale J. Int’l L. 365.
J.E. Alvarez, “Critical Theory and the North American Free Trade Agreement’s 
Chapter Eleven” (1997) 28 Inter-Am. L.R. 303.
A.C. Aman, “The Limits o f Globalization and the Future o f Administrative Law: 
From Government to Governance” (2001) 8 Ind. J. Global Legal Studies 379.
A.C. Aman, “Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a New Administrative 
Law” (2003) 10 Ind. J. Global Legal Studies 125.
R. Anderson, “Tribunal to rule on Czech bank failure” Financial Times (8 April 2005) 
27.
A. Anghie, “Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth- 
Century International Law” (1999) 40 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1.
253
M. Antinori, “Does Lochner Live in Luxembourg? An Analysis o f the Property 
Rights Jurisprudence of the European Court o f Justice” (1995) 18 Fordham Int’l LJ. 
1778.
B. Appleton, Navigating N A F T A  (Scarborough: Carswell, 1994).
S.K.B. Asante, Transnational Investment Taw and National Development (Lagos: University 
o f Lagos, 1981).
S.K.B. Asante, “International Law and Foreign Investment: A Reappraisal” (1988) 37 
I.C.L.Q. 588, 591-5.
S.K.B. Asante, “International Law and Investments” in M. Bedjaouni, ed., International 
Taw: Achievements and Prospects (Paris and Dordrecht: UNESCO and Martinus Nijhoff, 
1991).
R.S. Avi-Yonah, “Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis o f the 
Welfare State” (2000) 113 Harv. L.R. 1573.
R. Bachand and S. Rousseau, “International Investment and Human Rights: Political 
and Legal Issues” (Background paper for Rights & Democracy, 11 June 2003).
A. Baines, “Capital Mobility and European Financial and Monetary Integration: A 
Structural Analysis” (2002) 28 Rev. Int’l Studies 337.
R. Baldwin and C. McCrudden, 'Regulation and Public Taw (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1987).
E. Barendt, “Separation o f Powers and Constitutional Government” (1995) Pub. L. 
599.
M. Barlow and T. Clark, M AI: The Multilateral Agreement on Investment and the Threat to 
Canadian Sovereignty (Toronto: Stoddart: 1997).
W. Barnes, “Remarks” (1907) Am. Soc’ty Int’l L. Proc. 100.
V.L. Been and J.C. Beauvais, “The Global Fifth Amendment: NAFTA’s Investment 
Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International ‘Regulatory Takings’ 
Doctrine” (2003) 78 N.Y.U. L.R. 30.
K.-P. Berger, International Economic Arbitration (Deventer: Kluwer, 1993).
M.S. Bergman, “Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties: An Examination of the 
Evolution and Significance of the U.S. Prototype Treaty” (1983) 16 N.Y.U.J. Int’l L.
& Pol. 1.
254
J. Bhagwati, “The Capital Myth: the Difference between Trade in Widgets and 
Dollars” (1998) 77(3) For. Affairs 7.
J. Bhagwati, “Afterword: The Question of Linkage” (2002) 96 AJIL 126.
P.N. Bhagwati, “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation” (1985) 23 Colum. J. 
Transnat’l L. 561.
T. Bingham, The Business of Judging (Oxford: OUP, 2000).
R.D. Bishop, S.D. Dimitroff, and C.S. Miles, “Strategic Options Available When 
Catastrophe Strikes” (2001) 36 Texas Int’l L.J. 635.
L. Biucovic, “Impact o f the Adoption of the Model Law in Canada: Creating a New 
Environment for International Arbitration” (1998) 30 Can. Bus. L.J. 376.
A.K. Bjorklund, “Contract Without Privity: Sovereign Offer and Investor 
Acceptance” (2001) 2 Chi. J. Int’l L. 183.
K.-H. Bockstiegel, “An Introduction to the New German Arbitration Act Based on 
the UNCITRAL Model Law” (1998) 14 Arb. Int’l 19.
D. Bodansky and J.R. Crook, “Symposium: The ILC’s State Responsibility Articles — 
Introduction and Overview” (2002) 96 AJIL 773.
E.M. Borchard, “Basic Elements o f Diplomatic Protection o f Citizens Abroad” (1913) 
7 AJIL 497.
E.M. Borchard, “Government Responsibility in Tort, VI” (1927) 36 Yale L.J. 757.
E.M. Borchard, “Governmental Responsibility in Tort: VII” (1928) 28 Colum. L. Rev. 
577.
E.M. Borchard, “The Access o f Individuals to International Courts” (1930) 24 AJIL 
359, 362-3.
E.M. Borchard, ‘“Responsibility of States,’ At the Hague Codification Conference” 
(1930) 24 AJIL 517.
E. Borchard, “The ‘Minimum Standard’ o f Treatment o f Aliens” (1940) Mich. L.R.
445.
J.W. Boscariol, “Canada and the New International Investment Regime -  Canada’s 
Foreign Investment Protection Agreements” (Presentation to the Canadian Bar 
Association — Ontario International Law Section, March 1999).
E.H. Bouzari, “The Public Policy Exception to Enforcement o f International Arbitral 
Awards: Implications for Post-NAFTA Jurisprudence” (1995) 30 Texas Int’l L.J. 205.
255
D.W. Bowett, “Claims Between States and Private Entities: The Twilight Zone of 
International Law” (1986) 35 Cath. U. L. Rev. 929.
A.W. Bradley, K.D. Ewing, and E.C.S. Wade, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 11th 
ed. (1993).
J. Braithwaite and P. Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge: CUP, 2000).
W.W. Bratton et al., “Introduction: Regulatory Competition and Institutional 
Evolution” in W.W. Bratton et al., eds., International Regulatory Competition and 
Coordination (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996).
J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations, 5 th ed. (Oxford: OUP, 1955).
A. Broches, “An Analysis o f the Bank’s Tentative Proposals and of the Principal 
Issues Raised Thereby”, World Bank, UN Doc. SID/63-2 (18 February 1963), 
reprinted in ICSID, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States — Documents Concerning the Origins and the Formulation of the 
Convention, vol. 2 (World Bank, 1968).
A. Broches, “Development o f International Law by the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development” (1965) 59 Am. Soc’ty Int’l L. Proc. 33.
C.N. Brower and D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1998).
C.N. Brower, C.H. Brower II, and J.K. Sharpe, “The Coming Crisis in the Global 
Adjudicative System” (2003) 19 Arb. Int’l 415.
C.N. Brower and L.A. Steven, “Who Then Should Judge? Developing the 
International Rule o f Law under NAFTA Chapter 11” (2001) 2 Chi. J. Int’l L. 193.
C.H. Brower II, “Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back”
(2001) 40 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 43.
C.H. Brower II, “NAFTA’s Investment Chapter: Initial Thoughts About Second- 
Generation Rights” (2003) 36 Vanderbilt J. Transnat’l L. 1533.
D. Brown, “Commentary” in L.R. Dawson, ed., Whose RJghts? The N A F T A  Chapter 11 
Debate (Ottawa: Centre for Trade Law and Policy, 2002).
I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2003).
R. Bruno and J.H.H. Weiler, “Access o f Private Parties to International Dispute 
Settlement: A Comparative Analysis”, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 
13/97 (NYU School o f Law, 1997).
256
A. Bucher, “Court Intervention in Arbitration” in R. Lillich and C.N. Brower, eds., 
International Arbitration in the 21st Century: Towards Judicialization and Uniformity? 
(Ardsley, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 1994).
J. Byrne, “NAFTA Dispute Resolution: Implementing True Rule-Based Diplomacy 
Through Direct Access” (2000) 35 Texas Int’l L.J. 415.
C. Calvo, Te Droit International, 5th ed. (Paris: A. Rousseau, 1896).
P. Cane, “Public Law and Private Law: A Study of the Analysis and Use o f a Legal 
Concept” in J. Eckelaar and J. Bell, eds., Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 3rd series 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1987).
M.M. Carrow, The Background of Administrative Taw (Newark: Associated Lawyers, 
1948).
J.P. Carver, “The Strengths and Weaknesses o f International Arbitration Involving a 
State as a Party: Practical Implications” (1985) 1 Arb. Int’l 179.
D.Z. Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization (Oxford: OUP, 
forthcoming 2005).
J. Castaneda, “The Underdeveloped Nations and the Development o f International 
Law” (1961) 15 Int’l Org. 38.
Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), “International Law on 
Investment: The Minimum Standard of Treatment (MST)” (Issue Brief, August 2003).
P.G. Cemy, ‘Taradox o f the Competition State: the Dynamics o f Political 
Globalization” (1997) 32 Gov’t and Opposition 251.
A. Chayes, “The Role o f the Judge in Public Law Litigation” (1976) 89 Harv. L.R. 
1281.
G.A. Christenson, “The United States-Rumanian Claims Settlement Agreement o f 
March 30,1960” (1961) 55 AJIL 617.
R.R. Churchill, “Dispute Settlement in the Law of the Sea” in M.D. Evans, Remedies in 
International Taw: The Institutional Dilemma (Oxford: Hart, 1998).
P. Civello, “The TRIMS Agreement: A Failed Attempt at Investment Liberalization” 
(1999) 8 Minn. J. Global Trade 97.
A. Claire Cutler, “Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of 
International Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy” (2001) 27 Rev. o f Int’l 
Studies 133.
257
S. Clarkson, “Systemic or Surgical? Possible Cures for NAFTA’s Investor-State 
Dispute Process” (2002) 36 Can. Bus. L.J. 368.
D. Cohen and J.C. Smith, “Entitlement and the Body Politic: Rethinking Negligence 
in Public Law” (1986) 64 Can. Bar. Rev. 1.
J. Collier and V. Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in International Taw (Cambridge: CUP, 
1999).
Cooley, “Labor and Capital Before the Law” (1884) 139 North Am. Rev. 37.
C.M. Correa, ‘Trilateral Investment Agreements: Agents of New Global Standards for 
the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights?” (Report for GRAIN, August 2004).
A. Cosbey et al., “Investment and Sustainable Development” (Report by the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2004).
J.-P. Costa, “The Provision of Compensation Under Article 41 o f the European 
Convention on Human Rights” (Address to the British Institute o f International and 
Comparative Law, 7 December 2001).
T. Cottier, “Trade and Human Rights: A Relationship to Discover” (2002) 5 J. IntT 
Econ. L. 111.
P.P. Craig, “Compensation in Public Law” (1980) 96 L.Q Rev. 413.
P.P. Craig, “Once Upon a Time in the West: Direct Effect and the Federalization of 
EEC Law” (1992) 12 Ox. J. Legal Studies 453.
P. Craig and G. De Burca, E U  Law — Text, Cases, and Materials, 3rd ed. (Oxford: OUP,
2003).
B.M. Cremades and D.J.A. Cairns, “The Brave New World o f Global Arbitration”
(2002) 3 J. World Investment 173.
J.H. Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on International Commercial, Financial and Trade Law (Oxford: 
Hart, 2000).
C.K. Dalrymple, “Politics and Foreign Direct Investment: The Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency and the Calvo Clause” (1996) 29 Cornell IntT L.J. 161.
M. Daly, “Some Taxing Questions for the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI)” (1997) 20 World Economy 787.
M. Damaska, “Activism in Perspective” (1983) 92 Yale L.J. 1189.
I. Davies, “The New Lex Mercatoricr. International Interests in Mobile Equipment”
(2003) 52 I.C.L.Q. 151.
258
K.C. Davis, Discretionary Justice (Urbana, 111.: University o f Illinois Press, 1969).
R.G. Dearden, “Arbitration of Expropriation Disputes between an Investor and the 
State under the North American Free Trade Agreement” (1995) 29 J. World Trade 
113.
C. Deblock and D. Brunelle, “Globalization and New Normative Frameworks — The 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment”, Cahier de recherche 98-2 (Groupe de 
recherche sur l’integration continentale, Universite de Quebec a Montreal, 1998).
G.R. Delaume, “ICSID Arbitration and the Courts” (1983) 77 AJIL 784.
G.R. Delaume, “Sovereign Immunity and Transnational Arbitration” (1987) 3 Arb. 
Int’l 28.
I. Delupis, Finance and Protection of Investments in Developing Countries (Epping: Gower 
Press, 1973).
M. DeMerieux, “Deriving Environmental Rights from the European Convention 
Protecting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” (2001) 21 Ox. J. Legal Studies 
521.
E. Denza, “The Relationship Between International and National Law” in M.D. 
Evans, ed., International Paw (Oxford: OUP, 2004).
Y. Dezaley, “Between the State, Law, and the Market: The Social and Professional 
Stakes in the Construction and Definition of a Regulatory Arena” in W.W. Bratton et 
al., eds., International Regulatoiy Competition and Coordination (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996).
Y. Dezaley and B. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the 
Construction of a Transnational Legal Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
A.V. Dicey, A n  Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution [1885] (London: 
Macmillan, 8th ed. 1915).
W. Diebold, “The End of the ITO ” in Essays in International Finance, no. 16 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1952).
S. Dillon, International Trade and Economic Law in the European Union (Oxford: Hart, 
2002), 100.
W.S. Dodge, “National Courts and International Arbitration: Exhaustion o f Remedies 
and Res Judicata Under Chapter Eleven o f NAFTA” (2000) 23 Hast. Int’l & Comp. 
L.R. 357.
R. Dolzer, “New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation o f Alien Property” (1981) 
75 AJIL 553.
259
R. Dolzer, “Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property” (1986) 1 ICSID Rev. 41.
R. Dolzer and M. Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1995).
R. Donner, The Regulation of Nationality in International Taw, 2d ed. (Ardsley, N.Y.: 
Transnational Publishers, 1994).
D.F. Donovan, “Introduction to Articles — Dallas Workshop on Arbitrating with 
Sovereigns” (2002) 18 Arb. Int’l 229.
Z. Douglas, “The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2003) 74 
Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 151.
L. Drago, “State Loans in Their Relations to International Policy” (1907) 1 AJIL 692.
E. Drake et al., “The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: A Step Backward in 
International Human Rights” (Report for the Human Rights Clinical Project Program, 
Harvard Law School, undated).
F.S. Dunn, “International Law and Private Property Rights” (1928) 28 Colum. L. Rev. 
166.
J. Dunning, International Production and the Multinational "Enterprise (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1981).
R. Dussault and L. Bourgeat, Administrative Eaw —A. Treatise (Toronto: Carswell, 1985).
J. Dutheil de la Rochere, “Member State Liability for Infringement o f European 
Community Law” (1996) 11 Tul. Euro. Civ. L.F. 1.
C. Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Taw (New York: NYU Press,
1928).
P.D. Ehrenhaft, “Chapter 11 and Federalism” (Paper presented to the NAFTA 
Chapter 11 Investor-State Disputes: Litigating Against Sovereigns conference, 
Canadian Bar Association, March 2000).
L. Ehring, “De Facto Discrimination in WTO Law: National and Most-Favored- 
Nation Treatment — or Equal Treatment?”, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 12/01 
(NYU School o f Law, 2001).
B. Eichengreen et al., “L iberating  Capital Movements: Some Analytical Issues”, 
Economic Issues No. 17 (IMF, 1999).
S.E. Eizenstat, ‘“Fast Track’ needs protections for investors” The Boston Globe (2 May 
2002).
260
T. Epps and C.M. Flood, “Have We Traded Away the Opportunity for Innovative 
Health Care Reform? The Implications of the NAFTA for Medicare” (2002) 47 
McGill L.J. 747.
R.A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1985).
J.M. Evans et al., Administrative Law — Cases, Text, and Materials, 4th ed. (Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery, 1995).
R.C. Evans, “Damages for Unlawful Administrative Action: The Remedy for 
Misfeasance in Public Office” (1982) 31 I.C.L.Q. 640.
A.P. Fachiri, “International Law and the Property o f Aliens” (1929) 10 Brit. Y.B. Int’l 
L. 32.
J.K. Fairbank, The United States and China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1959).
D. Fairgrieve, “The Human Rights Act 1998, Damages and Tort Law” [2001] Pub. 
Law 695.
T.J. Farer, “Economic Development Agreements: A Functional Analysis” (1971) 10 
Colum. J. Transn’l L. 200.
M.J. Farrelly, “Recent Questions o f International Law” (1894) 10 L.Q.R. 254.
Fasken Martineau, News Release, “Raymond Loewen Responds to Decision on 
NAFTA Claim” (8 July 2003).
A. Fatouros, “An International Code to Protect Private Investment — Proposals and 
Perspectives” (1961) 14 U.T.L.J. 77.
A.A. Fatouros, Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1962).
A.A. Fatouros, “International Economic Development and the Illusion o f Legal 
Certainty” (1963) 57 ASIL Proc. 117.
A.A. Fatouros, “International Law and the Third World” (1964) 50 Va. L.R. 783.
A.A. Fatouros, “On Domesticating Giants: Further Reflections on the Legal 
Approach to Transnational Enterprise” (1976) 15 U. Western Ontario L. Rev. 151.
A.A. Fatouros, “Transnational Enterprise in the Law of State Responsibility” in R.B. 
Lillich, ed., International Taw of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens (Charlottesville: 
University Press o f Virginia, 1983).
261
W.A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Taw, Economics, and Politics (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1995).
O.M. Fiss, “Against Settlement” (1984) 93 Yale L.J. 1073.
G.G. Fitzmaurice, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court o f Justice: 
Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points” (1951) 28 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 1.
J.P. Fitzpatrick, “The Future of the N orth American Free Trade Agreement: A 
Comparative Analysis o f the Role of Regional Economic Institutions and the 
Harmonization o f Law in North America and Western Europe” (1996) 19 Houston J. 
Int’l L. 1.
L.Y. Fortier, “Delimiting the Spheres of Judicial and Arbitral Power” (2000) 80 Can. 
Bar Rev. 143.
L.Y. Fortier, “Caveat Investor: The Meaning of ‘Expropriation’ and the Protection 
Afforded Investors Under NAFTA” (2003) 20(1) ICSID News 1.
P.G. Foy, “Effectiveness o f NAFTA’s Chapter Eleven Investor-State Arbitration 
Procedures” (2003) 18 ICSID Rev. 44.
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, “The Argentine Crisis — Foreign Investors’ Rights” 
(Report, January 2002).
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, “Dispute Resolution in the Caspian Region” (Report, 
June 2002).
S. Friedman, Expropriation in International Taw (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 
1953).
W. Friedmann, Taw in a Changing Society (London: Stevens & Sons, 1959).
L.L. Fuller, “Consideration and Form” (1941) 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799.
L.L. Fuller, “The Forms and Limits o f Adjudication” (1978) 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353.
E. Gaillard, “Commentary” (2002) 18 Arb. Int’l 247.
N. Gal-Or, “Private Party Direct Access: A Comparison o f the NAFTA and EU 
Disciplines” (1998) 21 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L.R. 1.
S. Ganguly, “The Investor-State Dispute Mechanism (ISDM) and a Sovereign’s 
Power to Protect Public Health” (1999) 38 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 113.
G. Ganz, “Allocation o f Decision-Making Functions” (1972) Pub. L. 215.
262
Y. Ghai, R. Luckham, and F. Snyder, “Introduction” in Y. Ghai, R. Luckham, and F. 
Snyder, eds., The Political Economy of Taw (Oxford: OUP, 1987).
Y. Ghai, R. Luckham, and F. Snyder, “Law and the Internationalization o f Capital - 
Introduction” in Y. Ghai, R. Luckham, and F. Snyder, eds., The Political Economy ofEaw 
(Oxford: OUP, 1987).
P.S. Gibbs, “Prospects for Sustainable Liberalization o f Foreign Investment Laws as a 
Concomitant of Hemispheric Integration in the Americas” (1996) 28 Inter-Am. L.R. 
95.
S. Gill, “Globalization, Market Civilisation and Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism” (1995)
24 Millenium 399.
N. Girvan, Corporate Imperialism: Conflict and Expropriation (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 
1978).
P.H. Gleick et al., “The New Economy o f Water” (Report for the Pacific Institute for 
Studies in Development, Environment, and Security, 2002).
J. Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999).
R. Goodin, “Welfare, Rights and Discretion” (1986) 6 Ox. J. Legal Stud. 232.
R.W. Gorte, “Softwood Lumber Imports: The 1996 U.S.-Canada Agreement”, United 
States Congressional Research Service Report No. 96-540 (13 June 1996).
C.D. Gray, Judicial Remedies in InternationalEaw (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987).
C.N. Gregory, “Expropriation by International Arbitration” (1907) 21 Harv. L.R. 23.
F. Green, “Corporations as Persons, Citizens, and Possessors o f Liberty” (1946) 94 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 202.
C. Greenwood, “The Law o f War (International Humanitarian Law)” in M.D. Evans, 
ed., International Eaw (Oxford: OUP, 2004).
J. Griffith and H. Street, Principles of Administrative Eaw, 5th ed. (London: Pitman, 1973). 
J.A.G. Griffith, “The Brave New World o f Sir John Laws” (2000) 63 Mod. L.R. 159. 
W.E. Grigsby, “The Mixed Court o f Egypt” (1896) 12 L.Q. Rev. 252.
D.M. Gruner, “Accounting for the Public Interest in International Arbitration: The 
Need for Procedural and Structural Reform” (2003) 41 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 923.
O. Guglielmino, “Analista senala arbitrariedad del sistema judicial; Demandas 
inverosimiles” Ea Nacion [Argentina] (17 January 2005).
263
A.T. Guzman, “Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity 
of Bilateral Investment Treaties” (1998) 38 Va. J. Int’l L. 639.
M. Habicht, Post-War Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1931).
S. Haggard, Developing Nations and the Politics of Global Integration (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, 1995).
M. Hallward-Driemeier, “Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct 
Investment? Only a B it... and They Could Bite”, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 3121 (Washington: World Bank, June 2003).
P.I. Hansen, “Judicialization and Globalization in the N orth American Free Trade 
Agreement” (2003) 38 Tex. Int’l L.J. 489.
C. Harlow, Compensation and Government Torts (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1982).
C. Harlow, “Francovich and the Problem o f the Disobedient State” (1996) 2 Eur. L.J. 
199.
C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration (London: Butterworths, 1997).
D.J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 5th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
1998).
M. Hart, “A Multilateral Agreement on Foreign Direct Investment — Why Now?” 
(1996) in P. Sauve and D. Schwanen, eds., Investment Rules for the Global Economy 
(Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1996).
M.M. Hart and W.A. Dymond, “NAFTA Chapter 11: Precedents, Principles, and 
Prospects” in L.R. Dawson, ed., Whose Rights? The N A F T A  Chapter 11 Debate (Ottawa: 
Centre for Trade Law and Policy, 2002).
F. von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1944).
F. von Hayek, The Political Ideal of the Rule of Law (Lecture to the National Bank of 
Egypt, Cairo, 1955).
F. von Hayek, Law Legislation and Liberty, vol. 1 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1973).
D. Held and A. McGrew, “Globalization” (1999) 5 Glob. Governance 483.
A.S. Hershey, “The Calvo and Drago Doctrines” (1907) 1 AJIL 26.
264
J. Hewko, “Foreign Direct Investment — Does the Rule o f Law Matter?” (Report to 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Rules of Law Series, Report No. 26, 
April 2002).
R. Higgins, “Conceptual Thinking about the Individual in International Law” (1978) 4 
Brit. J. Int’l Studies 1.
S.M. Hill, (1900) “Growth o f International Law in Africa” 16 L.Q.Rev. 249.
H.M. Hill, “Central American Court o f Justice” in R. Dolzer et al., eds., 'Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1987).
J. Hillary, “Divide and Rule: The EU and US Response to Developing Country 
Alliances at the W TO” (Report for Action Aid International, 2004).
M. Hirsh, The Arbitration Mechanism of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993).
E. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire (London: Penguin, 1968).
P.W. Hogg and P.J. Monahan, Liability of the Crown, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2000).
G.N. Horlick and A.L. Marti, “NAFTA Chapter 11B: A Private Right o f Action to 
Enforce Market Access through Investments” (1997) 14 J. Int’l Arb. 43.
K. Hossain, “Introduction” in K. Hossain and S.R. Chowdhury, eds., Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources in International Eaw (London: Pinter, 1984).
M.-F. Houde and K. Yannaca-Small, Relationships between International Investment 
Agreements, OECD Working Paper on International Investment No. 2004/1 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, May 2004).
M.O. Hudson, “The Rendition of the International Mixed Court at Shanghai” (1927)
21 AJIL 451.
M.O. Hudson, International Tribunals (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace and the Brookings Institution, 1944).
G. Huscroft, “Rights, Bills o f Rights, and the Role o f Courts and Legislatures” in G. 
Huscroft and P. Rishworth, eds., Litigating Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2002).
International Chamber o f Commerce (ICC), Rules of Arbitration of the International 
Chamber of Commerce, revised 1 January 1998 (original rules 1922) [ICC Rules], online: 
ICC www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/rules.asp.
ICC, “Fair Treatment for Foreign Investments: International Code” (ICC Brochure 
no. 129,1949).
265
ICC, “Multilateral rules for investment” (Doc. No. 103/179, Rev., 30 April 1996).
ICC, “ICC’s expectation regarding a WTO investment agreement” (Policy statement 
o f the ICC Commission on Trade and Investment Policy, 7 March 2003).
C. Issawi, The Economic History of Turkey 1800-1914 (Chicago: University o f Chicago 
Press, 1980).
J.H. Jackson, The World Trading System, 2d ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997).
R. Jackson, “Sovereignty in World Politics: a Glance at the Conceptual and Historical 
Landscape” (1999) 47 Pol. Studies 431.
G. Jaenicke, “The Prospects for International Arbitration: Disputes Between States 
and Private Enterprises” in A.H.A. Soons, International Arbitration: Past and Prospects 
(Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1990).
A. James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1986).
W.I. Jennings, The Haw and the Constitution (London: University o f London Press, 1959).
P.C. Jessup, “Responsibility o f States for Injuries to Individuals” (1946) 46 Colum.
L.R. 903.
P.C. Jessup, Transnational Haw (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1956).
F. Johns, “The Invisibility of the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of 
International Law and Legal Theory” (1994) 19 Melb. U. L. Rev. 893.
J.R. Johnson, “Essential Disciplines o f the National Treatment Obligation Under 
NAFTA Chapter Eleven” (Report on investment protection for the Ad Hoc Experts 
Group on Investment Rules, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
2 December 2001), online: DFAIT http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/treatment- 
en.asp.
J.R. Johnson, “How Will International Trade Agreements Affect Canadian Health 
Care?” (Discussion Paper No. 22 for the Commission on the Future o f Health Care 
in Canada, September 2002).
W.R. Johnston, Sovereignty and Protection: A  Study of British Jurisdictional Imperialism in the 
Hate Nineteenth Century (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1973).
G.S. Jones, “The History of U.S. Imperialism” in R. Blackburn, ed., Ideology in Social 
Science (Glasgow: Fontana/ Collins, 1972).
P. Juillard, “MAI: A European View” (1998) 31 Cornell Int’l L.J. 477.
266
P. Juillard, “Freedom of Establishment, Freedom o f Capital Movements, and 
Freedom o f Investment” (2000) 15 ICSID Rev. 322.
D. Kalderimis, “IMF Conditionality as Investment Regulation: A Theoretical 
Analysis” (2004) 13 Social & Leg. Studies 103.
M. Kantor, “The New Draft Model U.S. BIT: Noteworthy Developments” (2004) 21 
J. Int’l Arb. 383.
Z. Kawaciukova, “State ordered to pay 10 billion Kc” The Prague Post (19 March 2003).
T. Kellner, “The Informer: Call It the Ronald Lauder Tax”, 171(9) Forbes Magazine (28 
April 2003).
J. Kelsey, “The Denationalization of Money: Embedded Neoliberalism and the Risks 
of Implosion” (2003) 12 Social & Leg. Studies 155.
B. Kenety, “Nova TV: New Democracy or Old-Fashioned Greed?” The Prague Post 
(12-18 February 1997).
C. Kennedy, “Address” (1907) Am. Soc’ty Int’l L. Proc. 100.
D. Kennedy, “Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication” (1976) 89 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1685.
S. Kierstead, “Referral to Arbitration Under Article 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law: 
The Canadian Approach” (1998) 31 Can. Bus. L.J. 98.
H.T. King et al., “Dispute Settlement Under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement” (1992) 26 Int’l Lawyer 855.
B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch, and R. Stewart, “The Emergence o f Global Administrative 
Law” (International Law and Justice Working Paper 2004/1, Institute for 
International Law and Justice, New York University School o f Law, 2004).
N. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives — Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics and Public Polity 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
M. Koskenniemi, “The Future of Statehood” (1991) 32 Harv. Int’l L.J. 397.
M. Koskenniemi, “What Is International Law For?” in M.D. Evans, ed., International 
Law (Oxford: OUP, 2004).
R. Kozul-Wright and R. Rowthorn, “Spoilt for Choice? Multinational Corporations 
and the Geography of International Production” (1998) 14 Ox. Rev. Econ. Policy 74.
A.K. Kuhn, “The International Conference on the Treatment o f Foreigners” (1930)
24 AJIL 570.
267
J. Kurtz, “A General Investment Agreement in the WTO? Lessons from Chapter 11 
o f NAFTA and the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment”, Jean Monnet 
Working Paper (NYU School of Law, 2002).
W.B. Lafferty, “The Persian Gulf War Syndrome: Rethinking Government Tort 
Liability” (1995) 25 Stetson L.R. 137.
I.A. Laird, “NAFTA Chapter 11 Meets Chicken Little” (2001) 2 Chi. J. Int’l L. 223.
C. Lalumiere and J.-P. Landau, “Report on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI)” (Interim report to the Government o f France, September 1998).
A. Landsmeer, “Movement of Capital and Other Freedoms” (2001) 28 Legal Issues of 
Econ. Integration 57.
C. Larsen, “International Commercial Arbitration”, A S IL  Insights (April 1997), online: 
ASIL http: /  / www.asil.org/insights / insight97041 .pdf.
J.H. Latane, “Address” (1907) Am. Soc’ty Int’l L. Proc. 100.
A.M. Latter, “The Government o f Foreigners in China” (1903) 19 L.Q.Rev. 316.
E. Lauterpacht, “International Law and Private Foreign Investment” (1997) 4 Indiana 
J. Global Legal Studies 259.
H. Lauterpacht, Private Sources and Analogies of International Laiv (Longmans, Green and 
Co., 1927).
T.J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Taw (London: Macmillan and Co., 1923).
E.R. Leahy, “Enforcement o f Arbitral Awards Issued by the Additional Facility o f the 
International Centre of Setdement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)” (1985) 2 J. Int’l 
Arb. 15.
P.L. Lee, “Central Banks and Sovereign Immunity” (2003) 41 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 
327.
B. Legum, “Federalism, NAFTA Chapter Eleven and the Jay Treaty o f 1783” (2001) 
18(1) ICSID News 6.
B. Legum, “The Innovation of Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA” (2002) 43 
Harv. Int’l L.J. 531.
B. Legum, “Trends and Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration” (2003) 19 Arb. Int’l 
143.
268
D. Lemieux and A. Stuhec, Review of Administrative Action Under N A F T A  (Scarborough: 
Carswell, 1999).
M. Lennard, “Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the W TO Agreements” (2002) 5 J. 
In ti  Econ. L. 17.
T. Levi, “NAFTA’s Provision for Compensation in the Event o f Expropriation: A 
Reassessment o f the ^Prompt, Adequate and Effective’ Standard” (1995) 31 Stanf. J. 
In t’l L. 423.
D,J. Levinson, “Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of 
Constitutional Costs” (2000) 67 U. Chicago L.R. 345.
R. Lillich, “The Law Governing Disputes Under Economic Development 
Agreements: Re-examining the Concept o f ‘Internationalization’” in R. Lillich and
C.N. Brower, International Arbitration in the 21si Century: Towards Judiciali^ation and 
Uniformity? (Ardsley, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 1994).
R.B. Lillich and D.B. Magraw, The Iran-United States Tribunal: Its Contribution to the Taw 
of State Responsibility (Transnational Publishers, 1998).
C. Lipson, Standing Guard — Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1985).
A. Liptak, “Review o f U.S. Rulings by NAFTA Tribunals Stirs Worries” New York 
Times (18 April 2004) 20.
V. Lowe, “Jurisdiction” in M.D. Evans, ed., International Taw (Oxford: OUP, 2004).
A.F. Lowenfeld, “The Party-Appointed Arbitrator in International Controversies: 
Some Reflections” (1995) 30 Tex. Int’l L.J. 59.
M. Loughlin, Public Taw and Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992).
M. Loughlin, “Law and Politics in the Conversation o f Mankind” (Presentation to the 
Faculty o f Law, University of Toronto, 1997).
M. Loughlin, Sword and Scales (Oxford: Hart, 2000).
M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Faw (Oxford: OUP, 2003).
M. Lunney and K. Oliphant, Tort Law (Oxford: OUP, 2000).
M.A. Luz, “NAFTA, Investment and the Constitution o f Canada: Will the Watertight 
Compartments Spring a Leak” (2001) 32 Ottawa L.R. 35.
269
R.S.J. Macdonald, “The Margin of Appreciation” in R.S.J. Macdonald, F. Matscher 
and H. Petzold, eds., The 'European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1993).
F.W. Maitland, “The Crown as Corporation” (1901) 17 L.Q. Rev. 131.
P. Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modem Introduction to International haw, 7th ed. (London: 
Routledge, 1997).
P. Malanczuk, “State-State and Investor-State Dispute Settlement in the OECD Draft 
Multilateral Investment Agreement” (2000) 3 J. Int’l Econ. L. 417.
V.S. Mani, International Adjudication (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980).
A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, “Internationalization o f Foreign Investment Agreements — 
Some Fundamental Issues o f International Law” (2000) 1 J. World Investment 293.
F.A. Mann, “State Contracts and State Responsibility” (1960) 54 AJIL 572.
H. Mann and K. von Moltke, “NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and the Environment: 
Addressing the Impacts o f the Investor-State Process on the Environment” (Working 
Paper for the International Institute for Sustainable Development, 1999).
G. Marceau and J.P. Trachtman, “The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement On 
Tariffs and Trade” (2002) 36 J. World Trade 811.
J. Mashaw, R. Merrill, and P. Shane, Administrative Haw: The American Public Taw System, 
Cases and Materials, 3rd ed. (West Publishing, 1992).
A.T. Mason, “Judicial Activism: Old and New” (1969) 55 Va. L.R. 385.
R.J. Mataloni, Jr., “A Guide to BEA Statistics on U.S. Multinational Companies” 
(March 1995) Survey Current Bus. 38.
W. Mattli, “Private Justice in a Global Economy: From Litigation to Arbitration” 
(2001) 55 Int’l Org. 919.
P. McAuslan, “Administrative Law, Collective Consumption, and Judicial Policy” 
(1983) 46 Mod. L.R. 1.
R. McCorquodale, “The Individual and the International Legal System” in M.D. 
Evans, ed., International Taw (Oxford: OUP, 2004).
M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and L. Chen, “Nationality and Human Rights: The 
Protection o f the Individual in External Arenas” (1973) 83 Yale L.J. 900.
270
J.A. McKinney, Createdfrom N A F T A  -  The Structure, Function, and Significance of the 
Treaty’s Related Institutions (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2000).
C. McLachlan, “Commentary: The Broader Context” (2002) 18 Arb. In t’l 339.
J.G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: CUP, 1998).
J. Merrills, “The Means of Dispute Settlement” in M.D. Evans, ed., International Taw 
(Oxford: OUP, 2004).
F.I. Michelman, “Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations o f ‘Just Compensation’ Law” (1967) 80 Harv. L.R. 1165.
A.S. Miller, “Protection o f Private Foreign Investment by Multilateral Convention” 
(1959) 53 AJIL 371.
A. Mody and A.P. Murshid, “Growing Up with Capital Flows” (IMF Working Paper, 
Doc. No. W P/02/75, 2002).
M. Mohebi, The International Taw Character of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1991).
E.F. Mooney, Foreign Seizures — Sabbatino and the A ct of State Doctrine (University of 
Kentucky Press, 1967).
J.B. Moore, Digest of International Taw, vol. 4 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1906).
C. Morris, “The Role o f Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions” (1949) 49 Col. L 
Rev. 21.
O. Morrissey, “Investment and Competition Policy in the WTO: Issues for 
Developing Countries” (2001) 20 Development Policy Rev. 63.
F.L. Morrison, “The Liability of Governments for Legislative Acts in the United 
States o f America” (1998) 46 Am. J. Comp. L. Supp. 531.
P.T. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Taw (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999).
P.T. Muchlinski, “The Rise and Fall o f the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: 
Where Now?” (2000) 34 Int’l Law. 1033.
P.T. Muchlinski, “Globalisation and Legal Research” (2003) 37 Int’l Lawyer 221.
D. Mullan, “Damages for Violation of Constitutional Rights -  A False Spring?” (1995) 
6 Nat’l J. Constitutional Law 105.
271
D. Mullan and A. Ceddia, “The Impact on Public Law o f Privatization, Deregulation, 
Outsourcing, and Downsizing: A Canadian Perspective” (2003) 10 Ind. T. Global 
Legal Studies 199.
M.J. Mustill, “Arbitration: History and Background” (1989) 6 J. In t’l Arb. 43.
National Association of Manufacturers, “The Havana Charter for an International 
Trade Organization” (1949).
National Foreign Trade Council, <rPosition of the NTC with Respect to the Havana 
Charter for an ITO ” (1950).
H. Neufeld, The International Protection of Private Creditors Prom the Treaties of Westphalia to 
the Congress of Vienna (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1971).
P.M. Nichols, ‘Tarticipation o f Nongovernmental Parties in the World Trade 
Organization” (1996) 17 U. Penn. J. Int’l Econ. L. 295.
R. Nishikawa, “Arbitration Law Reform in Japan” (2004) 21 J. Int’l Arb. 303.
A. Nollkaemper, “Concurrence Between Individual Responsibility and State 
Responsibility in International Law” (2003) 52 I.C.L.Q. 615.
P.M. Norton, “A Law o f the Future or a Law of the Past? M odem Tribunals and the 
International Law of Expropriation” (1991) 85 AJIL 474.
R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974).
A. Nussbaum, “Treaties on Commercial Arbitration” (1942) 56 Harv. L.R. 219.
E. Obadia, “ICSID, Investment Treaties and Arbitration: Current and Emerging 
Issues” (2001) 18(2) ICSID News 4.
L.A. O ’Connor, “The International Law of Expropriation o f Foreign-Owned 
Property: The Compensation Requirement and the Role o f the Taking State” (1983) 6 
Loyola L.A. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 355.
D.C. Ohly, “A Functional Analysis of Claimant Eligibility” in R.B. Lillich, ed., 
International Taw of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens (Charlottesville: University 
Press o f Virginia, 1983).
P. Okowa, “Admissibility and the Law on International Responsibility” in M.D. 
Evans, ed., International Taw (Oxford: OUP, 2004).
C.T. Oliver, “Legal Remedies and Sanctions” in R.B. Lillich, ed., International Taw of 
State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens (Charlottesville: University Press o f Virginia,
1983).
272
Ontario Law Reform Commission (OLRC), Report on the Basis for Compensation on 
Expropriation (Toronto: OLRC, 1967).
OLRC, Report on the Uability of the Crown (Toronto: OLRC, 1989).
C. Osakwe, “The Soviet Position on International Arbitration as a Method of 
Resolving Transnational Disputes” in T.E. Carbonneau, ed., Resolving Transnational 
Disputes Through International Arbitration (Charlottesville: University o f Virginia Press,
1984).
A. Ostrovsky, R. Speed, and E. Tuerk, “GATS, Water and the Environment” (Report 
for the Center for International Environmental Law and the World Wide Fund for 
Nature, 2003).
R. Palan, ‘Trying to Have Your Cake and Eating It: How and Why the State System 
Has Created Offshore” (1998) 42 Int’l Studies Q. 625.
W.W. Park, “Duty and Discretion in International Arbitration” (1999) 93 AJIL 805.
W.W. Park, “Arbitration and the Fisc: NAFTA’s Tax Veto’” (2001) 2 Chi. J. Int’l L. 
231.
A.R. Parra, “The Role o f ICSID in the Settlement o f Investment” (1999) 16(1) ICSID 
News 5.
A.R. Parra, “ICSID and Bilateral Investment” (2000) 17(1) ICSID News 7.
R.K. Paterson, “A New Pandora’s Box? Private Remedies for Foreign Investors 
under the North American Free Trade Agreement” (2000) 8 Willamette J. Int’l L. and 
Dispute Res. 77.
J.E. Pattison “The United States-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty: A Prototype for 
Future Negotiations” (1983) 16 Cornell Int’l L.J. 305.
J. Paulsson, “Arbitration Unbound: An Award Detached from the Law o f its Country 
of Origin” (1981) 30 I.C.L.Q. 358.
J. Paulsson, “Arbitration without Privity” (1995) 10 ICSID Rev. 232.
O.C. Pell, News Release via PR Newswire, “Recent Argentine Legislation and 
Bondholder Remedies — Memorandum to the Global Committee o f Argentina 
Bondholders” (16 February 2005).
W.L. Penfield, “Address: Is the Forcible Collection o f Contract Debts in the Interest 
of International Justice and Peace?” (1907) 1 Am. Soc’ty Int’l L. Proc. 129.
W. Peter, Arbitration and Renegotiation of International Investment Agreements (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1995).
273
E.U. Petersmann, “Taking Human Dignity, Poverty and Empowerment o f 
Individuals More Seriously: Rejoinder to Alston” (2002) 13 Eur. J. Int’l L. 845.
L.E. Peterson, “Investors emboldened by arbitral verdict against Czech Republic” 
Investment la w  and Policy Weekly News Bulletin (11 April 2003).
L.E. Peterson, “Swedish court affirms award against Czech Republic; damages could 
be taxable” Investment Paw and Polity Weekly News Bulletin (16 May 2003).
L.E. Peterson, “Bilateral Investment Treaties and Development Policy-Making” 
(Report for the International Institute for Sustainable Development, November 2004).
S. Picciotto, International Business Taxation (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1992).
S. Picciotto, “The Regulatory Criss-Cross: Interaction between Jurisdictions and The 
Construction of Global Regulatory Networks” in W.W. Bratton et al., eds.,
InternationalBegulatory Competition and Coordination (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996).
S. Picciotto, “A Critical Assessment o f the MAI” in S. Picciotto and R. Mayne, eds., 
P^gulating International Business (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1999).
S. Picciotto, “Introduction: What Rules for the World Economy?” in S. Picciotto and 
R. Mayne, eds., Begulating International Business (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1999).
F. Pollock, “Sovereignty in English Law” (1894) 8 Harv. L.R. 243.
A. Porges, “Step by Step to an International Trade Court” in D.L.M. Kennedy and 
J.D. Southwick, eds., The Political Economy of International Trade Law (Cambridge: CUP, 
2002).
M.E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York: The Free Press, 1990).
A. Prakash, “Beyond Seattle: Globalization, the Nonmarket Environment and 
Corporate Strategy” (2002) 9 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 513.
D.M. Price, “NAFTA Chapter 11 — Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Frankenstein 
or Safety Valve?” (2001) 26 Can-U.S. L.J. 1.
D.M. Price, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Trade o f the House Committee 
on Ways and Means, Hearing on the Summit of the Americas and Prospects for Free 
Trade in the Hemisphere (Statement on behalf o f the U.S. Council for International 
Business, 8 May 2001).
J.H. Ralston, “Some Suggestions as to the Permanent Court o f Arbitration” (1907) 1 
AJIL 321.
274
B.B. Ramaiah, “Towards a Multilateral Framework on Investment” (1997) 6 Transn’l 
Corp. 117.
C.F. Randolph, “The Eminent Domain” (1887) 3 L.Q. Rev. 314.
S. Rao and A. Ahmad, “Formal and Informal Investment Barriers in the G-7 
Countries” in P. Sauve and D. Schwanen, eds., Investment Rules for the Global Economy 
(Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1996).
A.S. Rau, “Integrity in Private Judging” (1997) 38 South Texas L.R. 455.
J. Rawls, A  Theory of Justice (1972).
A. Redfern and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999).
W.M. Reismann, Systems of Control in International Adjudication and Arbitration (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1992).
C. Reymond, “The Channel Tunnel Case and the Law of International Arbitration” 
(1993) 109 L.Q. Rev. 337.
K. Roach, “The Limits o f Corrective Justice and the Potential o f Equity in 
Constitutional Remedies” (1991) 33 Ariz. L.R. 859.
J.A.G. Roberts, A  History of China (London: Macmillan, 1999).
N.S. Rodley, “Corporate Nationality and the Diplomatic Protection of Multinational 
Enterprises: The Barcelona Traction Case” (1971) 47 Indiana L.J. 70.
D. Rodrik, The Global Governance of Trade A s  I f  Development Really Mattered (Report for 
the UN Development Programme, October 2001).
B.R. Roland, “The Access of Individuals to International Trade Dispute Settlement” 
(1996) 13 J. Int’l Arb. 143.
E. Root, “Elihu Root’s Services to International Law” (1910) 4 ASIL Proc. 16.
A.H. Roth, The Minimum Standard of International Law Applied to Aliens (Leiden, 1949).
W.-H. Roth, “From Centros to Ueberseering. Free Movement o f Companies, Private 
International Law, and Community Law” (2003) 52 I.C.L.Q. 177.
A.M. Rugman and M. Gestrin, “A Conceptual Framework for a Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment: Learning from the NAFTA” in P. Sauve and D. Schwanen, 
eds., Investment Rules for the Global Economy (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1996).
P. Ryan, “David v. Goliath” (2002) 11 National 30.
275
J.W. Salacuse, “BIT by BIT: The Growth o f Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their 
Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries” (1990) 14 Int’l Law. 655.
J.W. Salacuse, “Toward a Global Treaty on Foreign Investment: The Search for a 
Grand Bargain” in N. Horn, ed., Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2004).
G.L. Sandrino, “The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment in 
Mexico: A Third World Perspective” (1994) 27 Vand. J. Tranat’l L. 259.
S. Sassen, “Losing Control? The State and the New Geography o f Power?” (1999) 1 
Global Dialogue 78.
S. Sassen, “Globalization or Denationalization?” (2003) 10 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 1.
Lord Saville, “Denning Lecture 1995: Arbitration and the Courts” (1995) 61 
Arbitration — J. Institute o f Chartered Arbitrators 157.
H.-J. Schlochauer, “Jay Treaty (1794)” in R. Dolzer et al., eds., Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1987).
J.T. Schmidt, “Arbitration Under the Auspices o f the International Centre for the 
Settlement o f Investment Disputes” (1976) 17 Harv. Int’l L.J. 90.
D. Schneiderman, “Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism” (2000) 25 Law 
& Social Inq. 757.
C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A  Commentary (Cambridge: CUP, 2001).
E. Schwartz and J. Paulsson, “Confronting Political and Regulatory Risks Associated 
with Private Investment in Infrastructure in Developing Countries: The Role of 
International Dispute Settlement Mechanism” (Draft presentation to the Private 
Infrastructure for Development conference, Rome, 8-10 September 1999).
G. Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, vol.
I. 3rd ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1957).
G. Schwarzenberger, “The Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad: 
A Critical Commentary” (1960) 9 J. Public L. 147.
M.A. Scodro, “Arbitrating Novel Legal Questions: A Recommendation for Reform” 
(1996) 105 Yale L.J. 1927.
I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, International Economic Law, 3rd ed. (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1999).
276
L. Sek, “Fast-Track Authority for Trade Agreements (Trade Promotion Authority): 
Background and Developments in the 107th Congress” (CRS Report to U.S. Congress, 
17 January 2002).
M. Shapiro, “The Globalization of Law” (1993) 1 Ind. J. Global Legal Studies 37.
M. Shapiro, “Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and 
Governance” (2001) 8 Ind. J. Global Leg. Studies 369.
M.N. Shaw, International Law, 5th ed. (Cambridge: CUP, 2003).
D.R. Shea, The Calvo Clause (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955).
D. Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (Oxford: OUP, 1999).
E. Sik, “Concept o f Acquired Rights in International Law” (1977) 44 Neth. Int’l L.R. 
120.
I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention and the Law of Treaties (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1984).
R. Singh, “The Impact o f the Central American Free Trade Agreement on Investment 
Treaty Arbitrations: A Mouse that Roars?” (2004) 21 J. Int’l Arb. 329.
L.C. Situmbeko and J. Jones Zulu, “Zambia: Condemned to debt” (Report by the 
World Development Movement, April 2004).
Q. Skinner, “Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person o f the State” (1999) 7 J. Pol.
Phil. 1.
H. Smit and V. Pechota, World Arbitration R£porter, vol. 2 (Huntington, N.Y.: Juris, 
2002).
S. de Smith and R. Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 8 th ed. (London: 
Penguin, 1998).
E. Smythe, “Domestic and International Sources o f Regime Change: Canada and the 
Negotiation o f the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment” (Paper presented 
to the Annual Meeting o f the Canadian Political Science Association, St. John’s, Nfld,
8 June 1997).
F. Snyder, “Governing Economic Globalisation: Global Legal Pluralism and 
European Law” (1999) 5 Eur. L.J. 334.
F. Snyder, “The Gatekeeper: The European Courts and WTO Law” (2003) 40 C.M.L. 
Rev. 313.
277
L.B. Sohn, “The Role o f Arbitration in Recent International Multilateral Treaties” in 
T.E. Carbonneau, ed., Resolving Transnational Disputes Through International Arbitration 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1984).
J.A. Soloway, “Environmental Regulation as Expropriation: The Case o f NAFTA’s 
Chapter 11” (2000) 33 Can. Bus. L.J. 92.
M. Sornarajah, The Pursuit of Nationalised Property (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986). 
M. Sornarajah, “The UNCITRAL Model Law: A Third World Viewpoint” (1989) 6 J. 
Int’l Arb. 7.
M. Sornarajah, “The Climate o f International Arbitration” (1991) 8 J. Int’l Arb. 47.
M. Sornarajah, The International Taw on Foreign Investment (Cambridge: CUP, 1994).
M. Sornarajah, “Power and Justice in Foreign Investment Arbitration” (1997) 14 J. 
Int’l Arb. 103.
M. Sornarajah, The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes (Boston: Kluwer, 2001).
M. Sornarajah, “The Clash o f Globalisations and the International Law on Foreign 
Investment” (Presentation to the Centre for Trade Policy and Law, Ottawa, 12 
September 2002), online: CTPL
http :/ /  www.carleton.ca/c tp l/pdf/papers/somarajah.pdf.
O. Spiermann, “Individual Rights, State Interests and the Power to Waive ICSID 
Jurisdiction under Bilateral Investment Treaties” (2004) 20 Arb. Int’l 179.
M.J. Staff arid C.W. Lewis, “Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter 11: Past, Present, 
and Future” (2003) 25 Houston J. Int’l L. 301.
D.P. Steger, “The Appellate Body and its contribution to W TO dispute settlement” in
D.L.M. Kennedy andJ.D. Southwick, eds., The Political Economy of International Trade 
Eaw (Cambridge: CUP, 2002).
B. Stern, “Comments — International Economic Relations and the MAI Dispute 
Settlement System” (1999) 16 J. Int’l Arb. 118.
J.E. Stiglitz, “The Broken Promise o f NAFTA” The New York Times (6 January 2004).
Stockholm Chamber o f Commerce (SCC), Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, revised 1 April 1999 [Stockholm Rules], online: SCC 
www.sccinstitute.com/uk/Rules.
H. Street, Governmental Liability (Cambridge: CUP, 1953).
C. Sunstein, “In Defense of the Hard Look: Judicial Activism and Administrative 
Law” (1984) 7 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Policy 51.
278
A. Sweet Stone, “Islands o f Transnational Governance” in M. Shapiro and A. Sweet 
Stone, eds., Law, Politics, andJudiciali^ation (Oxford: OUP, 2002).
M. Tenenbaum, “International Arbitration o f Trade Disputes in Mexico — The Arrival 
of the NAFTA and New Reforms to the Commercial Code” (1995) 12 J. Int’l Arb. 53.
G. Teubner, ‘“Global Bukowina,: Legal Pluralism in the World Society” in G.
Teubner, ed., Global Law Without a State (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997).
C. Thomas, “Balance-of-Payments Crises in the Developing World: Balanced Trade, 
Finance and Development in the New Economic Order” (2000) 15 Am. U. Int’l L.R. 
1249.
J.C. Thomas, “Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven” (Paper 
presented to the NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Disputes: Litigating Against 
Sovereigns conference, Canadian Bar Association, Toronto, March 2000).
J.C. Thomas, “The Experience o f NAFTA Chapter 11 Tribunals To Date: A 
Practitioner’s Perspective” in L. Ritchie Dawson, ed., Whose Lights? The N A F T A  
Chapter 11 Debate (Ottawa: Centre for Trade Law and Policy, 2002).
J.C. Thomas, “Reflections on Article 1105 o f NAFTA: History, State Practice and the 
Influence o f Commentators” (2002) 17 ICSID Rev. 21.
J.C. Thomas, “A Reply to Professor Brower” (2002) 40 Col. J. Transnat’l L. 433.
J.C. Thomas, “Notes on Investor-State Arbitration in the N orth American Context” 
(Address to the International Bar Association conference, San Francisco, 9-14 
September 2003).
S. Timberg, “An International Trade Tribunal — A Step Forward Short o f Surrender 
of Sovereignty” (1945) 33 Geo. L.J. 373.
S. Timberg, “International Combines and National Sovereigns” (1947) 95 U. Penn. 
L.R. 575.
M.P. Todaro and S.C. Smith, Economic Development, 8th ed. (Harlow: Pearson, 2003).
E.C.E. Todd, The Law of Expropriation and Compensation in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1992).
C. Tollefson, “Games without Frontiers: Claims and Citizen Submissions Under the 
NAFTA Regime” (2002) 27 Yale J. Int’l L. 141.
C. Tollefson, “Metalclad v. United Mexican States Revisited: Judicial Oversight of 
NAFTA’s Chapter Eleven Investor-State Claim Process” (2002) 11 Minn. J. Global 
Trade 183.
279
S.J. Toope, Mixed International Arbitration — Studies in Arbitration Between States and 
Private Persons (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1990).
J.P. Trachtman, “The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution” (1999) 40 Harv. Int’l L.J. 
333.
J.P. Trachtman & P.M. Moreman, “Costs and Benefits of Private Participation in 
WTO Dispute Settlement: Whose Rights Is It Anyway?” (2003) 44 Harv. Int’l L.J. 221.
M. Trebilcock and R. Howse, The B^gulation of International Trade (London: Routledge, 
1995).
T. Tridimas, “Liability for Breach o f Community Law: Growing Up and Mellowing 
Down? (2001) 38 C.M.L Rev. 301.
A.E.L. Tucker, “The Energy Charter Treaty and ‘Compulsory’ International State/ 
Investor Arbitration” (1998) 11 Leiden J. Int’l L. 513.
W. Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory (London: Butterworths, 2000).
L.S. Underkuffler-Freund, “Takings and the Nature o f Property” (1996) 9 Can. J. Law 
&Jur. 161.
United States, Department o f Commerce, Office o f the Chief Counsel for 
International Commerce, International Arbitration (1998).
A.J. Van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958 (Antwerp: Kluwer, 1981).
K.J. Vandevelde, “The Bilateral Treaty Program of the United States” (1988) 21 
Cornell Int’l L.J. 201.
K.J. Vandevelde, “Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment Regime” 
(1998) 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 373.
K.J. Vandevelde, “The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty” (1998) 92 
AJIL 621.
J.A. VanDuzer, “NAFTA Chapter 11 to Date: The Progress o f a Work in Progress” 
in L. Ritchie Dawson, ed., Whose Bights? The N A F T A  Chapter 11 Debate (Ottawa:
Centre for Trade Law and Policy, 2002).
E. Vattel, Le Droit de gens, book II.
F. Orrego Vicuna, “Arbitration in a New International Alternative Dispute 
Resolution” (2001) 18(2) ICSID News 1.
280
B. Von Hase, “Do the Right Thing” The [London] Times Magazine (13 September 2003) 
50.
R. Von Hennigs, “European Convention on State Immunity and Other International 
Aspects o f Sovereignty Immunity” (2001), 9 Willamette J. Int’l L. & Disp. Resol. 185.
R. Wai, “Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of 
Private International Law in an Era o f Globalization” (2002) 40 Colum. J. Transnat’l 
L. 209.
T.W. Walde, “Investment Arbitration Under the Energy Charter Treaty — From 
Dispute Settlement to Treaty Implementation” (1996) 12 Arb. Int’l 429.
T. Walde and S. Dow, “Treaties and Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Investment” 
(2000) 34(2) J. World Trade 1.
H. Walker, “Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection o f Foreign Investment: 
Present United States Practice” (1956) 5 Am. J. Comp. L. 229.
A. Walter, “Globalisation and Policy Convergence: the Case of Direct Investment 
Rules” in R.A. Higgott et al., eds., Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System 
(London: Routledge, 2000).
A. Walter, “NGOs, Business, and International Investment: The Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment, Seattle, and Beyond” (2001) 7 Glob. Governance 51.
C. Warbrick, “States and Recognition in International Law” in M.D. Evans, ed., 
International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2004).
J.H.H. Weiler, “Emerging Issues on Compliance and Effectiveness o f Community 
Law” (1997) 91 ASILProc. 172.
J.H.H. Weiler, “Epilogue: Towards a Common Law of International Trade” in J.H.H. 
Weiler, ed., TheEU, the WTO , and the N A F T A  (Oxford: OUP, 2000).
J.H.H. Weiler, “The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the 
Internal and External Legitimacy o f W TO Dispute Settlement”, Harvard Jean 
Monnet Working Paper No. 9/00 (NYU School o f Law, 2000).
T. Weiler, “NAFTA Investment Arbitration and the Growth o f International 
Economic Law” (2002) 3 Bus. Law Int’l 158.
J.A. Weir, “Human Rights and Damages” (2001) 40 Washburn L.J. 412.
E.B. Weiss, “Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-first Century” (2002) 96 
AJIL 798.
281
J. Werksman, K.A. Baumert, and N.K. Dubash, “Will International Investment Rules 
Obstruct Climate Protection Policies?” (Report for the World Resources Institute, 
April 2001).
J. Werner, “The Trade Explosion and Some Likely Effects on International 
Arbitration” (1997) 14 J. In ti Arb. 5.
J. Werner, “Making Investment Arbitration More Certain — A Modest Proposal”
(2003) 4 J. World Investment 767.
J. Werner, “Some Comments on the NAFTA Chapter 11 Case — A D F  Group Inc. and 
United States ofAmericcT (2003) 4 J. World Investment 113.
B.H. Weston, ‘“Constructive Takings’ Under International Law: A Modest Foray into 
the Problem o f Creeping Expropriation” (1975) 16 Virg. J. Int’l L. 103.
G. Wetter, “The Present Status of the International Court o f Arbitration o f the ICC: 
An Appraisal” (1990) 1 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 91.
J.G. Wetter, The International Arbitral Process — Public and Private, vol. 3 (Dobbs Ferry, 
N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1979).
M. Whiteman, Damages in International Haw, vol. 1 (Washington, 1937-43).
C. Wilcox, A  Charter for World Trade (New York: Macmillan, 1949).
M. Wilkins, “Defining a Firm: History and Theory” in P. Hertner and G. Jones, eds., 
Multinationals: Theory and History (Aldershot: Gower, 1986).
J.F. Williams, “International Law and the Property o f Aliens” (1928) 9 Brit. Y.B. Int’l 
L. 1.
K. Williams, “British Re-Nationalization and Regulation: The Government’s Liability 
to Shareholders” (1993) 14 U. Penn. J. Int’l Bus. L. 243.
J. Willis, “Canadian Administrative Law in Retrospect” (1974) 24 U.T.L.J. 225.
W.W. Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Haw (New York: Macmillan, 1924).
G.M. Wilner, “Acceptance of Arbitration by Developing Countries” in T.E. 
Carbonneau, ed., Resolving Transnational Disputes Through International Arbitration 
(Charlottesville: University o f Virginia Press, 1984).
R.R. Wilson, “Postwar Commercial Treaties o f the United States” (1949) 43 AJIL 262. 
L.H. Woolsey, “The Problem of Foreign Investment” (1948) 42 AJIL 121.
B.A. Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Haw (Cambridge: CUP, 1959).
282
G. Xiao, “People’s Republic o f China’s Round-Tripping FDI: Scale, Causes and 
Implications”, Asian Development Bank Institute Discussion Paper No. 6 (ADB, 
2004).
D.R. Young, “Governmental Regulation o f Foreign Investment” (1969) 47 Texas L.R. 
421.
H.-L. Yu and L. Shore, “Independence, Impartiality, and Immunity o f Arbitrators -  
U.S. and English Perspectives” (2003) 52 I.C.L.Q 935.
“The Secret Trade Courts”, Editorial New York Times (27 September 2004) 26.
283
